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Abstract 
Julia Smith 
Transformation From Below?: The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the Global 
Governance of the Response to HIV/AIDS 
Key words: civil society, HIV/AIDS, global governance, non-governmental 
organizations, institutions, human rights, health governance, international relations, 
UNAIDS, Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria 
This thesis contributes to debates on the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) 
in global governance by asking if their participation in the global response to 
HIV/AIDS has been transformative – with transformation conceptualized as change 
towards a more equitable order. Adopting a critical International Relations 
approach, and applying qualitative methods, it analyzes how CSOs used the initial 
failure of biomedical responses to the epidemic to advance a human rights frame, 
which justified their participation in global governance. This frame complemented 
conceptions of AIDS exceptionalism, and has recently shifted in response to an 
increased focus on key populations. CSOs continue to advance the rights frame in 
global institutions – the focus here being on how they have done so within UNAIDS 
and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis. However, rigid 
bureaucracies and dominant power relationships limit CSOs’ ability to transform 
these institutions to be more responsive to and representative of those affected by 
the epidemic. CSOs have further struggled to influence the largest global donors of 
the HIV/AIDS response – the Global Fund and PEPFAR – to direct greater 
resources to rights-based initiatives, despite CSO participation in resource 
mobilization. Though CSO participation has been restricted by donor state power, 
bureaucratic structures, and changes in the political economy of global health, 
CSOs have continued to promote potentially transformative alternatives, and so 
have continued to represent the interests of those most affected by the epidemic. 
This allows potential for further transformative alternatives.   
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1. Introduction 
“The AIDS movement didn’t do a good job of including people 
with AIDS; the AIDS movement is those people, and that is 
how the AIDS movement started. It wasn’t like some outside 
force created a movement and said hey we should include 
these folks. People with AIDS started this and, everything else 
built around us – the entire global response”  
(CSO Representative 2013 #2). 
 
1.1 The HIV/AIDS Epidemic 
In the early 1980s, a mysterious and fatal illness began spreading among 
otherwise healthy young men in North America and Western Europe. In 1983, the 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) was identified as the cause of Acquired 
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). The modes of transmission, most often sex 
and sharing of needles, and lack of a cure or vaccine generated widespread panic. 
By the end of the 1980s it was clear that the virus was present in every region of 
the world and was particularly rampant in Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1980 and 
1996 (when treatment was introduced), over 6.4 million people worldwide died of 
AIDS related illnesses. The death rate has since declined, due to the introduction 
of Anti-Retroviral Therapy (ART) and effective prevention methods but, in 2012, 1.6 
million people still died of AIDS related causes, and there were 2.2 million new 
infections (UNAIDS 2013).  
HIV spreads through a complex mix of biological and social determinants. 
Those who are most vulnerable socially, economically and politically are also at 
greater risk of HIV infection. Globally, young women have an infection rate that is 
twice that of young men (UNAIDS 2013). Men who have sex with men (MSM), sex 
workers and people who inject drugs (PWID) are also at high risk of infection, 
partly because of biological determinants and behaviours, but largely because of 
poor access to health care, discrimination and social marginalization.  
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Access to prevention services, support, treatment and care is shaped by 
social, political and economic contexts. Only a little over half of those in need have 
access to life prolonging treatment, and the vast majority of People Living with 
HIV/AIDS (PWAs) without access live in low-income countries and rural locations. 
In many high-income countries cuts in social spending, due to the economic 
recession, have decreased funding for support groups, nutrition and care 
programs. The majority of PWID still do not have access to harm reduction 
methods - the only proven HIV prevention method among this population group. 
Women in Sub-Sahara Africa continue to provide the majority of HIV/AIDS care 
work voluntarily, unsupported by the state or private actors.  
The daily lives of PWAs, and those at risk of and affected by HIV/AIDS, must 
be kept in mind throughout the reading of this thesis. Though such experiences are 
not the topic under investigation, they are the impetus for it. Recognition that lived 
experiences of the epidemic are shaped by global systems of disease and political 
choices that shape the response necessitates critical reflection on if the global 
response is relevant and responsive to those most at risk of and affected by the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, and how it can better serve them.  
 
1.2 Problem, Justification and Purpose 
The problem at the heart of this study relates to the role of civil society in 
global governance.  Within academic literature there is much debate on the role of 
civil society in global governance forums, institutions and processes (outlined in the 
literature review in following chapter). These debates revolve around questions of 
what types of roles civil society organizations (CSOs) fill and to what effect. This 
thesis aims to inform these debates by focusing on a specific governance issue 
area where CSOs have played a particularly prominent role - the HIV/AIDS 
response. 
When HIV/AIDS first emerged as an infectious disease, in the 1980s, both 
states and international institutions failed to respond quickly and proactively. Within 
this governance gap, alliances of PWAs, medical professionals and human rights 
activist created their own response. By the time states and institutions recognized 
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HIV/AIDS as a global threat, CSOs were already engaged in activism and service 
delivery, and able to situate themselves as experts based on their experience living 
with and responding to the epidemic (a history that is expanded on in Chapter 
Three). Their participation gained global acceptances with the signing of the 
Greater Involvement of People Living with HIV/AIDS (GIPWA) principle, at the 
Paris AIDS Summit in 1994, which committed the 42 states leading the global 
response to “support a greater involvement of people living with HIV at all levels” 
(UNAIDS 2007a).  
The exceptional role of CSOs in the global response to HIV/AIDS has been 
widely celebrated. The response has been credited with contributing to 
participatory transformations in global health governance (GHG) and ushering in 
an era of more legitimate and accountably global health institutions (GHIs) (Nay 
2009). Sidibe et al. argue that HIV/AIDS CSO activism has created a precedent in 
GHG: “the many governance innovations offered by the AIDS response, mainly 
driven by people living with or affected by HIV, that have remade the playing field 
for tackling other global challenges” (2010, 3). Similarly, the editor of the Lancet 
argues, “AIDS occupies a unique place in the history of health and, in many ways, 
the AIDS response has “created” the concept and practice of global health—mainly 
due to the fact that AIDS forged the greatest civil society movement of the past half 
century” (UNAIDS PCB 2013).  
As the global health community now orientates itself around the post-
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) agenda and other health challenges, there 
are calls to replicate and learn from these examples of inclusive governance (Buse 
2012). The President of the World Bank wrote a commentary titled “Want to build a 
social movement, learn from AIDS activists”, in which he argued those engaged 
with other issue areas could build on the example of inclusive HIV/AIDS 
governance (Yong Kin 2014). Health and human rights champion Paul Farmer 
(2014) writes that those wishing to address Hepatitis C infections in the developing 
world should learn from the successful mobilization of HIV/AIDS CSOs. The 
exceptional inclusion of CSOs in global HIV/AIDS governance, and current calls to 
learn from their experience, suggests that the response presents a critical case 
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from which to better understand civil society interactions and influence in global 
governance. 
However, despite widespread recognition that CSOs have fulfilled a unique 
role in HIV/AIDS governance, there is little reflexive analysis of how and why these 
governance arrangements emerged, or of what their outcomes have been. Instead 
there is an assumption that CSO participation is inherently beneficial, as an 
outcome in itself. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, there are few 
sustained analyses of the opportunities and limits CSOs engage with, their 
motivations, and the results of their efforts. This thesis aims to contribute to filling 
this gap in research and knowledge by presenting a critical analysis of CSO 
participation in global HIV/AIDS governance 
 
1.3 Approach 
This topic is approached from a critical International Relations (IR) 
perspective. While this theoretical framework is expanded upon in the next chapter, 
it is helpful to briefly note key components that shape the specific research 
questions, methodology and structure of the thesis. Throughout the thesis the 
HIV/AIDS response is situated within the political economy of global health, aid and 
development, which is defined as predominantly biomedical and neoliberal in 
Chapter Three. Analysis is orientated around how actors within the response 
support or counter dominate structures, conceptualizing global governance as a 
series of overlapping struggles between hegemonic and counter hegemonic forces. 
In order to organize analysis of these struggles, the thesis is informed by Cox’s 
(1981) delineation of modes of production: ideas (Chapter Three), institutions 
(Chapter Four), and material capabilities (Chapter Five).  
 While many critical IR approaches to global governance focus on the global 
political economy of international trade, markets and development, this thesis falls 
into a specific grouping that focuses on institutions and social movements that 
attempt to bring about alternatives to not only economic systems, but also health, 
education and other social sectors. Other critical IR scholars who have pursued 
this line of inquiry include Baker (2007) who introduces the concept of social 
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reproduction, such as care work, into political economy frameworks, and 
Petchansky (2003) who analyzes global intersections between health, gender and 
development.  O’Manique’s (2004) work is most closely related to this study as she 
examines how neoliberal policies shaped the early response to HIV/AIDS. Building 
on this tradition, this thesis emphasizes certain aspects of critical approaches, such 
as those that relate to struggles for equal rights and the role of non-state actors, 
over others.   
This critical IR approach is defined broadly recognizing that, as Cox writes,  
 
“The problem facing anyone who seeks to define the 
‘problematic’ of the contemporary world is to draw upon and in 
so far as possible integrate-modes of understanding from 
different sources so as to yield a result that both explains 
adequately and orients action. That is the only valid test, not 
whether you follow correctly some pre-established model” 
(1981, 129).  
 
Therefore, some aspects of the thesis borrow from social constructivism (such as 
Chapter Three on the framing of the response); others draw from institutionalism 
(as is apparent in Chapter Four on the role of CSOs in GHIs), and others on 
political economy analysis (most notably Chapter Five on global HIV/AIDS 
resource generation and distribution).  
Due to the gendered nature of the epidemic,1 a critical feminist perspective is 
integrated throughout. This approach adopts Tickner’s conception of feminist IR, 
which aims to  “fundamentally challenge the often unseen androcentric or 
masculine biases in the way that knowledge has traditionally been constructed in 
all the disciplines” (2005, 3). While the topic of the thesis (CSOs in the global 
HIV/AIDS response) may not appear to be explicitly gendered, feminist theory is 
woven into the analysis, and issues related to women’s rights, sexuality and 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1 Women make up the majority of those living with HIV/AIDS; AIDS is one of the leading causes of 
death among women worldwide, and women provide most of the care work for other PWAs 
(UNAIDS 2013a) 
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gender equality are highlighted throughout in order to ensure reflection on if, and 
how, the HIV/AIDS response represents and responds to the group most affected 
by the epidemic. 
In line with other critical approaches, including feminist theory, emphasis is 
placed on documenting resistance, especially examples of resistance that have 
caused change, and explorations of how and why change has occurred or not 
(Tallis 2012; Murphy 2005). Change that promotes a more equitable order, in this 
case governance arrangements that develop more inclusive power structures and 
that better meet the needs of those most affected by the epidemic, is 
conceptualized as ‘transformation.’ It is assumed that such change is most likely to 
occur from the bottom up, as opposed to being imposed by existing dominant 
forces (Cox 1983). CSOs are conceptualized as possible (but not predetermined) 
conduits for promoting transformation, through the creation of, and struggles to 
advance, alternative projects.  
 
1.4 Research Questions 
The primary research questions are: does civil society involvement in the 
global governance of the HIV/AIDS response present an example of transformation 
from below? What are the outcomes of CSO participation in global HIV/AIDS 
governance?  These questions test assumptions about the role of CSOs in global 
governance in general, and the HIV/AIDS response in particular, and empirically 
explore outcomes of CSO engagement. These outcomes are analyzed through 
three sub-questions.  
Focusing on struggles to produce ideas within the HIV/AIDS response, the 
first sub-question asks: have, and how have, CSOs produced alternative frames 
within the HIV/AIDS response, and to what effect? Here ideas are conceptualized 
as frames in order to explicitly focus on processes of constructing a shared 
understanding of the epidemic, and therefore appropriate response.  
The second sub-question asks: what are the governance outcomes of CSO 
participation in institutions within the HIV/AIDS response? Answering this question 
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requires analyzing how and why relatively inclusive institutional arrangements 
developed, CSO participation within HIV/AIDS institutions, and the resulting 
governance outcomes.  
The final sub-question asks: how have CSOs contributed to and influenced 
resource mobilization and distribution in the global HIV/AIDS response, and to 
what effect? This question focuses specifically on the generation and distribution of 
financial resources from donor states. It analyzes if CSO efforts to promote 
alternative frames, and advance these within institutions, has directed greater 
resources towards a rights-based response to the epidemic.  
The thesis concludes that CSOs initiated a response to HIV/AIDS that 
promoted an alternative human rights frame and demanded space for affected 
communities and populations, and their allies, to participate in the global 
governance of the response. However, potentially transformative outcomes have 
been limited by shifts in the broader political economy, which reflect a resurgence 
of hegemonic approaches to global health, rigid institutional forms, and a lack of 
CSO influence over resource distribution. That CSOs remain active participants in 
global HIV/AIDS governance, despite these limits and changes in the response 
over the past 30 years, suggests continued transformative potential.   
 
1.5 Methodology  
Research for this thesis began with a literature review of secondary sources. 
These were drawn from multiple disciplines including: IR, political economy, health 
studies, development studies, gender studies and political science. This 
interdisciplinary approach was justified by the positioning of HIV/AIDS as not only a 
health issues, but also a political, economic and social concern, which has 
generated literature about the epidemic and response from various disciplines. 
Sources were searched for in relevant social science journals (such as Social 
Science and Medicine), as well as health journals (such as the Lancet), and online 
databases available through the University of Bradford library. Books on global 
governance, as well as global health were accessed through the British Library. As 
a result, this thesis draws on a wide breadth of interdisciplinary literature that 
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overlaps around a specific issue area (HIV/AIDS), scope (global response) and 
actor group (CSOs).  
In addition to secondary sources, research for this thesis included analysis of 
primary documents. Documents used include reports from CSOs and GHIs; board 
and meeting minutes from GHIs; information available in online archives (such as 
that available via the UNAIDS website); and press releases. For example, the NGO 
Delegation to the UNAIDS Program Coordinating Board (PCB) publishes all 
UNAIDS board meeting documents online, as well as transcripts of interventions by 
CSOs. These were analyzed for content and to verify accounts from key 
informants. Similarly, the Global Fund makes most of its documents available 
online, providing opportunities to analyze internal and external evaluations and 
reports. CSOs, such as Aidspan, provide further substantial databases of 
information on both CSO and GHI activities. All documents used were readily 
available in the public domain. 
Research for this thesis included 39 key informant interviews with 
representatives of CSOs (19), staff from GHIs (18) and states (2).  Appendix A 
provides a detailed breakdown of key informants demographics, as well as a list of 
CSOs and GHIs represented. Participants were purposively selected, with resulting 
snowball sampling. Efforts were made to ensure that both men and women were 
included, as well as PWAs and representatives from key populations. There was 
also an attempt to interview individuals from and living in various global regions, 
though a high percentage ended up being based in the global north because that is 
where staff of GHIs are most often located. The purpose of criterion around 
regional and key populations was not to ensure representation of these 
groups/regions in general (as the sampling would be much too thin), but of the 
much smaller populations from those groups/regions that participate in global 
governance processes.  
Interviews were semi-structured; revolving around three or four themes and 
related key questions, and then follow-up questions that emerged during the 
conversation. General questions were piloted with three test interviewees prior to 
conducting fieldwork. Interviewees were informed of the purpose of the research 
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and provided with a research outline and key questions in advance if requested (an 
example of key questions is attached as Appendix B).   
No questions about personal experiences (for example related to living with 
HIV/AIDS), beyond engagement in global governance processes were asked. 
Anonymity was respected, with only interviewees’ classification of representing 
CSOs, GHIs or states published. Based on this protection of identity and 
recognition that the focus of the research was on governance activity not personal 
history (and therefore lack of any personal/professional ramifications for 
participating in the research), as well as recognition that key informants were all 
individuals who engaged in high level forums and were used to speaking publicly, 
the University of Bradford deemed that ethics approval was not required.  
Interviews were conducted between February 2013 and April 2014, either in 
person or by phone/skype with the author. While phone/skype interviews restricted 
observations, they allowed greater regional representation, as the cost of traveling 
to various locations was prohibitive. Interviews were analyzed using thematic 
analysis. Initial themes were derived conceptually, based on research questions 
and concepts emerging from the literature review (such as accountability, gender 
equality, etc.). Substantive codes (such as ‘key populations’) were further derived 
inductively from the research process, and revised at regular intervals. 
Contradictions and conflicting information was situated within the broader context, 
and in relationship to other data, in order to be validated.   
In addition, the author attended a number of governance events, such as 32nd 
PCB meeting of UNAIDS (June 2013), a Global Fund replenishment meeting in 
Brussels (May 2013), and CSO consultation processes related to both events. 
Information from interviews and observations was triangulated with analysis of 
primary documents, such as meeting minutes and reports.  
The research process faced a number of limitations. In terms of interviewees, 
it would have been preferable to have more state representatives involved in the 
research, particularly from key donor states, such as the US, and high HIV/AIDS 
prevalence states, such as South Africa. However, state representatives were 
unresponsive and reluctant to participate. In the case of the US, this reflected the 
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general non-transparent and closed nature of PEPFAR programming. In the case 
of other countries, this reflected the work load of civil servants and representatives, 
who were often juggling numerous commitments, of which participating in the 
HIV/AIDS response was just one. The lack of state perspectives was mitigate by 
drawing on other primary research around state involvement in GHG, for example 
the 2007 and 2013 Review of NGO/Civil Society Participation in UNAIDS, which 
included perspectives from state members of the PCB.  
Greater observation of key processes, such as Global Fund board meetings, 
would also have added to the research process. However, the cost of attending 
such events was prohibitive, and as most processes were well documented in 
institutional reports and civil society publications it was felt that the majority of 
useful information could be gathered from these documents.  
Overall, the combination of interview transcripts, primary document analysis, 
and observations provided a robust collection of data, which could be compared 
with secondary sources to asses validity.  
 
1.6 Contribution to Knowledge 
The findings of this thesis make a number of important contributions to global 
governance, global health, and HIV/AIDS scholarship. The thesis adds to critical 
perspectives within the literature on GHG. It presents a sustained reflexive analysis 
of CSO participation in a governance arena – the HIV/AIDS response - aimed at 
informing ongoing debates around GHG and CSO participation in global 
governance in general. In the process, it contributes one of the few empirical 
studies to explore possibilities for transformation from below - particularly asking if 
CSO participation facilitates such change. 
The specific focus on CSOs in the global governance of HIV/AIDS has not, to 
date or to my knowledge, been analyzed to this degree or from a critical IR 
perspective. Furthermore, the discussion centres around a number of processes 
that have been neglected or not yet addressed in the literature: such as, the shift 
from a human rights to key populations frame; the role of the civil society 
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delegations on the UNAIDS and Global Fund boards; and the involvement of CSOs 
in resource governance, particularly around the Global Fund’s New Funding Model, 
and in PEPFAR. These contributions will be made more explicit in the literature 
review in the following chapter. 
 
1.7 Scope and Definitions 
Global governance is understood as including “a range of formal and informal 
agreements, principles and understandings that inform acceptable behavior” 
(McInnes et al. 2012, S86). The term ‘global’ in global governance does not 
necessarily indicate transnational or trans-regional. Instead it refers to governance 
processes that happen beyond the borders of the nation state. Most often these 
global processes, and the actors who have power within them, are located in the 
global north. Institutional headquarters, meetings and staff are most often based in 
northern locations, and much of the resources are generated in the north and then 
distributed elsewhere, based on the dynamics of the global political economy.  
Global governance usually, but not always, ‘happens’ in the north and is imposed 
on other regions - but these regions also react, respond and reinterpret these 
processes, influencing them in turn. So while the majority of this analysis focuses 
on activity in centres such as Geneva and New York, it also analyzes interactions 
with other levels of governance in different geographic regions. 
Global health governance “refers to tans-boarder agreements or initiatives 
between states and/or non-state actors to the control of public health and infectious 
disease and the protection of people from health risks or threats” (Harman 2012, 
2). It is the range of formal and informal agreements, understandings and 
arrangements that relate to health risks and responses. Like global governance, 
GHG is multifaceted and multidirectional, interacting with other levels of health 
governance in multiple ways. 
Though each chapter begins with a historical overview, the majority of original 
research presented here focuses on approximately the last six years (from 2008-
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2014).2 2008 was selected as a starting point for primary analysis as it marks a 
crucial juncture in the HIV/AIDS response. Notable changes during this period 
include: the emerging backlash against AIDS exceptionalism; the economic 
recession in donor countries and consequent stagnation of overseas development 
assistance; and general shifts within GHG towards more integrated programs 
(Smith & Whiteside 2009). The focus on the more recent time period also 
strengthens the contribution to knowledge as it advances research around current 
developments in GHG.  
The UN definition of civil society is “a social sphere separate from both the 
state and the market. The increasingly accepted understanding of the term civil 
society organizations (CSOs) is that of non-state, not-for-profit, voluntary 
organizations formed by people in that social sphere” (WHO 2014). CSOs do not 
include profit-making activity (the private sector) or public sector governance 
arrangements. In the case of the HIV/AIDS response, CSOs involved include: 
AIDS service organizations (ASOs), various non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), associations of PWAs, women’s rights groups, religious organizations, 
gay men’s rights groups, youth groups, medical organizations, associations of 
particular races and ethnicities, and many others.   As there are uncountable CSOs 
involved in the response to HIV/AIDS, the research here is directed towards the 
participation of global and regional networks, as well as associations of key 
populations and those CSOs that most frequently engage in global governance 
processes.  
Keygnaert et al.’s definition of a rights-based approach to health is adopted: 
“it considers health as a human right and assesses policies, programs and 
legislation accordingly, expecting them to promote health and guarantee access to 
health care for all independently of any status” (2014, 217). This approach is 
rooted in the overarching principle of universality, recognizing that all people 
regardless of gender, sexuality, race and class share the same right to health. The 
right to health is defined broadly to include not only the right to access health 
services and treatment, but to live a healthy life free of threats to bodily harm and 
with the capabilities to achieve wellbeing. It is recognized that this right is only fully 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
2 In order to ensure time for revisions no new research was included after July 2014 
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accessible in social, political and economic environments that allow the enjoyment 
of related human rights. The right to health, thus conceived, is an ideal, but one to 
be striven for.  
 
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter two begins by outlining a critical IR approach to global governance, 
and then considers the history of GHG theory and practice from this perspective. 
This highlights how GHG developed in conjunction with and in response to 
processes of globalization, and the lack of reflexive academic analysis on how 
current GHG arrangements came to be. Aiming to contribute to filling this gap by 
exploring the development of the HIV/AIDS response within GHG, and the role of 
CSOs within it, the chapter then outlines the current literature and contribution of 
the thesis.  
Chapter Three analyzes how and why CSOs were able to promote an 
alternative human-rights frame within the global HIV/AIDS response. It considers 
the rights frame as in struggle, but also converging, with the more dominate frame 
of biomedical neoliberalism, discussing particularly how the period of AIDS 
exceptionalism created space for multiple understandings of the epidemic – and 
how the demise of exceptionalism restricted CSO participation. It then analyzes the 
emerging frame of key populations as a confluence of human rights and biomedical 
neoliberal frames, which creates both new opportunities and limitations for CSO 
participation in HIV/AIDS governance. Through illustration of how CSOs apply the 
key populations frame to specific rights claims it analyzes dynamics between 
global rights struggles and national/local outcomes.  
The next chapter (Four) asks how CSOs have applied their right to participate 
in GHIs to advance rights-based approaches to HIV/AIDS through institutional 
governance. It focuses specifically on governance outcomes related to influence in 
decision-making, legitimacy and downward accountability, as these are most 
frequently related, in the existing literature, to CSO participation. It presents the 
analysis through two case studies: UNAIDS and the Global Fund.  
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Chapter Five builds on the proceeding findings to discuss if CSOs have been 
able to use the rights frame, and their participation in GHIs, to direct greater 
resources towards advancing the rights of key populations and affected 
communities. It specifically looks at the participation of CSOs in mobilizing and 
distributing resources in the two largest funding bodies: the Global Fund and the 
President’s Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).  
The thesis concludes with analysis of the historical and theoretical findings 
that emerge from this research, as well as consideration of the implications for 
further research and discussions on CSO participation in GHG. 
 
1.9 A Personal Note  
Cox writes “There is always a subjective element in a dialectical relationship 
between the analyst and the object of analysis” (Cox 2002, 26). He advocates 
acknowledgement of this subjectivity, while striving for objectivity as an ideal. In 
this spirit, I recognize that my subjectivity, shaped by personal experiences and 
biases, influences how I approach this research.  
I have worked with CSOs engaged in the HIV/AIDS response for over 10 
years. Though the majority of my experience has been at the community, not 
global, level, it is this experience that promoted my interest in the role of CSOs in 
the global governance of the HIV/AIDS response. As a community advocate, 
working in Kenya, Canada and South Africa, I was constantly motivated and 
inspired by my peers working in the HIV/AIDS response. I worked with pastors who 
fought stigma in their local communities, PWID who challenged their government in 
order to keep one of the only supervised injection sites in the world open, sex 
workers who bravely shared their stories in United Nations (UN) forums. I was 
overwhelmed by the diversity of people and groups involved in the HIV/AIDS 
response, and how they organized to influence all levels of governance.  
However, I also felt that the organizations I worked with were constantly 
coming up against barriers imposed from above: international guidelines that were 
disconnected from local realties, government ideologies that neglected those most 
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in need and, increasingly, a declining interest in the HIV/AIDS response. Of course 
opportunities were also present, but these seemed more often than not shaped by 
donor preferences for current trends in public health and development than by the 
experiences of PWAs and those affected by the epidemic. I saw organizations 
struggle to find adequate support for care work, and the failure of social protection 
campaigns. As my frustration at the aspects of the HIV/AIDS response that were 
beyond the control of those on the front lines mounted, I wanted to understand 
what was happening ‘out there’, where catch phrases like ‘an AIDS free generation’ 
were created by people in board rooms who were also paradoxically reducing 
funding. I recognized that while my colleagues and peers struggled to engage with 
these macro level processes, it was difficult to (except for in a few cases) identify 
clear outcomes. Instead it seemed a continual case of two steps forward, one step 
back - or vice versa. And so, while most of my previous research experience is at 
the local level, I decided to seize the opportunity of a PhD project to come to grips 
with global governance processes, how civil society has tried to influence them, 
and to what effect.  
My background, no doubt influences the analysis that follows. In particular I 
am an unapologetic advocate for a human rights-based response to HIV/AIDS. I 
also recognize the expertise, experience and moral force that CSOs often bring to 
governance forums. That said, I am not romantic about CSO involvement. Among 
many inspiring examples I have also witnessed questionable tactics and 
motivations; ‘experts’ making a living off the ill and briefcase NGOs. I have been 
party to northern-based CSOs imposing their definition of human rights on to 
southern contexts, and have witnessed the power relationships fought out between 
different regional and key population groups.  
Still my own experience with CSOs necessarily shapes my perspective of 
their roles in global governance, and likely shaped my interactions with key 
informants. When asked about my own history I readily explained my background 
working with local CSOs, and this identified me as an ally in the response by CSO 
informants, and may have made other informants more cautious in communicating 
with me. In turn, my own assumptions that a rights-based response is essential, 
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and CSO participation ought to be a beneficial force, influenced how I interpreted 
data.  
As opposed to a limitation, I see my subjectivity as an opportunity. Not only 
has it motivated me throughout the research and writing processes, it has also 
allowed me to connect with the subject matter, by requiring me to evaluate my 
own, and therefore others’, assumptions. I believe my commitment to the HIV/AIDS 
response has made me perhaps more critical than I otherwise would have been. 
On the one hand, I want to share a remarkable narrative of CSOs taking on 
international institutions, powerful governments and big business; on the other, I 
know there is a need to reflect critically on what has been achieved because, 
despite all the effort, there is still so much to do. I do agree with those who argue 
that there is something to be learned from the history of the HIV/AIDS response, 
for HIV/AIDS advocates as well as other health and human rights campaigns, but 
this is not necessarily an unqualified success story.  
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2. Theory, Context and Literature Review 
This chapter situates the thesis within theoretical debates around global 
governance, the historical development of the field and study of GHG, and the 
literature on CSOs in the HIV/AIDS response. It justifies a critical IR approach to 
global governance processes, and demonstrates how this approach is applied to 
the field of GHG. It argues that there is a need for greater critical reflection on how 
the current GHG order came to be and possibilities for transformation within it. The 
chapter concludes by illustrating the lack of sustained analysis of the role of CSOs 
in GHG, despite prevalent assumptions about CSO participation in the HIV/AIDS 
response, and argues that the research that follows will contributing to filling this 
gap, as well as adding to the growing body of literature on critical approaches to 
GHG.  
 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
 Since the end of the Cold War, IR scholars have been increasingly 
interested in global governance. The rise in number of international agreements, 
and growing intensity of trans-governmental relations through networks and 
regulatory bodies generated scholarly interest in the “new world order” that was 
said to be emerging (Slaughter 2004). In 1992, a prominent group of scholars 
launched speculations about “governance without government” (Rosenau & 
Czempiel 1992), and in 1995, a group of world leaders gathered at the UN funded 
Commission for Global Governance. In the same year, the journal ‘Global 
Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations’ was 
founded in collaboration with the UN University. The field of global governance has 
continued to evolve since. This section first outlines various approaches to global 
governance that developed, and then defines and justifies the critical IR approach 
it applies to analyze global HIV/AIDS governance throughout the rest of the thesis.  
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2.1.1 Conceptualizing Global Governance  
 Finklestein defines global governance as “governing, without sovereign 
authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers. Global governance is 
doing internationally what governments do at home” (1995, 369).  However, as 
processes of governance at the global level differ than at the national level (due to 
lack of state hierarchical structures; democratic accountability, and clearly defined 
leaders) this definition fails to explain the unique characteristics of governance at 
the global level. Taking these differences into account, Massiocotte writes that 
global governance is “the ensemble of regulation mechanisms, formal and 
informal, that organize and coordinate socioeconomic relations, from the 
household and the family to governmental policies and international agreements” 
(1999, 139). Yet under this definition the idea of global governance becomes all 
inclusive (Rosenau 1995, 13).  Global governance remains distinct from state or 
local governance, but also unwieldy and difficult to define.  
Theoretical approaches, such as regime theory and institutionalism have 
attempted to make sense out of the broad and ever shifting realm of global 
governance by exploring how actors construct governance arenas and institutions 
around specific issue areas. Keohane (2002) argues that even when states share 
potential interests they often need to form intergovernmental institutions to serve 
them, and that intergovernmental regimes are an active form of cooperation that 
allows states to pursue non-zero-sum games.  
Public Sphere theorists approach global governance as a potential forum for 
deliberative democracy on a global scale. Nanz and Steffeck describe that in the 
ideal global public sphere, “political decisions are reached through a deliberative 
process where participants scrutinize heterogeneous interests and justify their 
positions in view of the common good of a given constituency” (2004, 314). This 
functional approach, along with regime theory and institutionalism, conceives of 
global governance as a technical process, shaped by rational decision-making and 
the prioritization of efficiency in outcomes.  
Social constructivists, such as Barnett and Finnemore (2004), focus on 
persuasive communication and the construction of global norms, especially within 
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and through institutions. Keck and Sikkink (1998) coined the term “transnational 
advocacy networks” to explore how specific issues are advanced in global forms. 
They identify transnational advocacy networks as “relevant actors working 
internationally on an issue who are bound together by shared values, a common 
discourse, and dense exchange of information and services” (1998, 89). Resulting 
analysis looks at how these networks engage in agenda setting, shift discourses, 
adapt institutional procedures, and influence policy change and state behaviour. 
This more flexible approach allows greater integration of the role of non-state 
actors and consideration of non-linear processes.  
Focusing less on co-operation around specific issue areas, Rosenau (1995, 
2000) argues global governance is characterized by “fragmengration” or 
“glocalization” of politics, as social alliances find new political opportunities in 
spaces above and below existing states. His writing illuminates the complexity of a 
phenomenon that challenges previous notions about clearly defined actors and 
roles, problematizes simplistic understandings of levels of governance, and 
includes overlapping and often shifting governance arenas.  
Despite the strengths of this inclusive analysis, Murphy notes that Rosenau 
“seems less capable of explaining why so much of this creative movement in world 
politics seems to have added up to the supremacy of the neoliberal agenda both 
within and across states” (2000, 796). Murphy demonstrates that much global 
governance scholarship focuses on understanding the constructs of global 
governances, not the underlying causes. It does not asks why global governance 
has emerged as it has, and to what effect. Approaches, such as regime theory, fail 
to explain change within global governance processes (Strange 1982). There is a 
greater focus on describing global governance structures (or lack thereof), as 
opposed to analyzing why they are shaped as they are and whose interests they 
serve.  
In reviewing often quoted definitions of global governance Whitman notes, 
“What is striking about these definitions and much of the literature they have 
inspired is a conspicuous absence of considerations of agency. After all, 
‘governance’ is not an agent; nor are ‘capacity’ and ‘systems of rule.’ Who will be 
exercising authority without legal competence, or establishing and exercising new 
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systems of rule? Who – or what – will be ‘doing’ global governance?” (2002, 46). 
This emphasis on process above agency leads to global governance theories that 
are limited to abstract conceptions. The focus on bureaucratic and deliberative 
processes can create the impression of a functional system, separated from the 
power dynamics of states, corporation and CSOs. Recognizing these limitations, 
Benner et al. (2004, 207) argue that global governance taken seriously cannot 
constitute itself as a technocratic approach, because of the complexity of power 
relationships acted out within it. While various theoretical approaches illuminate 
differing aspects of global governance, many fail to deconstruct how and whose 
agency shapes these dynamics, or explain why it has developed as it is. 
 
2.1.2 A Critical Approach to Global Governance 
In contrast, critical IR approaches recognizes that global governance is 
dominated by a hegemonic neoliberal world order, and strive to understand how 
this has been created, how hegemony is maintained, and where it is contested.  
Hegemony is understood as the confluence of power, ideas and institutions (Cox, 
1981, 140). In particular, Gramsci – when writing of this type of power - stressed 
the importance of analyzing how dominating groups governed through a clever 
manipulation of ideas in order to influence the manner of thinking of the oppressed 
(Söderholm 1997, 57; Gramsci 1971).  Along these lines, Cox presents an early 
conception of global governance as a “nebuleuse” - the cloud of ideological 
influences that has fostered the realignment of elite thinking to the needs of the 
world market (1996, 8).  This approach highlights the role of powerful interests 
within global governance  
The label of critical (specifically spelled with a small ‘c’) here is defined 
loosely to describe a diverse grouping of IR scholarship. Much of this scholarship 
has developed from and refers back to the work of Antonio Gramsci.3 This field of 
inquiry (which includes those who explicitly identify with IR, as well as those who 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
3"Excluded"from"this"grouping"(for"the"purposes"of"this"thesis)"is"the"Critical"Frankfurt"School"of"
thought;"instead"the"focus"is"on"scholarship"that"developed"more"towards"critical"political"
economy"approaches."
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locate themselves within other social science disciplines that engage with 
international issues) includes the following characteristics: it aims “to achieve a 
perspective on perspectives” by reflecting on why certain approaches dominate 
over others (Cox 1981, 128); roots analysis in historical-materialist approaches; 
and has explicitly normative goals in that it aims to expose contradictions in order 
to illuminate how transformations to a more equitable world system might come 
about (Murphy 2005, 13).    
Critical scholars argue that dynamics within global governance are not static 
or predetermined.  Though neoliberal dominance shapes overarching structures, 
actors have the power to resists and respond to these structures. Murphy argues 
that, “Global governance is more a site, one of many sites, in which struggles over 
wealth, power, and knowledge are taking place” (2000, 799).  Similarly, Vale 
(1995) asserts that global governance must be understood within conceptual 
frameworks that recognize fundamental conflicts between the privileged and the 
marginalized. A critical feminist approach makes explicit conflicts not only between 
states and markets in governance arenas, but also between genders, races, 
classes and other social groups (Tallis 2012). Friedrichs writes that such analysis, 
“is possible if we understand global governance as the space where a variety of 
political projects compete for hegemonic status – no matter if they are ever going 
to attain . . . . global governance is a political arena for haphazard moves to 
establish liberal hegemony and quixotic counter-moves trying to prevent liberal 
hegemony from being established and proposing radical alternatives” (Friedrichs 
2009, 120). Such conflicts are viewed as potential sources of change in that 
through struggles actors resist, challenge or strengthen existing structures.  Global 
governance is then conceptualized as a system of overlapping struggles. This 
analytical framework emphasizes the power relationships that make global 
governance fragmented and complex, and that create opportunities for and 
limitations on change. 
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2.1.3 Institutions, Civil Society and Transformation from Below 
Much global governance literature has been dedicated to analyzing the 
prominent role of non-state actors, such as institutions and civil society (Dingwerth 
& Pattberg 2006, 189). Institutions involved in global governance include 
multilateral organizations, public-private partnerships and hybrid forms. Global 
governance literature asks how effective institutions are in meeting stated aims, 
what impacts they have on global governance and the broader political economy, 
and if they create forums for international co-operation.  
Critical scholarship also asks if and how institutions express hegemonic 
power and resistance to it; and if they represent and respond to the needs of the 
marginalized and oppressed (Murphy 2005).  According to Cox, institutions are 
produced to stabilize and perpetuate a particular order: “Institutions encapsulate 
and give voice to the universal norms that are part of the common sense ideology 
of a hegemonic world order. . . .as such they mirror perspectives that favour 
dominant state and economic classes” (Cox 1981, 149). For Cox, institutions 
absorb and co-opt ideas that challenge hegemonic orders so that they become 
less threatening, and have no interactions with mass constituencies.   Therefore, 
counter hegemonic challenges by international organizations can be ruled out: 
“Institutions provide ways of dealing with internal conflicts so as to minimize the 
use of force . . . . Institutions may become the anchor for such a hegemonic 
strategy since they lend themselves both to the representations of diverse interests 
and to the universalization of policy” (Cox 1981, 137). Responding to criticisms of 
this pessimistic view of international institutions, Cox has more recently clarify that 
institutions can play a more emancipatory role if they are able to focus on long term 
structural change, as well as immediate problems. Still, he does not view this as a 
likely shift: “Institutional change, I would suggest, is more likely to follow than to 
precede a new direction in global economic and social policy” (Cox 1992).   
Similarly, Murphy argues that world organizations have been better at 
satisfying basic physiological needs than in meeting fundamental needs for identity 
and security; that they have been able to manage threats in order to maintain 
existing systems, but are not designed to upset that system in order to empower 
the marginalized  (2005, 27). This approach to institutions’ role in global 
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governance illuminates contradictions between stated aims and outcomes, and 
critically analyzes the interests that converge within institutional arrangements.   
The type and make up of institutions has shifted greatly over the last decade 
to include innovative forms of partnerships and networks. The multilateralism that 
Cox critiqued has been upset by the increasing role of private actors and civil 
society (Walker 2011). This does not mean that Cox’s understanding of institutions 
as inherently hegemonic is no longer valid, but it is crucial to re-evaluate critical 
claims, and other perspectives on global institutions in light of more recent 
historical developments. Murphy advocates a nuanced investigation of institutions:  
 
“We need for example to look for proposed institutional 
innovations that would have served the interests of the 
powerful just as well as those that came into being, yet, at 
the same time, would have better served the interests of 
the marginalized. What prevented those that better served 
the marginalized to be chosen? Conversely, have there 
been proposed institutions that would have served the 
marginalized less well than those selected? What allowed 
the better institutions to be chosen” (2005, 12).  
 
Examining current institutional forms, how they came to be and whose interests 
they serve facilitates consideration of alternative arrangements that may present 
opportunities to better respond to the needs of the marginalized.  
Many current institutional forms claim to engage with mass constituencies 
through links with civil society. CSO networks are also referred to as social 
movements. Here the term civil society is preferred because it implies a diversity of 
type of actors, who may be orientated around different causes, but come together 
around a single issue (in this case HIV/AIDS) where and when those causes 
overlap. These actors might interact at varying levels of governance (local, 
national, regional and global), and might represent great differences, as well as 
similarities. For example both the Catholic Church and feminist organizations are 
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civil society actors that participate in the HIV/AIDS response, though they disagree 
on related issues of reproductive rights.   
Gramsci saw state forces and civil society to be mutually constitutive, 
formed in relation to historical and structural forces. He was interested in how 
counter-hegemonic movements might promote social and revolutionary change, 
and saw CSOs as potential, but not predetermined, actors in such movements. He 
understood civil society as including both top-down forces of economic, cultural 
and political forces; and bottom up processes lead by those marginalized by the 
current order attempting to develop counter-hegemonic projects (Bebbington et al. 
2008, 18; Gramsci 1971). Gramsci recognized CSOs as potential agents of 
change, but did not assume they would necessarily be so, noting the influence of 
dominant states, corporations and other actors on what constitutes civil society, 
and the limits and opportunities within existing world orders.  
The concept of civil society has changed with how it has been applied over 
time.  Cox writes that as states become increasingly responsive to market forces, 
citizens become disengaged and looking to other avenues of engagement – one of 
which is through CSOs (2000). CSOs can create opportunities for direct 
engagement/ confrontation with global governance forums (for example, the 
intellectual property regime which determines the price of HIV/AIDS treatment) 
when states do not. As a result, the involvement of civil society has expanded in 
global forums.  
The role of civil society, especially as representatives of the marginalized in 
global governance forums, raises questions about if such participation may 
instigate processes towards transformation from below. Cox argues that social 
transformation towards more equitable world orders will emanate from those social 
forces (defined as those engendered by the production processes) who are 
excluded from or marginalized by the global economy – that it has to come from 
below (1981, 149). Critical scholarship aims to analyze processes of resistance 
from such groups to identify where counter-hegemonic forces have been active 
and what the results of this action are, assuming that making explicit the 
opportunities for and limits of transformation facilitates “the articulating of the 
alternative” (Murphy 2005). Along these lines Cheru advocates for research 
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questions “from below”, which ask if transnational social movements are agents of 
transformation (1997, 168). Such questions prompt critical exploration of the role of 
civil society groups that engage in global governance processes.  
However, as Leysen (2008) and Moolakattu (2009) note, there are few 
examples of evidence of bottom up processes of transformation. Leysen in 
particular asks if it is realistic to expect those who are marginalized, and often 
struggling to survive, to transform global systems. Hobson argues that Cox’s 
writings provide scant examples of counter-hegemonic resistance (2007, 93). 
Similarly, Murphy (2007) notes that critical IR has not produced research that 
empirically incorporates or focuses on mass constituencies, and suggests greater 
integration with feminist approaches. This poses a valid challenge to critical 
scholarship, which has more often called for transformation from below than has 
been able to document it. Greater theoretical reflection on attempts to explore how, 
and if, marginalized groups can influence global governance in a transformative 
way is necessary.  
A critical IR framework provides analytical tools to conceptualize the ‘mess’ 
of global governance, by conceiving it as overlapping struggles of hegemonic and 
counter hegemonic forces. In particular, this framework facilitates analysis of both 
structures and agency, by framing governance as sites of struggle characterized by 
power relationships. It provides reflexive, historical, analysis of non-state actors in 
global governance, such as institutions and civil society, and introduces the 
concept of transformation from below as a way to explore what alternatives have 
been proposed and attempted in order to bring about more equitable global 
governance arrangements and outcomes. 
 
2.2 Global Health Governance  
Cox argues that theory must be understood within its historical context: 
“There is no theory in itself, no theory independent of a concrete historical context. 
Theory is the way the mind works to understand the reality it confronts” (1995, 31). 
Recognizing the dialectical relationship between theory and history, this sub-
section discusses the emergence of the field of GHG within its historical context, 
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and how IR scholars have understood it. It argues that the historical rise, and now 
possible decline, of health as a global political priority is tied to processes of 
globalization that generated a fragmented governance system. It further argues 
that current concerns about global health responses necessitate greater critical 
analysis of how the existing system came to be, and what possibilities exist for 
more equitable alternatives. 
 
2.2.1 The Emergence of Global Health Governance 
Interest in global health issues from politicians, policy-makers and public 
health professionals developed in response to recognition of how accelerated 
processes of globalization influenced health threats and outcomes.  Lee defines 
globalization as, “a set of processes that are changing the nature of how humans 
interact across three types of boundaries – spatial, temporal and cognitive. . . the 
changes they are creating are ‘global’, in the sense that, familiar boundaries 
separating us as individuals and societies have become increasingly eroded” (Lee 
2003, 5). Transnational health threats and international responses to health issues 
were not necessarily invents of globalization (for example, the bubonic plague of 
the middle ages represents one example of an international health threat that was 
responded to co-operatively through international containment strategies). What 
was new was that as globalization processes increased international travel and 
information sharing, health vulnerabilities and risks were no longer perceived as 
solely local and domestic issues. Lee writes, “The health implications of global 
spatial change are wide-ranging. The most direct effect is how patterns of health 
and disease are altering according to new forms of social organization.... in short, 
new spatial configurations of health and disease are emerging as consequences of 
globalization” (Lee 2003, 6). While globalization, and its impacts on health, remains 
a debated concept (Brown & Labonte 2011), it is evident that as individuals, groups 
and states became increasingly aware of global interconnections, how disease was 
experienced, understood, spread and contained also shifted. This awareness 
generated various demands, which both competed and converged with each other, 
to generate systems of GHG. 
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Human rights activists and public health professionals recognized that 
globalization was exacerbating inequalities through the negative impacts of global 
capitalism on the health of the poor and marginalized – for example, that 
transnational corporations in South Africa drew impoverished men away from their 
homes by the promise of employment, which also exposed them to increased risk 
of TB, HIV and injury, which then impacted their families’ well-being through loss of 
income and the spreading of disease (Msimang 2003). However, public health and 
human rights organizations also recognized that globalization created opportunities 
to respond to such threats through new technologies, shared information and 
intensified international networks (Buse et al. 2009, 2). Arguing from this public 
health perspective, Owen and Roberts argued, “In summary, the challenge is how 
to make globalization work for health and to use health to foster better forms of 
globalization” (2005, 5).  Concerned public health professionals, policy-makers and 
activists collaborated to advance norms around health as a human right and a 
social justice issue through global campaigns (such as for anti-retroviral treatment), 
and international organizations (such as Medicines Sans Frontiers). Harmer writes, 
“It is awareness and a compulsion to address this [health] inequality that has 
precipitated the emergence of a broad and complex system of global health 
governance” (Harman 2012, 2). From this perspective, systems of GHG were 
conceived to counter the negative health impacts of globalization, and utilize global 
interconnections to advance health agendas.  
Taking a more realist approach, Filder attributes increased political interest 
in global health issues to awareness by states that, due to globalization, they could 
not respond effectively to health threats without international co-operation:  
 
“Globalization exposed vulnerabilities of countries to public 
health threats that were previously non-existent, latent or 
ignored. Governments faced mounting public health threats 
with the realization that globalization constrained policy 
control over many determinants of health, limiting options to 
the detriment of population and individual health” (2006, 52).  
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States realized that health threats from other regions could easily cross borders, 
and national policy responses could only mitigate a certain amount of risk. A report 
by the US Institute of Medicine, in 1997, stated: “Distinctions between domestic 
and international health problems are losing their usefulness and are often 
misleading” (quoted in Frenk & Gomes Dantes 2002, 95). In particular, developed 
countries became increasingly concerned with communicable diseases from less 
developed countries, where it was feared the government did not have the capacity 
to contain epidemics. This fear was exacerbated by the SARS crisis of 2002-03 
(Elbe 2010). Recognition that health threats emerged both within and from outside 
of the nation state lead to demands for shared responsibility, international systems 
of response, and international intervention when necessary. Within this framework, 
health became increasingly linked to issues of security. 
Calls for global co-operation in response to health threats reflected an 
emerging global public goods paradigm. Global public goods are defined “as 
outcomes (or intermediate products) that tend towards universality in the sense 
that they benefit all countries, population groups and generations” (Kaul et al. 
1999, 11).  Health fit into this paradigm as, due to the interconnections of 
globalization, health outcomes in one region or population group were recognized 
as having the potential to impact others through the biological, social and economic 
relationships that span the globe. Chen et al. wrote: “Globalization is not simply 
accelerating long-term trends but is ushering in contextual changes that are 
qualitatively and quantitatively different in disease risk, health vulnerability and 
policy response” (1999, 289).  Recognition of health as a global public good 
created demand for a global architecture, or arrangement, to manage risk, govern 
responses and coordinate actors.  
Linked to this understanding of health was increasing acknowledgement of 
the connections between health and development. The 1993 World Development 
Report, produced by the World Bank and the World Health Organization (WHO), 
described the economic costs of ill health and introduced the concept of Disability 
Adjusted Life Years (DALYs). In 2000, the WHO implemented a Macroeconomic 
Commission on Health mandated to demonstrate the economic impacts of ill health 
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and wellbeing. Such initiatives gained attention and resources to address health 
issues, they also shifted how health issues were conceptualized, and therefore 
responded to. The economic perspective positioned health not only as an issue of 
public and individual welfare, but also as a commodity with an economic value 
(Kay & Williams 2009, 6). This rationalization justified the increased involvement of 
actors outside the public realm, including private businesses and NGOs. At a time 
when many developing country public health systems were struggling due to the 
impacts of structural adjustment policies, these private actors filled gaps left by 
states, intensifying a shift from public to private health care. The linking of health 
and economic development reflected and contributed to dominant neoliberal 
approaches to addressing global threats, evidenced by the increasing role of the 
World Bank in health governance (Harman 2009).  
As a result of these overlapping and competing approaches to global health, 
calls for co-operative responses were voiced in a number of international 
agreements, conventions and interventions. The following table provides a list of 
these from 1985 to 2005, demonstrating the rise of health on global agendas.  
 
Year Event Summary 
1986 Ottawa Charter for Health 
Promotion (WHO) 
Promoted international co-operation 
towards ‘Health for All by 2000” 
1993 World Development Report: 
Investing in Health (World 
Bank and WHO) 
Positioned health as a threat to economic 
and social development and introduced 
concept of DALYs 
1994 Human Development Report 
(UNDP) 
Introduced the concept of human security, 
which included ill health as a threat to 
individual security 
2000 Millennium Development Goals Three of the 10 MDGs addressed health 
issues: reducing child mortality; improving 
maternal health; and combating AIDS, 
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malaria and other diseases 
2000 Macroeconomic Commission 
on Health (WHO) 
Assessed the contribution of global health 
to economic development 
2001 The Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health 
(WTO) 
 
Reaffirmed the right of member states to 
use flexibilities within TRIPS to protect 
public health and promote access to 
medicines 
2005 In Larger Freedom (UN) The UN Security General’s declaration 
frames addressing health inequality as an 
essential step towards peace and 
development 
 
 
For the WHO (the international organizations created in 1948 to respond to 
global health threats)  the shift away from a primarily biomedical and public health 
approach threatened its leadership role – as the state-based organization worked 
solely with health ministries and was primarily responsible for providing technical 
assistance. Due to a convergence of internal (such as leadership difficulties) and 
external (such as lack of support from the American administration) factors, WHO’s 
stature did not rise with the increasing attention to global health issues. If anything 
it was crowded out by the new approaches and actors in the field (Harman 2012, 
2). Hein et al. write, “The rising importance of transnational interactions compared 
to relations between nation-states leads to a very complex pattern of global health 
governance, which makes it difficult if not impossible for international governmental 
organizations to maintain their dominance in this policy field” (2007, 227).  As 
competing conceptions of global health issues and approaches struggled for space 
and dominance, the WHO became one of many actors, representing one of 
numerous approaches.  
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Without specific leadership, and despite efforts to advance a shared global 
health agenda, the global health field became, and remains, fragmented. While a 
similar trend can be identified in other global governance arenas, GHG remains 
particularly disjointed. Seviron and Ray suggest that global health is an extreme 
case of their theory of hyper-collective action (referring to the double trend of 
proliferation and fragmentation of international cooperation) pointing out that more 
than 100 major organizations are involved in global health (2010, 6).  Bartsch and 
Kolmorgen note that there are over 3000 CSOs involved in health governance 
(2007, 92). A British Department for International Development (DfID) review found 
that the health sector faces coordination and harmonization challenges at the 
global level, with more than 40 bilateral donors, 26 UN agencies, 20 global and 
regional funds, and 90 global health initiatives (Nay 2009, 16).  
As a result, GHG suffers from an acute case of fragmentation, with 
numerous actors (and types of actors), and little coordination between them. Lee 
writes that, “there is a sense that the emerging system of GHG is characterized by 
a considerable degree of dysfunction (Lee 2007, 2). And Fidler notes, “Efforts to 
address these and other global health problems often acknowledge that existing 
institutions, rules, and processes are insufficient to support collective action” (Fidler 
2010, 1). It is clear that the numerous approaches, actors and processes in global 
health have not necessarily resulted in efficient or effective global governance - in 
fact the opposite may be true. 
Increased attention to health issues at the political level, increased funding 
for health, and greater actor involvement in health delivery, has not resulted in 
corresponding gains in health outcomes. Despite advancements in some regions 
on issues related to access to medicines and child mortality, in the areas with the 
worst health outcomes the situation remains largely unchanged. It is clear that the 
health MDGs will not be met in most Sub-Sahara African countries (Action for 
Global Health 2009). Furthermore, the factors that gave rise to GHG – recognition 
of links between global processes and local outcomes, the impacts of international 
trade and security on health and vice versa, and global health inequalities – have 
not been resolved, if anything they have intensified. Fidler, speaking specifically 
about women’s health, refers to a “health paradox”: the global level activity around 
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health issues has not had corresponding outcomes at the local level (2008a, 148). 
In describing the persistent challenges of global health, Williams and Kay write, 
“the defining mood of contemporary analysis of GHG is one of failure; failure in 
GHG to meet the challenges posed by the scale and variety of problems that 
constitute the global system of disease” (2009, 2).   
In response, a number of think tanks and other bodies have tried to spur 
greater coordination within GHG. Researchers and policy-makers are asking what 
an effective GHG architecture would look like (Gostin & Mok 2009); how it would 
better serve the needs of those most affected by ill health (Hanefeld 2008); and 
what structures would be more efficient (Labonte & Schrecker 2007).  In 2005, a 
seminar on GHG identified the need to find “strategies to develop a new 
architecture of global health governance.” In February 2006, the German Overseas 
Institute, in cooperation with the WHO, sponsored a workshop entitled “Defining 
and Shaping the Architecture for Global Health Governance” (Fidler 2007). Epstein 
and Guest argued that a new architecture for governance is needed to “constitute 
the scaffolding to sustain healthy, ecologically sound, and equitable global 
systems” (2005, 239).  In 2008, the Health Eight was formed by eight global 
institutions (WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNAIDS, the Global Fund, GAVI, Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation, and the World Bank) involved in GHG in order to 
improve coordination and stimulate urgency around achieving the health related 
MDGs. However, the lack of outputs and leadership from the H8 indicate its limited 
success in overcoming collective action problems (Harman 2012, 82).  
This is particularly concerning considering the prioritization of global health 
issues over the past two decades is now in decline. Evidence of the shift in GHG 
funding is apparent. The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation notes that 
development assistance for health has not grown since 2010 (2012, 7). Fidler 
(2009) writes that the global health revolution is over, and while health has 
established a place for itself on political agendas, this space is no longer 
prioritized. Similarly, Williams and Rushton write, “the golden age of global health 
may be drawing to an end” (2011, 25). GHG is now a declining priority area in 
global politics, with little to show (in terms of governance arrangements or health 
outcomes) for its brief rise.  
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2.2.2 IR Perspectives on Global Health Governance 
 Prior to the rise of global health issues, as outlined above, discussing 
disease as a key variable in political analysis was virtually unprecedented (Boone 
& Bastell 2001, 4). Health was identified as a transnational issue, but not 
substantially discussed within IR literature (Lee 2003). As a result, Kickbusch wrote 
that, “health has for too long been faced with serious neglect by scholars of IR” 
(2007, x). This began to change as the rising position of health issues in political 
forums began to draw attention from IR scholars interested in the role of civil 
society, the impacts of international trade regimes and issues of human security, 
among others. The interest in health coincided with a general broadening of the IR 
field, following the end of the Cold War, characterized by the emergence of critical 
studies and constructivism (Davies 2000, 1170). The linking of health and IR also 
facilitated the securitization of health issues, and the greater integration of health 
with foreign policy goals (Lee & McInnes 2012b). For multiple reasons – which 
there is not room to expand on here - IR scholars began research into global health 
issues and responses. 
 As IR research overlapped with public health scholarship, discussions 
emerged on the difference, or lack thereof, between international public health and 
global health. Fried et al. argued that “global health and public health are 
indistinguishable” and that the attempt to distinguish differences between “global 
health” and “public health” conflicted with the key tenets of a “global public health” 
(2010, 254). Bozorgmehr responded, that the ‘global’ adaption to the health field 
was not an attempt to carve out academic turf, but “a crucial point for identifying 
and setting priorities for educators, researchers and practitioners in the field of 
‘global health” (2010, 2).   
IR scholars generally prefer the term global health, which highlights the 
complex spatial relationships between health governance and outcomes. Lee 
writes, “’international’, strictly speaking, is traditionally defined by relations between 
states and their governments, whereas ‘global’ encompasses relations beyond 
governments, and includes individuals and groups within societies that interact 
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across national boundaries, such as transnational corporations, NGOs, and 
religious movements” (Lee 1998, 4). Whereas much health policy and other 
literature often fails to recognize the links between the international, national and 
local health spheres (Williams & Kay 2009, 16), IR approaches to global health 
examine the relationships between micro and macro health responses.  
Such scholarship also recognizes that, as health outcomes cannot 
necessarily be isolated as the result of individual behaviours, analysis must take 
political, social and economic relationships into account. An IR approach to global 
health,  
 
“... means recognizing that we now live in a context where 
the actors and factors that determine our health are 
shaped not by linear relationships between individuals, 
doctors, states and the international realm, but by a 
complex range of factors that interact in myriad ways 
depending on the context. From this perspective, it is 
important to understand the political, social and economic 
forces that shape health outcomes” (Davies 2010, 1169 ). 
 
 IR scholarship on GHG analyzes how the global political economy, and other 
factors, shape experiences of illness and responses to health threats.    
 Recognizing these complex relationships highlights the complexity and 
fragmentation of GHG, which IR scholars have developed multiple approaches to 
understanding and describing. Fidler introduces the concept of open source 
anarchy, through which he conceptualizes governance as “a normative ‘source 
code’ that states, international organizations, and non-state actors apply in 
addressing global health problems” (Fidler 2007, 1). He argues that GHG is 
composed of overlapping and sometimes competing regime clusters, which form a 
GHG complex in which states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-state 
actors apply old and new institutions, rules, and processes to strengthen collective 
action against health threats (Fidler 2010). Hein et al. (2009) and Bartsch et al. 
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(2007), suggest understanding global health governance through nodes and 
interface – referring to critical points of interaction or linkages between different 
fields or levels of order. Buse et al. (2009) write that global health partnerships are 
like a “mosh pits” of governance - less structured, non-hierarchic forums where 
multiple actors with different interests and ideas come together and “thrash-out” 
global health issues. While academics present various metaphors and terminology 
for describing GHG, they agree that it is complex and fragmented.  
Such approaches, fail to critically analyze power relationships within these 
multifaceted dynamics. For example, Fidler’s (2008b) theory of open source 
anarchy has adapted realist concepts, which do not deconstruct hierarchies within 
governance arenas. Similarly, the concept of GHG as a mosh pit perpetuates 
conceptions of chaos, in which no one has control (i.e. power), and in which actors 
are free from the influences of historical processes. Recognizing these limits in 
GHG literature, Walt et al. (2009) argue that most analyses of GHG prioritize 
structure and form, neglecting agency. The conception of GHG as a “mess” 
(however it is illustrated) obscures questions about whose interest this complexity 
serves, and what the power dynamics within it are. 
There are only a few examples of critical analysis of the complexities within 
GHG. McInnes and Lee (2012) note that GHG literature has been characterized by 
“weak theorizing”, and aim to examine how normative frameworks have defined the 
conceptualization and practice of GHG (2012, 101). Berridge et al. (2009, 28) 
argue that the seemingly new themes and issues within global health are in fact not 
new, and advocate subjecting the concept of globalization to “historical scrutiny” in 
order to allow a critical discussion of the “aura of newness”, which has been part of 
the refashioning of health governance. Others have drawn on the work of Foucault 
to develop a biopolitics/power analysis of global health, specifically looking at 
trends towards disease surveillance, the narrowing of knowledge, and the 
construction of risk (Ingram 2009, 2010; Nguyen 2010; Pereira 2011). From a 
political economy perspective, Lee and Zwi (2003) advocate taking a long view of 
historical and political processes that shape health outcomes and responses, 
looking at why certain models of response dominate over others. Similarly Kay and 
Williams claim to advance “the first major attempt to generate an IPE of global 
  36"
health governance” (2009, 1). They argue that this more critical perspective has 
been lacking in GHG scholarship, which accepts processes and outcomes without 
analyzing causes. While IR scholars have added new perspectives to literature on 
global health, only a minority of this work engages critically with why GHG 
developed as it did, or what this demonstrates about power relationships and 
opportunities for change.  
 
2.3 The Role of CSOs in Global HIV/AIDS Governance: A Literature 
Review 
This thesis aims to contribute to the literature on the role of CSOs in global 
health governance generally, and in the global governance of the HIV/AIDS 
response in particular. This section reviews existing literature, arguing that there is 
a lack of critical empirical research on the role of CSOs in the global governance of 
the response to HIV/AIDS. It first introduces debates on CSO participation in global 
governance in general, and then focuses on the literature specifically around CSOs 
in GHG and the HIV/AIDS response. It finds that the majority of studies focus on 
local and national CSO involvement and treatment campaigns, neglecting other 
crucial areas of CSO participation, such as advocacy around other human rights 
issues, participation in HIV/AIDS institutions and role in resource governance.  
 
2.3.1 CSOs in Global Governance 
A common critique of global governance processes is that they lack 
democratic processes and accountability mechanism, being dominated by 
technical experts and rule-makers. Nanz and Steffek write, “Separating the process 
of rule-making from politically accountable institutions, global governance is argued 
to suffer a massive democratic deficit” (2004, 314). This democratic deficit results 
from lack of direct horizontal accountability, such as exists between citizens and 
states through electoral processes. Recognizing that global governance is distinctly 
different from such national governance arrangements, and therefore demands for 
direct accountability are misplaced, Benner et al. (2004) focus instead on what they 
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term “the participatory gap” in global governance. They define this as the result of 
asymmetries between those who have access to the advantages of systems of 
globalization and interdependence, and those who do not.  Recognition of this gap, 
as well as concern over the democratic deficit, has prompted questions about how 
to develop global governance models that are inclusive of a diversity of actors 
(Benner et al. 2004, 195).  
 The participation of CSOs in global governance has been presented as 
having the potential to include those otherwise excluded from global governance 
processes. CSOs, it is suggested, can act as a discursive interface between global 
governance forums and actors, and as a “global citizenry” by monitoring policy-
making, bring citizens’ concerns into deliberations, and empowering marginalized 
groups so that they can participate effectively in global politics (Nanz & Steffek 
2004, 315). Assumptions about the ability of CSOs of fulfill this role in global 
governance, as well as demand from CSOs for such opportunities, has ensured 
that their participation has become something of a norm. Scholte notes that, “Most 
global governance agencies have now devised mechanisms of one kind or another 
to engage (at least to some extent) with these initiatives from civil society 
associations” (2004, 215). 
However, while CSO participation has become accepted practice, the 
outcomes of this involvement remain debated by IR and other scholars. 
Proponents argue that, “only civil society, however, can add critical, alternative 
perspectives. The task of transnational civil society is to enable stakeholders of 
global governance to make informed judgments and choices. Civil society can (and 
should) give voice to citizens affected by regulations made at the global level” 
(Nanz & Steffek 2004, 333). In particular, cosmopolitan scholars view CSOs as 
able to represent global citizens through their campaigns for human rights and 
poverty eradication, which seek to change dominate attitudes and approaches 
(Yanacopulous & Baillie Smith 2008). Kaldor writes that the social movements of 
the 1990s, and later anti-globalization movements, “had a significant impact on 
strengthening processes of global governance, especially in the humanitarian field” 
(2003, 588). She discusses the phenomenon of “globalization from below”, and 
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sees the Seattle protests as a victory for political globalization in that activists and 
CSOs were able to build bonds of solidarity and demand change.   
Such arguments rely on a number of assumptions: such as that the 
conditions for effective participation - defined as ensuring appropriate access to 
documents and meetings; incorporating all relevant concerns of civil society into 
agendas; openness of CSOs to citizen input and adoption on issues concerning 
marginalized populations (Nanz & Steffek 2004) - can exist despite the unequal 
power relationships that shape participation, and also that CSOs that have access 
will advocate for responses that meet the needs and interests of those without 
access. In particular, cosmopolitan perspectives on the role of CSOs in global 
governance have been critiqued for failing to recognize that the majority of CSOs 
that have access to global forums are based in high-income countries, and for 
assuming these organizations can represent interests of others. Such idealist 
conceptualizations also assume that CSOs function autonomously from 
government, and rarely consider that they can represent distinctly non-
cosmopolitan interests, such as those based on fascism and racism (Lenechucha 
et al. 2010, 75).  
Recognizing these assumptions, academics from across theoretical 
perspectives have increasingly questioned expectations that CSOs are essentially 
‘good’ and representative of those otherwise marginalized.  Scholte (2004) notes 
that the activities of CSOs involved in global governance should not be taken as 
necessarily democratic and benign; as such movements also reflected dominant 
power structures, claim authority without representation, and can have both 
peacebuilding and war mongering agendas.   The 2002 Human Development 
Report similarly noted that the role of CSOs was not entirely unproblematic: “When 
such groups spring from agendas or use tactics that are contrary to democratic 
values, they can be both civil and uncivil. The rise of such groups poses challenges 
for truly democratic political engagement” (UNDP 2002, 19). The rise of racists 
groups and organizations linked to terrorism has forced theorists to recognize that 
CSOs represent a full spectrum of beliefs and aims.  
Critical questions have also emerged about exactly who, or what groups, 
CSO represent in global governance forums. Scholte notes that civil society 
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networks “often lack clearly established procedures to formulate and execute joint 
positions, so that collective decision-taking among the participating groups can be 
cumbersome and confused. Moreover, members of a civil society network 
invariably have to negotiate differences – sometimes quite considerable 
divergences – regarding priorities, analyses, strategies and tactics” (Scholte 2004, 
225). When such networks are negotiated, more powerful CSOs may exclude 
actors and groups that challenge their beliefs or approaches, raising questions as 
to whose alternatives gain greater visibility in global governances processes.  
Bebbington (2008) argues that those CSOs that represent hegemonic interests, as 
opposed to presenting alternatives, have greatest influence within global 
governance forums.  
A number authors note the importance of recognizing asymmetries of power 
between CSOs from the global north and south in global governance. Academics 
from southern contexts have critiqued the concept of global civil society. Cheru 
writes,  
 
“The fashionable notion of transnational civil society also 
masks many contradictions. While Northern and Southern 
non-governmental organizations are collaborating together 
to lobby governments through the United Nations system on 
issues of human rights, ecology, poverty and other social 
issues of global dimensions, or in co financing of community 
development projects, their strength and capacity to conduct 
human-centered transitional foreign policy, independent of 
states, are exaggerated” (1997, 167).  
 
In particular the role of northern-based NGOs, as the most prominent civil society 
actors in global governance forums is noted.  Chandhoke argues that civil society 
has become a “hurrah word” and “flattened out”: “Witness the tragedy that has 
visited proponents of the concept: people struggling against authoritarian regimes 
demanded civil society, what they got were NGOs” (2002).  The assumption that 
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civil society, and especially northern NGO involvement, is a global democratizing 
force that fulfills desires for more accountable global governance is increasingly 
challenged by such analysis.  
Nuanced analyses further note that even those CSOs with ‘good intentions’, 
or that are representative of marginalized community groups, have material 
restraints on what ideals they can represent and achieve. In particular, because 
many CSOs receive state resources, need to attain funds can influence priorities to 
the detriment of constituent interests (Scholte 2004, 224). Flinders (2005) notes 
that in such cases truncated lines of accountability often result in mixed 
partnerships that are legally independent from government and yet spend public 
funds. Similarly, Bebbington et al. note that NGOs involved in international 
development often provide few options that differ from their states’ bilateral 
priorities (2008, 2). Others argue that NGOs have become vehicles of neoliberal 
governmentality, by providing services for international financial institutions and 
governments (Townsend et al. 2002).  
It is argued that as NGOs become agents of governmentality, or service 
delivery options for states, their role as advocates for the poor declines. However, 
the distinction between service delivery and advocacy organizations can be 
superficial - providing family planning to women, for example, is as much of (or 
perhaps more of) a political act, as arguing for women’s rights to reproductive 
health care in policy forums. Chhotray (2004) argues CSOs can fill both service 
delivery and broad transformation of social and political relations functions. 
Bebbington et al, also note that some CSOs resist neoliberal pressures, though 
such CSOs tend to identify more with alternative forms of intervention, as opposed 
to systemic change (2008, 4). Such arguments point out the need for more 
sustained analysis of the opportunities and limits CSOs face in promoting 
alternatives within global governance. 
As CSOs gain access to global governance space and participate in them, 
their own accountability is scrutinized.  Many CSOs do not provide sufficient 
information about their operations, funding sources and expenditures (Benner et al. 
2004, 201). Lee writes that there has been an increasing desire to assess CSOs 
against principles of “good governance”, but little sustained research doing so (Lee 
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2010, 2). The growing role, or recognition of the role, of CSOs in global 
governance has generated calls for analysis of CSO contributions, inputs and 
outputs against principles of transparency, accountability and legitimacy. However, 
few such studies have been produced.  
In reviewing debates about the role of CSOs in global governance Benner et 
al. write that, “neither naive optimism nor full-blown pessimism are helpful. Rather, 
we should aim at a realistic assessment of the conditions under which new forms 
of networked governance can provide value added by improving global 
governance” (2004, 192). The difficulty in achieving this critical assessment, 
according to Benner et al., is the lack of empirical research on the role of civil 
society in global governance. They write, “Evidence so far is largely impressionistic 
rather than living up to strict and sound social scientific methodology” (2004, 205). 
While there have been ongoing academic and policy discussions about the role of 
CSOs in global governance since Benner et al.’s comment 10 years ago, there is 
still a paucity of historically grounded, empirical studies. Bebbington et al. note that, 
in relation to the literature on the role of NGOs,  
 
“What has perhaps been most remarkable of late is the extent 
to which these critical concerns have been allowed to pass by 
in the academic literature with very little evidence that they 
have been seriously addressed. . . .We are arguably no clearer 
now concerning questions of effectiveness, accountability and 
successful routes to scaling-up than we were when these 
questions were raised over a decade ago” (2008, 35).  
 
In other words, while the theoretical debates have continued, there has not been a 
corresponding increase in research to inform these discussions.  As an antidote to 
this lack of analysis, they advocate for more studies that approaches the concept 
of civil society “carefully, historically, conceptually and relationally” (Bebbington et 
al. 2008, 16).  
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2.3.2 CSOs in Global Health Governance 
While there is a general lack of empirical analysis of the role of CSOs in 
global governance, there is an even more prominent gap in the literature on GHG. 
Lee writes, “There is a particular need for systematic analysis of the functions 
CSOs perform in global health governance” (Lee 2010, 2). Similarly, Doyle and 
Patel (2008) note the near absence of research on the participation of CSOs in 
GHIs. This is surprising considering Bartsch and Kohlmorgen’s assertion that, 
“CSOs play a more important role in the health sector than in other sectors of 
global politics” (2007, 93). This disconnect illustrates a contradiction within the 
literature on CSOs and GHG: on the one hand there is widespread recognition of 
the prominent role CSOs fill, on the other, there is little analysis of the outcomes of 
this participation.  
Aiming to contribute to filling the gap in GHG literature on CSO participation, 
Bartsch and Kohlmorgen (2007) present a brief analysis of CSO functions as 
including: participating in conferences, establish consultative relationships, 
participating in decision-making bodies, as well as implementing health projects 
and fulfilling “self-empowerment functions”, such as representing the marginalized.  
They note that the role of CSOs in GHIs is to be both allies and watchdogs, 
suggesting that CSO’s political function is characterized by a dualism of 
cooperation and conflict (2007, 114). However, they also argue that despite the 
variety of roles and functions CSOs fill, they are among the weaker actors in GHG 
suffering from fragmentation and poor legitimacy. While presenting a starting place 
from which to discuss CSO participation in GHG, this brief analysis is based more 
on theoretical arguments than historical examples.  
More empirically, Lee (2010) analyzes CSO participation in four health 
instruments under the auspices of the WHO: the International Code on the 
Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 
International Health Regulations and Codex Alimentarius. Lee draws on Haas’ 
framework to map CSO contributions to specific governance functions. Her study 
highlights the watchdog role CSOs play in global governance, and their influence in 
formulating and implementing rules while struggling to have the capacity to enforce 
them.  She finds, “the case studies suggest that, like global governance as a 
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whole, GHG is being characterized by greater, rather than lesser, concentration of 
power in fewer hands”  (2010, 17). Lee notes the study is more descriptive than 
analytical, and that further research is needed: “Beyond this initial mapping of 
functions based on secondary sources, systematic collection of primary data 
across a fuller range of intergovernmental institutions and instruments is needed 
such as the World Bank, UNAIDS and OECD” (2010, 17).  
Lee, along with a handful of other scholars, has written extensively on the role 
of CSOs in the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which is positioned as 
a case of CSOs having particular influence in GHG. Research on the convention 
by Lencucha et al. (2010; 2011) has contributed to debates about the role of CSOs 
in global governance by arguing that the dichotomy between realist and idealist 
positions is unhelpful, as the experience of CSOs in GHG must be contextualized: 
“In contrast to the popular perspectives of idealism (NGOs as unique and 
autonomous) and realism (NGOs as funded arms of the government), our findings 
suggest that neither opposition nor conformity on the part of the NGOs 
characterize the relationship between NGOs and government” (2010, 74). They 
further note the challenges “NGO diplomats” face in both representing constituent 
interests and working within existing power relationships:  
 
“To engage in the discourse of global health diplomacy, NGO 
diplomats, meaning those NGOs who participate in the 
development and negotiation of policy or legal governance 
instruments, are immediately presented with two challenges: 
conveying the interests of larger publics, including the most 
marginalized; and contributing to inter-state negotiations in a 
predominantly state-centric system of governance that is often 
diluted by pressures from private interests or mercantilist self-
interest on the part of the state itself” (2011, 406).  
 
This analysis recognizes the dialectical relationship between the power constructs 
of GHG, and CSO’s active role supporting and/or resisting them.   
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While much of the analysis on the Tobacco Convention focuses on the 
relationships between NGOs and government around producing and enforcing the 
convention, it is likely that the complexity of relationships described in this literature 
is also relevant to the relationships between CSOs and GHIs, as well as other 
actors, in global governance processes. However, other than the discussions on 
the Tobacco Convention, and a spattering of other contributions, there is little 
research that tests theoretical assumptions about the role of CSOs in GHG.  
 
2.3.3 CSOs in Global HIV/AIDS Governance 
The response to HIV/AIDS has garnered a great deal of attention from those 
interested in both CSOs and global governance because of the notable degree of 
CSO participation in all levels of HIV/AIDS governance. As is documented in the 
following chapter, CSOs were among the first to respond to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, and used the space created by the initially slow and ineffective response 
of states and institutions to carve out a role for themselves. However, there is little 
critical reflection on the phenomena of CSO participation in global HIV/AIDS 
governance: why it emerged, how it has been structured, and what the outcomes 
have been. Parker notes, “Although it is widely recognized that grassroots activism 
and civil society mobilization have played a major role in the global response to 
HIV and AIDS, the evolving nature of this response over the 30-year history of the 
epidemic has received relatively little attention or analysis” (2011, 21). While there 
are numerous case studies of civil society involvement at the local and national 
level (see for example Burgha et al. 2004; Kelley & Birdsall 2010), there is little 
sustained and critical analysis of involvement at the global level. 
The lack of critical analysis on civil society participation in the global 
HIV/AIDS response partly stems from lack of primary research. Harman notes that 
the “Majority of NGOs have not undertaken serious or sustained evaluation of their 
work” (2012, 58). There is little self-reflective analysis from the perspective of those 
CSOs that are engaging with global HIV/AIDS governance. The three-volume 
collection, Global HIV/AIDS Politics, Policy and Activism, edited by Smith (2013), 
begins to rectify this gap by compiling multiple cases studies of CSO, and other 
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actors’, involvement in the HIV/AIDS response at local, national and global levels, 
often written by those active in the response. However, most of these entries 
describe specific processes, such as the Global Commission on the Law (Dhaliwal 
et al. 2012), as oppose to critically analyze the role of CSOs in global HIV/AIDS 
governance. The more academic research that analyzes CSO participation in 
global processes, such as contributions from Seckinelgin (2004, 2009) and Parker 
(2011), does not include primary research with the CSOs involved. As a result, 
research fails to capture nuanced aspects of struggle from below within global 
HIV/AIDS governance. 
 
The Influence of CSOs in Framing the HIV/AIDS Response 
McInnes et al. note that global health literature has only recently begun to 
consider how ideational factors shape understandings of and responses to health 
issues (2012a, S84). They apply Gitlin’s definition of frames as “persistent patterns 
of cognition, interpretation and presentation, of selection, emphasis and exclusion, 
by which symbol handlers routinely organize discourse” (1980, 7), to analyze 
competing visions of GHG. Prominent frames that are identified include: evidence-
based medicine, security, economics, development and human rights (expanded 
on further in the next chapter).  
In particular, McInnes et al. note the influential role the HIV/AIDS response 
played in shaping human-rights framings of health issues (2012, S85). Similarly, 
Sidibe et al. write, “The AIDS response has been a champion of human rights, 
addressing HIV-specific concerns as an important vehicle to achieve broader social 
justice” (2010, 5); and Kickbusch writes that the HIV/AIDS response “brought 
voices of people living with HIV/AIDS and human rights to the center of the 
dispute” (2007, vi).  Research concurs that CSOs were the driving force behind this 
human rights framing within the HIV/AIDS response(Morin 2011; Ford et al. 2011). 
The most celebrated outcome of HIV/AIDS human rights framing is the CSO 
led campaign for universal access to ART. Hien et al. write, “CSOs are analyzed as 
the main actors who brought up the issue of access to ARVs in the global conflict 
arena by linking the needs of people, whose interests are not adequately 
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represented in global politics (advocating action), with accepted global norms 
(human rights)” (2007, 14). Researchers note that activism demanding universal 
access to ART successfully challenged international trade norms and mobilized 
international resources for chronic treatment regimes in low and middle-income 
countries for the first time. O’Manique writes that prior to the HIV/AIDS response, 
the idea that health would be discussed at an international trade forum was 
unheard of, but HIV/AIDS activism brought debates over the TRIPS agreement, 
and the need for all states to have access to affordable medicines for public health, 
to the forefront of political debates (2004, 83).  Colvin (2011) notes this demand for 
international aid for a long-term syndrome was unprecedented; donors funded 
vaccines and one off treatments, but rarely chronic care requirements. The 
outcomes of universal access as a human rights are generally renowned, as the 
struggle for HIV/AIDS treatment created momentum for broader universal access 
to medicines campaigns (O’Manique 2004; Morin 2011).  
Only a handful of researchers take a critical perspective on the role of CSOs 
as advocates for universal access. Parker (2011) documents how the prioritization 
of treatment campaigns was actually contentious among CSOs, with prominent 
Western-based groups consisting mostly of gay men prioritizing treatment access, 
and groups that represented women, PWID and others arguing for greater focus on 
the structural drivers of the epidemic and inhibiting factors to accessing care - such 
as lack of housing. Morin (2011) notes that the early excitement of ART campaigns 
petered out by 2007, before even half of those in need had access, raising issues 
about the life cycle of activism around policy issues, and the ability of CSOs to 
have sustained influence. Describing local level impacts in West Africa, Nguyen 
points out that treatment provision put CSOs, and other external actors in resource 
poor contexts, in the position of deciding who lives and who dies (2010, 6). He 
documents how those PWAs in West Africa who adopted Western human rights 
frames were rewarded (often with life saving medications) by foreign CSOs through 
systems of neoliberal governmentality (2010, 109).  
Such analyses point out that though civil society activism in the HIV/AIDS 
response clearly advanced notions of health as a human right, resulting in 
remarkable gains in terms of universal access to medicines, it did so largely 
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through a framework that reflected dominant ideologies that prioritizes certain 
conceptions of rights as individual and related to access to technology. This 
recognition in turn raises questions about why treatment campaigns garnered so 
much attention in policy discussions and academic literature, compared to other 
rights struggles. Nguyen (2010) and O’Manique (2004) suggest that it is because 
treatment fit into Westerner ideas of rights as individual and achievable through 
access to commodities.  
In contrast, there is distinct lack of analysis around how CSOs have 
advanced other related rights issues in global governance spaces. Rushton (2012) 
analyzes how human rights framing lead to changes in travel restrictions for PWAs, 
but does not explicitly discuss the role of CSOs, focusing largely on the role of 
GHIs and particular leaders. While there are numerous case studies of HIV/AIDS 
CSOs struggling for social and legal rights at national and local levels, few discuss 
how CSOs engage with global advocacy networks, international institutions and 
global governance processes to advance claims.  For example, Foller and Thorn’s 
(2008) collection, The Politics of AIDS: Globalization, the State and Civil Society, 
focuses exclusively on national and local CSO responses. Similarly, Tallis (2012) 
provides a feminist analysis of struggles to promote women’s rights within the 
HIV/AIDS response, but her work is directed towards the regional, national and 
local level.  
One of the only academic articles on the role of HIV/AIDS CSOs in engaging 
with global rights campaigns focuses on sexual rights. Seckinelgin (2012) explores 
how CSOs engaged in sexual rights and HIV/AIDS movements have assumed 
leadership and representation of those who are seen as marginalized or voiceless. 
He argues this process “creates a layer of power relations within civil society, 
which in turn leads to an under-representation of the voices and demands of 
people who don’t appear in the global register of sexuality politics” (2012, 1). In 
descripting how HIV/AIDS CSOs came together in global forums to discuss sexual 
rights he illustrates the failure of northern-based CSOs to incorporate other 
perspectives, and build global solidarity on the issue. This builds on Altman’s 
(2001) early work, which predicts that campaigns for sexual rights in Western 
countries will not be easily scaled-up to the global level or translated to other 
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cultures because of lack of recognition of the diversities of understandings of 
sexuality. Both analyses illuminate the challenges of fostering global movements 
around differing concepts of rights and the complex role of CSOs within these 
processes, calling for further research on the role of CSOs in advancing global 
human rights frames.  
 
The Role of CSOs in HIV/AIDS Institutions 
The HIV/AIDS response is described as an innovative force in GHG because 
it introduced inclusive institutional governance arrangements. Williams and 
Rushton write, “The HIV/AIDS response became a key site for the proliferation of 
new institutional and organizational forms and rationalities in global health and 
development, under the banners of global public private partnerships, global health 
partnerships and global health initiatives” (2011, 2). The formal participation of 
CSOs in institutions like UNAIDS and the Global Fund, is presented as prompting 
more representative and effective institutional forums of governance. 
However, in a literature review on civil society participation in GHG 
institutions, which focuses specifically on the HIV/AIDS response, Doyle and Patel 
point out:  
 
“Little research has been conducted to test the assumptions 
underlying these claims. Current monitoring and evaluation of 
CSO activity in GHIs is superficial, concentrating mainly on 
variables that are easily measurable, such as attendance at 
meetings....  Despite this escalating prominence of CSOs, few 
questions are asked about the legitimacy of their growing role” 
(2008, 1929).  
 
Indeed only a handful of researchers take a nuanced and critical view of civil 
society participation in HIV/AIDS institutions. Attempting to weigh civil society 
involvement on scales of efficiency, Bartsch writes, “It can be argued that 
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participatory models are necessary to create input legitimacy in global governance 
... yet lack of cooperation, high transaction cost, or inefficient mechanism for 
partnership management prevail” (2007, 168).  Analyzing how participation in GHG 
impacts CSOs, Seckinelgin argues that research has to take into account how civil 
society is restricted, co-opted and limited by participation structures, language and 
norms of international institutions (2009, 299). Similarly, Rau (2006) argues that 
international organizations have little trust in the professionalism of community-led 
initiatives and use their funding power to shape civil society led interventions, 
merely adopting the language of collaboration without relinquishing bureaucratic or 
technical control.  While Seckinelgin (2009) and Rau (2006), among others, 
highlight the limits of civil society participation in GHIs, they fail to explore the 
agency of CSOs within these contexts. While discussion of dominant norms, 
language games and political structures is crucial, denying agency to groups who 
initiated the HIV/AIDS response limits the analysis to only the conservative aspects 
of struggle. 
This lack of analysis is surprising considering that the HIV/AIDS response 
introduced some of the first institutional arrangements that formally included CSOs, 
such as UNAIDS. Soon after UNAIDS’ creation Soderholm wrote, “perhaps 
UNAIDS even signals the advent of a new programmatic focus in reform efforts” 
(1997, 197). UNAIDS was recognized for being the only joint program within the 
UN system, and for being the first UN body to include civil society actors on its 
board. Furthermore, Lee argues that the formation of UNAIDS signaled a shift from 
a purely biomedical, to a multisectoral response to GHG: “In the mid-1990s, there 
is much concern that biomedical interventions alone have failed to halt the 
alarming spread of the disease......the formation of UNAIDS reflects the recognition 
that the biomedical discourse alone cannot provide a complete global policy 
response to AIDS” (Lee 2003, 26). From a bureaucratic perspective, Seckinelgin 
writes UNAIDS “created a new perspective for international 
organizations”(Seckinelgin 2009, 208). Nay (2009) argues the unique features of 
UNAIDS shaped its role as norm entrepreneur.  However, beyond recognizing 
UNAIDS as somewhat of an anomaly in the UN systems, there is little sustained 
analysis of it, or the role of CSOs within it. This may be because by the time GHG 
  50"
scholarship took off, around the turn of the millennium, the creation of the Global 
Fund, PEPFAR and World Bank Mulit-Country HIV/AIDS Program (MAP) had 
greatly surpassed UNAIDS in terms of resources and political attention, which 
consequently resulted in greater academic attention to these initiatives. 
 The role of CSOs within UNAIDS governance has received scant attention. 
In a brief analysis Ritterberger et al. argues that UNAIDS “only meets the minimum 
requirements of inclusiveness and therefore ranks as an institution of low 
inclusiveness” (2008, 3), because it includes civil society but does not give them 
voting rights. Such an analysis is superficial, for it does not recognize that the 
UNAIDS’ governance board is consensus-based and has never voted (NGO 
Delegation 2009, 20). Therefore, the relationship between voting and inclusion is 
largely symbolic. Seckinelgin (2009) provides a more in-depth, though brief, 
analysis, drawing on a 2007 review of civil society participation. He concludes that, 
“All the inequalities are maintained despite the innovative governance structure. 
From the international organization’s perspective, this is an inclusion within a 
controlled compromise that does not change the assumptions underwriting the 
system” (2009, 222). However, his research focuses on UNAIDS’ governance 
structures, and therefore neglects analysis of the agency of civil society actors both 
within and outside the institution, and how they may react to, against and within 
these structures. While UNAIDS is recognized as the first of its kind in terms of civil 
society inclusion in a GHI, the actually outcomes of CSO involvement in UNAIDS’ 
governance have not been analyzed.  
The Global Fund is also celebrated for being inclusive. Walker argues that the 
Global Fund’s unique model of governance, “signals that the multilateral landscape 
has changed and a new order is emerging” (2011, 1).   The Global Fund followed 
in UNAIDS’ footsteps, also including civil society in not only its global governance 
structures, but also in its Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs). There is 
slightly more academic consideration of civil society participation in the Global 
Fund than in UNAIDS. Ritterberger et al. argue the Global Fund “presents itself as 
an institution with a high degree of inclusiveness” (2008, 28). However, this 
analysis is limited to established procedures, not how they are actually carried out 
or their outcomes.  
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A more in-depth analysis by Bartsch (2007) notes that the partnership 
approach of the fund provides unprecedented opportunities for non-state actors to 
participate in decision-making, and facilitates communication and learning 
processes between different constituencies. However, she goes on to note this 
model “is on the other hand associated with considerable transaction costs for the 
participating actors and raises questions of the legitimacy of the political processes 
and the accountability of the Global Fund both to its stakeholders and towards the 
broader structures of global health governance” (2007, 147).  Similarly, Walker 
(2012) argues that the fund represents a notable departure from the norms of GHG 
by being inclusive of non-state actors, but that its unique structure creates new 
accountability gaps. While, identifying accountability and legitimacy challenges 
within the partnership model of the fund, Bartsch (2007) and Walker (2012) do not 
provide detailed analysis on how the involvement of civil society contributes to or 
mitigates these challenges.  
 
The Role of CSOs in Producing Global Resources for HIV/AIDS 
The HIV/AIDS response is celebrated for “raising unprecedented resources 
for health” (Spicer et al. 2010, 2).  Research documents the rise of HIV/AIDS on 
global health agendas (Shiffman et al. 2009), and the increasing role of private 
foundations and corporations in the response (Williams & Rushton 2012). There 
has also been increasing critiques of the exceptional resources generated for 
HIV/AIDS, and fierce debates over the outcomes of such vertical funding initiatives 
(see for example Nattrass & Gonsalves 2009). Foller and Thorn note the need to 
move beyond such dichotomies to more complex analysis:  
 
“Future research on the impact of international aid to AIDS 
related activities must, beyond the debate on whether 
international aid in general should be considered as ‘good 
or bad’, to provide a differentiated and nuanced analysis, 
focusing on the different institutional settings, ideological 
commitments (implicitly or explicitly expressed) and political 
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agendas of donors – how these may impact on their AIDS 
aid and what this means in terms of influence on local 
AIDS work in the Global South” (2008, 293). 
 
Ingram presents such a critical perspective, arguing that while HIV/AIDS has in the 
past presented an “exception from the neoliberal norm of scarcity,” it is now being 
subsumed back within this neoliberal discourse (Ingram 2012, 3).  He argues that 
though it started off as potentially transformative, the HIV/AIDS response has 
become increasingly entangled with corporate actors, market mechanisms and 
entrepreneurial rationalities; “an entanglement that provides resources and 
opportunities, shapes imaginative horizons in ambiguous ways” (2012, 3). He 
charts the history of HIV/AIDS resources as representing shifts within the broader 
political economy, which have now left those affected in a precarious position. He 
argues that critical theorizing of the response to HIV/AIDS needs to engage with 
the relationship of global health to the global political economy within which 
questions of scarcity and exception are posed (2012, 16). While Ingram does not 
specifically discuss the role of CSOs, his demand for a more nuanced analysis of 
claims that HIV/AIDS resources has been exceptional prompts further exploration 
of the role that CSOs have played.  
However, there is a scarcity of research on the participation of CSOs in 
generating or influencing distribution of global HIV/AIDS resources.  Tallis (2010) 
analyzes the influence of donors in shaping the gendered agenda of NGOs and 
governments, but does not consider the other side of the relationship - how CSOs 
have tried to influence donor resources for gender interventions, and what 
opportunities and limits they have experienced.  Pisani (2008) accuses NGOs of 
being co-opted by donor agendas, and being more concerned with creating highly 
paid jobs for HIV/AIDS activists than effectively responding to the epidemic, but 
this journalistic account is more of a personal reflection than based on sustained 
research. Rau argues that though CSOs have promoted alternative resource 
distribution and application systems at the community level, they have not been 
able to influence global donors to support these alternatives beyond rhetorical 
commitment:  
  53"
 
“As large donor agencies and governments adopted some of 
the language of community participation, they did not 
relinquish their control of funding and assumed expertise. 
Governments and international agencies treated community-
level civil society organizations (whether short-lived self-help 
groups or more permanent NGOs and CBOs) merely as 
implementers of programs and approaches developed from 
outside their communities” (2006, 289).  
 
However, this research is based on local service provision CSO interactions with 
donors and national governments, as opposed to CSOs who take on advocacy 
roles at the global level, and is more of a theoretical commentary than empirical 
analysis.  
There is a limited collection of literature on CSOs as the recipients of global 
HIV/AIDS funding. Harman (2007; 2009) looks at how the World Bank’s MAP 
program has structured CSO participation in HIV/AIDS governance by prioritizing 
community groups as fund recipients.  There is surprisingly little academic 
research on the role of CSOs as Principle Recipients of Global Fund grants, or of 
the role of CSOs in mobilizing resources for the Global Fund. 
PEPFAR funding decisions have perhaps generate the most academic 
analysis of the role of CSOs. Dietrich (2009) documents the influence of 
evangelical CSOs in prompting President Bush to create a global HIV/AIDS 
program. Brukhalter (2004) notes these groups influenced the drafting of the bill 
creating PEPFAR, and Evertz (2010) writes that they continue to ensure spending 
provisions around prevention campaigns, and support for faith-based groups. Such 
analyses often frame the influence of evangelical CSOs as evidence of ideology 
triumphing over evidence, demonstrating the need to recognize the potentially 
negative impacts of CSO participation (Garnette 2005). However, there is lack of 
consideration of how other types of CSOs have tried to influence PEPFAR 
spending, and of their struggles with evangelical CSO agendas.  
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 Other than the literature on evangelical influence with PEPFAR, there 
appears to be a near absence on the role of CSOs in mobilizing resources for the 
global HIV/AIDS response or influencing how these resources are distributed. The 
lack of research on the role of CSOs in global HIV/AIDS resource production is 
likely based on the assumption that CSOs are not influential actors in this sphere 
(Kickbusch 2007); that donor states and institutions are the primary sources of 
resources and decision-makers, where as CSOs are passive recipients. While the 
dominant role of public and private donors is apparent, the potential role of CSOs 
as active participants in resource production also requires critical analysis; 
especially considering the role CSOs have played in advocating for a rights-based 
response to the epidemic and as participants in funding institutions, such as the 
Global Fund. Questions remain unanswered about if CSOs have been able to 
translate rights frames into resources for rights-based interventions; if they have 
been able to influence the funding decisions of the institutions they participated in 
creating and governing; and if they have supported or challenged (and in what 
ways, and when) dominant approaches to resource use.  
 
2.4 Chapter Conclusion  
In order to fill the gaps outlined above in GHG and HIV/AIDS literature, this 
thesis applies a critical IR perspective. Global governance is conceptualized as a 
collection of overlapping struggles between hegemonic and counter hegemonic 
forces; and the role of non-state actors, particularly CSOs and institutions, is 
critically analyzed to determine opportunities and limitations on potential 
transformations. 
Throughout this analysis a number of contextual and theoretical themes are 
prevalent. One is the shifting political economy of GHG, and the HIV/AIDS 
response within it. As noted in the second section of this chapter, GHG is in 
something of a crisis, but there is little critical reflection on how the current 
(dis)order came to be. This thesis makes a contribution to critical scholarship on 
GHG, particularly by analyzing these recent changes - many of which are as of yet 
largely undocumented in the academic literature – and the outcomes that are 
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emerging during this transition. The other primary theme relates to the role of 
CSOs in governance - if, how and when they are a transformative force. This 
contributes to the global governance literature by presenting a historical grounded 
analysis of the outcomes of CSO participation.  
The theoretical framework and background structures the sub-questions: on 
how, and to what effect, CSOs have contributed to the framing, institutional 
governance and resource generation/distribution of the response. Each sub-
question aims to fill a gap in the literature: 1) As there has been lack of analysis of 
the role of CSOs in advancing the human rights frame beyond treatment, Chapter 
Three looks at how CSOs pioneered ideas about health as a human right, 
particularly focusing on campaigns for the rights of key populations and women; 2) 
As the role of CSOs in HIV/AIDS institution is often celebrated without analysis of 
governance outcomes, Chapter Four discusses the influence of CSOs within global 
HIV/AIDS institutions, and if they are able to mitigate global governance challenges 
related to legitimacy and accountability; 3) As there is little analysis of the role of 
CSOs in global resources governance, the final research chapter documents how 
they have tried to influence the mobilization and distribution of the HIV/AIDS 
response and to what effect. 
The aim is to contribute a historically grounded critical analysis of the role of 
CSOs in the global governance of the response to HIV/AIDS, analyzing not only 
what they have done and what influence they have had, but also what the 
outcomes have been both within the broader context of GHG and in relation to the 
lives of those most affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  
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3. The Role of CSOs in Framing the Global Response to 
HIV/AIDS 
3.1 Introduction  
Within critical IR ideas are conceived of as inter-subjective meanings and 
collective images of social order; they are shared notions that perpetuate habits 
and expectations of behaviour, which are durable over time, but also historically 
conditioned. Ideas play a role in bringing about change by shifting how material 
conditions are understood and responded to (Cox 2002, 48). Combining such 
approaches with social constructivism, McInnes et al. note that a focus on ideas, 
“does not mean that the material work is of no concern, but rather that the material 
and ideational interact with each other” (2012, S84). Ideational forces need to be 
explored in order to better comprehend the material world and vice versa (McInnes 
& Lee 2012a, S191). By recognizing the influence of ideas on historical forces, 
critical questions can be asked such as: why do certain ideas become dominant 
and why others do not? And how do dominant and shifting ideas reflect and shape 
authority in GHG? 
In response to such questions, scholars such as Rushton (2012), McInnes et 
al. (2012), Shiffman (2009), Lee (2009), and Kay and Williams (2009) have begun 
exploring issue framing within GHG. Shiffman defines frames as: “the way in which 
an issue is understood and portrayed publicly” (2009, 609).    Lee argues that four 
frames shape GHG: biomedicine, economics, security and human rights (2009, 
29). However, Kay and Williams note that among these various frames, there is a 
hierarchy that is “increasingly driven and structured by processes of 
commodification and liberalization in global health” (2009, 2). They demonstrate 
that, “key features of economic globalization also have concrete institutional and 
policy manifestations with regard to health, and interact with an enduring ideational 
alliance of neoliberalism and the biomedical model to intensify the scope and scale 
of the global system of disease” (2009, 2). Though competing efforts to frame 
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global health are apparent, frames related to biomedical and neoliberal approaches 
are dominate.  
Within the context of this thesis, this broad ‘nebulous’ is defined as 
biomedical neoliberalism and recognized as a product of the combination of 
medical discourse and the interests of global capital. Expressions of biomedical 
neoliberalism include, but are not limited to, the World Bank’s concept of disability 
adjusted life years (DALYS), which quantifies the value of life years lost to illness 
and injury (1993), and the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 
(2000), which links health with poverty reduction and socio-economic development.  
Most recently, at the 2014 World Economic Forum, Bill Gates announced the 
creation of a Commission on Global Health, which again reiterates this dominant 
approach in GHG by conceptualizing economic growth as a dominant solution to 
poor health outcomes, and asserting that “the international community can best 
support convergence by funding the development and delivery of new health 
technologies” (Jamison 2013, 1898). While global financial institutions and public-
private partnerships particularly promote biomedical neoliberalism, it is pervasive 
throughout GHG.  
Within such framing, neoliberal economic rationales and biomedical solutions 
shape how health is understood and responded to. Biomedical neoliberalism 
includes an understanding of ill health as primarily an issue of resources, and/or of 
physical causes, such as infection or injury; a belief that solutions are 
predominantly scientific, technical and market-based; and a preference for 
responses that are framed in evidenced-based, economic and security terms. 
While there are contestations within and around biomedical neoliberalism (Lee 
2009), it continues to dominate GHG. Alternative frames can operate within or 
against it, but cannot ignore it.  
While biomedical neoliberalism shapes both systems of disease and the 
conditions of response, the focus here is specifically on conditions of response, 
though systems of disease are intertwined and related. This chapter discusses 
how, and the extent to which, CSO involvement in global HIV/AIDS governance 
has posed alternative frames to biomedical neoliberalism. It argues that HIV/AIDS 
CSOs have promoted and adapted a human rights frame both within and in 
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struggle with biomedical neoliberalism, which has justified their participation in 
global governance forums, creating continued opportunities for transformation. The 
first sections explores how the initial failure of a biomedical response to HIV/AIDS 
and resulting concept of HIV/AIDS exceptionalism created space for HIV/AIDS 
CSOs to advance a human rights frame within the HIV/AIDS response. It then 
argues that as AIDS exceptionalism became contested, and biomedical responses 
strengthened, both HIV/AIDS CSOs influence within GHG, and the human rights 
frame, became vulnerable. The second section of the chapter focuses on how 
HIV/AIDS CSOs, and other governance actors, are adapting to this post-
exceptionalism context by advancing a key populations frame, which justifies both 
continued HIV/AIDS CSO influence and human rights considerations within the 
current version of biomedical neoliberalism. It explores the opportunities and limits 
for transformation through the key populations frame by examine specific attempts 
to address rights issues at the global level and how they interact with national/local 
struggles.  
 
3.2 From Exceptional Alternatives to the End of AIDS 
This first section demonstrates, from a historical perspective, how CSOs used 
the failure of biomedical responses to the early HIV/AIDS epidemic to advance a 
human rights frame that also increased their own participation in GHG. Both 
human rights framing and HIV/AIDS CSO participation contributed to the concept 
of AIDS exceptionalism, sometimes resisting and at other times collaborating with 
biomedical neoliberalism. However, the end of AIDS exceptionalism has coincided 
with a reassertion of biomedical neoliberal dominance that threatens both 
HIV/AIDS CSOs' influence and the rights frame. This is illustrated through analysis 
of the struggles of HIV/AIDS CSOs to influence the post-MDG health agenda. 
 
3.2.1 The Failure of Biomedical Responses and Rise of Rights Frames 
In the early 1980s, a mysterious cause of death among young men in North 
America and Western Europe resulted in hysteria and fear. The originally 
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inexplicable nature of the disease, unknown cause, and lethal result caused panic: 
“[HIV/AIDS] seemed to resurrect the true meaning of epidemic: a disease that 
spreads like wildfire, consumes lives, and then burns out, leaving devastation in its 
wake” (Fee 1995, 1478). As it was mostly young homosexual men who were 
inflicted, terms such as Gay Related Immune Disease linked sexuality with 
disease, feeding conservative discourses about punishment for ‘sinful lifestyles.’ 
Few states responded to the early epidemic proactively. 
Once HIV was identified, in 1983, it was believed that both the deaths and the 
stigma would be short lived. Margaret Heckler, US Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, stated, regarding the discovery of HIV, “Today’s discovery represents the 
triumph of science over a dreadful disease” (quoted in Behrman 2004, 14). WHO 
had recently eradicated smallpox, and faith in scientific ability to beat illness was 
high. Now the cause of AIDS was identified, it was assumed that biomedical 
solutions, such as treatment and a vaccine would quickly follow. In the meantime, 
technological public health practices, such as testing and quarantine, would 
contain the epidemic (Fee 1995, 1478). Politicians and policy-makers focused on 
supporting biomedical approaches of containment and cure, neglecting and often 
stigmatizing those already infected. 
However, HIV/AIDS presented particularly acute challenges to this 
technocratic response. On a scientific level, HIV proved difficult (and remains so) to 
develop a vaccine against, and effective treatment was not available until over 10 
years into the epidemic. At a political level, technical prevention measures, such as 
condom and clean needle provision, were opposed by right-wing political parties 
and religious groups (Fee 1995, 1479). At a public health level, the fact that 
someone could live with HIV for years without having symptoms made testing and 
quarantine difficult to implement. At a moral level, questions arose about the 
purpose of testing when there was no treatment or vaccine, as testing exposed the 
individual to considerable social risk, due to stigma and discrimination, while 
offering no medical benefit (Fee 1995, 1478).  
The lack of a quick biomedical solution resulted in public health programs that 
focused on individual behaviour change through education as prevention 
(Soderholm 1997, 122). The effectiveness of this traditional public health approach 
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was limited by the modes of transmission of HIV: sexual behaviour and drug use 
are not rational activities that are highly susceptible to change through education 
and information (Fienberg 1989, 593). Technocratic behaviour change approaches 
further lacked appreciation for the social and political context of the epidemic: “In 
these campaigns, emphasis is placed on informed individuals taking responsibility 
for not engaging in such behaviours. HIV/AIDS was seen, in this context, as a 
disease of poor technical capacity, clinical practice or personal knowledge, and 
less a disease of broader structural features” (Gamson 1988, 25). This individualist 
approach did not acknowledge the broader context of social marginalization and 
homophobia that HIV was spreading within. 
As technological approaches failed to develop a vaccine or treatment, and as 
public health approaches placed emphasis on behaviour change, often bordering 
on blaming individuals for their positive status, PWAs and their allies developed an 
alternative response. The Gay Men’s Health Crisis, founded in 1981 in New York 
City, was the first formal PWA support group, and throughout the 1980s similar 
AIDS Service Organizations (ASOs) developed across North America, Western 
Europe and Latin America (Knight 2008, 12). These were some of the first disease 
specific organizations formed by patients (Soderholm 1997, 78). Membership 
largely consisted of middle class white males who were well educated, articulate 
and professional. They rejected state sponsored campaigns that characterized 
them as statistical risk groups and as populations of disease carriers (Fee 1994, 
1478). Instead, they argued that it was not their sexual orientation or behaviours 
that were the problem, but the homophobia, stigma and discrimination that forced 
individuals to engage in risky activities, and avoid information and medical care 
(Bayer & Fairchild 2006).  
In 1983, American ASOs met in Denver and produced what became known 
as the Denver Declaration. It condemned attempts to label PWAs as victims, and 
recognized the central role of these individuals in prevention (Merson et al. 2008, 
479). A pillar of this approach was a rejection of the unequal and patronizing 
relationship between doctors and patients (Soderholm 1997, 78). This resistance to 
biomedical authority had its roots in the gay rights movements; activists had battled 
over the conception of homosexuality as an illness in previous decades and so had 
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a history of questioning the medical establishment. They applied similar strategies 
as they had used to counter homophobia to address stigma and discrimination. 
Altman writes that, “The creation of the ‘person with AIDS’ as a specific identity 
clearly drew on earlier gay models of ‘coming out’ and has been a significant factor 
in breaking down the medical dominance of the epidemic” (2001, 74). By asserting 
expertise in addressing the social aspects of the epidemic, ASOs demanded an 
equal relationship with the medical establishment. 
In the context of HIV/AIDS, biomedical authority was challenged due to the 
inability to provide treatment or a cure, while PWAs claimed authority based on the 
experience of living with the virus. At the heart of this claim was the argument that 
the individual human rights of the infected individual trumped medical prescriptions 
for healthy behaviours, risk groups and testing. PWAs rejected the positioning of 
HIV/AIDS as purely biomedical and individual, and instead framed it as a social 
and collective experience. 
The forces of the gay rights movement combined with that of health 
professionals, frustrated by watching their patients die, and human rights activists 
opposed to discrimination. This “exceptional alliance” included the gay community, 
liberal and left-wing parties, and the healthcare and psychosocial professions 
(Rosenbrock et al. 2000). Also termed, “t-shirts, white coats and suits,” these 
groups advocated for a response that recognized that HIV/AIDS was an 
exceptional health issue that required the empowerment of those most affected in 
order for prevention, at this point the only solution, to be effective (Gordenker et al. 
1995, 65). In the absence of viable biomedical alternatives, public health programs 
increasingly adopted this human rights frame that took societal-based vulnerability 
into consideration and worked with those most affected (Mann & Tarantola 1998). 
In many respects the rights based approach was successful; new infections in the 
United States fell from 130,000 in 1984 to 60,000 in 1991 (El-Sadre et al. 2010). 
 
3.2.2 A Global CSO Network 
Much of the documented history of the early HIV/AIDS movement focuses on 
the role of CSOs in North America and Western Europe, and there is little literature 
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on the early response in other parts of the world. However, in the region most 
affected, Sub-Sahara Africa, civil society was also responding to the epidemic by 
developing alternative responses. In the context of poor to non-existent health 
services, and a generalized heterosexual epidemic, the issues facing PWAs were 
different than in Western contexts. However, the stigma and discrimination that 
developed towards a disease that was related to sexual behaviour, and for which 
there was no treatment or cure, was similar. In response to this stigma, as well as 
near complete neglect by what state health systems existed, Ugandan Noerine 
Kaleeba founded The AIDS Support Organization (TASO), in 1987, after having 
nursed her husband until his death. TASO focused on supporting families who had 
to care for HIV/AIDS positive members, and on addressing stigma and 
discrimination (Hampton 1991). TASO challenged prevalent frames of blame and 
stigma by coining the phrase, ‘Living Positively’, which would become the unofficial 
slogan of the global PWA rights movement. Kaleeba remembers,  
 
“At that time the public health messages were saying 
‘Beware of AIDS, AIDS kills.’… There were no messages 
for people who were already infected. What was implied 
was that people who were already infected should die and 
get it over with. We adopted the slogan of ‘living positively 
with AIDS’ in direct defiance of that perception. We 
emphasized living rather than dying with AIDS. For us it 
was the quality rather than the quantity of life which was 
important” (quoted in Knight 2008, 12).  
 
Over the next decade similar responses developed in Western and Southern 
Africa. Responses in African communities focused on the rights of the patient to 
live free of discrimination, and on the collective experience of the community as the 
primary care provider.  Despite the different context and epidemic, this approach 
was similar to that of the exceptional alliance in North America and Western 
Europe in its rejection of purely technocratic public health approaches, focus on 
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addressing stigma and discrimination, and framing of HIV/AIDS as a collective 
social and political, as well as individual medical issue. With increasing support 
from Western NGOs, these programs adopted similar approaches to other 
HIV/AIDS CSOs by focusing on developing a sense of community among people 
with HIV/AIDS, and providing peer support and counseling (Nguyen 2010). 
 In Latin America a variety of actors became involved in the response - 
ranging for gay rights groups to the Catholic liberation theology movement. In 
Brazil, the first ASO, the AIDS Prevention and Support Group of San Paulo, was 
founded in 1985, followed by a host of similar organizations across the continent 
over the next three to five years (Parker 2011, 23). These organizations linked 
HIV/AIDS with activist movements challenging social and economic inequality, and 
poor health services.  
 In Asia, groups already engaged in struggles for the rights of sex workers 
and transgender populations became involved in the HIV/AIDS response. In 
Thailand, EMPOWER (Education Means Empowerment of Women Engaged in 
Recreation), created in 1985, began to develop AIDS-related projects and 
programs by 1988, mobilizing Thai women involved in the entertainment industry 
and in sex work (Parker 2011, 24). In 1994, the Asia Pacific Network of People 
Living with HIV/AIDS was formed to bring together various ASOs and related 
organizations from across the region. 
Processes of globalization facilitated opportunities for CSOs to share 
information and experiences. A first truly global effort to bring HIV/AIDS CSOs 
together was attempted in 1989, when Canadian activists organized a five-day pre-
meeting prior to the International AIDS Society (IAS) Conference in Montreal. 
Representatives of over 100 HIV/AIDS CSOs from around the world came together 
to discuss common issues. One participant remembers: 
 
“You know probably half the people in the room had AIDS, 
and a large number of the other half, including me, my 
partner had AIDS. So most of us, if we didn’t have AIDS 
ourselves, were involved with AIDS because of you know 
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husband, wives, partners, children. So for all of the 
differences, and not just Salvation Army versus sex workers, 
but Zambian versus Canadian... for all the differences, we 
had AIDS in common, and we all agreed that our 
governments were failing us, and we all agreed that the 
international system was failing us. So we had anger in 
common. So there was a lot of anger, but there was a lot of 
energy and a lot of excitement in discovering common 
bounds across such diverse people” (GHI Representative 
2013 #3). 
 
The unfortunately universal experiences of stigma and discrimination, and of death 
(due to lack of medical solutions), united CSOs. Diverse but shared reflections on 
mourning and loss were able to create common bonds between “the experiences 
of AIDS in inner-city San Fransciso and Newark with that of Kenyan and Zambian 
villages” (Altman 2001, 83).  Similarly, the common experience of government 
neglected (as in almost all cases CSOs had established HIV/AIDS interventions 
before official government programs were put in place) motivated CSOs to 
combine forces to demand a global response that would pressure states to act 
(Parker 2011, 24). Emerging CSO networks not only spanned countries, but also 
communities and worldviews. 
Over 300 activists from the US and Canada stayed on after the meeting to 
protest at the IAS Conference, which was primarily a medical research event. The 
activists occupied the opening ceremony stage and seats reserved for VIPs 
demanding more robust state responses, PWA participation in all HIV/AIDS related 
processes, and recognition of the human rights aspects of the epidemic. A 
newspaper headline read the following day, “the International AIDS Conference will 
never be the same,” which proved prophetic (IAS 2013). Every IAS conference 
since has included a mix of scientists and activists, policy-makers and CSOs, 
making the IAS conference “like no other medical meeting in the world.” The editor 
of the Lancet goes on to explain, “It brings together people living with HIV and their 
partners, scientists and health workers, activists and politicians, policy makers and 
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the private sector. The messages at the meeting are also like no other messages 
you will see at traditional medical conferences” (Horton 2012, 324). The claim put 
forward at the 1989 IAS conference, and reiterated at every conference since, is 
that PWAs and their allies must be involved in order to ensure an effective rights-
based response to the epidemic. The demand for CSO participation transformed 
IAS conferences from a purely biomedical affair into a unique multi-disciplinary, 
multi-actor event, including alternative messages, as well as biomedical frames. 
It would be a gross over simplification to assume that one, homogenous, 
human rights approach developed across the global network of CSOs engaged in 
the HIV/AIDS response. Western approaches of disclosure and peer support were 
adapted to local contexts around the world, and local systems of coping developed 
based on resource availability and understandings of disease. At times these 
differences resulted in divisions in the global movement.  
At the following IAS Conference, which was boycotted by some CSOs (due to 
American refusal to provide visas to PWAs) but not others, tensions remained high 
during attempts to create a formal international HIV/AIDS organization, with 
differing interpretations of rights and concepts of sexuality fracturing an already 
diverse movement:  
 
“Representatives of organized sex workers... were angered, 
because they believed that they were being treated as a 
problem, not as a group that suffered from discrimination. 
From groups of male homosexuals, some of which 
confronted the conference with strident, largely sexual 
demonstration came similar complaints.... The women’s 
caucus voted to exclude men from its meetings.... the 
African caucus voted to exclude white Europeans from its 
meetings” (Gordenker 1995, 97). 
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However, a certain level of agreement also prevailed as most groups advocated for 
greater financing and political commitment to HIV/AIDS, as well as for the 
participation of PWAs and their allies in global forums.  
Over the next few years these commonalities continued to bring CSOs 
together, despite differences between them, and umbrella CSOs were created to 
represent the global movement. In 1993, the International Council of AIDS Service 
Organizations (ICASO) was formed. In 1994, the HIV/AIDS Alliance was 
established in response to the perceived failure of WHO to mobilize a global rights-
based response (GHI Representative 2013 #3). The Global Network of People 
Living with HIV (GNP+) was formed to represent PWAs in 1992, and the 
International Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS (ICW) was formed the 
same year. Regional and faith-based networks also continued to develop over the 
next decade.  
In 1994, these networks promoted the Greater Involvement of People with 
HIV/AIDS (GIPWA) principle at the Paris AIDS Summit. As a result, 42 countries 
agreed to, “support a greater involvement of people living with HIV at 
all…levels…and to…stimulate the creation of supportive political, legal and social 
environments” (UNAIDS 2007a, 1). PWAs, and their allies, ensured that the 
framing of HIV/AIDS as a human rights issue reached the global arena, and the 
rights of PWAs to participate in global discussions was widely recognized.  
CSOs and allied epistemic communities, including some early activists who 
found themselves working in international institutions or with governments, 
promoted the human rights frame. One former activist was asked to work in the UN 
system because he was seen giving a speech at a demonstration, and appeared 
more knowledgeable about the issues than most bureaucrats (GHI Representative 
2013 #12). Another began to lobby the WHO when his partner fell ill and went on to 
work for numerous UN agencies (GHI Representative 2013 #3). Many other 
activists found work in UNAIDS and the Global Fund, when they were formed in 
1994 and 2001 respectively, as both established policies of employing PWAs and 
developed a culture of recruiting from CSOs (GHI Representative 2013 #24; GHI 
Representative 2013 #16). These individuals promoted the human rights approach 
to HIV/AIDS from inside institutions, while CSOs advocated externally.  
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The result was near universal rhetorical commitment to the human rights 
approach to the epidemic by GHIs. For example, the UNAIDS preamble states that 
its work must be based on “human rights and gender equality” (2013); the Global 
Fund “is committed to protecting and promoting human rights” (Global Fund 2013); 
the World Bank argues HIV/AIDS interventions need to protect the rights of 
vulnerable groups (2008). Epistemic communities that grew out of civil society 
movements ensured human rights language became a staple of HIV/AIDS 
programming and policy. 
Within the global governance to HIV/AIDS, the right to health and the right of 
affected communities to participate in all levels of the response to the epidemic 
became intrinsically linked. Sandoval and Cáceres note that “the ‘success’ of PWA 
organizations in becoming a global movement was related to local histories of gay 
activism, combined with worldwide mobilization to confront a pandemic, and the 
emergence of a health rights discourse” (2013, 5). Human rights claims provided 
HIV/AIDS CSOs with credibility as experts  – with their authority derived from 
experiences of human rights violations, and from being among the first to propose 
viable responses when biomedical approaches failed. The demand for 
empowerment of those most at risk added a further justification for HIV/AIDS CSO 
involvement – participation (conceived of as an empowerment activity) addressed 
a cause of the epidemic (marginalization). The relationship between rights and 
participation was cyclical, “This gives rise to another complexity: effective 
participation is dependent upon the enjoyment of other human rights, such as 
freedom of expression, and the rights to information, assembly and association” 
(Potts 2008, 2). The human rights approach to HIV/AIDS, created and advanced by 
HIV/AIDS CSOs, expanded space for their participation in GHG, which in turned 
allowed them to reassert the rights response. While other actors, such as some 
states and the emerging GHIs, also played a role in advancing the human rights 
frame, HIV/AIDS CSOs pioneered it, nurtured it and ensured its continued 
presence in GHG, justifying their own continued inclusion. 
The twin developments of increased CSO involvement in GHG and the 
HIV/AIDS response’s advancement of ideas around human rights and health 
impacted GHG. Sandoval and Cáceres note that, “HIV-related health rights 
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discourse and community mobilization have played an influence in health policy in 
general” (2013, 8). And London writes that, “Human rights, as both a normative 
framework for legal challenges and as a means to create room for active civil 
society engagement provides a fulcrum around which to challenge constraints 
imposed by globalization, both real and purported” (London et al. 2012, 12). Gable 
argues that, partly due to civil society engagement around HIV/AIDS there has 
been an “expanded application of human rights in global health governance” (2007, 
534). This, “proliferation is likely to have a positive impact on the governance of 
global health because it can expand the avenues through which a human rights 
framework or human rights norms may be used to address and improve health” 
(London et al. 2012, 8). A wide range of key informants expressed similar views; 
for example, “The huge mobilization against AIDS has had a positive ripple effect” 
(GHI Representative 2013 #11). CSOs, initially representing those most affected 
by the epidemic, mobilized both community groups and global forums to advance a 
potentially transformative alternative to the dominant biomedical response, 
enshrining both the rights frame and their participation as accepted pillars on which 
to build the global HIV/AIDS response. 
 
3.2.3 AIDS Exceptionalism 
Human rights and HIV/AIDS CSO participation fit into the broader discourse 
of AIDS exceptionalism – the idea that the HIV/AIDS epidemic demands a 
response above and beyond the norm in GHG because of the particular features 
and impacts of the epidemic. Exceptionalism was partially the result of the framing 
of the epidemic within the language of securitization and globalization – HIV/AIDS 
was viewed as a global emergency with implications for those directly and 
indirectly affected. It was argued - by policymakers, activists and academics - that 
because HIV/AIDS had widespread impacts (largely due to its projected 
demographic effects) it could weaken state systems and reverse development 
gains in hyper-endemic countries, both of which could have global impacts (Barnett 
2006).  
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This rhetoric justified a response above and beyond other health issues - 
resulting in a dramatic increase in resources for and attention towards HIV/AIDS 
(Smith et al. 2011).  In 1999, the World Bank launched its MAP. In 2002, the Global 
Fund was established to channel donor financing to country-level health programs, 
and in 2003, the Bush administration launched the US President’s Emergency Plan 
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the largest single funding stream for HIV/AIDS 
programming. Annual donor support grew from US$1.6 billion in 2002 to US$8.7 
billion in 2008. With these increased resources, HIV/AIDS programs in many highly 
affected countries expanded exponentially (Ingram 2012, 3).  
Calls for an exceptional response created opportunities for the advancement 
of the human rights frame advocated for by HIV/AIDS CSOs, and for greater CSO 
participation in global HIV/AIDS governance. Human rights became one of the key 
frames within AIDS exceptionalism - along with development and security (Rushton 
2010). Though human rights claims conflicted with biomedical neoliberalism, these 
struggles were tolerated because of (near) consensus on the exceptional nature of 
the response: “This framing of HIV/AIDS as an exceptional humanitarian 
emergency with security implications is highly significant in the context of struggles 
over neoliberal globalization because it enabled the argument that HIV/AIDS 
should be excepted from the actually existing neoliberal regime for dealing with 
infectious disease” (Ingram 2012, 6). Because HIV/AIDS was different, alternatives 
that promoted greater resource transfers to support rights and empowerment 
interventions were tolerated, and even supported, as a necessary anomaly to curb 
a global crisis.  
Exceptionalism also facilitated the continued, and growing influence of 
HIV/AIDS CSOs in GHG. Their involvement was justified based on agreement that 
such innovations were required to address the unique threat of HIV/AIDS. For 
example, as noted in the next chapter, the NGO Delegation was included in 
UNAIDS’ governance structure because of recognition that HIV/AIDS was 
exceptional, and under the condition that the unique arrangement would not set a 
precedent in the UN system. CSOs were able to negotiate a role in HIV/AIDS 
governance because HIV/AIDS was deemed different than other health issues, 
requiring a unique configuration of actors to address it. 
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The emergency rhetoric of HIV/AIDS exceptionalism also overcame political 
uneasiness and differences around human rights language.  While some powerful 
states, such as the US, were unwilling to recognize health as a human right (due, 
for example, to domestic debates over national health insurance), the need to 
respond to what was conceived of as the global emergency of HIV/AIDS in 
innovative ways overcame the more contentious political debates (CSO 
Representative 2013 #10). As a result, HIV/AIDS interventions took on a 
humanitarian approach that obscured the political elements related to universal 
health rights, instead focusing on the need to rapidly deliver services (Ingram 2009, 
98). The emergency rhetoric around the epidemic neutralized the inherently 
political nature of rights claims. 
Furthermore, exceptionalism favored the promotion of liberal human rights 
frames advanced by northern-based NGOs in the global HIV/AIDS response. 
O’Manique notes that many CSOs continued to frame empowerment as an issue of 
individual agency, divorced from social and global inequalities: “Yet the institutional 
response to AIDS in Sub-Sahara Africa remains focused on the autonomous 
individual who is to be empowered to protect herself or himself from infection” (4, 
2004). European and North American CSOs traveled to other contexts to promote 
peer support and care programs based on Western experiences of coming out with 
HIV (Nguyen 2010).  Campaigns focused on access to technologies, such as 
condoms and treatment, which supported the expansion of these markets, as 
opposed to addressing the social, economic and political challenges people at risk 
of or living with HIV/AIDS faced in applying these technologies to increase their 
wellbeing. For example, Seckinelgin (2012) notes how treatment access programs 
in Burundi focused on medical provision, neglecting issues related to food security 
- also essential for treatment to be effective.  While HIV/AIDS CSOs promoted the 
diffusions of human rights frames, these were primarily advanced through liberal 
conceptions of rights as related to individual access to technical resources. 
As a result, while CSOs often struggled against biomedical neoliberal health 
rationales (Chapman 2009), they also increasingly participated in their promotion. 
For example, CSOs often advocate private, as opposed to public, responses to 
health care, in order to bypass state systems run by governments that did not 
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abide by human rights standards. Altman writes, “Successful AIDS work implies 
both the strengthening and weakening of the state, as ‘the new public health’ 
approach demands the empowerment of non-state actors and forces recognition of 
unpopular groups and behaviours” (2001, 84). The UN General Assembly 
Declaration on HIV/AIDS (2000) noted that while the leadership of governments is 
“essential”, “their efforts should be complemented by the full and active 
participation of civil society, the business community and the private sector.”  The 
private-public partnerships that flourished within HIV/AIDS exceptionalism, created 
space for both CSOs and corporations in health care, contributing to greater 
private interests in GHG, most of which reflected a dominate biomedical neoliberal 
ethos (Ingram 2011, 3). CSO participation in HIV/AIDS governance both posed 
alternatives to biomedical neoliberalism and worked with it. 
Within the space created by exceptionalism, the coalition of CSOs, states, 
private foundations, corporations, financial institutions and GHIs achieved 
remarkable gains. The UNAIDS 2008 World AIDS Report noted that the annual 
number of AIDS deaths was finally declining - falling from 2.2 million in 2005 to 2.0 
million in 2007 - largely due to the roll out of treatment in Sub-Sahara Africa. 
Meanwhile, the number of new infections in many high prevalence countries 
stabilized as prevention efforts began to take root. The exceptional coalition, which 
brought unprecedented resources and attention to the HIV/AIDS response, was 
beginning to turn the tide on the epidemic. 
 
3.2.4 The End of AIDS (Exceptionalism) 
Since around 2007, both the privileged space for CSO participation and the 
prominence of human rights frames have been challenged by shifts within GHG 
away from AIDS exceptionalism. These shifts were indicated in key publications 
questioning the exceptional claims of the HIV/AIDS response. In 2007, Epstein 
published The Invisible Cure: Africa, the West and the Fight Against AIDS, arguing 
that exceptionalist research around HIV/AIDS failed to address the main cause of 
the epidemic – multiple concurrent partnerships – because it was not politically 
correct to discuss African sexuality in such terms. It was suggested that the 
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politicization of the epidemic negatively impacted the response. Along similar lines, 
Pisani published The Wisdom of Whores, in 2008, arguing that the linking of 
HIV/AIDS with poverty and inequality obscured the basic biology of HIV 
transmission, over complicating the response and allowing highly paid experts to 
create an “AIDS mafia” (205). It was argued that the “AIDS lobby” had garnered an 
“unfair” amount of resources, and was wasting them on socially dubious 
expenditures (Garrett 2007). The most strident, and perhaps effective, attacks 
were made by England who, in a series of editorials in the British Medical Journal 
(2007a, 2007b & 2008), openly called for an end to AIDS exceptionalism, arguing 
that the vertical prioritization of HIV/AIDS detracted resources from other, often 
more pressing, health issues.  
Arguments against HIV/AIDS exceptionalism received a robust response. 
Nattrass and Gonsalves took on the economists who said that HIV/AIDS funding 
detracted from other health issues: “the balance of evidence suggests that AIDS 
funding has not been excessive nor at the cost of other health programs. …AIDS 
spending thus did not ‘crowd out’ other health-related spending in any absolute 
sense” (2009, 5). Whiteside and Smith (2009) argued that HIV/AIDS 
exceptionalism remained relevant in high prevalence states that require foreign 
assistance to meet prevention and treatment needs. Forman (2011) wrote that 
AIDS exceptionalism should be seen as an important corrective in global health: 
that HIV/AIDS had set a standard, in terms of garnering financial support, which 
other health issues should aspire too. 
These academic and policy debates were influenced by a number of shifts in 
knowledge around and material experiences of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Improved 
evidence was replacing fears of a global generalized epidemic. For example, in 
2007, UNAIDS’ reconfigured their epidemiological statistics downward from 39.5 
million in 2006 to 33.2 million. UNAIDS explained this revision as due mainly to 
improved methodology, better surveillance by countries and changes in the key 
epidemiological assumptions used to calculate the estimates. The downward 
adjustment created the sense that the epidemic was not as bad as feared.  
Similarly, arguments that HIV/AIDS would contribute to state collapse were 
questioned by research that demonstrated a weak correlation between state 
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security and the epidemic (Barrett & Prins 2006). These factors contributed to a 
further dynamic – the fading out of emergency rhetoric. Emergencies are generally 
conceived of as short-lived, and HIV/AIDS had been framed as an emergency for a 
quarter of a century. This rationale declined along with decreased fears of 
insecurity and mass death. As treatment programs were rolled-out, deaths began 
to decline, and prevention was buttressed by evidence that people on ART were 
less likely to pass on the virus. While treatment required increased resources, it 
decreased the urgency of the response.  
The rights-based framing, promoted by HIV/AIDS CSOs, also contributed to 
the end of AIDS exceptionalism: “the right to health brought groups together but 
then returned as a boomerang in a way. If health is a human right then surely there 
is no justification for prioritizing one disease” (CSO Representative 2013 #10). For 
example, access to ART spurred a general access for medicines campaign (Morin 
2011). While this extended human rights for health arguments, it also recognized 
that HIV/AIDS was but one of many diseases (such as asthma and diabetes) that 
were chronic health concerns in high-income countries, and fatal elsewhere. 
Concurrently, the rollout of ART increased awareness about the dire need for 
stronger health systems and greater human resources for health in hyper-endemic 
contexts.  
Some HIV/AIDS activists and CSOs began calling for an expansion of the a 
rights-based response beyond vertical interventions. Vertical programs, it was 
argued, contradictorily drew resources away from health systems in order to fund 
ART, which required strong health systems in order to be distributed. Sachs and 
Pronyk (2009) suggested that the Global Fund become a Global Health Fund, in 
order to provide resources for the health systems essential to disease specific and 
general health programs. Such proposals caused conflict among HIV/AIDS CSOs - 
with some arguing for continued prioritization of HIV/AIDS and others for 
integration (CSO Representative 2013 #10; Parker 2011). As the right to HIV/AIDS 
treatment and care grew to encompass greater health rights goals, arguments for 
AIDS exceptionalism were weakened by lack of consensus.  
By 2009, it was clear that acceptance of AIDS exceptionalism was declining, 
and a renegotiation of the positioning of HIV/AIDS within global health was in 
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process. DfID reassigned a portion of its HIV/AIDS funds to maternal and child 
mortality programs and health systems strengthening. The Netherlands cut its 
HIV/AIDS spending by US$70 million (MSF 2010). Most crucially, in 2011 the 
Global Fund announced that it was cancelling new funding rounds until 2014 due 
to governance challenges and lack of donor commitments (discussed more in the 
next chapter). These developments were exacerbated by a recession in donor 
countries and competing priorities in global governance (Fidler 2009). Continued 
arguments for a more integrated approach to GHG and backlashes against 
disease specific interventions speed the end of AIDS exceptionalism. 
Within this context, biomedical neoliberalism was reasserted, with restricted 
space for alternative frames. The renewed dominance of biomedical neoliberalism 
was facilitated by two complementary dynamics in GHG: a context of perceived 
scarcity and renewed faith in biomedical science. The context of perceived scarcity 
is partially the result of the economic crisis in donor countries, beginning in 2008, 
and the resulting stagnation of funding for global health. It is also the result of the 
idea that HIV/AIDS has had more than its fair share of resources - part of the 
backlash against HIV/AIDS exceptionalism.  
Faith in biomedical solutions to the crisis has been strengthened by perceived 
technological advancements, such as improved treatment regimes and diagnostic 
abilities. Whereas early rights arguments gained traction when there was no 
treatment, cure or vaccine for HIV/AIDS, advancements in treatment has enabled 
those with access to live healthy lives for longer, and also has prevention benefits. 
Testing has become easier and more accessible, as has diagnosis and the 
treatment of opportunistic infections. Post-exposure prophylaxis is also becoming 
more accessible. In such a context, the perceived need for an alternative to 
biomedical approaches is less acute.  
In response to these two dynamics an emerging frame has been promoted by 
GHIs involved in the HIV/AIDS response – the concept of ‘the End of AIDS.’ Key 
leaders, epistemic communities and institutions argue it is possible to ‘End AIDS’ 
or achieve an ‘AIDS Free Generation’ by stopping new infections and providing 
treatment to those who are HIV positive. As one interviewee notes, “Well the 
biggest, probably the biggest change [in the HIV/AIDS response] is that people 
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dare to speak about ending AIDS” (CSO Representative 2013 #26). Following the 
2012 IAS conference the Lancet reported, “The most commonly used phrase at the 
XIX International AIDS Conference, held in Washington, DC, this week, was ‘an 
AIDS-free generation’. The frequently expressed view of almost all leaders of the 
HIV community was that an AIDS-free generation was a rapidly approaching 
reality” (Horton 2012). Hilary Clinton, then US Secretary of State, reiterated 
PEPFAR’s call for an AIDS Free Generation; UNAIDS Executive Director, Michele 
Sidibe insisted, “We can end AIDS” (Sidibe 2012). The end of AIDS framing is an 
attempt to re-galvanize support in the context of perceived scarcity. Horton notes 
that, “these words [AIDS free generation] rallied a faltering AIDS movement” 
(Horton 2012, 324). Arguments that HIV/AIDS could be ended are reiterated in 
order to advocate for a ‘final’ new injection of resources in the HIV/AIDS response.  
At the 2014 IAS conference this rhetoric was continued with reference to “the 
last mile” of the HIV/AIDS response (IAS 2012). UNAIDS introduced the slogan 
’90,90, 90” (90 percent of people living with HIV will know their status, 90 percent 
of those with diagnosed infection will be receiving sustained antiretroviral therapy, 
and 90 percent of those will have durable viral suppression), which was framed 
within the broader concept of ending AIDS. UNAIDS stated “a final set of targets is 
needed to drive progress towards the concluding chapter of the AIDS epidemic, 
promote accountability and unite diverse stakeholders in a common effort” (quoted 
in Hayward 2014, 800).  
The rational that HIV/AIDS can be ended is based on scientific and technical 
arguments. Das and Horton note, “Scientific advances have to some extent 
prompted a renewal in efforts towards achieving an AIDS-Free Generation” (2012, 
309). End of AIDS messaging celebrates technological developments related to 
treatment and prevention as enabling a final push to end the epidemic. For 
example, UNAIDS insiders argue that, “the science exists to make an AIDS-free 
generation a reality” (Buse et al. 2012).  
CSOs have been more cautious of adopting and applying the end of AIDS 
frame. The CSO ONE has instead promoted the phrase, “the beginning of the 
end,” arguing that predicting the end of AIDS is unrealistic. A minority of HIV/AIDS 
CSOs hope that the End of AIDS frame can be used to advocate for greater human 
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rights, suggesting that by recognizing that technical solutions exists, the remaining 
barriers, which they identify as human rights related, become more crucial to 
overcome:  
 
“The most significant scientific hurdles have been 
addressed. We have very effective, relatively low cost, 
relatively safe, sustainable treatment that people can be on 
for a long time and now, we know that we have, a variety, 
and there are very effective prevention interventions....So 
that kind of ratchets up the human rights challenges, 
because we have the tools now. So the human rights 
impediments become the major obstacle” (CSO 
Representative 2013 #2).  
 
From these perspectives, it is hoped that policy-makers and leaders will recognize 
that the missing piece of the puzzle to ending HIV/AIDS lies in a rights-based 
response.  
However, the majority of CSOs who see the End of AIDS frame as obscuring 
crucial rights arguments. Prominent South African activist Mark Heywood argued, 
at the 2013 International Conference on AIDS and STIs in Africa, that the end to 
AIDS frame is “misleading, potentially demobilizing, and irresponsible, and does 
not fully consider the realities on ground.” Pointing out the need to address 
persistent inequalities and human rights violations he went on to state, “Let’s 
dispose the notion of an end to AIDS. While we acknowledge that we have made 
progress, we are in a more difficult space in 2013 than we were a decade ago. The 
end of AIDS is nowhere in sight and we need to tackle the social inequalities that 
continue to impact on the AIDS response” (quoted in Akanni 2013). Similarly, Das 
and Horton write: 
 
“The science of HIV can mislead us into thinking there are 
technical solutions to the epidemic. If we could only roll out 
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more antiretroviral in the developing world, develop the 
right regimen for treatment as prevention, or develop an 
effective vaccine or the right micro biocide all will be well. 
But, in truth, the underlying challenge of HIV is only partly 
technical. A more important barrier is cultural: stigma and 
alienation apply not only to the HIV epidemic among men 
who have sex with men but also among heterosexuals” 
(2012, 309).  
 
These CSO leaders recognize the contradiction within claims to end an epidemic 
spread largely through social discrimination and marginalization, with technological 
solutions. 
Within UNAIDS, the NGO Delegation has pointed out that the end of AIDS 
framing is not explicitly rights-based: “In this regard we are also concerned with the 
lack of specifics around the language proposed on the “end of AIDS”, which unlike 
the robust 3 zero’s [UNAIDS strategy], does not have an explicit and pronounced 
focus on human rights, stigma reduction and people-centeredness” (NGO 
Delegation 2013c). The 32nd PCB meeting included extensive discussion of the 
limits and drawbacks of the end of AIDS frame, making it clear that HIV/AIDS 
CSOs find little space to advance human rights arguments within it.  
As opposed to being a new frame, the focus on technical ‘solutions’ in the 
end of AIDS frame is reminiscent of the early HIV/AIDS response, when 
government officials argued that once the virus was discovered the epidemic would 
be curbed. The US congress insisted then that, “yet another terrible disease is 
about to yield to patience, persistence and outright genius” (quoted in Fee 1995). 
Since the 1980s, the introduction of successful prevention methods, such as 
condoms, and of treatment have brought about predictions that the epidemic would 
soon be over. The messaging now is that because there is increasingly accessible 
treatment and combination prevention, the epidemic will be defeated. However, 
these technologies are not particularly new (for example, treatment has been 
available since 1998, it was just not widely available), and implementation faces 
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both old (lack of funding) and new (drug resistance) limitations. In this sense it is 
unclear what advantage the current political and economic context, with decreased 
prioritization, has in ending HIV/AIDS. The end of AIDS frames represents a 
recycling of biomedical neoliberal narratives of technical solutions, within which 
there is restricted space for human rights arguments. As opposed to presenting an 
opportunity for HIV/AIDS CSOs to propose alternatives, it represents a resurgence 
of biomedical neoliberalism. 
 
3.2.5 HIV/AIDS CSO Participation in the Post-Exceptionalism Context 
In the post-exceptionalism context of GHG both the rights-based frame and 
the role of HIV/AIDS CSOs has become precarious. Members of epistemic 
communities and institutions note that HIV/AIDS focused CSOs are lagging behind 
the shift away from AIDS exceptionalism (CSO Representative #36 2013). Harmer 
writes, “A fundamental problem within this has been the uneasy relationship 
between the state and civil society ....Civil society campaigns have maintained 
exceptionalism” (Harman 2012, 108). CSOs forged their identity, and solidified their 
right to participate in GHG, within the space provided by exceptionalism and so 
struggle to adapt to the shifting political economy of GHG. One GHI staff member 
asks:  
 
“Can civil society get out of the AIDS incubators and get 
into health dialogue? The AIDS movement is not ready or 
equipped to engage in fancy discussions on global health, 
it is totally in contradiction to the way the AIDS movement 
has been geared. Because the AIDS movement has 
always been geared on, we are dying, we have to do 
something. This is our issue.....It is not the nature of these 
organizations. If they were they wouldn’t be the 
organizations that they are. They would lose their status.” 
(GHI Representative 2013 #12) 
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Engaging in broad global health processes is difficult for HIV/AIDS CSOs because 
their influence is justified on exceptionalist grounds that typical public health 
approaches are insufficient to address the unique characteristics and threats of the 
epidemic. Now these characteristics and threats are becoming normalized, the 
relationship between HIV/AIDS CSOs and the broader public health community is 
in flux. For example, where treatment is available HIV/AIDS is changing from a 
death sentence to a chronic disease, and HIV/AIDS CSOs have no unique claim 
for chronic care resources beyond and above that of CSOs representing other 
long-term illnesses.  
 This transition is further influenced by the decline in urgency around the 
HIV/AIDS response, which changes the role of CSO advocacy and activism. One 
activist notes, “So I think activism won’t be as important as it was in the beginning. 
Where at that time it was really necessary to get press attention, to make big 
statements, to act violently” (CSO Representative 2013 #18). Dramatic 
demonstrations, such as sit and die-ins, and other activist HIV/AIDS CSO 
techniques are becoming less common. Instead HIV/AIDS CSOs note that they 
have to “be smarter” and “more sophisticated” and “find a balance” in order to 
influence current governance practices (GHI Representative 2013 #29; CSO 
Representative 2013 #23). For example, treatment activists engage in lengthy legal 
negotiations over intellectual property rights, instead of throwing blood on 
politicians. Though crucial, these processes are much more difficult to explain to 
constituencies, citizens and donors, and almost impossible to get media coverage 
for (CSO Representative 2013 #9). Morin (2011) documents how media attention 
to universal access to ART campaigns declined exponentially as the issue moved 
from high profile court cases and protest, to negotiations and legal proceedings 
with pharmaceutical companies and governments. Furthermore, as HIV/AIDS 
specific campaigns expanded to include broader access to medication issues, 
media attention and public awareness plummeted.   
Despite these challenges, HIV/AIDS CSOs argue that other health CSOs do, 
and can further learn from their example: “I think that other communities, look to 
the AIDS community to say, you guys have been so successful in terms of raising 
money, raising the profile of the issue, driving real scale up of services, so I think 
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there are a lot of lessons to be learned from the AIDS community that other 
disease are trying to tap into as well” (CSO Representative 2013 #7). The relative 
success HIV/AIDS CSOs have achieved in influencing the framing of the HIV/AIDS 
response to reflect human rights concerns is perceived as something to be 
expanded on to influence other health sectors (GHI Representative 2013 #12).  
However, the assertion that HIV/AIDS CSOs have something to teach other 
CSOs demonstrates a degree of hubris. The legacy of AIDS exceptionalism 
created a division between HIV/AIDS CSOs and other health and rights groups. 
Many CSOs involved in other health priorities resented the prioritization of AIDS 
during the period of exceptionalism. A CSO representative states: “There has 
always been some conflict between NGOs that mobilize around a vertical response 
to HIV and those that said we want, it should be health system strengthening, it 
should be money going to budget support” (Civil Society Representative 2013 #1). 
The vertical nature of AIDS exceptionalism directed great resources and attention 
to HIV/AIDS CSOs, at the perceived cost of other health issues (England 2008). 
Now that AIDS exceptionalism has declined, CSOs continue to pit HIV/AIDS 
against other health issues. Referring to a meeting about a Gates Foundation 
funded health project one observer notes: “At the start there were quite anti-HIV 
political messages: AIDS gets too much money, if a fraction of what went to HIV 
went to diarrhea, or maternal health then it would make a huge impact. And you 
saw people making presentations that showed how much money HIV got 
compared to other causes” (CSO Representative 2013 #1). In such contexts it is 
difficult for HIV/AIDS CSOs to collaborate with other health CSOs, never mind lead 
or provide an example for them. The unique involvement of HIV/AIDS CSOs in 
GHG often alienated, as opposed to inspired, other health-focused movements. 
 
Framing the Post-MDG Health Goals 
The challenges HIV/AIDS CSOs face in maintaining influence in the post 
exceptionalism context is evident in their attempts to influence the post-MDG 
agenda around health. The MDGs have guided development interventions since 
2000. Goal six specifically refers to HIV/AIDS (combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and 
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other diseases), and includes the following targets: have halted by 2015 and begun 
to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS; and have achieve, by 2010, universal access to 
treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it. The inclusion of HIV/AIDS in the 
MDGs was a coup for a then still emerging HIV/AIDS response. It was the result of 
extensive lobbying by UNAIDS, personal commitment to the issue by then UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, and advocacy efforts by HIV/AIDS CSOs (Piot & 
Marshall 2012). The inclusion of HIV/AIDS in the MDGs spurred the exceptional 
HIV/AIDS response that unfolded over the next decade.   
However, while global progress towards MDG 6 has been noted, in that HIV 
infections declined by 24 percent between 2001 and 2011, infections also more 
than double in certain regions, such as the Caucasus and Central Asia, meaning 
that the goal to halt and reverse the spread of HIV will not be met (Action for Global 
Health 2009). Meanwhile goals towards universal access to ART are still mere 
ambitions, as over 36 percent of those in need still go without. Due to this uneven 
progress, HIV/AIDS remains an unfinished MDG.  
Around 2012, as evidence of progress, or lack thereof, towards the MDGs 
began to be consolidated, global institutions, states and CSOs began to articulate 
the next version of a global development agenda. HIV/AIDS CSOs were the first 
actors to express concerns that the post-MDG process was not prioritizing 
HIV/AIDS, and to take action in response, demonstrating their sole continued 
allegiance to AIDS exceptionalism. The HIV/AIDS Alliance, in the UK, presented 
evidence supporting the continued prioritization of HIV/AIDS to DFID as early as 
October 2012 (CSO Representative 2013 #1). At an annual Freespace meeting of 
the International Civil Society Support (ICSS), in January 2013, partners noted that 
there was no organized mobilization from the HIV/AIDS response in the post-MDG 
processes, and asked ICSS to follow-up. ICSS found that HIV/AIDS was not 
present on most health agendas, and began facilitating consultations among CSOs 
(CSO Representative 2013 #26).  
HIV/AIDS CSOs, such as ICASO, led and participated in an e-discussion on 
HIV, Health and Post-2015 Agenda, sponsored by UNAIDS. Six representatives 
from civil society monitored forums on the following themes: the unfinished HIV 
agenda; AIDS, health and development; decision-making and accountability. The 
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over 200 contributions to these discussions were overwhelmingly from CSOs, who 
constantly reaffirmed the need for a rights-based response led by those most 
affected by the epidemic. One participant noted: “A key success of the AIDS 
response is that it has come, first and foremost, from the advocacy efforts of many 
affected communities and groups, without which the global response may never 
have taken off” (UNAIDS 2013). The synthesis report from the e-consultation was 
distributed to various actors involved in the post-MDG process, including 
participants of the High Level Thematic Meeting on Health.  
Despite these concerted efforts, HIV/AIDS has not been prioritized in post-
MDG planning.  In a letter to UN Secretary General, the NGO Delegation to 
UNAIDS wrote, “However, despite the unrelenting efforts, HIV currently has limited 
visibility in all the key Post 2015 documents, including the eleven thematic 
outcomes, in the High Level Panel report – and is alarmingly omitted in the recent 
report from the Open Working Group meeting on Health that was held last May” 
(NGO Delegation 2013a). When HIV/AIDS CSOs engaged with the NGO platform 
that was mobilizing around the post-MDG agenda – Beyond 2015 the World We 
Want – they found a distinct absence of HIV/AIDS in health and related position 
papers and statements (CSO Representative 2013 #9). Lack of attention to 
HIV/AIDS demonstrates that not only is AIDS exceptionalism over, but also that 
HIV/AIDS CSOs do not have the same influence, and perhaps allies, as they did 
during the original MDG framing. 
This is particularly noteworthy because overall the post-MDG process is 
perceived as including greater CSO involvement than previous processes. 
HIV/AIDS CSOs and other actors see this greater participation as evidence that the 
HIV/AIDS response has contributed transformation in GHG towards more inclusive 
global governance (CSO Representative 2013 #1); a belief that is supported by 
continued reference to the role of HIV/AIDS CSOs in previous processes. One 
report on a civil society consultation notes, “During the Town Hall meeting it was 
acknowledged that the HIV response has catalyzed a new form of activism around 
health, comprising the centrality and leadership of the people most affected by the 
epidemic; the non-negotiability of gender equality and human rights as essential to 
successful health outcomes; and the value of multi-sectorial partnerships and 
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governance models” (World We Want 2013). The precedent HIV/AIDS CSOs set in 
influencing GHG is being expanded on in the post-MDG process. However, the 
reference noted above is also the only mention of HIV/AIDS in the post-
consultation briefing, demonstrating that despite a desire to build on the history of 
activism around HIV/AIDS, it is also being regulated to the sidelines of current 
global health framing.  
 Somewhat ironically, the high level of CSO participation in the post-MDG 
process means HIV/AIDS CSOs have a difficult time getting their voice heard over 
that of other issue areas, especially due to perceptions that HIV/AIDS has already 
had more than its far share of attention and resources. The legacy of jealousy and 
division from the exceptionalism period continues to play out through CSO 
competitions to influence the post-MDG processes. One representative from an 
advocacy organization notes HIV/AIDS CSOs have to fight for space to participate 
in broader health CSO consultations, “where as before we would, it would have 
been part of the main stream NGO asks” (CSO Representative 2013 #1). Nilo 
(2013) refers to the advocacy context around the MDGs as one of “fierce 
competition”, noting that getting HIV/AIDS on to the agenda is a “huge challenge 
posed to AIDS activists.” In the crowded environment of CSO mobilization around 
the MDGs, the HIV/AIDS voice is just one of many, and one that is viewed as 
having already having had its turn.  
 Recognizing their limited power as a single issue lobby, HIV/AIDS CSOs 
have tried to work with other health related CSOs to promote continued focus on 
HIV/AIDS within universal health goals, and to ensure at least reference to human 
rights approaches to health in the final health goal. As one participant in post-MDG 
processes noted, “AIDS exceptionality is over. We have to use universal health 
coverage to promote rights” (CSO Representative 2013 #10). E-consultations 
reflected opinions from CSOs that approaches to universal health coverage could 
be complementary to human rights approaches by improving health systems for 
the under-severed and promoting integration between HIV/AIDS, sexual and 
reproductive health rights movements. Interview informants further argued that 
integration could reduce the stigma associated with HIV/AIDS by normalizing it 
(CSO Representative 2013 #18). HIV/AIDS CSOs have identified opportunities, for 
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both the HIV/AIDS response and broader health goals, to advance the rights frame 
within universal health coverage.  
  However, HIV/AIDS CSOs note that the universal health goal is 
predominantly framed with a biomedical paradigm, with limited space for human 
rights frames. There are worries that a broad health goal will become, “selective 
primary health care... a watered down alma ata”, and that it will be used to reduce 
prioritization for not only HIV/AIDS, but the universal right to health in general to 
purely biomedical approaches (CSO Representative 2013 #10). Such an approach 
will prioritize service delivery CSOs, over advocacy-based organizations that do 
not contribute to technical targets. One representative commented:  
 
“The question for us is how helpful is it [universal health 
coverage] in relations to HIV, I think the question is not a 
question any more. We see it as unhelpful. It is maybe a 
good goal in promoting health systems, but less helpful in 
terms of promoting the work that is more complex than just 
health systems, which AIDS is. HIV has to do with key 
populations, with human rights, with all these other issues, 
that are not just health system related, but are you know 
cultural, social, legal” (CSO Representative 2013 #26).  
 
CSOs fears about a universal health goal appear well founded. A draft version of 
the new Sustainable Development Goals, produced in June 2014, includes the 
health goal ‘Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages’. Under 
this universal access goal, an HIV/AIDS sub-goal is listed as, “by 2030 end 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and neglected tropical diseases”. There is no 
reference to a rights-based approach to health within the language of the draft 
health goal. 
  HIV/AIDS CSOs have written to the Secretary General to stress the need to 
“go beyond a biomedical focus” with a universal health goal, and include 
“pronounced focus on human rights, stigma reduction and people-
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centeredness”(NGO Delegation 2013a). They continue to advocate for greater 
attention to both HIV/AIDS and the right to health within the post-MDG agenda in 
international forums. At the July 2014 UNAIDS PCB an observer intervened to 
noted that,  
 
“We remain concerned, that the last report of the Open 
Working Group, HIV has not received the necessary 
attention and that sexual rights, sexuality education, 
gender identity risk to disappear from the agenda. . . .The 
need for a stronger human rights based post-2015 
Framework, with specific attention to marginalized, 
excluded and stigmatized populations, in particular 
under the health and the equality goals” (NGO Delegation 
2014a).  
 
HIV/AIDS CSO continue to voice opposition to the universal health goals that do 
not include strong rights language, but are restricted by the post-exceptionalism 
context of reasserted biomedical neoliberalism. 
 
3.2.6 Section Summary  
The failure of the medical establishment and governments to respond 
effectively to the early HIV/AIDS epidemic created space for HIV/AIDS CSOs to 
promote an alternative human rights frame within the broader context of biomedical 
neoliberalism. This frame both promoted a rights-based response to the epidemic, 
and demanded opportunities for HIV/AIDS CSO participation in GHG. The role of 
CSOs, and the rights frame they promoted, flourished during the period of AIDS 
exceptionalism, which allowed space to pose alternatives within biomedical 
neoliberalism and participatory innovations in GHG. However, the end of AIDS 
exceptionalism has resulted in a resurgence of biomedical neoliberalism, which 
threatens the rights frame and raises questions about the role of HIV/AIDS CSOs 
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in GHG. This intensified struggle is demonstrated by the lack of rights 
considerations and HIV/AIDS CSO influence in the post-MDG framing of GHG. 
Though HIV/AIDS CSOs were able to advance an alternative rights-based frame 
within GHG, ensuring their own participation in the process, the potential of such 
transformations have been curtailed by shifts in GHG that indicate a return to 
biomedical neoliberalism. 
 
3.3 From Human Rights to Key Populations 
The section above demonstrates how, in the post-AIDS exceptionalism 
context of reasserted biomedical neoliberalism, both the human rights frame and 
the role of HIV/AIDS CSOs has become vulnerable. This section analyzes how, in 
response to this shifting context, HIV/AIDS CSOs, in collaboration with institutions 
and donor states, promote the frame of key populations. It is argued that this frame 
allows inclusion of human rights and justifies the ongoing participation of civil 
society in HIV/AIDS governance, but also reflects the limitations of transmitting a 
global frame to regional and national governance processes. As there is not space 
to provide sustained analysis of the application of global frames in multiple 
contexts, pertinent examples are selected.  
 
3.3.1 Human Rights and Biomedical Neoliberalism Converge 
 ‘Key populations’ refers to those groups at higher risk of HIV infection and of 
being more greatly affected by the epidemic (UNAIDS 2011b). The term usually 
refers to PWAs and their partners, MSM, PWID, sex workers and their clients. The 
key population approach seeks to overcome the contradiction of normalizing an 
epidemic that remains exceptional for those groups that have higher prevalence 
and risk of HIV infection. Arguments within this frame counter the post-
exceptionalist context, with its shift away from HIV/AIDS and human rights, by 
arguing that for certain groups HIV/AIDS remains a prevalent threat, and that 
because key populations are neglected by public health programs and 
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marginalized by society, reaching them with prevention and treatment services 
requires rights-based interventions, usually led by CSOs.  
For example, the HIV/AIDS Alliance’s ‘What’s Preventing Prevention’ 
campaign argued that prevention efforts would only be effective when interventions 
focused on the rights of key populations. The campaign countered post-
exceptionalist arguments that HIV/AIDS prevention programs were often based on 
poor evidence (Epstein 2007), by arguing that an evidence-based approach 
identified key populations as a target group. The campaign further emphasized, 
through extensive reviews and subsequent publications that, so far, the HIV/AIDS 
response failed to prioritize key populations, a gap that was presented as the 
missing piece of the prevention puzzle. The Alliances’ campaign both addressed 
critiques of exceptionalist approaches (that they were not based on sound 
evidence), and asserted that the human rights frame was essential to the HIV/AIDS 
response.  
The key populations frame also fit into the end of AIDS discourse, outlined 
above, by suggesting that recently improved knowledge about who is most at risk 
of HIV creates new opportunities for high impact, targeted interventions. For 
example, one research institute writes,  
 
“In spite of an aggregate decline in HIV incidence 
worldwide, a growing body of epidemiological evidence 
shows that key populations continue to bear a 
disproportionately high burden of HIV infection in both low- 
and high-prevalence countries. With HIV/AIDS 
concentrated among these populations, efforts to achieve 
an AIDS-free generation will not succeed unless much 
greater attention and adequate resources are directed to 
address their HIV-related needs” (AMFAR 2013).   
 
Similarly, Smith et al. (2009) argued AIDS remains exceptional in Easter Europe 
because of high prevalence amongst key populations, such as PWID. The 
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confluence of exceptionalism arguments and end of AIDS terminology within such 
policy discussions demonstrates how the concept of key populations is adaptable 
to multiple frames. 
In addition to CSOs, GHIs and donors promote the key populations frame 
through biomedical and economic rationales, as well as human rights arguments. A 
study by the World Bank, UNPF and John Hopkins School of Public Health (2011) 
notes that technical interventions, such as condom provision and needle 
exchanges, which target key population are cost effective, as “resources need to 
target the most effective interventions, based on sound evidence.” The World Bank 
report goes on to note, “This means focusing on some of the hardest-to-reach and 
most stigmatized populations, including sex workers, people who inject drugs, and 
men who have sex with men. The public health urgency to address these key 
populations is consistent with the human rights imperative to include those most in 
need of HIV prevention, treatment, and care” (2012). Similarly, a key informant 
from the Global Fund notes that the economic recession helped spur the focus on 
key populations, as such approaches were seen as more efficient: “This is a 
positive result of austerity . . . . In countries where there is not enough resources, 
people want to know is there a way to identify three populations who represents 80 
percent of the epidemic” (GHI Representative 2013 #21). Economic and rights 
frames become mutually supportive within arguments that it is most affective to 
address the epidemic by focusing on key populations. 
The term key populations is appealing to donors and GHIs as it is politically 
palatable, suggesting a neutral and more technical approach than human rights, 
with its highly political connotations. It can also obscure just who these populations 
are, turning heroin addicts and gay men, for example, into sanitized categories 
(PWID and MSM) that require technical interventions, such as clean needles and 
condoms to address vulnerability. Through the language of key populations, it is 
argued that ensuring the rights of those most vulnerable to HIV/AIDS is both cost 
effective and efficient - representing a (perhaps uneasy) marriage of human rights 
and biomedical neoliberal rationales. 
Due to its broad appeal, the term has gained policy traction with institutions, 
policy-makers and HIV/AIDS CSOs. One representative from the Global Fund 
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states: “I think key population is becoming a buzz word, it is super sexy, and if you 
work in key populations you are cool guy... And now everybody is talking about key 
populations” (GHI Representative 2013 #21).  Reflecting this prioritization, 
PEPFAR, the WHO and UNAIDS developed a comprehensive package of services 
for key populations to guide national HIV/AIDS plans, funding requests and donor 
policies (USAID 2014). Article 29 of the 2011 UN General Assembly Political 
Declaration on HIV and AIDS specifically refers, for the first time, to the need to 
address key populations, noting “that many national HIV-prevention strategies 
inadequately focus on populations that epidemiological evidence shows are at 
higher risk, specifically men who have sex with men, people who inject drugs and 
sex workers.” The concept of key populations in the response to HIV/AIDS has 
gained widespread use and popularity. 
HIV/AIDS CSOs use the key populations frame to justify their continued 
participation in GHG through the argument that in order to provide effective 
services to key populations, participation of representatives from these groups, and 
CSOs that work with them, is required. Since most states and institutions rarely 
have positive relationships with such groups, the role of CSOs in global HIV/AIDS 
governance processes remains particularly necessary. Furthermore, though states 
may adopt the language of key populations in declarations and national plans and 
resolutions, they also often continue to criminalize, marginalize and/or neglect 
these groups, necessitating CSO involvement. The Global Fund states, “In 
particular, civil society organizations have a key role to play in reaching out to 
those key affected populations not usually reached by government services” 
(2014). HIV/AIDS CSOs have found continued space to engage in GHG and 
advocate for human rights approaches by applying the key populations frame. The 
sections that follow explore how CSOs have attempted to utilize this frame to 
advance struggles for human rights globally and what the national and local 
outcomes are. 
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3.3.2 People Who Inject Drugs  
 An editorial in the International Journal of Drug Policy argues drug issues 
rarely enter into discussions on international human rights obligations, creating a 
vacuum in which “human rights abuses flourish with little public comment” (Lines & 
Elliot 2007, 454).  These human rights violations, such as lack of access to health 
services and police harassment, increase the vulnerability of PWID to HIV infection 
and prevent them from accessing treatment when they are infected. In almost all 
regions of the world, “those who inject drugs are among the most marginalized 
people in society and unnecessarily put at increased risk of preventable [HIV] 
infections” (Persson et al. 2011, 469). As a result, PWID are one of the population 
groups with a growing epidemic, making up five to 10 percent of PWAs globally 
(UNAIDS 2013).  
Harm reduction programs, such as opiate substitutes and needle exchanges, 
have been proven to be an effective approach to preventing HIV infections and in 
helping PWID access rehabilitation services, and HIV/AIDS treatment and care 
(UNAIDS 2013). However, in countries with concentrated HIV/AIDS epidemics 
among PWID – such as those in Eastern Europe – harm reduction approaches are 
often resisted as contradicting condemnation of drug use, and PWID are 
stigmatized and criminalized. Even in most countries where harm reduction is 
available, PWID are still viewed as “bad citizens” and resources are inadequate 
(CSO Representative 2013 #18). PWID and allied CSOs have increasingly tried to 
argue that increasing access to harm reduction both prevents further spread of the 
epidemic among PWID, and is consistent with a rights-based response to the 
epidemic - arguments that are supported by extensive research on methadone 
clinics, needle exchanges and supervised injection sites (IHRA 2009). However, 
harm reduction advocates face numerous barriers, sometimes (in contexts such as 
Russia and China) as severe as harassment and imprisonment for advocacy 
efforts (IHRA 2009). As a result, “while significant progress has been made in other 
areas of the HIV response, the vast majority of people who use drugs – a 
marginalized and largely criminalized population – have been the last to benefit 
from HIV prevention, treatment and care services” (IHRA 2009, 5).  
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Global Struggles 
The key populations frame provides an opportunity to move PWID from the 
margins to the center of the HIV/AIDS response. CSOs that advocate for the rights 
of PWID have used the key populations frame to gain access to, and influence 
over, global governance forums in order to promote harm reduction as a human 
right. An example of this comes from efforts by the International Network of People 
Who Use Drugs (INPUD) – a global organization aimed to defend the rights and 
promote the health of PWID. The group initiated global lobbying efforts at the 2009 
High Level Meeting on the Commission of Narcotic Drugs, chaired by UNODC, but 
reported, “people who use drugs were made to feel extremely unwelcome and 
Executive Director Costa went out of his way to question the value of our 
participation” (Southwall 2010). INPUD representatives also joined the UK 
delegation to the UNODC, but once again found their participation was sidelined by 
the UN agency, which has a reputation of being unfriendly to civil society and of 
interpreting its commitments to CSO participation “in the most narrow terms” (IHRA 
2009). 
As a strategic move, INPUD then decided to influence UNODC through 
UNAIDS, where there was already an established practice of CSO involvement, 
and where the participation of key populations groups was encouraged (CSO 
Representative 2013 #23). INPUD used this opportunity to call for a unified 
response to injection drug use within the UN system, pointing out the vast 
differences between UNODC arguments against harm reduction and UNAIDS 
support for it, as well as varying levels of engagement with civil society. Over the 
next few years, INDUP, and other CSOs engaged in the rights of PWID, attended 
PCB meetings, sometimes sharing personal accounts of discrimination and living 
with both addiction and HIV/AIDS, and sometimes presenting efficiency arguments 
for better prevention and treatment services for PWID (CSO Representative 2013 
#23). 
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Meanwhile, organizations of PWID engaged with both UNAIDS and the WHO 
around policies related to drug use, and participated in forums with other 
stakeholders, such as an UNAIDS led dialogues with faith-based groups and key 
populations. At the December 2012 UNAIDS PCB meeting, the NGO delegate from 
INDUP outlined the success of these processes in advancing policies around the 
meaningful participation and rights of PWID, particularly in relation to harm 
reduction. However, he also noted, 
 
“Sadly our experience with UNODC, our lead cosponsor, 
could not have been more different. In three years we have 
had only three opportunities for meaningful participation 
and the absence of any systematic form of engagement 
means that civil society has very limited knowledge of 
UNODC’s plans, activities and results. This inhibits 
meaningful participation and the community watchdog 
function” (Southwall 2012). 
 
He went on to critique the Executive Director of UNODC for failing to mention harm 
reduction during his speech on World AIDS Day. This intervention by the NGO 
delegate pushed the limits of what was acceptable criticism in the UNAIDS PCB, 
and would likely not have been tolerated in many other UN bodies (CSO 
Representative 2013 #23). It was made possible by the acceptance of key 
population representation in HIV/AIDS governance, which created space for a 
PWID to challenge current UN practice.  
In many ways this was a successful engagement. Staff members of UNODC 
were impressed with civil society participation in the PCB, and advocated for 
UNODC to develop a similar model: “So the effectiveness of civil society in raising 
that issue [harm reduction] and pushing it basically lead to UNODC following this 
meeting, becoming really engaged saying, ‘we want to become, the inclusiveness 
of civil society in the PCB, we want to achieve that in UNODC” (CSO 
Representative 2013 #1). The UNODC’s Global Coordinator for HIV/AIDS invited 
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international and regional organizations to a high-level meeting at the UNODC 
headquarters in Vienna, with CSOs reporting that, “the meeting was very positive” 
(CSO Representative 2013 #23). It was also agreed that the group of NGOs would 
meet with the UNODC every six months, a meeting that was informally referred to 
as a “mini PCB,” as it mimicked UNAIDS’ inclusive format (CSO Representative 
2013 #23). While such developments may have partially resulted from leadership 
transitions within UNODC, and shifting ideas around harm reduction in general, the 
space created by the HIV/AIDS response for key population involvement 
contributed to a spillover effect that allowed for greater CSO participation in global 
drug policy in order to further promote the rights of PWID and harm reduction 
policies. 
 
Regional and National Implications 
Such opportunities to engage in global HIV/AIDS governance processes 
enable PWID to challenge national denial about the existence of PWID 
populations. Some countries, for example Rwanda and Eritrea, claim that since 
there are no reported incidents of injection drug use there is no need to report on it 
or develop programs to address it (Persson 2011, 470). Such claims are supported 
by the fact that PWID in such contexts hide from authorities, out of fear of 
prosecution, and also only access health services in the most extreme 
circumstances – greatly impeding HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment activities. In 
order to overcome state denial about PWID populations, and therefore improve 
access to services, CSOs use global HIV/AIDS governance spaces to speak out 
within the safety provided to key populations representatives. The NGO Delegation 
to UNAIDS brought a PWID from Afghanistan to a PCB meeting in order to “stop 
people from saying these things don’t exist” (GHI Representative 2013 #29). Spicer 
et al. quote a CSO respondent explaining, “I started the advocacy on the 
international stage because I felt safe there” (2011, 1752). Acceptance, and even 
encouragement, of key population participation in global HIV/AIDS forums can 
counter national repression of, and failure to recognize, PWID as a key population.  
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CSO representatives of PWID use the acceptance of key populations in 
global governance forums to influence national policies. In the Ukraine, the 
International HIV/AIDS Alliance and the GNP+, the two Global Fund grant principal 
recipients, successfully advocated for the introduction of methadone as drug 
substitution therapy, despite initial state resistance to harm reduction (Spicer et. al. 
2011). Though at one point the Ukrainian government tried to impose customs (of 
about US$2000-3000) on needles, the HIV/AIDS Alliance was importing for its 
harm reduction programs, the Alliance was able to use its influence with donor 
governments and GHIs to pressure the Ukrainian government to remove the tax 
(CSO Representative 2013 #1). Such cases demonstrate the power of global 
networks, with a shared frame, in influencing national policies and practices 
towards a rights-based approach.  
However, a disconnect persists between the empowerment opportunities in 
global forums, and the continued repression of local CSOs implementing harm 
reduction programs. Spicer et al. find that in three Eastern European countries the 
difference between international CSOs and local CSOs is distinct: “In contrast, 
smaller CSOs in all three countries with limited resources, fewer skills and less 
knowledge and experience continued to have limited influence, although some 
interviewees reported that they were starting to gain knowledge and advocacy 
experience” (2011, 1752). Though local CSOs that are members of global 
networks, and/or closely connected to international CSOs, benefit from increased 
access to resources and mentoring around advocacy, most continue to focus on 
service delivery programs as they fear government reprisals if they engage in 
advocacy (Spicer et al. 2011, 1753).  
CSOs have used the space available due to the acceptance of the key 
population frame in global HIV/AIDS governance, to promote the participation of 
PWID in global drug governance and advance acceptance of harm reduction 
policies, often subverting repressive state influences. However, the top down 
approach of HIV/AIDS CSOs and allies has yet to overcome the gap between the 
inclusiveness of global forums and restrictive national/local contexts. 
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3.3.3 Men Who Have Sex with Men  
HIV/AIDS research has demonstrated that the denial of sexual and legal 
rights, and homophobia, increases the risk of HIV infection for MSM, and prevents 
them from accessing treatment and care (Horton & Das 2012). However, the 
majority of hyper-endemic countries (such as those in Southern Africa) and 
countries with growing HIV epidemics (such as those in Eastern Europe and the 
Middle East) continue to criminalize same-sex acts. Some HIV/AIDS CSOs also 
engage in the denial of sexual rights (Seckinelgin 2012a, 2). Examination of the 
origins and power politics imbedded in this homophobia is complex and beyond the 
scope of this thesis. What is crucial here is how those HIV/AIDS CSOs that invoke 
a rights-based approach have engaged in struggles, using the key population 
frame, to promote the rights of MSM – and to what effect.  
 
Global Struggles 
Advocates for the rights of MSM have been well represented in global 
HIV/AIDS governance, and therefore do not have to fight for space as PWID did 
(as described above). Because the early HIV/AIDS movement in North America 
and Western Europe grew largely out of the gay rights movement, this component 
of the HIV/AIDS response has had extensive influence on global HIV/AIDS 
governance  (which remains located in North America and Western Europe and 
dominated by interests from these regions). This is not to deny homophobia in 
these contexts, but to simply note that HIV/AIDS CSOs representing MSM have 
not had to use the key populations frame to demand space in GHG, as this space 
had already been established. Instead the dominance of Western interests in 
advocating for the rights of MSM has influenced how the key populations frame 
has developed globally, and been transmitted to national and local contexts. 
Since the early activism of the 1980s, HIV/AIDS interventions have promoted 
global identities based on sexual behaviours, which have been overwhelming 
dominated by Western concepts of sexuality. Altman notes that the terminology 
used in HIV/AIDS sexual rights frames comes from a Western context: “Ironically 
the term ‘men who have sex with men’ was coined to reach men who rejected any 
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sense of identity based upon their sexual practices, but fairly quickly became used 
in ways which just repeated the old confusions between behaviour and identity” 
(2001, 74). Similarly, the confessional technologies of coming out as HIV positive 
are derived from the Western gay rights experience (Nguyen 2010). The prominent 
role gay rights movements played in the early response resulted in Western terms 
and practices being promoted through globalized networks to other regions. 
However, attempts to create solidarity from a distance through terms such as 
MSM, and cultural practices such as coming out, are complicated by cultural and 
personal understandings and experiences of sexuality.  As Seckinelgin notes, “sex 
is always about crossing multiple boundaries and sexuality follows from this and at 
its base it is about a crossing between the public and the private spheres” (2012, 
2). Similarly, Altman notes that, “Speaking openly of homosexuality and 
transvestism, which is often the consequence of Western influence, can unsettle 
what is accepted but not acknowledged. Indeed there is some evidence in a 
number of societies that those who proclaim themselves ‘gay’ or lesbian, that in 
seek a public identification based on their sexuality, encounter a hostility which 
may not have been previously apparent” (Altman 2001, 92). He goes on to note 
that “modern (i.e. Western) ways of being homosexual threatens not only the 
custodians of ‘traditional’ morality, they also threaten the position of ‘traditional’ 
forms of homosexuality, those which are centered around gender nonconformity 
and transvestism” (2001, 88). Western, approaches to MSM rights can exacerbate 
tensions and discrimination in other contexts by upsetting cultural norms, such as 
around privacy. This makes the construction of a global rights frame for MSM 
highly complicated as it interacts with contested identities, personal experiences 
and cultural norms.  
These complications are apparent in the attempts of Western-based 
HIV/AIDS CSOs to use the key populations frame to advocate for legal reforms in 
non-Western countries that punish homosexual acts. In 2010, CSOs, academics, 
and legal and medical professionals formed the Commonwealth HIV/AIDS Action 
Group. Together with the Commonwealth Foundation and Secretariat it launched a 
project that aimed to increase understanding of how legal frameworks that 
discriminate against key populations restrict the HIV/AIDS response. The project, 
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which collaborated with the UNAIDS Reference Group on Human Rights, lobbied 
the Commonwealth of Nations to promote law reform, with a particular focus on 
addressing anti-homosexuality laws in commonwealth countries though online 
petitions, letters to Commonwealth Ministers of Foreign Affairs (18,000 were sent), 
CSO-government dialogues and media campaigns. The extensive briefing papers 
and reports produced by the program and its partners repeatedly point out that 
ensuring MSM rights is essential for an effective HIV/AIDS response focused on 
key populations (CAAHR, HIV/AIDS Alliance 2010).  
Following this campaign, Foreign Ministers from Commonwealth countries 
agreed to recommendations that prioritized law reform for a more effective 
response to HIV/AIDS, though what actual laws would be changed and how was 
not specified. While the Commonwealth agreement was celebrated as a success 
by HIV/AIDS CSOs (HIV/AIDS Alliance 2012), there have been no known positive 
changes in anti-homosexuality laws in Commonwealth countries since. In fact, in 
January 2014, Nigeria passed legislations that will punish anyone who promotes 
gay rights with a 10-year prison sentence - the opposite type of law to that it 
agreed to at the 2012 Commonwealth meeting. In this case, the identification of 
MSM rights with key populations approaches to the epidemic failed to move 
beyond global rhetoric.  
Two factors limit the transformative potential of the Commonwealth campaign 
for MSM rights. First, the focus on legal reforms reflects a predominately liberal 
understanding of rights that neglects social, cultural and economic contexts. As 
Essa points out,  “The fact is, protective laws themselves will not change the lived 
experience of gays in most of these countries, not in their current state, at least” 
(2014). High HIV/AIDS prevalence countries with legal rights for sexual minorities, 
such as South Africa, still suffer from extreme repression of these groups, 
restricting the effectiveness of HIV/AIDS interventions. Furthermore, legal 
protection only assists those who are ‘out’ about their sexuality, as opposed to 
those who wish to keep it private. In addition to legal prosecution, MSM who 
disclose their orientation in Sub-Saharan African countries report family rejection, 
public humiliation, harassment by authorities, and ridicule by health-care workers 
(Smith et al. 2009), challenges that require a more holistic, and culturally 
  98"
appropriate, rights-based response. While changing legal environments may be a 
step in addressing the rights of key populations, it presents a technical solution to a 
social problem.  
Furthermore, promoting legal change at the global level represents an 
attempt to interfere in governance realms (legislature and judiciary) protected by 
national sovereignty. As a result, in contexts where homosexuality is conceived of 
as a Western or neocolonial import into African cultures, pressure to change laws 
can be framed is a threat to national sovereignty. Despite extensive evidence of 
same-sex acts and relationships in all contexts and cultures, the high levels of 
participation of MSM from Western contexts in the HIV/AIDS responses supports 
the impression that the focus on key populations rights is a Western led campaign, 
and resistant governments use Western dominance as an excuse to discredit 
rights claims (Essa 2014, Altman 2001). Such accusations are facilitated when 
Western leaders - such British Prime Minister, David Cameron, and US President, 
Barak Obama - speak out about the rights of MSM. And when other donor states, 
such as Netherlands and Denmark, prioritize funding for HIV/AIDS programs that 
promote the rights of MSM in Sub-Saharan Africa. These advocacy and funding 
efforts create the impression that the HIV/AIDS response is a conduit for spreading 
Western cultural preferences to other regions. Such interference results in a 
backlash, with accusations of cultural imperialism coming from both governments 
and some national CSOs (GHI Representative 2013 #11). While the key 
populations frame has drawn attention to MSM rights globally, the Western 
dominance of this particular aspect of the HIV/AIDS response limits its applicability 
in other contexts.  
 
Regional and National Implications 
However, where global actors are willing to let local organizations lead, the 
key populations frame can be linked with local conceptions of rights to protect key 
populations. Recognizing the limits on global engagement around MSM rights in 
national contexts a representative from the Global Fund (who has a long history of 
working with national and regional CSOs in Southern Africa) noted that when news 
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emerged that an HIV/AIDS activist who had spoken about the rights of MSM on 
Zambian television had been arrested she cautioned the institution and other 
colleagues to not speak until a national response was organized: “So I rang 
everyone. I altered them and said ‘this is what is happening in Zambia’, but no 
action until the Zambians tell us what to do. Because we do not want to make 
noise and this noise is not useful.... Your noise can be made useful, but in some 
instances you noise is not useful” (GHI Representative 2013 #19). The need for 
national CSO leadership on this issue was respected as not only appropriate, but 
more effective than external involvement. 
Regional HIV/AIDS CSOs, and other rights groups, took the lead in 
condemning the arrest of the activist. The HIV/AIDS Rights Alliance of Southern 
Africa (ARASA) responded by linking the denial of MSM rights with the HIV/AIDS 
key populations frame, with the Executive Director stating, “Apart from being a 
gross violation of his right to freedom of expression, Kasonkomona’s arrest and 
charge are particularly concerning because he was on a commercial television 
station, defending the rights of marginalized populations, who are not being 
reached by HIV services due to the criminalized nature of their sexual orientation 
and/or gender identity” (Clayton quoted in  ARASA 2013). ARASA used the key 
populations frame to legitimize its condemnation of the arrest, by linking the denial 
of sexual rights with the need for an effective HIV/AIDS response.  
In February 2014, Kasonkomona was acquitted of the charges against him. 
The court ruled that he had the right to speak his opinion, even when contradicting 
Zambian law and cultural norms. The ruling demonstrates that by linking sexual 
rights with another already accepted right (of freedom of speech) Kasonkomona’s 
release was allowed without violating cultural codes. This suggests that there 
maybe be further opportunities for HIV/AIDS activists to assert a rights-based 
response by drawing on local conceptions of rights, in addition to global key 
populations frames.  
ARASA has witnessed a shift in how its members, CSOs in Southern Africa, 
view sexual rights issues. Up until a few years ago ARASA partners were resistant 
to working on sexual rights, not only because of personal prejudices, but also out 
of fear of legal reprisals. However, a few years ago ARASA began dialogues with 
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partners on sexual rights. This coincided with the increase funding from donors for 
interventions that target key populations, and the high profile cases against 
HIV/AIDS activists in member countries (such as the one noted above), which 
members clearly identified as violating other human rights, such as freedom of 
speech (CSO Representative 2013 #8). One member representative explains, “All 
of a sudden our partners were being threatened for working on this issue and as a 
regional partnership, we needed to form a strong voice that stood behind these 
partners and said, wherever it exists, human right violations are wrong” (CSO 
Representative 2013 #8).  
As a result, ARASA members voted for sexual rights to be their advocacy 
priority during 2013. They promoted this agenda in international forums, such as at 
the WHO and UNAIDS/UNDP Human Rights Reference group; at regional level, 
through advocacy targeting the South African Development Community, and at the 
national level by lobbying governments, and locally by challenging homophobic 
attitudes. They produced reports, and engaged in advocacy activities, particularly 
exploring interactions between sexual rights, African cultures and Christian values. 
While the outcomes of these initiatives are hard to measure, the ability of ARASA 
to foster ongoing discussions about key populations rights suggests that where 
global solidarity around sexual identity is limited, regional and national mobilization 
presents possibilities when such rights are linked to domestic understandings of 
justice. Furthermore, it may be that the global campaigns, while creating a 
backlash against MSM rights, have also provided resources to build local struggles 
around sexual rights, fostering further potential for change. 
 
3.3.4 Sex Workers 
HIV/AIDS CSOs have used the key populations frame to shift policy 
discussions around sex work. Sex workers are 14 times more like to be infected 
with HIV than their peers and so are identified as a key population in the response 
to HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS 2013). The identification of sex workers as a key population 
has directed resources towards sex worker rights initiatives. Currently, HIV/AIDS 
programs provide the majority of global funding for sex worker support 
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interventions, providing crucial resources for programs that are chronically 
underfunded (OSI 2006). The key populations frame has also generated 
government and donor attention towards sex work. Representatives from sex 
worker organizations in India state, “The country woke up to issues of sex workers, 
only when HIV became a threat. Till then, about a million female sex workers in this 
country were a silent minority; preferably forgotten” (Pragati 2012). The key 
populations frame has increased attention and resources to addressing the 
vulnerability of sex workers. 
However, recognition of the vulnerability of sex workers does not always have 
positive effects. Brijnath notes that the correlation between HIV and sex work “has 
seen an additional layer of discrimination leveled at urban women who in addition 
to having to endure the stigma of whore, are also characterized as repositories of 
infection and disease” (Brijnath 2007, 378). Similarly, Scambler and Paoli note that 
emergence of HIV/AIDS resurrected the association of sex work with sexually 
transmitted infections (STIs) (2008, 1853). Such stigma is exacerbated by a 
continuing focus on sex workers as ‘the problem’ with little attention paid to their 
clients (O'Manique 2004, 28). Negative attitudes towards sex work mean that the 
key populations frame within the HIV/AIDS response can be either repressive or 
transformative – and in practice has played out as a mix of both. 
 
Global Struggles 
The identification of sex workers as a key population brought the HIV/AIDS 
response into complex struggles over conceptions of rights. Some international 
women’s organizations, and other CSOs, argue that sex work is universally 
degrading and must be criminalized. These abolitionist approaches to sex work 
focus on enforcing legal punishments for buying and selling sex, and on providing 
economic alternatives for sex workers. While this approach is more acceptable 
within biomedical neoliberalism because of the focus on legalities, and integration 
into the formal economy, and is supported by a number of religious organization, it 
is generally opposed by people who do, or have, worked in the sex trade as 
stigmatizing, responsible for driving sex work underground where it is more 
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dangerous, and failing to promote the rights of sex workers who do not, or cannot, 
leave the trade.  
In contrast, advocates of a ‘sex-positive’ approach argue that sex work should 
be decriminalized to ensure workers have access to public health, state protection 
and legal services, and that empowerment interventions should respect the rights 
of sex workers whether they leave the trade or not (Ahmed 2011). Sex-positive 
activists have used the key populations frame of the HIV/AIDS response to counter 
abolitionist approaches to sex work.  
In 2007, when UNAIDS statements shifted from sex-positive, to abolitionist 
approaches (probably due to American influence4), NGO delegates at the UNAIDS 
PCB lobbied on behalf of sex worker rights. The NGO meeting report noted:  
 
“Following the UNAIDS Guidance Note on HIV and Sex Work 
was released in April 2007, there has been extensive criticism 
from networks of sex workers and sex work projects from across 
the world due to the undermining of a human rights-based 
approach and the promotion of repressive approaches to sex 
work and HIV, which are known to have an adverse impact on 
working conditions, and increasing stigma surrounding sex work 
“ (quoted in Ahmed 2011, 240).  
 
CSOs used HIV/AIDS governance forums to argue that an abolitionist approach to 
sex work was ineffective and repressive.  
 In response UNAIDS formed an advisory group with the Global Network of 
Sex Trade Projects. Based on the advice of this group, and continued emphasis on 
creating enabling legal environments for key populations, UNAIDS shifted its 
policies back towards decriminalization. In addition, the UNDP led Global 
Commission on HIV and the Law, made up of UN and civil society actors, took up 
the cause of sex workers, explicitly advocating for decriminalization. These actions 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
4"The"US"government"has"consistently"supported"abolitionist"approaches"to"sex"work,"more"on"which"will"be"
discussed"in"Chapter"Five.""
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culminated in 2013, with the WHO publishing a guide for implementing health 
projects with sex workers, which openly called for decriminalization and a rights-
based response. By arguing that a sex-positive approach to sex worker was 
essential to an effective global HIV/AIDS response, HIV/AIDS and sex-worker 
rights CSOs were able to influence the policies and statements of GHIs.  
 
Regional and National Implications 
Ahmed notes “sex-positive feminists are attempting to use top-down global 
governance structures to constrain the power of national authorities at the state 
and local level. This form of activism allows sex workers to mobilize both for work 
and for health purposes” (2011, 240). HIV/AIDS CSOs advocating for the rights of 
sex workers use global forums and policies to influence national policies. For 
example, following the Human Rights Reference Group’s campaigns and UNAIDS 
shift in policy to promote decriminalization of sex work, Vietnam stopped putting 
sex workers in rehabilitation centres (GHI representative 2013 #32). Global 
HIV/AIDS governance forums have become a site of struggle where the key 
populations frame draws attention to sex worker rights, and creates opportunities 
to influence national policies. 
However, the influence of these global processes is less notable in high-
income countries. In February 2014, the European Parliament voted in favour of a 
resolution to adopted the Nordic model towards sex work throughout the region, 
putting pressure on member states to revise their stance on sex work inline with 
this policy. The Nordic model - so named because it is implemented in Sweden, 
Norway and Iceland - criminalizes buying and benefiting from the profits of sex 
work, but does not criminalize selling sex. This approach is supported by some 
radical feminist, who argue any subjugation of a woman’s body is violence against 
all women, and by religious groups who view it as punishing the purchasers of sex, 
not those selling sex, who they argue are victims (Ahmed 2011). Supporters of the 
Nordic model argue prostitution is inherently wrong and that all sex workers are 
victims, forced into the trade by others or circumstances. While sex workers should 
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not be punished themselves, prostitution ought to be eliminated by decreasing 
demand by criminalizing buying sex. 
The Nordic model contradicts both WHO and UNAIDS policy, and is generally 
condemned by sex worker organizations and HIV/AIDS CSOs as inhibiting, not 
supporting, a rights-based approach to sex work and HIV/AIDS. Because the 
Nordic model prohibits buying sex, workers are isolated to obscure locations where 
their clients are not at risk of getting caught. In such places sex workers are less 
able to screen potentially dangerous clients, such as those who do not want to use 
condoms or who are violent. Clients are also unlikely to report abuse they may 
witness in brothels for fear of prosecution. Because the Nordic model prohibits 
benefiting from the income of sex workers, workers cannot employ bodyguards to 
protect themselves from unprotected and violent sex (Ka Hon Chu & Glass 2013). 
According to key informants, the Nordic model increases risk of HIV infection and 
prohibits sex workers from accessing health services: “We have seen so much 
evidence that the control sex workers have over their working conditions, including 
protecting themselves from HIV, has a huge impact in driving this wedge between 
sex workers and health care” (CSO Representative 2014 #37).  
A coalition of 450 civil society organizations and 45 researchers protested the 
European Parliament’s acceptance of the Nordic model (ICRSE 2014). Some 
member states, such as Germany, have also publicly expressed resistance to the 
Nordic model. However, the European Parliament’s adoption of this approach 
demonstrates the limits of global guidelines - such as those promoted by UNAIDS 
and WHO - to influence regional processes.  
The concept of the Nordic model has spread across the Atlantic, where 
struggles for rights-based approaches to sex work gain little traction from 
international process. For example, the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network played 
a key role on the UNAIDS Human Rights Reference Group and Global 
Commission on HIV/AIDS and the law, promoting decriminalization of sex work as 
best HIV/AIDS practice. It also played a key role in efforts to reform sex-work 
conditions in Canada. However the Legal Network has not had the same influence 
with its own government as with the GHIs.  
  105"
In 2007, the HIV/AIDS Legal Network combined forces with other CSOs to 
take the Canadian government to court over existing sex-work related legislation, 
which it argued violated the country’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, by forcing 
sex workers to work in unsafe locations and prohibiting them from taking measures 
to protect themselves (both working out of a brothel and hiring a body guard were 
prohibited under the legislation, forcing workers on to the streets without any 
security). In December 2013, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the plaintiff, and 
gave the Canadian government one year to develop new legislation that ensured 
sex workers could exercise their constitutional rights (Bennett 2013). This decision 
was heralded by HIV/AIDS and sex worker CSOs has an opportunity to 
decriminalize sex work, inline with the global standards set by the WHO and 
UNAIDS.  
The new legislation, introduced in May 2014 and deemed ‘a Canadian Model’ 
by the government, reflects many aspects of the Nordic Model, while also 
criminalizing further activities related to sex work, such as communicating for the 
purposes of selling sex in certain locations and prohibiting the advertising of sexual 
services. Both Canadian and global HIV/AIDS and sex worker rights CSOs argue 
these provisions contradict a rights-based approach to HIV prevention and sex 
work (Smith 2014).  
Despite continued reference to global guidelines and research, these CSOs 
have been unable to shift the Canadian government’s position. Instead of relying 
on global frames and policies, national CSOs will have to bring another 
constitutional challenge against the legislation. This is expected to take between 
three and five years, and as one representative of a CSO preparing for this 
eventuality notes, “The sad reality is that in the meantime circumstances on the 
ground for sex workers are not going to change. These laws go further than the 
previous laws did in terms of creating an environment where sex workers are far 
more vulnerable to exploitation and violence" (CSO Representative 2014, #37). 
Despite continued global efforts to use the key populations frame to advance sex-
positive approaches to sex work, implementation continues to be restricted by 
competing approaches to sex worker rights and the disconnect between global, 
regional and national policy processes.  
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3.3.5 Other Populations – Women’s Rights 
The experiences of HIV/AIDS CSOs in advocating for the rights of sex 
workers as a key population demonstrates the limits of applying global frames to 
regional and national struggles. A further limitation relates to those human rights 
issues that do not fit within the key population paradigm – such as women’s rights.  
Women, though the majority of PWAs (making up 60 percent of PWA worldwide), 
are not a ‘key population’ in their own right, but are only so in specific 
circumstances (particularly when they are giving birth or breastfeeding). It is 
argued here that despite concerted efforts by HIV/AIDS CSOs, women’s rights 
have remained a neglected priority within the rights-based response, a 
marginalization that the key populations frame continues, as oppose to overcomes. 
 
Global Struggles 
As the early HIV/AIDS response focused on the plight of gay men in Western 
countries, attention to the initial impact of the epidemic on women was delayed 
(O’Manique 2004, 22). However, as data from Sub-Saharan Africa improved, and 
evidence emerged that, in the context of a generalized epidemic, women were 
most vulnerable, calls for specific attention to the biological and social factors that 
put women at risk developed. HIV/AIDS CSOs, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
began linking arguments for women’s rights with the rights frame of the HIV/AIDS 
response. 5 This frame convergence occurred at an opportune time; the rise of 
HIV/AIDS on international agendas coincided with increased attention to women’s 
rights; the international women’s rights movement achieved status in global 
governance forums with the Beijing Declaration in 1995, the same year UNAIDS 
was formed. Braun and Dreiling write, “With support from transnational networks 
and international agencies, the re-framing of women’s grievances into a human 
rights language occurred as the HIV/AIDS crisis peaked” (2010, 468).  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
5 The terms ‘gender’ and ‘gender equality’ are used most often in HIV/AIDS publications, 
representing the adoption of gender mainstreaming. However, as in the majority of cases this refers 
specifically to the unequal position of women compared to men, I use the term ‘women’s rights’. 
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Women’s rights activists recognized that in order to achieve long-standing 
goals around women’s sexual and reproductive rights they needed to cooperate 
with other organizations, international institutions, and social movements, and 
found allies in the HIV/AIDS response (Tallis 2012). The creation of organizations, 
such as UNAIDS and the Global Fund, provided opportunities for women’s rights 
focused CSOs to participate in global forums, “bringing together women’s rights 
claims with health” (Braun & Dreiling 2010, 469). CSOs concerned with women’s 
rights dedicated time and resources to engaging in these processed by serving on 
boards and advisory bodies, and participating in organizations, such as the Global 
Commission on Women and HIV/AIDS. The relative openness of HIV/AIDS 
institutions to civil society participation, and adoption of human rights frames, 
suggested that the global HIV/AIDS response could provide an opportunity to 
advance women’s rights.  
However, the ability of CSOs to use HIV/AIDS governance institutions as an 
entry point to transform women’s rights was restricted by the dominance of state 
power. Describing early efforts within WHO, Booth (1998) argues that “femocrats” 
were caught in a contradiction of promoting a global vision of social and political 
change, and pressure to conform to organizational norms that prioritized state 
sovereignty. Within these norms there were few opportunities to challenge state 
policies to advance women’s health related rights. 
While it might be argued that a more multi-actor approach has developed 
since Booth’s analysis in 1998, women’s rights advocates engaged with current 
GHIs continue to struggle to promote women’s rights. A review of the primary 
institutions in the global governance of the HIV/AIDS response (UNAIDS, 
PEPFAR, World Bank, WHO and Global Fund), suggests efforts to advance 
women’s rights have had limited impacts in a context that is dominated by state 
priorities (Fleischman 2008, 5). For example, Fleischman notes that,  
 
“World Bank officials stress that the institution is demand 
driven i.e. directed by the expressed needs of their clients—
national governments—and that its assistance is developed 
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largely in consultation with these governments, with some 
civil society participation, and in collaboration with other 
development partners and donors. Accordingly, the issues of 
both gender and AIDS have to be prioritized by the country 
itself, which is not often the case” (2008, 7).  
 
Similarly, a CSO representative who advocates for greater attention to women’s 
rights in the UNAIDS PCB notes that, “it is pretty difficult to tell a country want to do 
– Egypt and Iran and some of the other countries. .... And one of the things, 
especially Egypt keeps popping up, [and saying] well that’s interfering with 
sovereignty, you are telling us how to run our country” (CSO Representative 2013 
#15). Advocates for women’s rights have been unable to overcome the rigidity of 
state-based systems that respond to the interests of governments before women 
affected by HIV/AIDS (whose interests are rarely represented by government). As 
a result, as one advocate notes, “I don’t know that the AIDS response has made 
any huge, significant changes [in relation to women’s rights], but I think what it has 
done is brought to the surface more for the discussion. It has raised awareness 
around it more and they are certainly pushing it more in their policies, it just that 
getting countries to do anything about it” (CSO Representative 2013 #15). 
HIV/AIDS institutions have not proven to be a fruitful site for struggles towards 
greater gender equality.  
The Global Fund, with its public-private partnership model suggests an 
opportunity to challenge state dominance. However, a NGO observer to the Global 
Fund also notes that, “they use country ownership as an excuse for not addressing 
women’s rights” (CSO Representative 2013 #25). CSOs, attempted to overcome 
this resistance by recommending, at the 2011 Partnership Forum, that the Fund 
developed a gender strategy, which it did.  It then hired one person (in a 
Secretariat of over 200) to implement this strategy, did not provide a budget for 
implementation, and did not communicate the strategy to staff, fund recipients, 
donors or other partners (ATHENA 2013). Therefore, it is not surprising that all 
three external evaluations of the gender strategy are damning. The most recent 
review, lead by the ATHENA network of southern based CSOs involved in 
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HIV/AIDS and gender interventions, said that the strategy was “commendably 
progressive on paper,” but that it had not been adequately budgeted, that its 
implementation has been limited, and that no adequate communications strategy 
has been launched to explain or promote it. As a result, “many people remain 
unaware of the existence of the GES and the importance assigned to addressing 
gender equality through the Global Fund” (ASAP 2013). This lack of follow through 
on commitments to promoting gender equality demonstrates the persistent neglect 
of women’s rights in the largest donor organization of the HIV/AIDS response.  
The increased focus on key populations threatens to exacerbate this 
marginalization of women’s rights agendas within the global governance of the 
HIV/AIDS response, and to divert attention and resources. In most cases, 
definitions of key populations do not include women, focusing solely on MSM, 
PWID, and sex workers. The prominence of the key populations frame has focused 
attention and resources to these groups. For example, CSOs from Southern Africa 
report that they are having to shift resources away from programs that focus on 
women to those that focus on key population groups: “Because the LGTB 
advocacy and the advocacy around key populations is really strong, some of the 
money is shifting that way... funding for home-based care and women is 
decreasing” (CSO Representative 2013 #8). In a context of perceived resources 
scarcity, the key populations frames diverts HIV/AIDS resources and attention 
away from struggles for women’s rights.  
Within current global HIV/AIDS policy, women are only identified as ‘key’ to 
the HIV/AIDS response as mothers who might pass on the virus to their children. 
Booth (1998) argues that the HIV/AIDS response frames women as either 
“mothers or whores”, and in either case as a source of infection. In other words, 
women’s issues are only considered if they are sex workers (within the confines 
discussed above) or mothers, but the general experience of women living with and 
affected by HIV is neglected.  
Global programs reflect this perception, placing a particular emphasis on 
preventing vertical transmission (from mother to child), obscuring principles of 
women’s right to health for its own sake. For example, UNAIDS and PEPFAR are 
implementing a ‘Global Plan Towards the Elimination of New Infections Among 
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Children by 2015 and Keeping Their Mothers Alive’. In response to the plan’s most 
recent report, the President of CSO Family Care International expressed frustration 
that it “almost completely ignores the second target [keeping mother’s alive]”, and 
goes on to note that the 15 page report only includes “one glancing” reference to 
the fact that women have the right to ART for their own sake (Starrs 2013). Her 
commentary represents a continued frustration by women’s rights advocates, 
around the failure of HIV/AIDS interventions and policies to recognize women’s 
rights as essential to the response, beyond their role as mothers. The identification 
of women as key to the HIV/AIDS response only when they are pregnant or 
breastfeeding fails to transform ideas about women’s right to health - and neglects 
HIV positive women who are not mothers. 
 
Regional and National Implications 
The recent rollout of Option B+ demonstrates the continued lack of 
consideration of women’s rights and focus on vertical transmission, as well as 
prevalence and limits of biomedical neoliberal approaches to rights issues, which 
CSOs have tried to challenge. Option B+ is the method of starting HIV positive 
pregnant women on treatment even when their CD4 count is above 350 (the usual 
threshold for starting treatment), and keeping them on treatment for the duration of 
their life.6 The rational is that this introduces treatment when women are in health 
facilities, access they may not normally enjoy, and is highly effective in preventing 
vertical transmission. It also includes a simplified ART regime of one pill, as 
opposed to the combination methods provided to pregnant women in better-
resourced contexts. Option B+ is deemed cost-effective: “potentially saving more 
than 250,000 maternal life years, compared to other practices of preventing vertical 
transmission, and yields incremental cost effectiveness ratios of US$ 455 per life 
year gained over current practices” (Fasawe et al. 2013, e57778). A further benefit 
is that PWAs on ART are less likely to pass on HIV to sexual partners – therefore 
Option B+ has prevention impacts. As a result, Option B+ is celebrated by 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
6"This"differs"from"Option"A"and"Option"B,"under"which"women"stop"treatment"after"having"given"birth"or"
stopped"breast"feeding"respectively,"and"then"return"to"treatment"when"their"CD4"count"falls"below"350"
(WHO"2013)"
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UNAIDS, UNICEF and WHO as a powerful new tool for preventing vertical 
infection. A UNICEF document reads, “this new approach called ‘Option B+’ has 
already begun to show impressive results in ‘real world’, resource-constrained 
settings, dramatically increasing the numbers of pregnant women enrolling on 
ART. The tide is turning - now is the time to move with the momentum and 
embrace a bold public health approach to effectively eliminate new pediatric HIV 
infections” (2013, 2). To date, Option B+ has been implemented in Malawi, since 
2011, and in Uganda, since 2012. 
While not opposed to Option B+, HIV/AIDS and women’s rights CSOs point 
out a number of contradictions within the current approach to rolling it out, and are 
attempting to influence delivery to include a greater rights focus. A primary concern 
is that Option B+ lacks adequate consideration of the implications of starting ART 
earlier than necessary on women’s long-term wellbeing. The chances of PWAs 
developing drug resistance and side effects increase the longer they are on ART. 
In the general PWA population about 20 percent of people on ART develop drug 
resistance, requiring more expensive (and therefore less available) second line 
medications. Research from Malawi indicates that women who start treatment as 
Option B+ are more likely to be lost to follow up than women who start on Option A 
or B, and therefore are at greater risk of drug resistance (and therefore AIDS 
related death) (Landes et al. 2012). This suggests that Option B+, while having 
immediate benefits for infants, may have negative long-term outcomes in terms of 
drug resistance for mothers. 
In order to influence policy discussions around Option B+, ICW and GNP+ 
conducted research in Uganda and Malaria with pregnant women. Evidence from 
these focus groups notes that women understand Option B+ to be primarily about 
protecting the baby from infection, not the wellbeing of the mother, which “caused 
concern among some participants” (ICW & GNP+ 2013, 2). Such findings expose 
the assumption that women will ultimately sacrifice their own wellbeing for that of 
the child, an assumption that Option B+ proponents capitalize on. The research 
further demonstrated that Option B+ is implemented in a way that denies pregnant 
women an informed choice. As one CSO representative stated, “These women 
wouldn’t generally have a choice. You don’t get asked if you would like to be on 
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medication. You can get forced into it” (CSO Representative 2013 #15). The 
research report notes that: “Despite being called an ‘option’, Option B+ is being 
offered as the only available method in Malawi to prevent vertical transmission. 
Pregnant women were generally expected to start treatment as soon as they tested 
HIV positive, either the same day or within a week, but often did not receive 
enough information to understand the choices involved. Women reported little or 
no support to make decisions about their treatment” (GNP+ & ICW 2013, 3). Many 
women feel ill informed about Option B+, what it entails and what it means for their 
and their children’s health. This contradicts the rights-based principles of the 
HIV/AIDS response, as promoted by CSOs, of patient empowerment and 
participation in decision-making.  
CSO research also illuminated broader community equity issues inherent in 
the Option B+ approach, which are largely ignored by state and institutional 
proponents. Focus group participants expressed concern over increased risk of 
gender-based violence, due to unequal treatment access – making explicitly the 
consequences of providing treatment for mothers but not for fathers (GNP+ & ICW 
2013). As there is no global goal to prevent paternal HIV related deaths (to keep 
fathers alive), men are not prioritized for treatment, which can create resentment 
and violence within families. The failure to provide treatment for fathers also 
illustrates rigid conceptions of gender roles, which prioritize women as child 
carriers and caregivers, failing to consider that fathers are also essential family 
members who contribute to the wellbeing of mothers and infants. Furthermore, as 
Coutsoudis et al. (2013) note, prioritizing pregnant women, over non-pregnant 
women and men who may have higher viral loads, raises ethical issues and may 
contribute to community conflicts and impact behaviours (for example, encouraging 
HIV positive women to get pregnant, in order to access treatment). While the 
argument can be made that in contexts of resource scarcity certain lives have to be 
prioritized, the Option B+ triage approach to ART delivery produces multiple 
consequences, some including rights violations that are not acknowledge or 
mitigated within the current rollout program.  
Women’s rights advocates are concerned that the WHO and national health 
programs are primarily promoting Option B+ because it is cost effective and has 
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immediate efficiency gains: “From a public health perspective it is easier to just put 
a person on a pill, rather than monitoring ok, this person has a CD4 of 600, let’s put 
them on medications until after the baby, then they come off the medications. 
That’s all too complicated so let’s put them all on meds” (CSO Representative 
2013 #15). Advocates note the contradiction of claiming cost efficiency and lives 
saved, when the effects of women starting treatment early, and of infants 
breastfeeding while their mothers are on treatment, remain largely unknown: “The 
business case, which supports use of Option B+ in resource-limited settings, does 
not fully address four critical considerations: ethics, medical safety and benefits, 
program feasibility, and economic concerns” (Coutsoudis et al. 2013, 269). CSO 
representatives argue that Option B+ is based on untested assumptions that low 
recruitment costs will balance out the costs of prolonged medical care and 
increased risk of drug resistance, with little concern for the long term wellbeing of 
the women involved. 
The rollout of Option B+ raises questions around who claims success and 
how, highlighting the “disjuncture between the assumed ideal governance of the 
disease and people’s needs to obtain healthy lives” (Seckinelgin 2012b, 453). In 
the case of Option B+ preventing vertical transmission is deemed successful even 
if it has long-term negative impacts on mother and infant wellbeing. For example, a 
WHO document reports,  
 
“Malawi envisioned that Option B+ would be easier to 
implement due to its simple “one size fits all” approach 
which would enable women to access ART at high levels 
even in settings with poor access to CD4 testing. The early 
experience with Option B+ in Malawi has borne this out, 
being extraordinarily successful, with a more than fivefold 
increase in the numbers of pregnant women being enrolled 
on ART in only the first quarter of full nationwide 
implementation” (2013, 3).  
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Success in this statement is based on increased numbers of women on ART, 
without considering how many of these women actually required ART for their own 
health, will have to deal with side effects and adverse impacts on their wellbeing 
because of ART, and are at risk of drug resistance. Having more mothers on ART 
demonstrates progress to achieving international goals, but not necessarily 
improved wellbeing for mother and infant.  
Questioning such claims, CSOs continue to voice concerns that Option B+ 
interventions include a stronger and more holistic women’s health and rights focus. 
A global women’s rights advocate summarizes, “It’s just like, [the organizations 
say] we just need to fix this right now.... and the voice of positive people is just 
bring everyone back and said ‘have you thought of this, and have you thought of 
that. And you need to think of this and you need to think of that. And also bringing it 
back to human rights” (CSO Representative 2013 #15). It is unclear if women’s 
rights advocates will be able to bring the response “back to human rights” but they 
continue to try. While it is too early to determine the outcomes of CSO efforts to 
impact Option B+ rollout, efforts are underway to scale up Option B+ in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
As Tallis writes, “Without an understanding of power inequalities, especially in 
intimate relationships which essentially provide the framing for sexual and 
reproductive issues, mainstreaming sexual and reproductive health and rights can 
only improve the health of the women they reach and will do little to shift the status 
quo” (Tallis 2012). The lack of critical consideration of power inequalities is 
apparent in institutional approaches to women’s rights, and through the 
predominately biomedical endeavors that focus on vertical prevention, as opposed 
to women’s rights and wellbeing. The key populations frame does little to challenge 
persistent gender inequality, at best considering women ‘key’ only when they are 
pregnant and within the biomedical confines of reproductive health. Through 
continued CSO advocacy these contradictions are exposed. 
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3.3.6 Section Summary 
The key populations frame enables an uneasy marriage between human 
rights and biomedical neoliberalism, and justifies continued CSO participation in 
global HIV/AIDS governance. HIV/AIDS CSOs have used this opportunity to 
advance the rights of key populations in global forums, advocating for acceptance 
of harm reduction for PWID, campaigning for the end of repressive laws against 
MSM, and challenging abolitionist approaches to sex work. These governance 
struggles interact with regional, national and local rights struggles with varying 
outcomes. For PWID, global mobilization around harm reduction has increased 
opportunities for engagement in governance processes and greater access to 
harm reduction services, but local CSOs still struggle within repressive 
environments. For MSM, top down approaches have resulted in a backlash against 
Western led HIV/AIDS responses, raising questions about the appropriateness and 
utility of global frames in addressing rights related to personal experiences and 
cultural understandings. However, there is evidence of local CSOs linking sexual 
rights with local rights frames more successfully. The increased attention to sex 
work has advanced rights-based policies at the global level, but these have had 
little influence on regional and national policy contexts, illustrating the greater 
opportunities CSOs find in promoting change in global institutions as opposed to 
states.  
Such processes demonstrate the while the key populations frame has created 
continued space for rights claims in global HIV/AIDS governance, how these global 
struggles interact with the lived realities of those affected by HIV/AIDS is by no 
means straightforward, or necessarily transformative. This is most clear in relation 
to those groups whose rights do not fit within this paradigm  - the most obvious 
example being women. Despite the fact that women make up the majority of 
PWAs, and are most at risk of infection, women’s rights have and continue to be 
neglected by the HIV/AIDS response, except for where they relate to biological 
maternal functions. While HIV/AIDS CSOs have attempted to promote a more 
holistic approach to women’s rights, so far – as is demonstrated by the rollout of 
Option B+ - they have had little success beyond exposing current contradictions.  
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3.4 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter argues that CSOs pioneered and advanced an alternative 
understanding of disease and response to that of biomedical neoliberalism - one 
that conceived of vulnerability and experiences of ill health as directly related to 
rights, and of an effective response as one that not only asserts the rights of those 
affected, but specifically their right to participate in global governance.  This history 
illustrates a number of dynamics regarding opportunities to advance human rights 
frames. First, CSOs were able to use the space provided within the limits of a 
biomedical response, to advance a rights frame, but as science and technology 
has caught up with the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the space for rights arguments has 
diminished. This demonstrates the ever shifting relationship between material and 
ideational changes, and also the reliance of hegemonic interests on biomedical 
framing.  
Secondly, struggles to frame the HIV/AIDS response have not unfolded as 
polarized conflicts: at times CSOs work with states, institutions and other interests; 
they have used economic and medical arguments to advance their cause, just as 
other actors have at times used rights arguments. These dynamics demonstrate 
and entwining of interests, and therefore frames, to shape the HIV/AIDS response. 
These linkages solidified within the key populations frame. While ensuring 
continued space for rights arguments at the global level, the key population frame 
rarely trickles down smoothly to influence regional and national governance 
outcomes. The differing outcomes of the various applications of the key 
populations frame demonstrate how such frames can promote transformation (by 
creating space in global governance forums and changing institutional policies), 
and where they are limited (in influencing state decision-making and overcoming 
cultural norms). Furthermore, the conflation of biomedical neoliberal and rights 
rationales limits opportunities to transform approaches to those rights issues the 
HIV/AIDS response has experienced the most resistance to - particularly around 
women’s rights. 
Despite these limits, the chapter demonstrates that CSOs created their own 
terms of participation in the global governance of the HIV/AIDS response through 
the human rights frame, and though this frame remains restricted by the 
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dominance of biomedical neoliberalism, it has proven durable and adaptable over 
time. 
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4. CSO Participation in Global HIV/AIDS Institutions 
The previous chapter demonstrates that CSOs advanced human rights 
frames within the global governance of the HIV/AIDS response, and that one of the 
outcomes of this framing was the justification for continued CSO participation. This 
chapter looks at how CSOs used the right to participate to gain access to global 
HIV/AIDS institutions, and asks what the governance outcomes of their 
participation in such institutions have been. In particular, it analyzes how and why 
HIV/AIDS institutions included CSOs; if and how CSO influence decision-making 
within institutions to advance the human rights frame; how their participation affects 
governance outcomes related to institutional legitimacy; and if their participation 
strengthens downward accountability.  
In asking how and why HIV/AIDS institutions include CSOs, the chapter takes 
up Murphy’s call to document the development of more inclusive global 
governance arrangements, and the related opportunities and limitations 
experienced by non-state actors seeking access (2005, 12).  The three governance 
elements (influence, legitimacy and downward accountability) are selected in an 
attempt to move beyond analysis that celebrates CSO participation as an end in 
itself, towards considering the outcomes of such involvement, contributing to the 
literature on the role of CSOs in global governance and in the HIV/AIDS response. 
  Influence in decision-making is conceptualized as the ability to both directly 
and indirectly shape policies, processes and resolutions. This influence is shaped 
by historical and bureaucratic structures. Bøås and McNeill argue that CSO 
influence in global governance is shaped by institutions’ “point of origin” (2003, 3). 
CSOs have greater influence where they share a history with the institution, which 
shapes how both CSOs and the institution understand the issue at hand. CSOs, at 
least initially, are most likely to have influence when they reflect and advance the 
already dominant institutional approach. This constrains CSO influence within the 
institutional worldview, but facilitates participation within it. Also considering 
structural determinants of CSO participation in GHIs, Seckinelgin argues 
bureaucracy restricts CSO participation (2009, 214). Because rules and 
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institutional processes generally serve the interests of powerful actors and 
bureaucrats, they impose limits on CSO participation.  
However, CSOs can exercise agency within these confines, and/or 
challenge them. Research on global environmental movements demonstrates 
that CSOs have influenced decision-making in international arrangements 
through knowledge production, modeling themselves as experts to be 
consulted (Jasanoff 1997; Betsill & Corell 2001; Humphreys 2004). Lencucha 
et al. document, in analyzing the role of NGOs in producing the Convention on 
Tobacco Control, how CSOs assert knowledge and normative claims to 
exercise influence (2010, 411). They argue that CSOs exercised discursive 
influence (the ability to change arguments) and emotive force (communicating 
positions through morality frames). In this case, CSO influence contributed to a 
policy-making environment that reflected sensitivity to the priorities of poor 
countries rather than only the self-interest of high-income countries (Lencucha et 
al. 2011). CSOs also used networks to consolidate influence where issue areas 
and interests overlapped, and to shape policies and practice at multiple 
governance levels. Such analysis demonstrate that CSO influence is multi-faceted; 
it shifts in response to the relationships between the types of agency CSOs employ 
and the structures they engage with (Lencucha et al. 2010).  
The global governance literature on legitimacy conceptualizes it as having 
two forms: input and output. Input legitimacy relates to whether processes 
result in representation, transparency and accountability; output legitimacy is 
determined by the effectiveness of governance systems (Brackstrand 2006). 
Research on CSO participation in global governance recognizes that the 
relationship between input and output legitimacy can be tenuous: “To engage in 
the discourse of global health diplomacy, NGO diplomats . . . .are immediately 
presented with two challenges: conveying the interests of larger publics, including 
the most marginalized; and contributing to inter-state negotiations in a 
predominantly state-centric system of governance” (Lencucha et al. 2011). 
Similarly, Flinders (2005) warns that transnational civil society networks must make 
trade-offs between managerialist notions (such as efficiency) and democratic 
notions (such as accountability). These analyses suggest that assumptions that 
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CSO involvement inherently strengthens the legitimacy of institutions need to be 
critically analyzed.  
The degree of input legitimacy an institution generates relates to its 
downward accountability to constituents or those it aims to serve. By claiming to 
represent constituencies, CSOs demand accountability from institutions through 
mechanism on actors, processes and outcomes (Benner et al. 2004, 193). In turn, 
CSOs must respond to accountability claims from constituents and peer networks.  
Yet, constructing accountable global governance systems is complicated by the 
hybrid nature of GHIs, which often lack democratic and hierarchical authorities 
(Brackstrand 2006, 292). As opposed to resulting in an accountability deficit the 
plurality of relationships within GHG results in numerous accountability claims, 
“organizations are therefore anything but ‘out of control bureaucracies,' 
accountable to nobody. . . .These organizations are subject to accountability claims 
from almost everybody” (Keohane 2002, 19). The multiple and complex 
accountability claims on international institutions requires, “more imagination in 
conceptualizing, and more emphasis on operationalizing, different types of 
accountability” (ibid). Because accountability within global governance 
relationships is multi-faceted and complex, it is based less on representation  (i.e. 
assumptions that a person from a particular community ensures accountability to 
that community) than on transparency, redress and reputation. 
 These concepts (influence in decision-making, legitimacy and 
accountability) are explored in relations to two GHIs: UNAIDS and the Global 
Fund. These institutions are selected as critical cases because they present 
explicit examples of CSO involvement in GHG. Both institutions formally 
include CSOs in their governance bodies, reference the GIPWA principle in 
their governance documents, and formally and informally involve CSOs in 
decision-making. UNAIDS was the first UN agency, and global institution, to 
formally include civil society in its governance body. It continues to involve 
CSOs in extensive consultations at all levels, and argues that other actors have 
built on its example and experience (Sidibe et al. 2010). Many interviewees 
from civil society note that the Global Fund is “the best example of inclusive 
governance” (CSO Representative 2013 #1), and “THE governance 
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model”(CSO Representative 2013 #26), because of the prominent role CSOs 
play in all aspects and levels of governance. Both institutions present most 
likely cases: if CSOs are to have an impact on global HIV/AIDS governance, 
they are most likely to have it through these GHIs. Furthermore, both 
institutions are influential in global HIV/AIDS governance. The Global Fund is 
the single largest donor, and has influence in terms of shaping priorities and 
procedures. UNAIDS has played a prominent role in advancing norms and 
producing knowledge around HIV/AIDS, and as a global advocate for the 
HIV/AIDS response.  
However, this is not a comparative analysis. While comparisons may be 
inferred from the presentation (i.e. if it is noted that UNAIDS does B and the 
Global Fund does A, the reader might conclude X), comparison will not be used 
as an analytical tool because the two institutions are distinctly different in 
structure and mandate.  It is also recognized that while the research could be 
extended to include other institutions influential in the HIV/AIDS responses, 
such as the World Bank or PEPFAR, as these do not formally include civil 
society in global governance, they are less directly relevant to this study. Other 
inclusive organizations, such as UNITAID, could have been included, but as 
these have more limited governance mandates and relatively shorter histories, 
it is felt that their inclusion would add little additional insight within the confines 
of the space available. Instead the focus is on the two primary governance 
institutions of the HIV/AIDS response that formally incorporate civil society at 
the global level.  
 The chapter is divided in to two main sections: the first on UNAIDS and the 
second on the Global Fund. Both sections follow the same structural pattern of 
presenting the history of how and why CSOs became participants in these 
institutions, and then situate the GHIs in the broader GHG context, before 
analyzing CSO participation and influence in decision-making, legitimacy and 
downward accountability. 
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4.1 CSO Participation in UNAIDS Governance 
UNAIDS has repeatedly reiterated that civil society participation has enabled 
it to include the interests of constituents in decision-making, generate legitimacy 
based on connections to those affected, and enhance downward accountability. Its 
Guidance on Partnerships with Civil Society states that: 
 
 “Among multiple other benefits, partnership with people living 
with HIV, key populations and broader civil society enables 
UNAIDS to be more grounded and stay alert to the real needs, 
issues and resources of individuals, communities and 
countries affected by HIV. Informed by that knowledge and 
understanding UNAIDS is better able to support countries and 
communities to develop more effective responses to the 
epidemic, guided by lived realities and successful outcomes, 
responding to epidemiology and evidence, not to ideology” 
(2012, 12). 
 
Similarly, a commentary written by UNAIDS staff argues that UNAIDS derives its 
leadership position in the HIV/AIDS response through its pioneering role in creating 
governance spaces open to the meaningful participation of civil society, and 
remains accountable to the broader HIV/AIDS movement because of this 
participation (Sidibe et al. 2010). These assertions are repeated by observers and 
academics (Horton 2012; CSO Representative 2013 #31), with only a handful of 
critical perspectives on such claims (Seckinelgin 2009). 
This chapter contributes an in-depth analysis of the participation of CSOs in 
UNAIDS by first discussing how civil society leadership in the early HIV/AIDS 
response, and the failure of traditional multilateral governance efforts to address 
the epidemic, created space for CSO participation in the formation of UNAIDS. It 
then analyzes how civil society participants have contributed to processes related 
to decision-making, legitimacy and accountability. It argues that CSOs were able to 
use acceptance of the GIPWA principle and calls for a mutlisectoral response to 
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HIV/AIDS to gain access to global governance spaces. CSO representatives 
exercise influence within the state-based bureaucratic limits of the UNAIDS PCB 
and Secretariat, but not over them, and therefore while they have been able to 
shape governance discussions to represent human rights frames, lack of influence 
over processes means that CSO representatives must constantly chose between 
input and output legitimacy, which in turn limits opportunities to strengthen 
downward accountability. 
The focus here is on how civil society engages with UNAIDS at the global 
level, though linkages to regional, national and local processes will be discussed 
when relevant. This reflects the scope of the research, and also recognizes that 
participation in UNAIDS’ regional and national initiatives is not uniform, and 
therefore requires case-by-case analysis beyond the ability of this thesis.  
Furthermore, the focus is on civil society participation in the UNAIDS PCB and 
Secretariat, not the cosponsoring organizations. Each cosponsor has its own 
model of engaging with civil society (or lack thereof), and therefore analysis of 
these processes would require greater depth and space than the limits of this 
thesis allow. 
 
4.1.1 History 
In the 1980s, the UN agency best positioned to respond to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, the WHO, was slow to initiate action. Merson, the Executive Director, 
originally saw the disease as primarily affecting high-income countries that 
could respond without external assistance. Though some African countries tried 
to raise awareness about the epidemic, stating it was spreading “like bush fire,” 
they got little response from WHO (Lisk 2010, 35). Meanwhile, highly affected 
countries’ public health systems were constricted by numerous health 
demands, reduced budgets under International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural 
adjustment policies, and political-cultural resistance to discussing issues of 
sexuality. With little support coming from national or international institutions, 
CSOs filled the void by providing home-based care, support and counseling. As 
these groups became connected with and got support from global advocacy 
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networks, their concerns reached international forums. Activists began to 
demand a global response, lobbying the WHO to set international standards 
and provide assistance in developing countries (GHI Representative 2013 #3).  
Finally, in 1987, the WHO General Assembly acknowledged the 
pandemic proportions of HIV/AIDS, and through Special Resolution 42/8, 
WHO’s Special Program on AIDS was created, with the aim of addressing the 
health and other impacts of the epidemic (Lisk 2010, 40). Jonathon Mann, a 
physician and human rights advocate, was appointed Director. He immediately 
drew on the expertise of activists and NGO partners to ensure the new program 
adopted the human rights approach developed by the now burgeoning global 
network. This level of collaboration with CSOs was unprecedented for the WHO 
(Merson et al. 2008, 481).  The Global Program on AIDS (GPA), as the Special 
Program was renamed in 1988, adopted the discourse of AIDS exceptionalism 
to frame HIV/AIDS as social, economic, and political, as well as a health, issue.  
By 1989, over 100 requests for technical assistance had been received 
by GPA from member states, most concerning development of national 
HIV/AIDS plans. Within three years it was the largest WHO program. The US, 
for example, by the early 1990’s was putting three fifths of its extra-budgetary 
contributions to the WHO into the GPA (Goodlee 1995, 178). However, the 
GPA under Mann, while effective in getting international support for the 
HIV/AIDS response, did not sit easily within the broader WHO framework. The 
success of the GPA created funding competition. While WHO’s main budget 
was frozen for much of the late 1980s and early 1990s, commitments to GPA 
rose from US$30.3 million in 1987 to US$82.4 mill in 1990 (Lisk 2010).  Donor 
countries preferred to fund the extra-budgetary program, which they had more 
control over, than the member state governed general budget. Furthermore, 
Mann challenged the biomedical approach of WHO by adopting the human 
rights frame pioneered by HIV/AIDS activists, and upset the state-centric 
approach of the organization by welcoming the participation of CSOs. 
The tension between the GPA and the rest of WHO intensified with the 
change of Director General in 1988. Former Director General Mahler had let 
Mann implement the program with little oversight, often tolerating missteps in 
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bureaucratic process. He had also supported Mann’s adoption of human rights 
approaches to the epidemic and his partnership approach with civil society. 
The new Director General, Hiroshi Nakajima, was not so tolerant, prioritized 
bureaucracy, and favored biomedical state-based approaches.  Davies writes 
that Nakajima’s leadership, “can be best characterized as a return to technical 
initiatives, but largely based on the neoliberal model” (2010, 37). Nakajima 
viewed HIV/AIDS as getting too much attention, compared to the rest of WHO’s 
mandate (Lisk 2010, 44). As he attempted to reign in the GPA, conflicts 
emerged between Mann and Nakajima, causing Mann to resign in 1990.   
Following Mann’s departure, tensions developed between the WHO and 
CSOs. Mann commented, “As the winds of change within WHO moved the 
organization back to status-quo ante thinking, the GPA and non-governmental 
organization relationship suffered” (Mann & Kay 1991, 227). These tensions 
were exacerbated by a sense of competition. CSOs were working directly with 
communities most affected. This gave them credibility and a degree of control 
in producing knowledge around HIV/AIDS. CSOs had the further advantage of 
being closely connected to programs around the world and linked together in 
networks. They could provide rapid information about the epidemic and what 
responses were and were not working (Martin 1999, 62).  CSO’s active 
involvement in the response justified assistance for HIV/AIDS going directly to 
them, bypassing expensive international systems, such as the WHO. By 1990, 
CSOs received 17 percent of the US$480 million distributed for external 
HIV/AIDS assistance (Lee 2003, 27).   
Differences in approaches created further riffs between CSOs and WHO. 
A WHO statement claimed: “NGOs do not possess an overall appreciation of 
the AIDS pandemic and all its manifestations and, moreover, usually represent 
a specific interest group and hence possess only a specific or limited 
orientation toward the dilemma as a whole” (quoted in Gordenker et al. 1995, 
90).  In contrast, the GPA approach was criticized for its one size fit all 
implementation strategy:  “These packages were all more or less the same as 
they were manufactured and exported from Geneva to the countries of Africa, 
Asia and Latin America” (Knight 2008, 34-35). Civil society presented dynamic 
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systems for implementing programs in contexts that were changing rapidly as 
new knowledge about the epidemic emerged and increasing numbers of actors 
became involved. WHO’s cumbersome state centered bureaucracy was much 
slower to adapt (Soderholm 1995, 165).  
Calls for UN reform followed the end of the Cold War and WHO in 
particular was singled out as a problem agency. In 1993, Nakajima was re-
elected amidst allegations of vote rigging, and external auditors reported 
serious financial mismanagement (Goodlee 1994, 1491). Soderholm writes: 
“WHO itself was under attack. Donors were ill at ease with how the Director-
General conducted his work. This criticism spilled over into the AIDS strategy. 
National governments saw reasons to withdraw support from GPA, as did other 
UN agencies” (1997, 101). Funding for the GPA stagnated for the first time in 
1990.  In 1992, an external review of the GPA was published, which criticized 
WHO for failing to coordinate interagency responses, poor collaboration with 
other institutions, and interagency rivalries, which detracted from a coherent 
UN response.  
The multisectoral response called for by activists and NGOs justified the 
involvement of other UN agencies in the HIV/AIDS response. In particularly 
UNDP (which had strong relationships with CSOs) and UNICEF (which was 
concerned with issues related to HIV transmission from mother to child, and 
orphaning) began implementing interventions. However, as the UN agencies 
had little history of working together well, efforts to collaborate on HIV/AIDS 
interventions were short lived and fraught with tensions. As a result, the 
external review of the GPA called for a “new or alternative mechanism for 
ensuring effective coordination of the global efforts to combat AIDS at the 
country level and adequate collaboration within and beyond the UN system” 
(Lisk 2010, 48).  In response a General Management Committee was 
established to explore options. In 1992, the committee produced a report 
stating: “One of the most important lessons... has been that no single agency is 
capable of responding to the totality of the problems posed by AIDS; and, as 
never before, a cooperative effort, which is broadly based but guided by a 
shared sense of purpose, is essential” (quoted in Knight 2008, 20). Global 
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HIV/AIDS governance was to become a testing ground for a multi-sector, multi-
actor response. 
Donor countries pushed for an option outside of WHO, stressing the 
need for greater co-operation between UN agencies and for UN reform. CSOs 
used these dynamics to enhance their demands for a more inclusive UN 
response.  The GIPWA principle, which had been adopted by most donor 
states at the Paris AIDS Summit, in 1994, was now reasserted to demand CSO 
inclusion in the new global program. CSO participation was further justified by 
the key role they had filled by being the first to respond to the epidemic, 
providing services to those affected, and advocating for a global response. One 
early UNAIDS staff member noted civil society involvement was assured, 
“Because of the [GIPWA] principle, because the AIDS response has been 
completely different to so many public health responses and it changed the way 
the global health community works. In that PWAs in the early days of the 
epidemic demanded to be front and center in the response so the phrase 
‘nothing about us with out us’ was key” (GHI Representative 2013 #24). The 
desire for a new type of UN entity from donors, combined with participation 
demands from CSOs to put pressure on the UN system to be more inclusive.  
The resulting task force, the Interagency Advisory Group on AIDS, 
included 12 members: three representatives from donor countries (the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the USA); three from low-income countries (Bulgaria, 
India and Sudan); three from UN agencies (the World Bank, WHO and UNDP); 
and three from civil society organizations (the Netherlands-based AIDS 
Coordination Group, GNP+, and ENDA Tiers Monde from Senegal).  The 
inclusion of CSOs on this task force, especially in equal number to the 
institutional and state actors, was unprecedented: “With the intention of 
facilitating the negotiation process, a radically new method was devised .... On 
the task force, NGOs could provide input to the same extent that governments 
could, thus breaking out of sovereignty-bound practice” (Soderholm 1997, 166).   
However, the role of CSOs in the new entity continued to be contentious. 
China and Cuba were against formal involvement of CSOs (because of their 
particular resistance to CSO activity in their domestic settings), as were some 
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European countries, which argued UN entities should remain state-based. 
Amongst the cosponsoring organizations, the World Bank and UNDP were 
supportive of civil society involvement while WHO, UNICEF and UNESCO were 
initially against it (GHI Representative 2013 #24).  After some negotiations, it 
was agreed that CSOs would continue to have a formal role in the new 
organizations, on the condition that this would not set a precedent in the UN 
system. The perceived need for an exceptional multi-sector response to the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, calls for UN reform, and CSO leadership in the early 
response combined to justify this unique arrangement.  
In July 1994, ECOSOC endorsed the creation of UNAIDS through 
resolution 1994/24. The memorandum of understanding for the new program 
was signed by the cosponsors in October of 1995, and UNAIDS was publicly 
launched on World AIDS Day of the same year. UNAIDS was to be governed 
by a Program Coordinating Board (PCB), which included CSOs for the first time 
in UN history. Nay writes,  “The ECOSOC decision to include CSOs in the 
governance of UNAIDS was a major step. It acknowledged the key role of these 
organizations in the development of the global response to the epidemic, based on 
the assumption that they can provide useful information and expertise because of 
their grass- roots activity and connection to vulnerable populations” (2009, 10). The 
role CSOs had played in providing HIV/AIDS related services, advocating for a 
global rights-based response and challenging the WHO led to their incorporation 
into the only joint program in the UN system to tackle a single health issue.  
CSOs had great expectations of this new institution, as did the new staff, 
many of which came from a CSO background. One early staff member recalls, “We 
really felt that we were on the cutting edge of UN reform. We felt we had an 
opportunity of testing new ways of doing business, of being more efficient, being 
more responsive, of trying to get out of some of the traps that go with any UN 
bureaucracy” (quoted in Knight 2008, 36).  It was hoped that the unique 
governance arrangement within UNAIDS would result in an institution that was 
responsive to and representative of those it claimed to serve. 
However, a distinct feature of UNAIDS was that it was confined to being a 
coordinating agency, not an implementing one. The cosponsors were suppose to 
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implement programs under the auspice of UNAIDS, but were resistant to 
surrendering leadership. Due to continued infighting, and anxieties about the new 
governance format, many donor governments pledged less to UNAIDS than they 
had to the WHO’s GPA. The limited budget (US$120 − 140 million for the biennium 
1996-1997) restricted the type of activities UNAIDS could engage in. Former GPA 
chief, Merson, recalled “UNAIDS was disabled from the start” (quoted in Knight 
2008, 44).  During the 1990s UNAIDS’ activities largely revolved around collecting 
reports of all the cosponsor activities and attempting to combine them to present a 
coherent project (Nay 2009).   
 The limits of the new institution frustrated CSO expectations. UNAIDS held 
regional meetings to introduce the new program to civil society, but these usually 
resulted in more confusion than clarity: “people attending these regional meetings 
were confused by what they heard about UNAIDS. If UNAIDS was being created 
because the epidemic was such a major problem, why was it so much smaller than 
GPA? And what was happening to the funding that GPA used to provide to 
countries?” (Knight 2008, 37). Those CSOs that attended PCB meetings quickly 
discerned that the cosponsor governance format led to cautious resolutions, based 
on compromises, which did not satisfy CSO expectations for the rapid 
advancement of a rights-based response (Nay 2009, 13). Furthermore, the 
consensus-based governance format depended on the agreement of conservative 
states resistant to both CSO involvement and rights-based responses to the 
epidemic. As UNAIDS did not provide funding, and remained hampered by UN 
protocols, the high expectations CSOs had for the organization were soon 
regulated to more modest hopes. 
Still, the relationship between UNAIDS and CSOs was an improvement on 
that of the WHO: “UNAIDS was able to reach out to and work with activists in a 
way WHO could not” (GHI Representative 2013 #3). The new institution had 
recruited staff from civil society and had strong networks with CSOs around the 
world. Peter Piot, the first Executive Director, had worked with CSOs in the past, 
and now often collaborated with them to push agendas member states were 
resistant to (GHI Representative 2013 #24).  One informant noted,  
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“UNAIDS was not created to support communities. On the 
other hand there were people involved in the creation of 
UNAIDS who shared an understanding and belief in the 
centrality of community responses. And I hoped that regardless 
of what happened ... that UNAIDS would bring a much needed 
multi-sectoral perspective, not just multi-sectoral in terms of 
different ministries, that was needed as well, but also multi-
sectoral in terms of public private community” (GHI 
Representative 2013 #3).   
 
While tensions persisted between UN bureaucracy and CSO’s aspirations, the new 
organization had greater flexibility than the WHO. Despite contradictions and 
challenges, UNAIDS created expanded institutional space for CSOs to engage in 
and influence the global governance of the HIV/AIDS response. 
 
4.1.2 Position in GHG 
Throughout its 20 year history (from 1994 – 2014) UNAIDS has continued to 
be something of an anomaly in the UN system. It remains the only joint program, 
the only single health issue entity, and the only UN institution with formal space for 
civil society on its board. It describes itself as “an innovative partnership that leads 
and inspires the world in achieving universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, 
care and support” (UNAIDS 2013). Interviewees particularly perceive UNAIDS as 
an advocacy institution, stating, “I think that was one of the big successes of 
UNAIDS – keeping AIDS on the agenda” (GHI Representative 2013 #6), and “I do 
think UNAIDS was absolutely central to the advocacy efforts that led to the 
dramatic increase in development assistance and world attention to HIV”(GHI 
Representative 2013 #3).  
One example of UNAIDS’ advocacy role is fostering support for UN Political 
Commitments/Declarations on HIV/AIDS in 2001, 2006 and 2011, which have 
continued to position HIV/AIDS as global public goods issue. Many actors also 
note the key, and not unrelated, role UNAIDS plays in gathering and disseminating 
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information: “In no other issues do you have a global commitment and a UN 
agency that collects the stats at the country level, and collects global indicators for 
progress for global aims” (CSO Representative 2013 #1).  UNAIDS has developed 
as an information broker in the HIV/AIDS response, and an advocate for 
exceptional political attention and resources. 
However, since the decline of HIV/AIDS exceptionalism (described in the 
previous chapter), UNAIDS has had to increasingly justify its place within the UN 
system and broader GHG. This is largely the result of the backlash against vertical 
health interventions, in which UNAIDS, as the only disease- specific UN entity, is a 
prime target. An opinion piece in the British Medical Journal in 2007 called for 
dissolution of UNAIDS as “the biggest vertical program in history” (England 2008, 
1072). The declining popularity of vertical health initiatives has combined with the 
impacts of the economic crisis in donor countries to cause stagnation in funding for 
HIV/AIDS programs; UNAIDS’ budget projects zero growth (UNAIDS 2013).  
UNAIDS’ position is further impacted by the shifting role of the UN system in 
general. Nay writes, “In this new international landscape, the UN system is no 
longer in a position of leadership when it comes to designing and implementing 
international development policies” (Nay 2009, 4). In the crowded GHG arena, UN 
agencies compete with better-resourced entities, such as the Global Fund 
(discussed in the next main section of this chapter), and private foundations, such 
as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
Noting these developments, many interviewees raised questions about the 
continued relevance of UNAIDS. One interviewee asked, “if it [UNAIDS] went, what 
would the AIDS movement lose?”(CSO Representative 2013 #26). Another noted, 
“I wouldn’t be surprised if UNAIDS was dissolved and reorganized back into the 
WHO” (CSO Representative 2013 #15). A state representative asked, “UNAIDS 
was certainly necessary at the beginning because this was a disease that required 
a response that is big, quite different than others and targeted marginalized 
populations. But now, is it really necessary? What is the added value that WHO in 
a more mainstream way could not provide?” (State Representative 2013 #14).  
UNAIDS’ role within the current GHG order is increasingly questioned. 
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UNAIDS is aware of its precarious position and has responded by 
attempting to reposition itself away from being a proponent of AIDS 
exceptionalism, and towards being seen as an innovator within the broader GHG 
architecture. Recent messaging campaigns argue that the success of the 
HIV/AIDS response can be used to inform the post-MDG and other 
development/health agendas (Kim et al. 2011, Sidibe et al. 2010, UNAIDS 2013). 
An UNAIDS representative explains,  
 
“UNAIDS sees itself as having - based on the AIDS 
response and the progress of the AIDS response - having 
the legitimacy to say ‘you know this is how we have 
accomplished this so far’ and other health and 
development issues can really learn from this experience... 
So increasingly we are positioning ourselves as an 
organization that while driving advocating for the end of 
AIDS. We are hoping to drive progress across a lot of 
other different issues”  (GHI Representative 2013 #31).  
 
In particular, UNAIDS argues that as it has pioneered inclusive governance 
structures that engage civil society, other organizations can learn from its example 
(UNAIDS 2013, 5). 
 
4.1.3 Influence in Decision-Making 
CSOs engage in both the UNAIDS Secretariat and PCB in a variety of 
capacities, aiming to influence decision-making to better reflect a rights-based 
response to the epidemic. The mission of the NGO Delegation to UNAIDS’ PCB is, 
“to ensure that their [constituent] human rights and equitable, gender sensitive 
access to comprehensive HIV prevention, treatment, care and support are 
reinforced by the policies, programs, strategies and actions of the PCB and 
UNAIDS” (NGO Delegation 2013f). However, CSOs bring their own hierarchies to 
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UNAIDS, and operate within what remains to be primarily state-based structures, 
shaped by multiple ideological and material influences (Seckinelgin 2009). This 
raises questions about how their participation and influence is shaped by existing 
structures, and how/if CSO participants are able to influence decision-making to 
promote alternatives. 
 
Influence within the PCB 
The UNAIDS PCB, the main governance body, includes 22 member states, 
11 cosponsoring organizations and five NGO delegates. According to the 1994 
ECOSOC resolution on the formation of UNAIDS,  “NGOs invited [to participate in 
the PCB] should be those either in consultative status with the Economic and 
Social Council or in relationship with one of the six co- sponsoring organizations or 
on the roster of non-governmental organizations dealing with matters pertaining to 
HIV/AIDS, in accordance with the rules, procedures and well-established practice 
of the United Nations system” (ECOSOC 1995, 2). Seckinelgin (2009) argues such 
restrictions reinforce a “durable inequality” between state members and NGOs, 
because only NGOs that complement the UN system are included, and only at the 
will of states. However, the current process of delegate selection is somewhat 
different than what was likely envisioned by the authors of the 1994 resolution. 
According to the ECOSOC resolution (1994/24) the five NGO seats should 
be filled by three delegates representing NGOs from developing countries and two 
delegates from developed, or in transition, countries. In practice, currently, the 
delegation includes five board members and five alternates (10 in total, all of whom 
usually attend the meetings), representing the geographical regions of North 
America, Europe, Asia, South and Central America, and Africa. Though individuals 
are nominated to be NGO delegates, it is actually the NGOs they represent that 
hold the seat, in order to ensure continuity if an individual is unable to continue to 
meet their commitments (i.e. if one person has to abdicate, the NGO can put 
forward another member, who must be approved by the delegation). In the call for 
nominations, which goes out to a list-serve of over 3000 addresses, and is posted 
online, eligible NGOs are defined as local, national, regional and international 
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organizations, networks of people living with HIV, ASOs, community-based 
organizations (CBOs), AIDS activist organizations, faith-based organizations 
(FBOs), and networks or coalitions of AIDS organizations. NGO delegates often 
come from regional networks, such as the Asia Pacific Network of People Living 
with HIV/AIDS, key population networks, such as the International Network of 
People Who Use Drugs, or national organizations, such as the Ghana HIV/AIDS 
Network.  
In order to qualify, individual representatives from NGOs must meet the 
following criteria:  
 
“Be actively and principally involved with HIV work in the 
country and/or region for which the applicant is applying; 
maintain a comprehensive understanding of the health, 
political, and social consequences and needs of the AIDS 
pandemic, particularly as it relates to the region; be strongly 
connected to and actively liaise with national and regional civil 
society networks; and have extensive experience in national, 
regional, and/or international policy making and advocacy” 
(NGO Delegation 2013f).  
 
The individual delegates are not meant to particularly represent their NGO, but the 
broader civil society response in their region. Furthermore, though regional 
representation structures their participation, other affiliations to particular key 
populations (such as sex workers) or issue areas (such as treatment access) are 
also considered in the selection process. Though not explicitly stated, efforts are 
made to ensure equal gender representation on the delegation, and PWAs 
delegates are encouraged (GHI Representative 2013 #29).   
Short-listed nominations are selected by the current NGO Delegation, in 
consultation with broader civil society, and interviewed by current delegates. The 
PCB approves finalists but, to date, there has not been a case of the PCB refusing 
a candidate put forward by the existing delegation. The approval process is viewed 
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more as a formality and opportunity to introduce the new delegates to the PCB 
(CSO Representative 2013 #30). The delegation's ability to essentially self-select 
members from civil society, according to criteria CSOs establish, indicates they 
have greater autonomy than Seckinelgin (2009) analysis suggests.  
However, there are also imposed directives on who can be a delegate, 
restricting access to decision-making forums in less direct but influential ways.  
Delegates must have working knowledge of English, which means the pool of 
people from some regions (such as Sub-Sahara Africa) is much smaller than from 
others (such as Europe and North America). In practice, most delegates have 
university level education and professional backgrounds, which eliminates the 
majority of PWAs (GHI Representative 2013). While there are practical rationales 
behind such requirements (delegates must have the language skills and 
knowledge of policy processes to participate in bureaucratic decision-making), it 
also means that access remains exclusive, especially for delegates from those 
regions with the majority of PWAs and key populations.   
In addition to the NGO Delegation, observer NGOs can attend the PCB 
meetings. They must register in advance, and the Executive Director has the right 
to refuse permission to attend, though this has rarely been used. Observers note 
the UNAIDS PCB is one of the most accessible UN forums (CSO Representative 
2013 #30). NGO observers may speak in plenary after all PCB members (member 
states, cosponsors and the delegation) have done so at the discretion of the chair. 
Prior, during and after board meetings, the NGO Delegation invites NGO observers 
to attend briefings in order to inform participation strategies and interventions. The 
number of observers who attend meetings can vary greatly, depending on agenda 
items and current concerns in the HIV/AIDS response, but on average there have 
been about 60 NGO observers at meetings since 2007 (GHI Representative 2013 
#28). 
However, as observers must attend at their own cost, the majority comes 
from Europe (due to its close proximity to Geneva headquarters) and North 
America (as these CSOs have greater resources). There are few observers from 
low and middle-income countries. At the June 2013 PCB Meeting, only three (of 
approximately 60) observers were from CSOs based outside of the Europe and 
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North America. The costs of observing the PCB, means that well resourced and 
European CSOs are able to participate, while others are largely excluded. 
Even for those who have access to the PCB, ability to participate is 
constrained by democratic practices. In addition to the PCB, there are side 
meetings to be attended, as well as informal negotiations (GHI Representative 
2013). Delegates and observers note the challenges of deciphering how to gain 
access and influence in these less formal negotiations that shape outcomes in 
plenary, as they lack diplomatic know-how, coming from community backgrounds 
not political training (CSO Representative 2013 #23). The formal speaking process 
of the PCB, and the UN setting, can be overwhelming to new delegates. One 
representative states,  
 
“That is one thing I find about being on the PCB. Is that you 
do need to have a highly level of academia to be an effective 
voice at times. And I struggled. To be honest I struggled 
being on the PCB because it is a little bit above my level. I 
never worked in this kind of advocacy, policy level before. It 
has been a huge learning curve .... I’ve struggled to the point 
where I sort of have anxiety attacks because I don’t feel I am 
doing enough” (CSO Representative 2013 #15). 
 
As this informant has postgraduate university qualifications and is a native English 
speaker and is therefore likely better prepared than many others, the quote 
demonstrates that the learning curve for effective engagement is steep. It also 
illustrates the anxiety that results from the desire to participate effectively to 
represent those who do not have access, and barriers to doing so. This suggests 
that the delegate is committed to representing, to the best of their ability, those who 
do not have access to decision-making, but their capacity to do so is restricted by 
procedures.  
In 2005, the NGO Delegation requested an evaluation of NGO/Civil Society 
involvement in the PCB. The NGO Delegation hoped this would promote beneficial 
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governance changes, such as increased funding to support communications and 
coordination amongst CSOs involved in UNAIDS. Reflections by current actors on 
the NGO Delegation’s role prior to the review, suggest that the delegation had 
suffered from poor organization, and frequent internal (with each other) and 
external (with other board members) conflicts (GHI Representative 2013 #29). One 
long time observer notes, “I mean it was quite shocking in the early days. I mean 
there was some stunning people, some really inspiring people involved. But to be 
honest, it was all a bit of a mess. It was very impromptu” (CSO Representative 
2013 #30). Self-recognition of these inadequacies, as well as long-standing 
frustrations with perceived lack of support from UNAIDS, prompted the delegation 
to suggest the review.  
The review was widely supported by the Delegation, partner CSOs, 
cosponsors and the Secretariat. It resulted in a number of notable, and generally 
agreed beneficial, changes. For example, a Communications Facility was 
established to provide support to delegates in terms of internal and external 
communication, organizing logistics and facilitating information exchange.7 
Following the evaluation, more specific terms of reference were developed for 
delegates and an accountability mechanism was put in place in order to monitor 
their commitments. Furthermore, though the ECOSOC resolution does not include 
reference to a ‘NGO Delegation’, instead referring to individual NGO delegates, 
following the 2007 review the group made concerted efforts to act as one 
delegation, consolidating influence (UNAIDS 2012a; CSO Representative 2013 
#30; GHI Representative 2013 #29). As a single delegation, they have agreed to 
focus on promoting the rights of key populations and universal access.8  
UNAIDS Secretariat staff and external civil society observers agree that 
these changes have had a positive impact on the NGO Delegation’s participation 
(GHI Representative 2013 #29; CSO Representative 2013 #30). One observer 
compares the current role of the Delegation to its participation prior to the review, “I 
think without a doubt the Delegation has really got its act together. A lot more, a lot 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
7"The"facility"is"funded"by"the"Secretariat"and"hosted"by"external"NGOs"on"two"year"contracts."
8"Due"to"the"changes"that"occurred"following"the"evaluation,"the"analysis"that"follows"focuses"
specifically"on"the"period"since"2007"and"considers"the"NGO"delegates"as"a"single"delegation."
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better. Its a hell of a lot more professional” (GHI Representative 2013 #29). The 
Delegation used the review process to increase its capacity to participate 
effectively within the decision-making bureaucracy.  
Research on the NGO Delegation to the UNAIDS PCB argues that its 
influence is particularly limited because it does not have voting rights, which are 
reserved for states. The 1994 ECOSOC resolution on the formation of UNAIDS 
stipulated the NGOs, “would not participate in any part of the formal decision-
making process, including right to vote, which is reserved for representatives of 
governments” (UN 1995, 3).  Ritterberger et al. find that “these disparities in 
decision-making rights means the UNAIDS only meets the minimum requirements 
of inclusiveness” (2008, 23). Seckinelgin notes, “While NGOs roles are recognized 
in relation to HIV/AIDS through their inclusion into the formal architecture of the 
governance, the resolution still asserts that priority be given to state members by 
constraining the formal procedures of participation” (2009, 219).  Lack of voting 
rights is viewed, by these analyses, as a barrier to meaningful participation. 
For the NGO Delegation, the issue of the vote has shifted over the years. An 
early UNAIDS staff member noted that when UNAIDS was formed the NGOs 
involved did not want voting rights as they felt this would compromise their 
independence: “in the early days of UNAIDS, NGOs explicitly did not want to have 
voting right at all, because they said, then we become part of the system, we 
become responsible for the decisions and we want to keep our independence and 
our kind of watch dog function” (GHI Representative 2013 #24). Later, around the 
turn of the millennium, the Delegation began campaigning for voting rights, a 
demand that was generally resisted by other board members and the Secretariat. 
The 2007 NGO/Civil Society Review suggested NGOs should be given voting 
rights, but this was not adopted.  
It was recognized that changes to the board structure would require opening 
the resolution on the creation of UNAIDS, which would result in extensive 
bureaucratic process and create space for numerous other competing issues to 
become contentious. Some actors felt that in the process the NGO Delegation 
might lose more than they gained, as a minority of state members have expressed 
displeasure over the role of NGOs in the PCB and might suggest reforms to curb 
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their influence, as opposed to increase it (GHI Representative 2013 #29). Since 
2007, the NGO Delegation has largely given up its campaign for voting rights. 
Voting is not seen as particularly crucial to its interests, being more of a symbolic 
power, as the board is consensus-based and has never actually voted, as opposed 
to related to direct influence over decision-making (GHI Representative 2013 #29; 
CSO Representative 2013 #15). 
 One forum where the NGO Delegation and observers are recognized as 
having influence is during thematic sessions. At every second UNAIDS PCB 
meeting the last day is dedicated to a thematic topic, such as criminalization, 
gender or youth. A number of informants note that on thematic days the NGO 
Delegation and observers play a particularly crucial and active role, as the topics 
under discussion are often those issues they are most concerned with, 
knowledgeable about, and experienced in (related to human rights, gender 
equality, etc.) (GHI Representative 2013 #28; CSO Representative 2013 #15) - 
and therefore NGO Delegates and observers are able to apply their expertise in 
sharing knowledge, and exercise discursive influence, and emotive force.  
For example, at the 34th PCB in June 2014, the NGO Delegation prepared a 
background document and case studies on social drivers of the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
(the designated theme), taking a lead role in knowledge production. They explicitly 
aimed to shift the discussion away from purely legal responses to stigma and 
discrimination, to responses that consider the political, social and economic drivers 
of the epidemic.  To this aim they invited observers from various regions to share 
personal accounts of experiencing barriers to treatment, care and prevention, and 
community-based strategies for overcoming them. A transgender former sex work 
from Asia spoke about the need for health services to reach out to marginalized 
populations, and a woman from Kenya spoke shared her experience forming a 
barmaids association in order to empower women at risk of HIV infections (NGO 
Delegation 2014b). These personal accounts added emotive force to discursive 
arguments for a more holistic rights-based response. 
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Thematic days do not result in decision points,9 as it is argued that this 
allows board members to speak freely, without being hampered by national policies 
and cosponsor responsibilities (GHI Representative 2013 #28). However, this limits 
the outcomes of any influence CSO representatives have during thematic days. 
Because of the importance of topics discussed during thematic days, the NGO 
Delegation first campaigned for a change in policies, so that thematic days might 
result in decision points. The argument, from the NGO Delegation, was “the 
absence of decision points is a wasted opportunity” (NGO Delegation 2013e). 
While this campaign failed – due to lack of support by both other board members 
and the Secretariat – the Delegation successfully campaigned for follow-up to 
thematic days to be a standing item on the proceeding PCB agenda, a which point 
related decision points could be proposed. This creates an opportunity for the NGO 
Delegation to advance the influence they have during thematic sessions to 
decision-making processes. For example, though the NGO Delegation did not feel 
its interventions in the thematic session on social drivers adequately shifted the 
discussion from legal to socio-economic rights, it is drafting a decision point to this 
effect for the next PCB meeting in December 2014, in order to reiterate its 
argument (NGO Delegation 2014b).  
Many interviewees refer to the ability of the Delegation to “shift the 
discourse” in this way: “it is actually very clear, in particular how they changed the 
nuances and tone of the discussion and decision points in the PCB” (CSO 
Representative 2013 #30). A Secretariat staff member notes, “I think the NGOs 
have huge influence at the table.... and has impact on being able to say things in 
the right way that can perhaps move an agenda” (GHI Representative 2013 #27). 
The Delegation has influence over the language of decision points as it is able to 
go in to the drafting room during board meetings (GHI Representative 2013 #28). 
Delegates persistently use these opportunities to make incremental changes: “And 
slowly, each time we get one thing more past. . . . Having been involved in the 
process now I can see it. And I do see that we make a difference, we do get 
through” (CSO Representative 2013 #15). Similarly, the 2012 evaluation notes, 
“The NGO Delegation plays a vital watchdog role ‐ monitoring and, as necessary, 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
9"Technically*thematic*days*may*results*in*decision2points*on*‘a*case2by2case’*basis"
  141"
pushing issues and agenda items of relevance to civil society that risk slipping off 
the agenda” (UNAIDS 2012a).  
 
Influence within the Secretariat 
 CSOs engage with the UNAIDS Secretariat in multiple ways to influence 
decision-making. The Civil Society and Private Sector Division of the UNAIDS 
Secretariat collaborates with global HIV/AIDS related networks, and includes staff 
members who focus on specific groups, such as women’s networks, key 
populations, religious organizations and PWAs. It also draws on the expertise of, 
and supports, about 60 community mobilization, gender and human rights advisors 
in the field (GHI Representative 2013 #28). The Secretariat works with CSOs in 
preparation for and during the High Level Meetings on HIV/AIDS. Prior to the 2011 
meeting, for example, it provided technical and coordination support to the Civil 
Society Task Force, which was convened to support the President of the General 
Assembly and advised on civil society engagement in the global review processes. 
The UNAIDS Secretariat encourages member states to include civil society 
representatives in their delegations, and for CSOs to attend as observers (GHI 
Representative 2013 #28).  
 In particular, CSOs influence Secretariat processes through various 
Reference Groups. The Reference Group on HIV and Human Rights reviews the 
rights-based language and messaging in UNAIDS documents and policies. For 
example, it promoted stronger language on the decriminalization of the sex trade in 
UNAIDS policies, as discussed in the previous chapter. Members of the Reference 
Group (all of whom come from civil society) meet with Secretariat staff working on 
issues related to human rights in order to share suggestions, information and 
advice, and comment on draft papers and policies. The Reference Group on 
Human Rights also has the capacity to put out its own statements and publications, 
which may present a different position than UNAIDS. In this way it influences 
discussions from both within and outside the institution through the independent 
production of knowledge.  
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Exercising Influence: HIV/AIDS and Legal Environments 
The particular manner in which civil society delegates, observers and 
participants in Secretariat processes influence decision-making in UNAIDS can be 
illustrated through the case of mobilization around issues related to HIV/AIDS and 
legal rights. Briefly, the legal issues concerned revolve around: the criminalization 
of HIV transmission, which raises questions about shared responsibility and what 
constitutes informed consent; the criminalization of homosexuality, sex work and 
drug use, which inhibits these groups from accessing HIV/AIDS services; and 
stigma and discrimination perpetuated by law officials and judicial systems, which 
results in inadequate protection and recourse for key populations.  Since 2010, 
these issues have become an increasing concern for CSOs involved in the 
HIV/AIDS response due to high profile cases of PWAs being charged over HIV 
transmission; new penalties in countries, such as Uganda, for homosexuality; and 
growing campaigns around harm reduction and the rights of sex trade workers. As 
outlined in the previous chapter, CSOs have increasingly applied the key 
populations frame to advance the rights of marginalized groups in global 
governance forums. Within UNAIDS there has been a particular focus on improving 
legal environments. 
In 2011, the NGO Delegation began conducting research on HIV/AIDS and 
legal environments. The findings of this research were then presented in the 
Delegation’s annual NGO Report at the 29th PCB meeting in December 2011. The 
report drew on 27 focus groups with over 250 participants who shared direct 
experience and expertise about how laws around the criminalization of sex work, 
drug use and HIV transmission impede prevention and treatment programs – using 
case studies from program implementers to strengthen arguments. The delegation 
circulated the report ahead of the PCB meeting, along with decision points that 
called for countries to repeal prohibitive laws, such as those around homosexuality, 
as well as address related issues, such as ensuring the right to safe abortion - 
points that were purposefully inflammatory. Then, after introducing the full report, 
and recognizing that once a document is rejected by the PCB it cannot be 
reintroduced, the delegation withdrew these decision points, listing them as 
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recommendations instead.  A delegate explains this strategy of influencing the 
discourse, if not the decisions:  
 
“So that opened the door to allow us to bring the topic 
back at the next board meeting. Because otherwise the 
report would have been discarded and not accepted. So 
by withdrawing, it created a big stink amongst anyone 
who read it and then we withdrew them. So we put our 
point across and I think everyone saw what we wanted. 
So we’ve been able to every board meeting go back to it. 
Bring it back” (CSO Representative 2013 #15).  
 
In this case the delegation recognized the limits of its power, especially as confined 
by the authority of the member states and the bureaucratic system, but was able to 
retain influence for further discussions.  
 The delegation continued to exercise this influence by highlighting issues 
around HIV/AIDS and legal environments at further meetings.   For example, the 
delegation secured external funding to bring in an NGO observer, who spoke at the 
following thematic session about his experience of being imprisoned for HIV 
transmission in the US. Then, at a the following PCB, during the follow-up to the 
thematic session on HIV/AIDS and Legal Environments, an incoming NGO 
delegate from Africa, an openly gay man, took the floor during a heated debate to 
insist that key populations exist in all contexts, regardless of state assertions to the 
contrary. The rest of the delegation, and NGO observers, stood in solidarity when 
he spoke.  
The delegation and observers used their influence, as members of key 
populations and those most affected by the epidemic and punitive responses, to 
counter the negative politicization of right issues with both personal (based on 
experience) knowledge of abuses and emotive force about the effects of such 
abuse. This resulted in relatively strong language in the decision point that followed 
calling for enabling legal environments, and “Increased access to justice for people 
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living with, and affected by HIV, including their families, women, young persons, 
children, and key populations” (UNAIDS PCB 2012, 6.1). The reference to key 
populations is crucial here as it included a footnote defining key populations as 
including MSM, a category some states had previously resisted recognizing. It also 
included a call to eliminate “all forms of violence against women and girls, including 
harmful traditional and customary practices” (UNAIDS PCB 2012, 6.1). For 
UNAIDS’ consensus and sovereignty-based governance format, this was 
unprecedentedly strong language (CSO Representative 2013 #23).  
 At the 31st PCB meeting, the delegation returned to controversial issues on 
women’s rights. During an agenda item on gender issues, the NGO Delegation 
ensured language on “women from key populations” and “women’s rights and 
health organizations” was included in decision points on gender (Coulterman 
2013). The strong language infuriated some countries and it looked as if the PCB 
might vote for the first time in its history, which would have excluded the delegation 
from decision-making. However, the chair asked the delegation if they would agree 
to be a vote being taken, indicating a recognition of the importance of their consent 
and, though the delegation assented, the vote was eventually averted. This 
demonstrates that though the formal influence of the delegation is limited, its 
compliance is still sought. 
During these heated PCB meetings, the NGO Delegation was supported not 
only by NGO observers, but also by members of the HIV and Human Rights 
Reference Group who attended the meeting. The Reference Group had been 
engaging in its own meetings with the UNAIDS Secretariat and representatives 
from cosponsor organizations around enabling legal environments for the 
HIV/AIDS response. While the NGO Delegation and observers aimed to influence 
states, the Reference Group worked on the UN agencies. One influential outcome 
of these discussions was a joint statement by all cosponsors and the Secretariat on 
the closure of compulsory drug detention and rehabilitation centres – a rather 
impressive feat considering the previous resistance of some organizations, such as 
UNODC, to approaches that prioritize human rights over punitive laws around drug 
use (GHI Representative 2013 #6). By asserting discursive and emotive influence, 
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the NGO Delegation and CSOs involved in the Secretariat were able to shape 
policies to reflect a rights-based approach. 
The case of civil society involvement around HIV/AIDS and legal 
environments, demonstrates the influence of CSOs in advocating for the rights of 
key populations within the UNAIDS PCB and Secretariat. Bureaucratic processes 
and the dominance of state power, which prevent changes to dominate structures, 
restrict this influence but civil society actors have proven astute at working within 
these confines to promote a rights-based response. As one informant noted:  
 
“I think we had some really small victories, I mean they 
were big, but in the bigger scheme of things they were 
small, but they were really significant for civil society and 
for people directly affected by and living with HIV, because 
we have really been able to push the agenda quite 
significantly. I think some of the outcomes we had in terms 
of discussion at the board were really interesting I think 
because you wouldn’t expect to get those kinds of 
outcomes out of a UN discussion” (CSO Representative 
2013 #8).  
 
CSOs that engage with UNAIDS have been able to apply discursive and emotive 
force to make incremental changes, influencing discussions, if not decisions, 
around human rights.  
 
4.1.4 Legitimacy 
Both the UNAIDS PCB and Secretariat claim legitimacy based on civil society 
participation. An article written by Secretariat staff asks, “how has UNAIDS 
acquired a degree of legitimacy to espouse a vision for the future of the entire 
AIDS response?” (Sidibe et al. 2010, 4). The answer provided includes a list of 
UNAIDS lead innovations in the HIV/AIDS response, including having created 
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“expanded political space for affected people, communities and civil society in the 
governance of a health-related development challenges” (Sidibe et al. 2010, 4). 
However, considering that (as demonstrated above) CSO influence is restricted by 
dominant state power and bureaucratic processes, and the challenges global 
institutions face in generating both input and output legitimacy, such claims require 
critical assessment. 
 
Input Legitimacy  
The mission statement of the NGO Delegation is,  “to bring to the PCB the 
perspectives and expertise of people living with, most affected by, and most at risk 
of, vulnerable to, marginalized by, and affected by HIV and AIDS, as well as civil 
society and nongovernmental entities actively involved in HIV work. . . .” (NGO 
Delegation 2013f). The Delegation claims input legitimacy based on representation 
of those most affected by the epidemic. However, the ability of the Delegation to be 
truly representative is restricted by regulations and practical expectations around 
participation in the PCB. For example, while the NGO Delegation is structured by 
regions, these do not necessarily represent the contours of HIV/AIDS geography; 
there is no delegate for the Middle East and only one seat for Africa; though the 
majority of PWAs live in Africa, and some of the fastest growing epidemics are in 
the Middle East (GHI Representative 2013; UNAIDS 2012a). Therefore, those 
regions most affected by the epidemic do not necessarily have corresponding 
representation on the delegation. This is exacerbated by the skill requirements for 
delegates (outlined above), which means that the pool of qualified people from 
some regions (particularly those that are not English speaking) and population 
groups (such as those with lower education levels, such as sex workers) is much 
smaller than from others.  
One interviewee notes, “it just really worries me that you do just see the same 
old people on these delegations....Not to take anything away from those 
individuals, most of them are fantastic at what they do. But it does become a sort of 
self-filling sort of thing. You don’t always get newer people in” (CSO 
Representative #30 2013). Interviewees identify a revolving door from the UNAIDS 
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NGO Delegation to the civil society delegations of other international institutions. 
NGO Delegates also recognize that access to the PCB is restricted: “Sometimes 
our constituents say that ‘its only certain people’, but it is. You need a degree. You 
need a masters or a bachelors, otherwise you don’t get in” (CSO Representative 
#15 2013). These dynamics substantiate Boedeltje and Cornips argument that in 
interactive governance forums “a trade-off must be made in which the principle of 
competence dominates at the expense of the criterion of fairness” (2004, 2). In the 
selection process for NGO Delegates, competence in terms of education and skills 
trumps other possibly criteria, such as representation. 
Recognizing it has weak representation claims, the NGO Delegation instead 
claims legitimacy based on membership in key population groups. As one observer 
noted, “You know we have been stuck with this problem of does any one person, 
or two people, can they represent a movement? Can they represent the diversity of 
what you see in the civil society or non-governmental sector? And the probably the 
answer is no, but what you can do is that you can bring a unique voice to the table 
based on your experience” (GHI Representative April 2013 #27). When relevant 
issues are discussed the Delegation ensures it is represented by a member of that 
population group or regions, or ensures that NGO observers attend who represent 
these groups. For example, in the advocating for strong policies around rights and 
legal environments, as discussed above, the Delegation had an openly gay African 
man speak about homosexuality in order to assert membership (if not 
representation) of that key population. This type of legitimacy is not based on 
democratic norms of representation, but membership to key population groups.  
 
Output Legitimacy 
The NGO Delegation contributes to institutional output legitimacy by 
contributing expertise in responding to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. An UNAIDS 
observer notes: 
 
“When you have civil society, when you have people living 
with HIV and you know representatives of MSM, and drug 
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users and sex workers, in the room with ministers, and the 
government minister puts a phrase up on the screen, this is 
what we want to say, and the delegation says no we want 
these words in here, because without that there will be 
repercussions at the country level . . . . In those negotiations 
they have a very strong influence in that way” (GHI 
Representative 2013 #28).  
 
Because the NGO Delegation consists of individuals with direct experience 
responding to the epidemic it is able to promote responsive policies. Other 
governance actors defer to this expertise because the delegation is viewed as 
representative of those responding to the epidemic (in terms of having experience 
in service delivery), as opposed to representing government policies (as states do) 
or institutions (as the Secretariat and cosponsors must). 
The Delegation is also recognized as contributing to output legitimacy by 
shifting processes beyond diplomatic confines through sharing experiences of 
living with or responding to the epidemic, and appealing to moral commitments. 
Such interventions push the boundaries of UN bureaucracy, but are recognized as 
promoting responsiveness. One UNAIDS representative explains,  
 
“In many of these board meetings, many government 
delegations say ‘I wish I could work like you guys’ I wish I 
could say what I wanted to say, instead I have a speech 
from my capital and I just have to repeat it in a meeting. 
Where as NGOs are a bit more flexible in approaching how 
to influence and how to put forward an idea that others 
adopted, and take on a position that the community feels will 
be really important to them” (GHI Representative #28 2013).  
 
Similarly co-sponsors, on the whole, appreciate that the delegation is present 
because “NGOs can say things that we cannot” (GHI Representative 2013 #11). 
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This is not to imply that cosponsors and governments all, or even mostly, agree 
with the NGO Delegation’s interventions, but that they recognize it strengthens 
output legitimacy by, at times, supersede the rigidity of the UN system to ensure 
relevance and greater responsiveness.  
One of the reasons the NGO Delegation is able to promote greater 
responsiveness is that it aims to participate within established and accepted 
bureaucratic procedures. In order to increase its legitimacy, from the perspective of 
other governance actors, the Delegation takes on diplomatic roles. These roles 
fulfill state and institutional expectations of effective governance, and enable 
communication with such governance actors (Lencucha et al. 2010).  The NGO 
Delegation has developed its diplomatic role by adopting institutional practices of 
deliberation, presentation and rational argument. Such behaviour enables it to 
contribute to the output legitimacy of the organizations by promoting effective co-
operation. One observer notes, “They work as a team, they prepare their 
interventions. They work together to put forward their comments on decision 
points. They really have their act together...So with that also comes more 
acceptances from the other stakeholders around the table of the PCB” (CSO 
Representative #30 2013). The 2012 NGO/Civil Society Review notes that all but 
two member states, and all cosponsors, welcome the participation of the NGO 
Delegation because they behave “professionally” (UNAIDS 2012a). By working 
within institutional processes the delegation gains acceptance by other governance 
actors, while contributing to the output legitimacy of UNAIDS. 
 
Negotiating Legitimacies  
However, the diplomatic role played by the Delegation alienates civil society 
peers, weakening its input legitimacy. Delegates note that, when they do engage 
with broader civil society, their legitimacy is often questioned due to the 
compromises they have to make in order to work within the UN system. One civil 
society representative explains: “You can’t go in there [PCB meetings] as an 
activist because you will just be ignored. So you have to learn to play the 
game....You know we have to go back to our constituents and tell them what we 
  150"
are doing and often, because they are sort of more fast moving and connected 
they don’t understand why we are taking what appears to be a softly softly 
approach” (CSO Representative #15 2013). CSO peers do not recognize the 
delegation’s diplomatic methods as representing their experiences of the epidemic 
and response, which (from their perspective) require urgency and action.  The 
characteristics that make the delegation an effective (and therefore legitimate) 
governance actor, from the perspective of other PCB members, are the opposite to 
those that other CSOs recognize as representing their interests, creating a tension 
between input and output legitimacy.  
As a result, the delegation suffers from having to wear “multiple hats” as both 
a member of activists and advocacy groups, and a participant in an institutional 
bureaucracy. The 2012 Review of NGO/Civil Society Participation notes, “Some 
respondents question if the delegation has a clear enough identity (as ‘diplomat’ or 
‘activist’)” (UNAIDS 2012a). The legitimacy of the delegation is threatened by this 
lack of a valid identity.  The NGO Delegation finds it has to adhere to the norms of 
a state-based UN bureaucracy to have influence, gain legitimacy from other PCB 
members, and contribute to output legitimacy. However, these means of 
participation weaken its input legitimacy because they do not correspond with CSO 
peer expectations.  
This tension between input and output legitimacy is further complicated 
because successful governance in UNAIDS is indicated by consensus; meaning 
lack of agreement threatens output legitimacy. One civil society member noted, 
“governments are corrupt, and have different priorities, they can be against 
homosexuality...there is nothing UNAIDS can do about that. They could kick them 
off the UNAIDS delegation but they never do. That is not what they want... They 
want to keep everyone on board because you are better being on board and 
accessible than being off” (CSO Representative #15 2013). In order to maintain 
consensus, and therefore legitimacy, the NGO Delegation is sometimes asked to 
modify its demands: “They [UNAIDS Secretariat and PCB] don’t like disruptions, 
and quite often we are asked as the NGO Delegation to temper our claims and to 
calm down our wording” (CSO Representative #23 2013). Toning down demands, 
especially during confrontations with conservative states, pits (perceived) effective 
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governance against civil society goals to advocate a rights-based response; it 
requires a trade off between input and output legitimacy.  
For example, at the June 2012 meeting, mentioned above, the NGO 
Delegation and allied member states, engaged in nine hours of negotiations with 
Egypt and Iran over language in the decision points, with the two countries finally 
deciding to disassociate themselves from the particular points (UNAIDS PCB 
2012). At the December 2012 meeting, consensus again broke down around the 
language on decision points related to gender, with Iran and Egypt again 
disassociating from the final point (NGO Delegation 2012b). For the NGO 
Delegation, the resulting decision points were successful because the issues that 
they felt to be important to their constituents were included. However, other actors 
did not feel the same:  
 
“I think that the NGO Delegation has been blamed a little bit 
for it, and I think mainly, because the aim at UNAIDS level is 
for consensus, and if don’t reach consensus then it is almost 
like there has been a failure. .... And while from an NGO 
perspective we are happy about that because it means that 
things are moving forward. It is not really seen, not 
celebrated, while we did celebrate it I guess. It is seen as 
quite a failure on behalf of UNAIDS and the coordinating 
board” (CSO Representative #15 2013). 
 
Indeed such protracted debates caused one observer to complain that the PCB 
was becoming “something of a circus” (CSO Representative #30 2013). In this 
case, the NGO Delegation sacrificed output legitimacy (in terms of achieving 
consensus) of the PCB in order to insist on language reflecting civil society 
concerns. The constant trade off between input and output legitimacy means that it 
is almost impossible for the delegation to be legitimate from both the perspective of 
other PCB members and external CSOs; to contribute to effective governance and 
promote a rights-based response in ways indefinable to other civil society actors.  
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4.1.5 Accountability 
Much like legitimacy, the argument put forward (by UNAIDS and allied 
CSOs) is that CSO involvement strengthens downward accountability. In order to 
analyze this claim, particularly considering the challenges to negotiating input and 
output legitimacy noted above, this section asks if CSO participants are able to act 
as effective conduits between broader civil society and UNAIDS governance actors 
in order to share information, monitor commitments and demand recourse. 
 
The NGO Delegation as Downward Accountability Conduit 
One of the missions of the NGO Delegation is “enhancing the transparency 
and accountability of relevant PCB decision-making and policy-setting, helping to 
meet requirements for upwards accountability (towards the PCB and other 
delegations) and downwards accountability (towards the people, communities and 
constituencies affected by HIV)” (NGO Delegation, 2013f). As part of its mandate 
to contribute to downward accountability, the delegation undertakes a number of 
measures to attempt to communicate UNAIDS’ activities and outcomes to, and 
gather feedback from, civil society. Newsletters and communiqués are sent to over 
3000 people on the delegation’s and UNAIDS’ lists (GHI Representative, 2013, 
#29).  The NGO Delegation’s website includes blogs that are posted almost 
immediately after PCB meetings, reports and other documentation in English, 
French, Arabic, Chinese, Russian and Spanish. YouTube clips from meetings and 
interventions are also posted online. The annual NGO Report is a consultative 
process including regional focus groups with civil society actors, e-surveys and 
online forums. The delegation holds conference calls prior to board meetings, and 
briefings with NGO observers throughout. They disseminate information through 
global and regional networks, hoping it will trickle down to local groups who will 
feed responses back up. They also actively pressure the UNAIDS Secretariat to 
share information (GHI Representative, 2013, #29). 
The delegation aims to expose UNAIDS’ policy choices to public scrutiny, but 
faces particular challenges in being an effective “transmission belt” of 
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accountability (Nanz & Steffek 2004). Though the delegation goes to extensive 
efforts to publicize itself, and share UNAIDS information, there is little response 
from external civil society. At the International AIDS Conferences in 2012, which 
brought together over 23,000 participants, the NGO Delegation hosted a Meet 
Your Representative event. However, this only attracted 20 to 30 individuals (GHI 
Representative 2013 #29). Prior to the June 2013 board meeting, the NGO 
Delegation coordinated a conference call to go over agenda items and discussion 
points with civil society. An invitation to the call was sent to the over 3000 email 
addresses; two call times were scheduled in order to take in to consideration the 
different time zones. However, one call was cancelled due to lack of participants 
and the other only attracted five non-UNAIDS associated participants. One 
delegate explained, “So often we find there is very little response when we do 
things like that... it is definitely an area we need to work on and we are trying to 
work on” (CSO Representative 2013 #15). Despite ongoing efforts to engage with 
broader civil society in HIV/AIDS, the NGO Delegation gets little response.  
The cause of weak accountability relationships relates to the reputation of 
UNAIDS as a bureaucracy, which is not seen as relevant to those implementing 
programs. UNAIDS does not provide funding, and does not have strong in-country 
presence, as cosponsors are responsible for implementation.  Instead UNAIDS 
coordinates UN activities and advocates for the HIV/AIDS response in global 
forums. Such governance processes, characterized by having meetings and writing 
reports, are removed from the daily activities of most CSOs. As one interviewee 
noted: “I think that it is that people still don’t know about the PCB, they still don’t 
know about the NGO Delegation. When they do know they don’t especially care 
about it. Because it doesn’t seem relevant. If they take two hours to read through 
some papers, they don’t really see that is going to make a whole lot of difference 
that will affect their work on the ground” (CSO Representative 2013 #30).   
Even for those who are aware of and engaged with UNAIDS, the relevance of 
the PCB is questioned because of the bureaucratic processes it must engage with: 
“The problem with these things it that you want the community representation on 
these kinds of panels but it takes up a great deal of people’s time, a great deal of 
effort, it costs a lot of time. And you always ask - what is the point of all of this?” 
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(CSO Representative 2013 #2). Broader civil society actors generally do not 
recognize connections between their work and the bureaucracy of UNAIDS - a 
disconnect that raises questions about the role of the NGO Delegation as one of its 
purposes is to provide such links. 
Challenges to building accountable relationships also relate to difficulties 
communicating UNAIDS’ processes and outcomes effectively to wider civil society. 
Board meeting papers can be over a hundred pages and are often released just 
days before a meeting. The turnaround time for delegates to translate these into 
other languages, as well as accessible English, distribute them to their networks 
and incorporate feedback is exceptionally tight, particularly considering that the 
delegates are volunteers with other full time jobs. One delegate notes: “We are all 
working full time and are busy people. Because we are all so busy, and because 
we can’t reach out, because time is too short there is not enough connection 
between us and our constituents. ...And to be honest, I’m not sure how we can 
change that, but we are going to have to look at it (CSO Representative 2013 #15). 
Delegates’ restricted time and resources limits their ability to be accountable to 
constituents. 
A number of processes have been attempted to improve accountability 
relationships, but demonstrate an unwillingness or inability of UNAIDS bureaucracy 
to adapt to meet CSO needs. An independent evaluation of UNAIDS relationship 
with civil society noted that the Civil Society Partnership Unit remains under-
resourced and marginalized within the organization (UNAIDS 2009). And the 2012 
review of civil society participation found, “Civil society participation has maintained 
high profile on the PCB agenda. The resulting decision points – notably at the 20th, 
23rd and 25th meetings ‐ remain valid. However, while some have been effectively 
implemented and led to concrete results, others have received only partial or no 
follow‐up”⁠ (UNAIDS 2012a). For example, it was recommended in the 2007 NGO 
Review that PCB documents be produced eight weeks ahead of meetings in order 
to allow the NGO Delegation time to translate, circulate and gather feedback on 
them. Though the PCB accepted this recommendation, it was not consistently 
implemented, inhibiting the ability of the delegation to consult broader civil society 
in a timely manner. Similarly, following the 2007 review, member states were 
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encouraged and cosponsors were requested to including representatives from civil 
society on their delegations, in order to increase the participation of civil society 
and build links with other PCB actors. However, to date, neither cosponsors nor 
states have acted on these decision points (GHI Representative 2013 #28). While 
the practical planning and financial challenges of preparing documentation in 
advance and increasing delegations to include civil society can be appreciated, the 
lack of follow through on these decision points indicates that where CSOs have 
tried to strengthen downward accountability, these processes have not been 
prioritized by other PCB members or the Secretariat.  
Following the most recent evaluation of the NGO and civil society 
participation in UNAIDS, 13 recommendations for the Secretariat and PCB were 
put forward on how to improve civil society participation; however these were 
translated into only four draft decision points for the PCB – something some 
observers viewed as a watering down (GHI Representative 2013 #29; CSO 
Representative 2013 #30). It was further felt, by some, that these 
recommendations were not acted on beyond “making check lists and ticking things 
off” (GHI Representative 2013 #29), demonstrating weak outcomes from a key 
accountability process between the board, NGO Delegation and broader civil 
society response.  
The cosponsor structure of UNAIDS creates a particularly complex 
accountability framework for CSOs to negotiate. Because CSOs do not participate 
in cosponsors’ governance structures (which are all state-based), engagement is 
inconsistent, especially at country level, with some cosponsors readily and 
frequently including CSOs and others resisting CSO participation (GHI 
Representative 2013 #29). National and regional HIV/AIDS related initiatives are 
often implemented by cosponsors without communicating with the PCB NGO 
delegate for the region (CSO Representative 2013 #30). NGO delegates argue this 
impedes their ability to build strong networks with regional and national civil society 
groups, and makes downward accountability mechanisms overly complex. External 
CSOs argue that the cosponsor format makes it difficult to know which cosponsor 
to approach, and how to do so, depending on what HIV/AIDS interventions are 
being implemented where, or what policies they aim to influence.  
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In order to overcome the challenges of the cosponsor format, CSOs pushed 
for a formal UNAIDS partnership strategy to guide cosponsor and Secretariat 
engagement with civil society, which ultimately resulted in a Guidance Note on Civil 
Society Participation in UNAIDS (2011). This document was well received by civil 
society as it included a number of useful tools, such as checklists on civil society 
involvement. However, it lacks an accountability structure to ensure its 
implementation, and so once again does not result in meaningful outcomes. The 
extensive bureaucratic systems of UNAIDS PCB and Secretariat alienate CSOs, 
as opposed to create opportunities to strengthen downward accountability 
processes.  
 
UBRAF as an Accountability Mechanism 
The NGO Delegation has also tried to gain more clarity on cosponsor 
involvement with civil society through participation in current efforts to revise the 
Unified Budget, Results and Accountability Framework (UBRAF) - UNAIDS’ 
primary accountability mechanism. This tool has been going through extensive 
revisions due to a number of concerns about it – mostly revolving around its 
extensive length (the 2013 report was over 200 pages) and lack of technical merit 
(indicators, outputs and outcomes demonstrate weak relationships). As one 
observer noted, the UBRAF is, “very vast and quite inadequate” (CSO 
Representative 2014 #33). Though it is not necessary to go into the details of the 
UBRAF here, generally the complexity and length frustrates cosponsors, the weak 
technical merit concerns donors, and the lack of consideration of issues related to 
key populations and PWA participation upsets CSOs.  
The process of improving the UBRAF has been complex, due to the 
numerous actors involved, and inherent complications of developing a monitoring 
mechanism for 11 cosponsors. Throughout the process, CSO representatives have 
expressed frustration at what they have felt to be unnecessary delays in 
addressing issues of civil society participation, and lack of sufficient consultation 
with civil society on the part of UNAIDS and cosponsors (GHI Representative 2013 
#29; NGO Delegation 2012b). Although at first not included in the revision 
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processes, spearheaded by the Monitoring and Evaluation Reference Group, the 
NGO Delegation was able to demand space to participate. In this role they have 
focused on the need to improve accountability between CSOs and cosponsors.  
The 2013 UBRAF included 11 (out of 123) indicators directly related to civil 
society participation. However, the NGO Delegation expressed concerns, in 
December 2012, that these are “without the rigor required to effectively measure 
meaningful engagement and support for civil society” (NGO Delegation 2012b). In 
particular, the delegation argued for greater transparency about resources for civil 
society (i.e. how much and what type of funding cosponsors and the Secretariat 
provide to civil society organizations they partner with); greater qualitative analysis 
of how PWAs and key populations are being engaged with, and whether that 
engagement is meaningful or if it is tokenistic; and that, as opposed to highlighting 
only positive outcomes, reporting should also discuss challenges in order for it to 
be more useful to cosponsors and credible to donors. Based on these concerns, 
the delegation requested improved indicators that better reflect the engagement of 
cosponsors and the Secretariat with civil society, and put forward 12 new 
indicators. The Secretariat felt these were over ambitious, and reduced them to 
three. In return the delegation expressed concerns that these were inadequate.  
In mid 2013, the UNAIDS Secretariat agreed to a proposal made by the 
delegation to hire a specialist to review the civil society indicators. The consultant, 
who was required to work within the confines of the existing indicators as opposed 
to suggest new ones, proposed that those civil society related indicators with 
strong technical merit (seven of the 11) remain, and that in addition the checklist 
already present in the UNAIDS Partnership Guidance document be used to collect 
background information. The consultant also recommended that cosponsors 
continue the practice, pioneered at the request of the NGO Delegation in 2013, of 
producing an annual Civil Society Working Paper outlining their engagement with 
civil society on HIV/AIDS related interventions. In 2013, working papers from 
UNWomen, UNESCO and UNPF provided percentage estimates of their direct 
financial support to civil society. The consultant suggested that other cosponsors 
do the same, including actual amounts of support (as opposed to just 
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percentages). In addition, it was recommended that more case studies and 
qualitative data, collected by objective third parties, be used.  
At the 33rd PCB, in December 2013, it was announced that, in response to the 
consultant’s recommendations, the Secretariat and cosponsors had organized a 
Co-sponsors’ Evaluation Working Group on Civil Society, including two members 
of the NGO Delegation, to shape the questionnaire and the annual working 
paper.  At the 34th PCB, in June 2014, the first outcomes of this working group 
were shared, including greater financial information on cosponsors’ commitments 
to civil society. If this process further improves civil society participation, and 
downward accountability, remains to be seen.  
 
Global AIDS Response Progress Reporting 
Civil society has had some success in contributing to the downward 
accountability of member states through participation in the UNAIDS Secretariat 
lead processes of Global AIDS Response Progress (GARP) reporting. GARP 
reports monitor progress towards the Declaration of Commitment (2001), and 
Political Declarations (2006 and 2011) on HIV/AIDS. Taylor et al. write, “the 
Declaration of Commitment, with its reporting mechanism, is considered among the 
most effective models of a non-binding instrument in global health policy. The 
reporting mechanism has evolved and come to have a substantial impact on 
domestic AIDS legal and policy environments and has significantly improved 
accountability at both national and global levels” (2014). 96 percent of UN member 
states completed UNGASS reporting in 2012.   
In addition to being a widely supported accountability tool, GARP reporting 
demonstrates that CSO participation in UNAIDS can directly improve downward 
accountability. Civil society is included in all aspects of reporting, from participating 
on the UNAIDS MERG, which develops the indicators, to holding civil society 
hearings prior to, and participating in, the most recent High Level Meeting on 
HIV/AIDS, at which the goals were agreed to. CSO participants successfully 
advocate for the most recent version of the GARP guidelines to include an 
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indicator to reduce intimate partner violence, and another on the elimination of 
stigma and discrimination (GHI representative 2013 #33).  
UNAIDS strongly encourages national governments to involve CSOs in the 
monitoring and reporting process as a source of information and expertise. This 
encouragement has proven impactful, with the majority of governments that 
complete reports including CSOs in consultations and data collection, and then 
presenting findings through validation workshops. Taylor et al. note, “In countries 
with little previous history of multi- stakeholder collaboration on AIDS, the 
unprecedented manner in which civil society actors were often involved in reporting 
may be the most immediate and tangible result of the process” (2014, 7). The 
National Policy Commitment documents, completed every two years by each state, 
include a section to be completed by government and a section to be completed by 
civil society. This provides a tool for CSOs to hold governments to account on 
promises to engage with civil society and honor commitments to a rights-based 
response. CSOs are also able to use the data from the reports, widely available on 
the website AIDSinfo.org, to lobby governments to address neglected issues and 
key populations (Taylor et al. 2014, 7). 
 Where civil society feels excluded, that government data is inconsistent, or 
the indicators used are not indicative of needs and results in their particular 
context, CSOs can produce Shadow Reports with what they feel are more 
representative indicators and data. UNAIDS explains,  
 
“Wherever possible UNAIDS encourages civil society 
integration into national reporting processes…. Shadow 
reports are intended to provide an alternative perspective 
where it is strongly felt that civil society was not adequately 
included in the national reporting process, where 
governments do not submit a report, or where data 
provided by government differs considerably from data 
collected by civil society monitoring government progress 
in service delivery” (2013, 15).  
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Shadow reports are also produced by CSOs to present an alternative view on 
national responses. For example, in 2008, the Global Youth Coalition on HIV/AIDS 
produced Shadow Report for 10 countries in order increase awareness of the 
unmet prevention, treatment and care needs of youth at risk of and affected by 
HIV/AIDS. Shadow reports created an opportunity to draw attention to the 
particular human rights issues that affect youth. UNAIDS uses both shadow and 
state reports to compile its annual Report on the Global AIDS Response.  
 The number of Shadow Reports increased from 103 in 2003 to 176 in 2010 
– indicating increasing involvement of civil society in GARP reporting (Sidibe et al. 
2010, 3). Even more telling is that the number of Shadow Reports has dropped 
over the last two years, due to improved reporting by governments (often with the 
involvement of CSOs), and improved indicators produce by UNAIDS (Taylor et al. 
2014).  This demonstrates that the pressure CSOs and UNAIDS put on 
governments to be accountable to GARP commitments, and to report more 
effectively; as well as the pressure CSOs exerted on UNAIDS to develop better 
indicators has had system wide outcomes; reporting has become more reflective of 
rights-based goals and so the need for shadow reports has declined. The reporting 
on GARP targets presents an example of UNAIDS, civil society and states working 
together, sometimes co-operatively and sometimes through struggles, to produce 
innovative downward accountability mechanism and outcomes. 
 
4.1.6 Section Summary 
The prominent role CSOs played in advocating for a global response to 
HIV/AIDS, combined with the failure of WHO to develop an effective multisectoral 
response, led to the unprecedented inclusion of civil society actors in a UN body - 
UNAIDS. However, aspirations for transformation through this CSO participation 
were immediately curbed by bureaucratic restrictions and state dominance. CSOs 
have struggled to assert influence in decision-making within the confines of 
governance structures that limit accessibility and resist efforts to change processes 
so that CSOs have more direct influence (for example by allowing decision points 
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on thematic days). However, CSOs have been able to use their unique role to 
shape discussions if not decisions around human rights. Because CSO participants 
have not been able to influence how governance processes are conducted, they 
have to continually negotiate input and output legitimacy; in order to contribute to 
effective governance they have to play by bureaucratic rules that alienate their 
constituents; when they prioritize promoting alternatives reflective of constituent 
interests, such as human rights issues, they are accused of threatening 
effectiveness. The resistance of UNAIDS to adapting to CSO participatory 
requirements further limits the ability of CSOs to be successful conduits for 
downward accountability between the institution and broader civil society response. 
External CSOs remain alienated by extensive bureaucratic processes, and internal 
CSO participants are frustrated by the inflexible bureaucracy. However, the case of 
CSOs, state and UNAIDS Secretariat co-operation around GARP reporting 
demonstrates the potential for CSO participation to strengthen accountability 
processes.  
The limits of CSO participation in transforming UNAIDS into a responsive and 
representative GHI were established at its formation. Considering these restrictions 
CSO participants have exercised considerable influence and continued to advocate 
for the rights of those most affected by the epidemic. While claims that CSO 
participation strengthens legitimacy and accountability are over stated, the 
potential utility of having CSOs involved in institutional governance is 
demonstrated. 
 
4.2 CSO Participation in the Global Fund Governance 
The Global Fund was formed at the turn of the millennium, embodying hope 
that a unique multi-stakeholder partnership would be able to curb the epidemic 
through more efficient and effective aid delivery. Civil society actors were given 
unprecedented space within the governance of this new institution, positioned as 
equal and essential partners.  The aspirations for inclusive and effective 
governance, embodied in the Global Fund, continue to be held up as an example 
of a uniquely participatory governance arrangement (Ritterberger et al. 2008).  
  162"
This section analyzes the role of CSOs in the governance of the Global Fund. It 
argues that the creation of the Global Fund represents aspirations to create an 
innovative institution, which resulted in unprecedented civil society influence, able 
to shape both decisions and processes to increase the involvement of those 
affected by the three diseases and advance human rights agendas. This influence 
is generated within the dynamic structure of the Fund, and is based on the role of 
CSOs as advocates for the Fund with extensive networks. However, claims that 
civil society delegations to the board facilitate input legitimacy are overstated, as 
delegates are more representative of a coalition of like-minded CSOs than of those 
most affected by the epidemic. Instead, the delegations generate output-orientated 
legitimacy, at the same time as creating new legitimacy challenges.  Lack of well-
rounded legitimacy negatively impacts the ability of the civil society board 
delegations to strengthen downward accountability, creating relationships that 
better represent a network of horizontal accountability. Though this gap is 
somewhat mitigated by the efforts of external CSOs, civil society participants 
struggle to hold the Fund to account.  
 While recognizing that the Global Fund provides funding for three diseases 
and so includes CSOs from various health backgrounds, the focus is on HIV/AIDS 
CSOs. This reflects the topic of the thesis, and is not a particularly limiting factor, 
as the majority of civil society actors that engage in the Fund come from HIV/AIDS 
CSOs (Bartsch 2007). Furthermore, in keeping with the focus of the thesis, the 
analysis is on CSO participation at the global level and so only discusses regional 
and national processes (such as CSO participation on CCMs) when engaged with 
global level processes. 
 
4.2.1 History  
 A number of dynamics contributed to the formation of the Global Fund in 
general, and the participation of CSOs in its governance in particular. These 
include: the growing recognition of HIV/AIDS as a global security threat, which 
mobilized donor states; civil society campaigns for universal access to treatment, 
which created demand for increased funding for HIV/AIDS; and awareness of the 
  163"
limits of UNAIDS in mobilizing a global response to the epidemic, which lead to 
calls for an institution outside of the UN system. Combined, these dynamics 
created demand for an innovative governance structure, with increased space for 
CSO participation. 
The previous chapter outlined how the concept of AIDS exceptionalism 
facilitated multiple framings of the epidemic, such as around human rights issues. 
A further frame was the securitization of the epidemic - the argument that 
HIV/AIDS had to be responded to urgently because it had global security 
implications. The securitization of the epidemic was advanced by a number of 
advocates within the HIV/AIDS response such as Peter Piot, the Executive Director 
of UNAIDS, who saw securitization as an opportunity to gain greater international 
attention to the potential implications of the epidemic (Piot & Marshall 2012), and 
the US Ambassador to the UN at the time, Richard Holbrock, who while on a trip in 
Africa visited an AIDS orphanage and was overwhelmed by the degree of suffering 
caused by the epidemic. Holbrock lobbied UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to 
raise awareness about the epidemic among member states (Barnett & Prins 2006, 
360).  As a result, the first UN Security Council meeting of the new millennium was 
also the first meeting to focus on a health issue as a security threat. At that 
meeting Annan stated: 
 
“Today marks the first time, after more than 4,000 
meetings stretching back more than half a century, that 
the Security Council will discuss a health issue as a 
security threat. We tend to think of a threat to security in 
terms of war and peace. Yet no one can doubt that the 
havoc wreaked and the toll exacted by HIV/AIDS” (2001). 
 
Other leaders followed Annan’s lead, with the President of the World Bank stating, 
“Many of us used to think of AIDS as a health issue. We were wrong ... We face a 
major development crisis, and more than that, a security crisis” (quoted in Elb 
2005, 404). The resulting resolution positioned HIV/AIDS as the cause-celeb of 
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shifting notions of security, which argued that not only could viruses be used as a 
biological weapon, but also that the impacts of HIV/AIDS  (such as widespread 
orphaning and deaths amongst the labor force) could contribute to state collapse 
and social break down, which in turn could lead to civil unrest and terrorism.  
Despite the lack of evidence to support such hypothesis, securitization propelled 
the HIV/AIDS response to the top of international agendas (Barnette & Prins 2006). 
This framing positioned the epidemic as a threat to both developing and developed 
states, generating demands for increased financing to contain the epidemic.  
As states focused on the security implications of the epidemic, most CSOs 
continued to advocate for a rights-based response. Around the turn of the 
millennium, much of this mobilization centered around the right to treatment 
access. In 1996, ART was announced at the IAS Conference in Canada, 
potentially transforming AIDS from a lethal disease to a chronic condition. Soon 
after high-income countries began public provision of treatment. Pharmaceutical 
companies justified high prices on medications (over US$25,000 per patient per 
year in1996) by referring to intellectual property rights, and research and 
development costs.  It was unthinkable to states and institutions that concepts of 
rights and equity could interfere with intellectual property norms or trade regimes, 
and so it was accepted that ART was a life prolonging option only for those who 
could afford it (O’Manique 2004, 83). Initially, policy-makers and public health 
professionals in the HIV/AIDS response accepted this rationalization, believing that 
ART delivery was not a possibility in less developed countries due to limited 
technological capacity. Hein writes, “[International organizations] active in the fight 
against HIV/AIDS in developing countries- basically the WHO and the World Bank 
– concentrated on strategies of prevention, as this was seen as the most cost-
effective strategy. This approach took the extremely high price of ART for granted” 
(2007, 50).  Furthermore, health interventions in the developing world rarely 
addressed chronic health issues, as donors preferred short-term technical 
solutions, such as preventative vaccines, to long-term commitments. 
 However, for global networks of PWAs, and their allies, the inequality 
created by the high cost of ART was too obvious and devastating to ignore: some 
members were able to live healthy lives, while those sitting across from them at 
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meetings were dying. Activists around the world began extensive campaigns 
against pharmaceutical companies and their political allies, arguing that the prices 
of ART needed to be reduced, and that the production and trade of generic 
medications should be allowed in high prevalence low-income countries. Activists 
critiqued organizations, like the WHO and the newly formed UNAIDS, for not taking 
a radical stance on treatment. In order to advance their cause, they worked with 
and created organizations such as MSF, Oxfam, Consumer Project for 
Technology, Treatment Action Group, ACT UP, Health Global Access Project, 
Health Action International, Treatment Action Campaign, Kenyan Coalition for 
Access to Essential Medicines, and the Ugandan Coalition, among others 
(O’Manique 2004). These groups protested at political and business events, and 
implemented programs to prove that treatment delivery could be effectively 
implemented in resource poor contexts. 
CSO activism and advocacy campaigns created a demand for treatment in 
resource poor countries. Former UNAIDS Executive Director remembers, “The 
donor’s strategy of demand containment was slowly disintegrating” as activists 
staged die-ins in front of government and pharmaceutical representatives, and 
developing countries took the pharmaceutical companies to court (Piot & Marshall 
2007, 316-17). India began manufacturing generic drugs, which activists smuggled 
into highly affected countries, such as South Africa.  
In response to these campaigns, at the 2001 Doha Round of the WTO 
negotiations, it was agreed that intellectual property agreements should not 
prevent countries from protecting public health - enabling low and middle-income 
countries to manufacture and import generic HIV/AIDS medications for public 
programs.  Despite success in reducing prices and increasing access to generics, 
it remained clear to CSOs that mid and high HIV/AIDS prevalence contexts, most 
of which were in low-income countries, would still not be able to afford public ART 
provision without donor support. CSOs began to mobilize not only for reduced 
prices and access to generics, but also for greater funding. 
While demand for universal access to ART created contentions regarding 
intellectual property laws, and challenged previous global health norms around 
providing medications for complex chronic illnesses, it also complemented 
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biomedical neoliberal approaches. Treatment presented a quantifiable and 
technical ‘solution’ to the HIV/AIDS epidemic: “The Lazarus effect of ART, which 
brought life back to the dying, made spectacular and poignant human stories, and 
also could be relatively easily measured and quantified” (Piot & Marshall 2007, 
317). ART appealed to donors, CSOs and recipient states, as it not only curbed 
death and suffering, but also applied market and medical approaches to address 
the epidemic. The affects of ART could be easily measured, and the stories of 
survival made for good press to galvanize fundraising. As recipient states became 
increasingly aware of growing death tolls, and donor states feared the global 
security implications of the epidemic, treatment became conceived of as a solution 
that could meet a variety of interests. The persistent problem, however, was how to 
mobilize funding to provide treatment.  
UNAIDS was already in existence and was, by some, consider a possible 
institution through which to coordinate resources. Furthermore, as noted in the 
previous section, the unique structure of UNAIDS reflected an attempt by donor 
states to try to overcome shortcomings of the UN system (Nay 2009, 11). But, as 
also already noted, UNAIDS did not live up to these ambitions, as the cosponsor 
format resulted in cautious compromises in the PCB and a lack of implementation 
capacity for the Secretariat. Dissatisfaction with the UN system prevailed, and 
donors remained unwilling to commit funding to a UN entity. Even when they 
offered resources, as DFID did, UNAIDS lacked the administrative capacity to 
implement projects, being dependent on UNDP and WHO for logistics (Piot & 
Marshall 2012, 316).  
As the limits of UNAIDS’ capacity became increasingly apparent, and concern 
over the increasing epidemic in the developing world grew, various proposals 
emerged for the establishment for new multilateral funding mechanisms outside of 
the UN system (Piot & Marshall 2012, 319). The US, EU and Japan said they 
would only increase funding for HIV/AIDS if the UN was not involved – reflecting 
continued perceptions of inefficiency within the UN, and recognition of the limited 
capacity of UNAIDS. The UNAIDS Executive Director at the time recalls, “The 
major donor countries and the European Commission agreed on one thing: they 
were on a warpath against the UN”  (Piot & Marshall, 320). CSOs, while still 
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generally supportive of UNAIDS, realized that it was not the funding mechanism 
they and their constituents needed to access treatment, and so also advocated for 
the formation of a new institution. 
Hein et al. (2007) argue that the HIV/AIDS response went through a process 
of forum shifting, from the WHO, to UNAIDS and then to the Global Fund, changing 
institutional practices and allowing for new resources and actor coalitions in each 
case. In advocating for an option outside of the UN, donors expressed 
dissatisfaction with the current multilateral system. However, it is also crucial to 
note that the development of the Global Fund both responded to the limits of 
UNAIDS, and built on its precedents. As one observed noted, the creation of the 
Global Fund “probably would not have been possible without UNAIDS. The Global 
Fund was set up seven years after UNAIDS and so benefited from the ground that 
had been laid by UNAIDS. So each of these things grows of what has been laid 
before”  (GHI Representative 2013 #3). UNAIDS was an experiment within the UN 
system; the limits of which were recognized and used to conceptualize a further 
innovation in GHG. 
 At the G8 summit in Okinawa, in 2000, leaders proposed the creation of a 
partnership for addressing Malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS; the diseases that caused the 
highest number of combined deaths worldwide, and that were resultantly prioritize 
in MDG 6. In April 2001, African heads of state met in Abuja for a special summit of 
the Organization of African Unity, which focused on infectious disease. They 
produced the Abuja Declaration calling for a “Global AIDS Fund capitalized by the 
donor community to the tune of US $5-10 billion accessible to all affected 
countries.” In response, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, also at the summit, 
called for a “war chest to fight AIDS” (Annan 2001). Finally, at a Special Session of 
the UN General Assembly on HIV/AIDS, in June 2001, member states adopted a 
Declaration of Commitment, pledging to “support the establishment, on an urgent 
basis, of a global HIV/AIDS and health fund to finance an urgent and expanded 
response to the epidemic.” In July, the G8 committed US$1.3 billion to the fund, 
which had yet to be established. This resource mobilization happened relatively 
quickly, presenting a unique example of rapid international co-operation (Bartsch 
2007, 150). 
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In 2001, a Transitional Working Group was created to develop the structure 
for the new institution. It included 40 members representing developing countries, 
donors, CSOs, the private sector, and the UN system. Concurrently, the UK AIDS 
Consortium coordinated regional CSO consultations on issues related to 
governance, country processes and eligibility criteria. These were communicated 
to CSO representatives in the working group, who made the following 
recommendations:  
1. NGO participation must be ensured in Global Fund decision-making 
activities at all level.  
2. The composition of the Global Fund Board should reflect the following 
proportions and status:  
• NGO participants should have full voting status (not less than 30 
percent) 
• UN/multilateral organization participants should have observer status 
• Donors and recipient nations should have equal representation 
• There should be a dedicated position on the Secretariat with 
responsibility for NGO liaison and outreach 
3. In order to ensure maximum transparency in Global Fund activities, all 
proposals, interim and final reports as well as other supporting/review 
documentation and working documents of the Global Fund Board, 
Secretariat and Partnership Forum should be available publicly and for 
comment in a timely way. 
4. In circumstances where NGOs or vulnerable groups are not recognized by 
national governments, mechanisms must be in place to allow them to have 
access to the Global Fund. 
5. The key roles of the Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs) should be 
to bring together all key stakeholders, including NGOs, civil society and 
representatives of people living with and affected by the three diseases 
covered by the Global Fund, set country priorities and monitor programs 
supported by the Global Fund (GFATM 2001).  
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These recommendations were supported by the soon-to-be Executive Director, 
Richard Feachmen, and other key insiders, who had a history of working with 
CSOs, and recognized the powerful advocacy roll they filled in creating demand for 
funding (Piot & Marshall 2007). They were incorporated into the new institution’s 
governance structure, enshrining an unprecedented degree of CSO participation 
and promoting accountability between the institution and CSOs. 
CSOs, mobilized by the promise of resources for treatment and space in 
Global Fund governance, used their networks to fundraise for the new initiative. 
They pressured governments at the Abuja meeting to commit to increasing global 
spending for the three diseases (GFATM 2007, 10). Piot remembers that during 
fundraising efforts, “Pressure from outside, by AIDS activist was intense” (Piot & 
Marshall 2007, 321). By applying pressure on both donor states (to give 
generously) and recipient states (to create demand), CSOs played a key role in 
mobilizing resources for the first round of Global Fund grants: “The internationally- 
recognized role that civil society played in launching Round 1 and in participating in 
the conceptualization and design of the Global Fund led to a sense of ownership; 
the Global Fund was an initiative that they had helped to create, fund and govern” 
(GFATM 2007, 10). Similarly, key informants state, for example, “the Global Fund 
originated from demand coming from civil society” (GHI Representative 2013 #21). 
This history of ownership has continued to shape CSO participation and influence 
in the Fund. 
The formation of the Global Fund reflects a desire by donors to do aid 
differently.  At the G8 Genoa summit, in 2001, heads of state affirmed:  
 
“[The fund] will operate according to principles of proven 
scientific and medical effectiveness, rapid resource transfer, 
low transaction costs, and light governance with a strong focus 
on outcomes. We hope that the  existence of the Fund will 
promote improved co-ordination among donors  and provide 
further incentives for private sector research and development.”  
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The aim was to overcome the politicization of aid delivery in favour of technical 
approaches, increasing the role of private actors and emphasis on results.  
Williams and Rushton note that, “In many senses, the establishment of the Global 
Fund was an attempt to redress the political shortcomings of multilateral UN 
efforts... In summary, the Global Fund was an attempt to create a depoliticized and 
more accountable mode of global health governance” (2011, 54). They question 
this ambition, noting that, “the multisectoral and technically oriented design of the 
Global Fund is in fact based, in large part, on political drivers.... in other words, 
despite the insistence that the Global Fund is a non-political organization, the 
reasoning which underwrote its creation as its operating procedures reflects 
inherently political normative concerns”  (Williams & Rushton 2011, 58). The Global 
Fund’s private-partnership model and focus on results-based management 
reflected prioritization of technical, medical interventions - reiterating biomedical 
neoliberal approaches to global health and so was only innovative within these 
confines.  
While CSOs understood that the Fund was not created to respond to human 
rights demands, they saw it as a potential site of struggle in three ways. First, it 
reflected a remarkable ambition to mobilize resources for health, which CSOs 
hoped could be channeled to meet rights goals and lead to further transformations 
(CSO Representative 2013 #26). As one observer noted, “It was huge amounts of 
money for the Global Fund, as an antithesis, to the standard bilateral donors, was 
something we had never seen” (GHI Representative 2013 #32). Secondly, 
because it embraced a public-private multi-stakeholder model, the Fund was open 
to the participation of non-state actors, creating unprecedented space for CSO 
involvement. Thirdly, because the new entity was “to be different than anything 
before” it was flexible, open to continued innovation. One early CSO activist 
recalled, “And with the Global Fund you know we could develop a model from 
scratch, where as when other models were being developed, you can only move 
incrementally. With the Global Fund it was developed from scratch, nothing ever 
existed before”  (GHI Representative 2013 #27). Starting from scratch provided the 
chance for CSOs to advocate for a dynamic institutions that, even if it did not 
specifically aim to focus on human rights, could be more flexible to CSO influence. 
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4.2.2 Position in GHG 
In addition to its inclusion of civil society, the Global Fund governance 
structure presents a number of unique features. First, it is a performance-based 
fund, which means grant disbursements are reduced, suspended, or cancelled in 
cases of poor grant performance. Over the course of the grant, Principle Recipients 
(PRs) are responsible for regularly reporting to the Global Fund on results, 
expenditures and changes. As the fund is not an implementing organization, 
aiming instead to strengthen country capacity to respond, funding proposals and 
disbursement processes are managed by CCMs, consisting of representatives of 
government, civil society and the private sector. Proposals are judged by the 
Technical Review Panel (TRP), which makes recommendations to the board. The 
Fund, “takes an unusually hands-off approach compared to most donors, leaving 
much of the responsibility for program design and implementation to country 
representatives and local groups” (Radelet 2004, 3). The CCM model of 
disbursement, with performance-based oversight from the Secretariat in Geneva, 
creates a unique model of aid delivery.  
This model did not initially fit easily within existing GHG systems and 
relationships, especially as various actors brought pre-established interests to the 
Fund:  
 
“The Global Fund assumed a win-win situation for all 
participating actors in the pursuit of the common goal to 
fight HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria and thus expected its 
partners to fully support all Global Fund activities. It did 
not consider sufficiently, however, that competing 
interests, different organizational cultures, a lack of 
mutual trust, or resource constraints could hamper an 
effective operation” (Bartsch 2011, 51).  
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For example, Piot notes it was not always easy to maintain good relations between 
UNAIDS and the Global Fund (Piot & Marshall 2012, 323).  In order to write 
proposals for the fund, CCMs required the assistance of highly paid experts. This 
resulted in the WHO and UNAIDS investing resources in Global Fund proposal 
development without receiving any compensation, creating frustrations. 
Furthermore, the dependence on external (usually Western) experts to write the 
highly technical proposals raised questions about how committed to country 
ownership the Fund was able to be in practice (GFATM 2011b). These questions 
were exacerbated as tensions became apparent between the Fund’s ambitions to 
be country driven, responsive to civil society, and accountable to donors (GHI 
Representative 2013 #3). Governments and civil society often disagreed over 
priorities, especially in relation to addressing key populations, and donors wanted 
more control over how the funds were used than recipient governments. 
Meanwhile, the fact that the US formed PEPFAR so soon after the Global Fund 
demonstrated American dissatisfaction with the Fund’s inclusion of civil society, 
and resulted in two large funding bodies in GHG, who often duplicated efforts, and 
created double reporting and administrative burdens for recipient countries. The 
five-year evaluation of the Fund, conducted in 2007, found that despite rhetorical 
commitment to partnerships, the Fund had not successfully worked well with other 
actors in GHG, often duplicating efforts as opposed to building synergies.  
Despite these challenges, due to its vast resources and ongoing, if often 
frustrated, support from multiple stakeholders, the Global Fund became a major 
player in GHG. Between 2002 and December 2006, the Global Fund approved six 
rounds of grants and disbursed US$3.2 billion (CGD 2012). It became one of the 
highest profile international aid bodies and a prominent forum for decision-making 
on global health. Bartsch writes, “The GF is not only an important financing 
mechanism in global health, it is also a major organizational interface, linking 
different kinds of stakeholder groups in its governing and administrative bodies” 
(2011, 47). Walker argues the Global Fund became increasingly involved in 
normative policy making as it matured, due to the substantial influence it exercised 
by determining grant requirements and priorities  (Walker 2011, 72). Similarly, one 
key informant states, “What makes the Global Fund an amazing institution is the 
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fact that at the end of the day it is a global funding mechanism that has these 
amazing policies attached to it. Because it could have so easily become just a sort 
of conduit for money. But it is money plus” (CSO Representative 2013 #1). As the 
Global Fund became one of the most influential actors in GHG, it shaped both 
donor and recipient health priorities, shifting attitudes and practices around 
resource mobilization, monitoring and use, and successfully mobilized other actors 
- including UNAIDS, WHO and various CSOs - to achieve its aims.  
 As a result of its growing influence and increasing funding, a certain 
optimism accompanied the Fund’s first 10 rounds of grants. One early board 
member recalls, “We were funding round after round with lots of fights and lots of 
debates, but still it happened. The funding was there in principle. There was more 
funding at the time than there was demand…. I mean we were building the ship 
while sailing, which was fun too”  (CSO Representative 2013 #26). The fund rapidly 
scaled-up programs, often at the expense of planning and oversight (GFATM 
2011b, 7). Such practices were justified by the emergency rhetoric of AIDS 
exceptionalism, which prioritized quick deliver over planning.  
Then, in January 2011, the Associated Press published an article on several 
instances of fraud and corruption at the Global Fund. As the article noted, this 
corruption had been discovered and disclosed several months prior by the Office of 
the Inspector General (OIG) and was being dealt with by the Fund. However, the 
article labeled the level of fraud “astonishing,” with “as much as two-thirds of some 
grants eaten up by corruption” (Heilprin 2011). In fact, the affected funds 
represented 0.3 percent of the Global Fund’s total disbursements between 2002 
and 2010 - an amount many observers, such a Bill Gates, noted was negligible 
compared to many other international donors (2014).  
However, the Global Fund did not handle the bad press proactively. One staff 
member remembers, “My personal opinion is that we did a very poor job of 
responding to that. The arrogance of the organization of the time, through all 
levels, was that we didn’t need to do anything. The article was wrong, and 
everybody would see through to the truth” (GHI Representative 2013 #16). The 
Fund did not responded until April with its own report, Results with Integrity, which 
reiterated the Fund’s “zero-tolerance” approach to corruption.   
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In the meantime donors, such as Germany and Sweden, suspended aid to 
the Fund, and others began calling for inquiries and reforms. Civil society 
advocates and the Secretariat felt that donors were using the corruption 
accusations as an excuse to reduce funding during the economic recession (CSO 
Representative 2013 #1; GHI Representative 2013 #17). The corruption charges, 
backlash against AIDS exceptionalism and disease specific funding, and financial 
crisis converged to create “the perfect storm for the Global Fund” (CSO 
Representative 2013 #26), which cumulated in the cancelation of Round 11, due to 
lack of resources and donor demands for restructuring.  
The Global Fund formed a High Level Panel to assess practices in financial 
oversight and implementation. The panel examined grants in 40 countries in 
different risk categories, drawing conclusions and making recommendations, 
including improving financial and board oversight, simplifying grant application 
processes, and putting in place a robust risk management framework. The Global 
Fund subsequently underwent a series of reforms.  In January 2012, the board 
appointed Gabriel Jaramillo as General Manager to lead the Fund’s restructuring 
for a year. Immediately thereafter, the Executive Director, Michel Kazatchkine, 
resigned in response to the board’s decision to transfer many of his responsibilities 
to Jaramillo. In his resignation Kazatchkine (2012) noted:  
 
“Today, the Global Fund stands at a cross-road. In the 
international political economy, power-balances are 
shifting and new alignments of countries and decision-
making institutions are emerging or will have to be 
developed to achieve global goals. Within the area of 
global health, the emergency approaches of the past 
decade are giving way to concerns about how to ensure 
long-term sustainability, while at the same time, efficiency 
is becoming a dominant measure of success." 
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As Kazatichine notes, changes within the Fund reflected broader shifts in GHG, 
beyond the mere corruption accusations. The paradigm of global health aid 
delivery was shifting from the emergency response characterized by rapid scale-up 
and a prioritization of delivery over processes, to more systematic processes 
focused on sustainability. In this shifting context, the efficiency and purpose of the 
Fund’s model was called into question – generating discussions about how 
decisions were made, what the Fund’s legitimacy rested on, and how accountable 
it was to both donors and recipients. 
From the civil society perspective, the crisis and resultant changes created 
multiple concerns. Grant recipients and CSOs in implementing countries had dealt 
with the strict reporting procedures and accountability measures from the Fund for 
a decade. To have been constantly called to account and then hear there was poor 
management at the top made both implementing states and CSOs feel mistreated 
(CSO Representative 2013 #10). The cancelation of the round caused panic and 
damaged trust:  
 
“When we found out the work we were doing was 
threatened because Round 11 was cancelled,  it’s alarm, 
alarm, alarm, what are we going to do? …And it was at 
the same time, where the OIG was criticizing everyone. 
Realistically so, but from our perspective, we felt that as 
much as the Global Fund now has an OIG who can name 
and shame everyone, it is a bit unfair of the Global Fund 
to do that…. And while we appreciate the Global Fund’s 
stance, we were very angry, because we said, you know 
from the beginning, you should have put controls in 
place” (CSO Representative 2013 #8).  
 
The conditions some donors began to demand before releasing further funding, 
also made CSOs feel that the principles of equality that had shaped their 
relationships with other governance actors previously were at risk - they were 
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denied funding to scale-up their work and told they could only access future funds 
on the basis of donor approval (CSO Representative 2013 #20). Furthermore, the 
acting Executive Director, Jaramillo, was not seen as particularly open to CSO 
involvement, and one of his reforms included disbanding the Civil Society Team in 
the Secretariat. The cancelation of the round, exposure of corruption in the Fund, 
restructuring, and donor country reactions created tensions between the board, 
Secretariat and CSOs.  
In 2013, Mark Dyble, former Global AIDS Coordinator at PEPFAR, was 
appointed the new Executive Director of the Global Fund, and a New Funding 
Model was announced. These changes, along with the reforms, eased donor 
concerns (which also relaxed with the relative recovery from the economic crisis) 
and renewed the hope of other partners, including CSOs. In December 2013, 
US$12 billion was pledge to the Global Fund, which began accepting applications 
under the New Funding Model (discussed in the preceding chapter).  
Interviewees reflect a sense that the Fund has gone through some necessary 
growing pains, but has emerged stronger: “So I think on the whole it was a rough 
time for the fund but I think in some cases there were self inflicted wounds by the 
fund along the way. But I do think now we have come out the other side and I think 
Mark Dyble as the new Executive Director, will help drive some of these reforms in 
a positive way” (CSO Representative 2013 #26). And, “Now that the Global Fund 
has reformed, we have been very happy, we strongly lobbied for more aid effective 
approach. . . . I think there is still an expectation that things will get better, things 
are getting better, last year was a bad year. But I think we will see where we move 
with the fall out” (State Representative 2013 #39). Relationships between the many 
stakeholders within the fund appear to be on the mend. 
Resultantly, the Global Fund has largely regained its prominent place in 
GHG. It remains the preferred method for multilateral aid dispersants for health, the 
focus of CSO campaigns for greater resources, and an influential policy driver.  By 
mid-August 2012 the Global Fund had disbursed US$17.1 billion, through 1,050 
grants in 150 countries. This resulted in  
• 4.2 million people receiving ART  
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• 9.7 million people receiving effective TB treatment 
• 310 million insecticide-treated bed nets being distributed to protect families 
from malaria 
• 250 million people had been reached with HIV counseling and testing  
• 4.2 billion condoms had been distributed 
• 1.7 million women had received treatment for prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV 
• 30 million services had been provided to most-at-risk populations (GFATM 
2012d) 
While actual attribution of what funding, by which organization, has achieved these 
goals, is debatable (as Global Fund grants are distributed along side domestic 
resources and other funding mechanism) it is clear that the Global Fund has made 
a substantial contribution to scaling-up the HIV/AIDS response. Walker writes, “The 
Global Fund has become a leader in terms of its institutional size, the magnitude of 
the resources it has mobilized and distributed and its authority at global and 
country levels” (2012, 32). The Global Fund continues to not only influence the 
GHG landscape, but also shapes national and local responses to the three 
diseases. However, the recent crisis raises pertinent questions about the Fund’s 
relationship with civil society partners, decision-making structure, legitimacy and 
accountability. 
 
4.2.3 Influence in Decision-Making 
The Global Fund is celebrated for its innovative structure that includes civil 
society in all aspects of decision-making. Its mission states:  
 
“Under the Global Fund business model, the work is carried 
out by all stakeholders working together, including 
government, civil society, communities living with the 
disease, technical partners, the private sector, faith-based 
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organizations, academics, and other multilateral and bilateral 
agencies. All those involved in the fight should be involved in 
the decision-making process” (Global Fund 2013).  
 
Interviewees agree that the Global Fund’s participation structure is remarkably 
inclusive stating, for example, “We call it ‘The Model’, the best example of how civil 
society can be engaged in governance at all levels" (CSO Representative 2013 
#26). This section analyzes what influence CSOs have at the global level, 
particularly discussing their role in the decision-making of the board and 
Secretariat.10 It asks how CSO influence is shaped by governance structures, how 
it is applied, and to what effect - particularly focusing on if CSO influence facilitates 
the advancement of human rights agendas within Global Fund governance.  
 
CSOs on the Global Fund Board 
At the global level, the Global Fund’s governance board includes 20 voting 
member (donor countries with eight votes, implementing countries with seven 
votes, the private sector with one vote, private foundations with one vote, and civil 
society with three votes), and eight non-voting members (the Chair and Vice Chair, 
UNAIDS, WHO, the World Bank, Stop TB Partnership, Roll Back Malaria, 
UNITAIDS, the Executive Director and a Swiss resident). Board members serve as 
representatives of their constituencies, as opposed to as individuals, organizational 
or country representatives. For implementing states constituencies are based on 
WHO regions; for civil society they are divided into Developing Country NGOs, 
Developed Country NGOs and Affected Communities; donor constituencies reflect 
geographic regions (such as the Scandinavian countries) or common approaches 
(for example Canada and Switzerland share a seat). The board is responsible for 
“strategy development; governance oversight; commitment of financial resources; 
assessment of organizational performance; risk management; [and] partner 
engagement, resource mobilization, and advocacy” (Global Fund 2013). It meets at 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
10"Civil"society"actors"also"participate"in"the"various"governance"committees"of"the"Global"Fund."However,"
these"are"not"discussed"here"due"space"limitations."Participation"in"the"Partnership"Forum"is"analyzed"in"the"
accountability"section."
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least twice a year, and attempts to make all decisions by consensus. When 
disagreements arise decisions are taken by a two-thirds majority of those present.  
Each board member (apart from the Chair and Vice-Chair) is permitted to 
come to the board meetings with a delegation of up to 10 people, including the 
alternate board member, and a communications focal point, which is responsible 
for coordinating information sharing with the delegation and constituency. Each 
delegation determines how the board member, alternate, communications focal 
point, and members of the core delegation are selected.   
The Affected Communities Delegation was originally a non-voting member, 
choosing to distance itself from decision-making as it felt there might be a conflict 
of interest if CSOs on the delegation were to benefit from Global Fund grants. 
However, once it become clear that the board remained arms length from grant 
decisions (because grants are essentially decided by the TRP and only approved 
in batch by the board), and that the vast majority of funding went to states, the 
Affected Communities Delegation requested to be a voting member, and has been 
since 2004. The ability of the Affected Communities Delegation to switch from non-
voting to voting membership demonstrates the power of CSOs to not only 
participate in governance processes, but also their ability to shape the terms of 
participation.  
The Affected Communities Delegation has a particular type of influence 
because of its status as representing those communities most affected - the main 
beneficiaries of the fund. This provides the delegation with a degree of expert 
status based on their lived experience with one of the three diseases (analyzed 
further in the following legitimacy sub-section). As one observer notes, “I think the 
presence of communities on the board, are actually very active, very strong, they 
can actually push for an issue, create a block, very easily. To the point that if you 
want to pass a decision you have to consult with communities” (GHI 
Representative 2013 #19).  Another states, “You see the other board members and 
the Secretariat always look to that [Communities] delegation to see whether they 
approve it” (CSO Representative 2014 #34). The status of the Communities 
Delegations as representatives of those most affected provides them with influence 
as experts for other actors to consult in decision-making. 
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The Developed Country NGO Delegation enjoys influence due to its access 
to resources and well-resourced networks. Most delegates work for relatively well-
funded CSOs, and participation in the Global Fund is part of their jobs. Therefore, 
coordinating between meetings, communicating with other actors, and lobbying the 
Secretariat and other board members are supported by their organizations. 
Delegates are well resourced and coordinated, and able to prepare extensively 
before board meetings. As a result of this advantage, the Developed Country NGO 
Delegation has substantial influence on the board. One observer noted, “Though I 
would say that it is mostly the northern NGOs that are far more dominating than the 
Southern NGOs, and that is a matter of capacity” (GHI Representative 2013 #24). 
The ability of the Developed Country NGO Delegation to dedicate time and 
resources to board processes allows it significant influence. 
The Developed Country NGO Delegations adds to this influence by building 
relationships with key donor states. One Global Fund staff member notes, “there 
are particular donors which have the ear of the Developed Country NGOs, and so 
when something comes up that the Developed Country NGOs complain about, it is 
remarkable how quickly those particular donors come in and find our about it as 
well” (GHI Representative 2013 #16). The informant goes on to note that this 
alliance has advantages, “I think that from a governance perspective that is not 
unhelpful. I think it helps the donor keep things real as well.” For example, the 
Developed Country NGOs has collaborate with the Scandinavian block of donors 
to promote greater attention to LGBT rights, and with the UK to assert support for 
harm reduction for PWID in Eastern Europe (CSO Representative 2013 #1). The 
alliance between some donor states and the Developing Country NGOs converges 
financial and constituency interests. 
It also consolidates power amongst northern-based delegations. This causes 
some observers to note, “The Global Fund becomes driven by [northern] NGOs 
and the Donors. And that is the problem”  (GHI Representative 2013 #3). The 
aspired for equality in decision-making between actor types and regions is 
subverted by the dominate influence of northern delegations. The influence of the 
Developed Country NGO Delegation, when combined with particular donors, 
consolidates power among those coming from northern contexts, raising questions 
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about if decision-making within the fund is as equally balanced as espoused. As in 
other multilateral arrangements, the well resourced have greater influence than 
those meant to benefit from funding (Williams & Rushton 2011, 72). 
This dynamic is exacerbated by the relatively weaker role of governance 
actors from the implementing states. The Developing Country NGO Delegation’s 
influence at the board meetings is difficult to summarize as it represents a coalition 
of malaria, HIV/AIDS and TB focused CSOs from Latin America, Africa, Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia and South Asia. This extremely diverse grouping creates 
a number of difficulties in developing a unified voice and position.  Certain actors 
within the Developing Country NGO Delegation have greater influence than others. 
Delegates from Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA) note that they struggle to 
represent the interests of CSOs because of the overt focus on Africa, as the region 
with the highest prevalence of the three diseases (Developing Country NGO 
Delegation 2008). The diverse make-up of the Developing Country NGO 
Delegation limits its ability to have influence because of lack of consensus and 
competing interests within it. 
When the three civil society delegations (Developing Country NGO, 
Developed Country NGO and Affected Communities) work together on the board, 
which they often do, they have substantial influence in that they only need one 
additional delegation to join their coalition in order to block a vote, and if they 
mobilize four allies they have a majority. Such influence is celebrated by CSOs as 
evidence that the Fund’s structure is as inclusive of civil society voices as of other 
stakeholders: “The Global Fund is a model on how civil society delegations can 
have equal say on a board discussion. And I think the influence is significant. The 
northern NGO Delegation influence is as significant as the US [government], which 
puts in all that money. And there isn’t another institutions where civil society has so 
much influence” (CSO Representative 2013 #1). Governance participants argue 
this influence translates into decision-making power that rivals that of state board 
members.  
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Removing Travel Restrictions for PWAs 
An example of how the civil society delegations are able to influence not only 
decision-making in the Global Fund board room, but also decision-making 
processes and the broader HIV/AIDS response, comes from a November 2007 
board meeting in China. In the lead up to the board meeting the Communities 
Delegation became aware that in order to travel to China individuals had to declare 
their HIV status on their landing cards and could be denied entry based on a 
positive status (CSO Representative 2014 #34). Not only could this prevent some 
of the delegates from attending the meeting, it violated the principles of non-
discrimination that the delegation, as representatives of the broader PWA 
community, honored. Travel restrictions had been a global human rights issues for 
PWA since the 1990 IAS Conference (discussed in Chapter Three). Following that 
conference, the IAS pledged not to hold a conference in any country with travel 
restrictions, and global networks of HIV/AIDS CSO began campaigns against travel 
restrictions arguing that they were not only discriminatory and put PWAs at risk of 
harassment, but were also ineffective in controlling the epidemic (UNAIDS 2009).  
The Affected Communities Delegation, many of whom were HIV positive, 
communicated their concerns about holding a Global Fund board meeting in a 
country with travel restrictions with the board leadership and Secretariat. About 
three months before the meeting, as the board and Secretariat had not acted on 
the delegation’s concerns, the Affected Communities Delegation decided to boycott 
the meeting in protest against the Chinese policy on travel restrictions and the 
Global Fund’s lack of action (CSO Representative 2014 #34). The delegation 
informed the Global Fund leadership of their reasons for not attending, but got little 
response - likely because the board could still function without the Affected 
Communities Delegation (despite some minor political fall out). Then the 
Communities Delegation reached out to other delegations asking them, in 
solidarity, to also not attend. They got four other delegations to agree to boycott the 
meeting, which meant that the board would not have quorum. This got the attention 
of the Global Fund Chair and Secretariat, who asked the delegation what it 
proposed. 
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The delegation put forward the following demands: 1) there be a clear 
timeline as to when the Chinese travel restrictions would be lifted prior to the board 
meeting; 2) the board and Global Fund leadership make a high powered statement 
against the travel restrictions; 3) a meeting be held between the board leadership, 
Global Fund leadership and government representatives in China; 4) the 
establishment of an international task team to address the issue of travel 
restrictions; 5) the Global Fund establish a policy to never again hold a board 
meeting in a country with travel restrictions against PWAs (Rivers 2007). Because 
the Communities Delegation had built a coalition that had the power to stop the 
meeting, causing a crisis in Global Fund governance, and embarrassment for the 
Chinese government, it was successful in securing all of its demands. 
This demonstrates a number of dynamics about the influence of the Affected 
Communities Delegation particularly, and the civil society delegations in general. 
First, civil society was able to build a coalition to assert influence to address a 
human rights issue. It prevailed over institutional influence (of the Global Fund) and 
state influence (of the Government of China). Secondly, this coalition was able to 
affect decision-making and change institutional policies - effectively ensuring that 
the issue of travel restrictions would not arise again. Thirdly, the demands made by 
the Communities Delegation had impacts beyond the Global Fund board. The High 
Level Task Team, which was formed in response to the Communities Delegation’s 
demands, successfully lobbied for the removal of travel restriction in key countries, 
including China and the US. While these changes were likely due to a number of 
different political factors, such as the change in administration in the US, the task 
team took a lead roll in the process, particularly advocating against travel 
restrictions prior to the 2008 UN High Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS. The civil society 
delegations not only influenced board decision-making outcomes and processes, 
but also the global HIV/AIDS response in order to advance the rights of PWAs. 
 
Influence within the Secretariat 
The influence of CSO’s on decision-making in the Global Fund Secretariat is 
difficult to summarize because of varying processes across divisions, and the 
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numerous changes that have occurred in the Secretariat over the last few years. 
However, both Secretariat staff and CSO representatives refer to a “continuous 
flow of information” between the institution and external CSOs (GHI Representative 
2013 #21; CSO Representative 2013 #1). Sometimes this is through board 
delegates, but CSOs also contact staff directly by email and phone.  Secretariat 
offices that work closely with civil society, for example the Civil Society and Political 
Advocacy Department and Strategic Investments and Partnerships Department, 
hold monthly telephone conferences with partners (mostly regional networks 
representing key populations), in which about 60 CSOs participate (GHI 
Representative 2013 #19; GHI Representative 2013 #21). They also hold quarterly 
meetings with CSOs, and meet with both the Global Fund Advocates Network and 
World AIDS Campaign when needed or requested. Through these communications 
channels, CSOs are able to exert discursive influence within the Secretariat by 
providing information based on their experiences, and offering feedback on 
proposed policies and processes.  
For example, CSOs have advocated for the greater involvement of key 
populations on the CCMs. This campaign was partly initiated through CSO lead 
research. Aids Accountability, based in South Africa, held workshops with CSOs 
and conducted primary research on access to CCMs, finding that youth and LGBT 
populations are not adequately represented or consulted (Oberth et al. 2012).  
Concurrently, CSOs participants used Secretariat trainings on CCM procedures to 
lobby staff about the need for improved access of key populations to the CCMs 
(GHI Representative 2013 #21). In response to these demands, the Global Fund 
launched a pilot project in 10 countries to provide additional funding to CCMs that 
include key populations. The pilot project was completed in December 2013 and is 
now under review. In this case, CSOs advocates at the global level were able to 
increase access to decision-making for key populations at the country level by 
sharing knowledge, and promoting further discussions on a rights-based response 
within the Secretariat. 
The influence of CSOs on the Secretariat is tied to their role in fundraising 
and advocacy. In reflecting on the process related to key populations and the 
CCMs a Global Fund staff member states,  
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“They are coming in and saying this is our experiences at 
the country level in terms of our participation in the CCMs 
and this is what we are suggesting you should do to 
ensure our voices are heard….And they’ve been 
monitoring that  – saying so what are you doing about 
this? So for this team, it is quite important that action is 
taken to meet those demands. Because if we don’t meet 
the demands of civil society organizations, in terms of 
realities on the ground, then who are we going to call on 
to do the advocacy with us?” (GHI Representative 2014 
#20). 
 
Because CSOs engage in extensive fundraising around the replenishments, this 
increases their sense of ownership of the fund, already established through the 
history of the Fund, and influence with the Secretariat. The staff member quoted 
above noted that there was no way the Secretariat team could complete all the 
fundraising and advocacy external CSOs do on the Global Fund’s behalf, and so 
was dependent on CSOs good will. CSOs mobilize extensive networks to support 
the Fund. For example, before the previous funding round, CSOs created the Here 
I Am campaign, which included video and blog testimonials of people affected by 
the three diseases calling for a fully funded Global Fund. In return for such support, 
CSOs demand influence in the Secretariat. 
CSOs have substantial influence in both the Global Fund board and the 
Secretariat. At the board level, delegates have influence over both decisions and 
decision-making processes. Similarly, CSOs use their role as advocates of the 
Fund to justify participation in Secretariat affairs. In both cases, civil society actors 
use their influence to promote the rights of key populations within Global Fund 
governance and the broader HIV/AIDS response. 
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4.2.4 Legitimacy 
Walker argues that the Global Fund is a new type of institution, which “has 
created sources of legitimacy distinct from those of traditional multilateral 
organizations” (2012, 32).  She suggests that this unique legitimacy is based on 
three interlinked characteristics: the Global Fund’s inclusiveness at global and 
country levels, its transparency and performance-based funding practices, and the 
scale of its resource mobilization and distribution (2012, 84). This section focuses 
on the first characteristic, inclusiveness, particularly focusing on the participation of 
CSOs in governance - an aspect Walker only analyzes in passing.  The 
involvement of CSOs in Global Fund governance aims to strengthen the 
institution’s legitimacy by mitigating the democratic deficit multilateral institutions 
are accuse of through representation of those the Global Fund claims to serve 
(health service providers and communities affected by the three disease). In turn, it 
is assumed this inclusion will result in greater institutional responsiveness and 
efficiencies. As Williams and Rushton note, “By including state and non-state 
actors from the South, the Global Fund strives at gaining legitimacy both in terms 
of input and output legitimacy” (2011, 154). This subsection critically explores how 
this ambition plays out.  
 
Input Legitimacy 
One of the implicit purposes of having civil society delegations on the Global 
Fund board is to strengthen input legitimacy (Doyle & Patel 2008, 1929). The 
structure of the Global Fund’s board, with three civil society seats with substantial 
influence, leads some observers to argue such input legitimacy has been achieved: 
“in terms of the goal of representation or the objective of representation I think, the 
Global Fund probably provides the best example for how these principles of 
representation and inclusion have been adopted into a very large mechanism” 
(CSO Representative 2013 #26). However, others note the challenges the three 
delegations, of just 10 people each, face in representing a global and diverse 
movement: “There is still a lot of tokenism, and absurd tokenism. Having someone 
who once had malaria sitting in a room, is not representing an adequate health 
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community voice” (GHI Representative 2013 #29). Such comments demonstrate a 
tension between legitimacy related justifications for, and claims around, civil 
society participation, and the ability of civil society delegates to fulfill them. These 
tensions play out slightly differently for each of the civil society delegations to the 
board, as they have varying strategies of representation.  
The Developing Country NGO Delegation’s mission is to “represents the 
diverse NGO / CBO response from the global south when it comes to AIDS, TB 
and Malaria on the GFATM Board.” It consists of approximately 23 representatives 
from the four ‘developing’ regions of Latin America -Caribbean (LAC), Eastern 
Europe -Central Asia (EECA), Africa, Asia. Each region has a ‘focal point’ member 
whose job is to communicate with CSOs in that region. It is hard to over emphasis 
the magnitude of the task of a delegation of 23 people to represent CSOs that 
engage in HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria interventions in over half the world - the 
following discusses the challenge just one region faces. 
Delegates from EECA report difficulties in connecting with CSOs in their 
region due to:  language barriers; the self-incurred costs of communication, printing 
and consulting with stakeholders; and the time translation, traveling and 
consultation takes, when all delegates are also working full-time jobs. In addition, 
delegates find that when they do consult with CSOs they do not get sufficient 
responses because CSOs are not aware of the work of the Global Fund, and/or do 
not believe that their voice will be heard. These challenges are specific to the 
EECA context, where there is lack of public information about HIV/AIDS 
interventions, and states are largely resistant to civil society involvement in policy-
making (Spicer et al. 2011). There is little tradition of CSOs influencing policy, and 
many CSOs are scared of engaging in advocacy, or exposing corruption issues 
that occur during grant implementation, because of government retribution. As 
noted in the previous chapter, most HIV/AIDS CSOs in EECA work with PWID and 
are at risk of government harassment. As a result of the challenges of engaging 
with regional and national CSOs, delegates find it hard to claim representation of 
CSOs in their region (Developing Country NGO Delegation 2008). 
However, its the Developed Country NGOs that face the greatest legitimacy 
challenges, though this at first seems contradictory considering their relative 
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advantages in terms of resources and communications networks. The delegation 
consists of representatives from the following regions: North America, Western 
Europe, Australia and Japan. The core delegation of 10, who attend board 
meetings, engage with a larger contact group of about 60 people, which it keeps 
informed about and consultants with on processes and decision-making (CSO 
Representative 2014 #34). These individuals are member of other CSO networks, 
such as the Interagency Coalition on AIDS and Development (ICAD) and GNP+, 
who in turn share information with their members. The Developed Country NGO 
Delegation does not struggle with communications challenges as the NGOs 
engaged in resource mobilization for the three diseases are few in number, easy to 
identify, and have access to good communication services and organizational 
support. Therefore, being a valid representative of its direct constituents is 
relatively unproblematic for the Developed Country NGO.  
However, the legitimacy of the Developed Country NGO Delegation is 
questioned when it claims representation beyond this constituency. Many members 
of the Developed Country NGO Delegation have been involved in the HIV/AIDS 
response for decades as pioneers of the rights-based response, and were directly 
involved in the formation of the Global Fund. Based on this experience they 
assume a global leadership role, which is reasserted by their substantial influence 
on the board. They speak of “mentoring” CSOs from other regions, and claim 
“ownership” of the Fund (CSO Representative 2013 #1). However, this leadership 
role is not recognized by other board members. As one observer notes, “there has 
been resentment at times, where for instances certain members of the North 
[Developed Country] NGO Delegation speak as if they just know what is right, not 
just for civil society, but for the implementing world” (CSO Representative 2013 
#30).  Because the Delegates come from relatively well-resourced CSOs, largely 
based in the global north and connected to donors, their claims of broader 
leadership are questioned by board members from implementing states and CSOs.  
The Developed Country NGO Delegation’s role in fundraising generates 
further legitimacy concerns related to conflicts of interest. Some Developing 
Country NGO delegates work for CSOs who receiving resources from the Fund to 
implement grants, from which the CSOs necessarily take an administrative cut. For 
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example, the HIV/AIDS Alliance has always had a staff member on the Developed 
Country NGO Delegation, and is also the largest CSO recipient of Global Fund 
grants. Though there is little evidence of the Developed Country NGO Delegation 
using their influence to advance their own positions, legitimacy is based on 
perceptions as much (or perhaps more) than evidence (Doyle and Patel 2008). 
Therefore, perceived conflicts of interests, as both decision-maker and recipient, 
cause other governance participants to describe members of the Developing 
Country NGO Delegation as “paid lobbyist, that are there to get what they need 
from the fund because that is how that person has made their living for 10 years” 
(GHI Representative 2013 #16). Because being on the board is part of their job in 
an organization receiving financing from the Fund, some delegates are seen as 
promoting their own careers, as opposed to the interests of those affected by the 
three diseases (as does that Communities Delegation) or the interests of those 
implementing programs (as should the Developing Country NGO Delegation). One 
Secretariat staff notes:   
 
“At least the implementing [Developing] Country NGOs 
are doing the work. The communities, are the people 
living with the diseases, and other people are here to 
serve. But the Developed NGOs are sometimes there 
because they’ve all got very good Western 
salaries….they are rights based people, and they are 
there to hold the Global Fund accountable to the human 
rights and all those kinds of things, but there is a 
tension, where people say what is your skin in the 
game? What do you bring to the table?”  (GHI 
Representative 2013 #16). 
 
These questions about both the validity and utility of the Developed Country NGO 
Delegation’s influence, demonstrating that including CSOs in institutional 
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governance can raise new legitimacy questions, particularly where CSOs are filling 
dual roles as decision-makers and receivers of grants. 
The Affected Communities Delegation’s purpose is “to ensure the voices and 
issues of people living with and affected by HIV, TB and malaria influence the 
deliberations and decisions on investments and programs of the Global Fund to 
achieve greater and sustained impact for communities.” In practice the majority of 
members of this delegation are people affected by HIV/AIDS (Hein et al. 2007). 
Neither the TB nor the Malaria response has an organized global network, to the 
same extent as HIV/AIDS.11 While some observers note that the PWA dominance 
in the Affected Communities Delegation limits its ability to be representative, these 
limitations are well understood by most governance actors, and do not seem to 
detract from its legitimacy (GHI Representative 2013 #21; CSO Representative 
2014 #34). There is an unspoken acceptance that ‘affected communities’ refers to 
PWAs and key populations, with minimal representation from TB and Malaria 
constituencies.  
The Communities Delegation makes concerted efforts to be valid 
representatives of those affected by HIV/AIDS and the other diseases. Each 
member of the support delegation (20-40 people) aims to have 10 further contacts 
they communicate with, who then have another 10 contacts each, increasing the 
network exponentially by degrees of separation. The feasibility of creating this web 
of connections is largely based on personal commitments, abilities and resources 
(capital, human and social) of the individuals involved (CSO Representative 2014 
#34). While this effort to create representation through network building is highly 
variable and difficult to monitor, it appears to have achieve a sort of web of 
representation, as opposed to linear structure, which is perhaps more realistic 
considering the impossible task of establishing relationships with such a diverse 
and vast constituency base. In addition, the delegation signs memorandums of 
understanding on partnership agreements with organizations that have their own 
networks, such as Roll Back Malaria, Stop TB and GNP+. This intentional 
networking allows the Affected Communities Delegation to contribute a degree of 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
11"This"is"likely"due"to"the"unique"historical"development"of"HIV/AIDS"response"outlined"in"Chapter"Two,"and"also"
because"TB"and"Malaria"are"not"necessarily"chronic"illness"that"affect"particular"population"groups"in"the"same"way.""
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input legitimacy, as it is recognized that they make a concerted effort to 
communicate with constituents within recognized limitations.  
The Affected Communities Delegation attempts to build further legitimacy 
through open and transparent processes. Board members for the Communities 
Delegation are drawn from a core and support delegation. The core delegation 
consists of 10 CSO representatives who attend board meetings and provide 
advisory and communications support to the board delegates (main, alternate and 
communications focal point). Core delegates are recruited from the support 
delegation, of 20-40 members, who participate in governance processes from 
remote locations. The board and alternate board member serve for 18 months, and 
the board member can only serve one term. The board member must be a PWA 
and must come from the global south - the alternative usually comes from a 
different geographical region. Efforts are made to ensure key populations are 
represented on the delegation, and that it reflects gender balance (most often the 
board and alternate board member are of different genders). This process 
constructs validity based on effective processes, regulations, and population 
presence, combining input and output legitimacy. 
In the decision-making section above, it is noted that the Communities 
Delegation has a specific type of influence on the board, based on its role as 
representing those most affected - with other board members ‘looking to it’ when 
making decisions. In other words, it has a “normative validity” (Bartsch 2007, 5). 
The legacy of the GIPWA principle continues to provide moral legitimacy to the 
Communities Delegation as it reinforces “a generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 
1995, 574). Other governance actors view the Communities Delegation as 
representing those most affected by the three diseases, because they accept that 
the participation of PWAs, and affected communities, is desirable and effective.   
Though it first appears input based, this legitimacy is largely output orientated 
as it reflects assumptions that having representation of affected communities 
promotes effectiveness; that the presence of a PWA on the board will enable the 
Global Fund to better meet the needs of PWAs. While this assumption is largely 
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untested, it does generate significant legitimacy.  Because of the established 
GIPWA norm in the HIV/AIDS response - that the representation of those most 
affected is essential and effective - the Communities Delegation is viewed as 
legitimate, and as adding legitimacy to the institution, despite its variable ability to 
actually represent constituents. While there are few direct links between 
constituents and the delegation, legitimacy is partly generated by the delegation’s 
efforts to create networks of communication and processes of representation, and 
is then reasserted by normative claims.   
 
Output Legitimacy 
Some donor states and Secretariat staff members express concern that the 
substantial influence the civil society delegations have in decision-making (as 
described above) negatively impacts the output legitimacy of the institution. They 
argue the civil society delegations have “too much power” (State Representative 
2013 #38) and “They have much more influence than we would hope for” (State 
Representative 2013 # 39). While not taking issue with the rights-based agenda of 
the CSO delegations, they argue that the way the delegations exercise influence 
threatens output legitimacy. For example, one member of the donor block 
remarked that during a particularly crucial board meeting, in which the new 
Executive Director was appointed and the New Founding Model proposed, the civil 
society coalition blocked a vote over a seemingly small detail,  
 
“It was really important that board said, we need to come 
out of this meeting with a new Executive Director, with a 
new funding model, and the message needs to be clear. 
And then they [the civil society delegations] blocked the 
vote, after it was discussed. These people were sitting on 
the committee that looked at every word [of the proposed 
decision-point], and over something where they thought 
could be a misinterpretation; they voted the whole thing 
down…so they did that because they thought ‘we can 
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renegotiate that’. So of course it worked out, but nobody 
understood what the fuss was all about. …If you have a 
fundamental problem you deal with it beforehand and do 
not do these games, and that is really bad governance I 
would say” (State Representative #38 2013). 
 
The donor’s concern was not with the proposed change the civil society coalition 
pushed through, but how they engaged in the governance process. Similarly, a 
member of the Global Fund staff noted that the civil society delegations often 
appear to be “writing decisions in bathroom stalls” and lobbying as activists, as 
opposed to acting co-operatively in governance processes (GHI Representative 
2013 #16).  
 In contrast, other observers note that, “they [civil society delegations] are 
probably by far the most organized, even if you compare them to the governments. 
Even if, in terms of consultation, in terms of issues, they have discussed them and 
they have had a position” (GHI Representative 2013 #21). Similarly, the five-year 
review notes that, compared to other board delegations, “The civil-society groups 
on the Board have maintained a much more stable and disciplined membership 
over the years” (GFATM 2012b, 27). CSO policies related to rotations of delegates, 
terms served, and communication strategies tend to be more transparent and 
credible, than the other delegations.  A Global Fund Staff member notes, “I also 
think that some of that tension [between civil society and other actors] can be good 
and healthy. It keeps us on our toes” (GHI Representative 2013 #16). From these 
perspectives, the civil society delegations contribute positively to board governance 
by being well prepared, presenting a strong position, and challenging the Global 
Fund to remain responsive.   
 Because the civil society delegations have substantial influence in the 
board, and can shape how decisions are made, as well as what decisions are 
made, they do not have to behave by the rules of bureaucratic multilateral 
governance - they are not dependent on the approval of other governance actors.  
Therefore, though civil society delegations often resist bureaucratic processes, this 
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may not necessarily result in inefficiencies - especially for an organization that aims 
to avoid doing business as usual. The five-year evaluate of the Fund notes that, 
“Civil society stakeholders continue to remind the Global Fund that it is an evolving 
institution with a unique model” (MACRO 2009, 10).  Quick acting, on the part of 
the delegation by (for example drafting new decision-points in bathroom stalls) may 
make the board more responsive to changing circumstances and new ideas. 
Walker argues that “Rather than a source of input-oriented legitimacy which 
provides some form of global deliberative equality, the Global Fund’s board can 
better be understood as a source of output-oriented legitimacy” (2011, 7). She 
argues that this is because the balance of power on the board favors donors. While 
donor influence is dominant, the influence of the civil society delegations is also, as 
noted in the above section, significant. However, Walker’s argument stands-up in 
relation to the civil society delegations as well. The civil society delegations cannot 
claims to represent the diverse HIV/AIDS organizations and individuals affected by 
the three diseases. The Communities Delegation makes the most successful 
attempt at this, but their legitimacy is derived more from normative output 
functions, than representative input legitimacy. The Developing Countries 
Delegation has an impossible task of representing varied movements across half 
the globe, which it admittedly struggles with. The Developed Country NGO lacks a 
valid leadership role, and raises new legitimacy challenges around conflicts of 
interest.  
Despite the limited input legitimacy they bring to the fund, the substantial 
influence of the civil society delegations enables them to contribute to governance 
processes in a way that makes some observers feel they threaten output 
legitimacy, because of their advocacy tactics, and others feel they strengthen it by 
forcing responsiveness. The civil society delegations do not need to depend on 
legitimacy from constituents, or develop it by following pre-established processes. 
Instead they demand it by asserting their influence in the Fund, building on output 
related assumptions that CSOs participation breeds greater responsiveness, if not 
representation. 
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4.2.5 Accountability 
The Global Fund argues that the inclusion of CSOs in its governance 
improves its ability to be accountable to those most affected by the three diseases. 
It states that civil society actors that engage in board and Secretariat processes 
serves as “an important channel for influencing policy decisions for all civil society 
stakeholders” (Global Fund 2012, 4). However, considering that, as demonstrate 
above, the civil society board members struggle to represent constituents, suffering 
from weak input legitimacy, their ability to act as downward accountability conduits 
is compromised.  
There is a sense that the Global Fund “is run by a section of good old friends” 
or “a small family, a group” (State Representative 2013 #38). While CSOs draw on 
networks of influence, as described in the previous sections, these tend to be 
based on established relationships and relatively select connections. Indeed, the 
five year evaluation of the Fund stated, “The Global Fund’s approach during its first 
five years more accurately reflects a ‘friendship model’ than a genuine ‘partnership 
model” (MACRO 2007, 34).  While the challenge of reaching out beyond existing 
contacts to the massive and diverse global movements - and organizations with 
different aims and processes - is immense, even civil society participants note that 
more could be done to diversify input: “It worries me at the end of the day. There is 
still this critique of global advocates doing the rounds, and they are fantastic 
people, but I just don’t know that we have really sussed that communication and 
consultation thing”  (CSO Representative 2013 #30). Lack of networks beyond a 
select group of CSOs impacts downward accountability as access to the Global 
Fund is viewed as a closed group. 
A further restriction on downward accountability is the type of functions board 
members fill. Civil society board members influence decisions about Global Fund 
policy and governance, but these are not always, or even most often, the aspects 
of the Fund that are most crucial to those implementing programs or affected by 
the three diseases. For example, Walker argues that the Global Fund has a 
“double accountability gap” in that it is not accountable to those whose lives it 
affects (2012, 34). Using the case of Malawi’s unsuccessful proposal to the TRP, 
and challenges with ART provisions, she argues that the Malawians who were 
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impacted by the TRP’s decisions and delayed grant disbursements, do not have a 
process of recourse - they cannot hold the Global Fund to account when access to 
ART is threatened because of Global Fund decisions.  
The role of civil society delegates on the board does not fill this gap as they 
are rarely connected to country health providers and local patient groups. 
Furthermore, the board approves the TRP’s recommendations in batch (not by 
particular country), and to date has always accepted the TRP’s recommendations 
in full. Civil society delegates do not have influence over the specifics of funding 
decisions, or what factors are taken into consideration when they are made. CSOs 
that engage in the Secretariat at the global level also do not fill this gap, as the 
majority of them collaborate on global advocacy goals, not operational challenges. 
In other words, the structures that civil society actors engage in, through the board 
and Secretariat, do not provide accountability links between those affected by 
funding decisions and the people that make the decisions at the global level (this is 
expanded on in the following chapter). Williams and Rushton find that “the 
stakeholder group with perhaps the least opportunity to demand such 
accountability is those people affected by the three diseases” (2011, 69). The civil 
society actors who engage with the Global Fund board and Secretariat do not fulfill 
a role that connects them with those affected by funding decisions. 
Arguably, connections could be made by the Secretariat’s Fund Portfolio 
Managers (FPMs) who are, among their many roles, responsible for 
communicating with local civil society actors and service providers, and for 
informing the Secretariat of realities on the ground. However, the 2007 review 
found that at the country level many civil society groups are “unaware of whom it 
should speak to within the Secretariat to voice concerns or challenges regarding 
Global Fund processes and, therefore, may not invite an FPM visiting the country 
to address those concerns” (MACRO 2007, 26). Similarly, many CSOs view the 
FPMs as inaccessible, and only in communication with CCM heads and 
Secretariats, as opposed to CSOs that are not represented on the CCMs (Kageni 
2012). Such Secretariat structures do not provide adequate accountability 
relationships beyond the CCMs. 
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The Partnership Forum 
In an attempt to promote accountability to those civil society actors beyond 
the board delegation and key partners of the Fund, the Global Fund holds 
Partnership Forums every 24 to 36 months. Partnership Forums aim to allow a 
wide range of stakeholders “to express their views on the Global Fund’s policies 
and strategies” by serving as a “visible platform for debate, advocacy, continued 
fund raising, and inclusion of new partners” (GFATM 2013c). The core functions of 
the Partnership Forum are to: 
• Review progress based on reports from the board and provide advice to the 
Global Fund on general policies; 
• Provide an important and visible platform for debate, advocacy, continued 
fundraising, and inclusion of new partners; 
• Mobilize and sustain high-level coordination, political commitment and 
momentum to achieve the Global Fund’s objectives; and 
• Provide a communication channel for those stakeholders who are not 
formally represented elsewhere in the governance structure 
Though there is decision-making and resource mobilization functions related to the 
Partnership Forum, its primary purposes is to build communication networks with 
stakeholders to strengthen downward accountability. 
The Partnership Forum generally includes e-forums and regional 
consultations, as well as a global meeting of between 200-500 participants from 
affected communities, NGOs and FBOs, donors, multilateral development 
cooperation agencies, technical and research agencies, foundations and the 
private sector. The largest group of participants is usually from civil society (29 
percent of participants at the last forum) (Fremount Center 2011). At the forum 
CSOs, states and other partners make presentations on a range of topics in order 
to share experiences and lessons learned. Partnership Forums have been held in 
Bangkok, Thailand, in 2004; in Durban, South Africa, in July 2006; in Dakar, 
Senegal, in December 2008, and in Sao Paulo, Brazil, in June 2011.  
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The forum results in recommendations that go to the Strategy Investment and 
Impact Committee, in order to be presented to the board for consideration. This 
provides a sense of accountability - that decision-makers will hear topics of 
concern. One participants describes his impressions after participating in the 
forum: 
 
“I think that it was an amazing, amazing meeting….where 
you have a person who uses drugs sitting next to an 
African ministers, sitting next to a donor or whatever. So 
it was phenomenal conversations, it really went to the 
heart of the issues of the fund. And at the time you know 
that the recommendations are going to go somewhere” 
(CSO Representative 2013 #26).  
 
The aim is to ensure that civil society groups and other partners have an 
opportunity to speak directly (via the committee) to the board and Secretariat. 
However, the accountability relationship generate by the Partnership Forum is 
one-dimensional. Participants can access information and share concerns, but the 
board is not required to be responsive, and participants have no recourse to follow-
up on suggestions that result from the Partnership Forum. This weakens the ability 
of the Partnership Forum to hold decision-makers accountable. For example, the 
2008 Partnership Forum produced the following recommendation, which lead to 
the development of the Global Fund’s Gender Strategy:  
 
“That the Board instruct the Secretariat to ensure that the 
implementation plan for the gender equality strategy is 
produced in consultation with women’s organizations and 
other groups working on gender equality, and that it has 
specific, measurable goals and objectives with indicators 
to track progress by the fund and countries against 
defined benchmarks and within defined time frames. This 
  199"
implementation plan should reflect progress at the 
country level, in particular, linking disbursements with 
outcomes for girls and women” (GFATM 2008). 
 
This recommendation was taken to the committee responsible for developing the 
Gender Strategy. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the resulting 
strategy was not adequately resourced or communicated. Furthermore, it did not 
include the monitoring structure recommended by the Partnership Forum, and it 
has had only minimal impact on Global Fund processes (Fleishman 2008).  
 In this case, the Partnership Forum provided an opportunity for CSOs to 
promote human rights concerns - particularly related to gender - but had no 
recourse to follow-up on how these recommendations were implemented. In the 
absence of an internal accountability mechanism for the strategy, CSOs have tried 
to hold the Global Fund to account by producing external evaluations of the 
Gender Strategy, which highlight weak implementation, but to date (six years later) 
no reforms have been forthcoming. The Partnership Forum, while allowing broader 
civil society to communicate with the board and Secretariat, does not provide 
mechanisms to hold decision-makers to account.  
The limits on creating downward accountability through the Partnership 
Forum are highlighted by the evaluation of the 2011 forum (Fremount Center 
2011). The 2011 forum included an e-survey, an e-forum, and a main conference 
in São Paulo, Brazil from 28 – 30 June.   289 people attended the Sao Paulo 
meeting, representing 107 countries.  As the Partnership Forum occurred during 
the development of the Global Fund’s 2012-2016 strategy, it provided CSOs with 
the opportunity to influence planning. Consultations were organized around the 
following themes: 1) maximizing impact; 2) delivering on a human rights approach 
for the three diseases; 3) using the money wisely; 5) Implementing for increased 
impact.  
The evaluation found that “the consultations did not result in bold, new 
thinking” (Fremount Center 2011, 18). The Partnership Forum resulted in more of a 
reassertion of preexisting ideas, than a challenging of current practice. While lack 
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of critique does not necessarily imply weak accountability - accountability 
processes can be affirming as well as critical - to some this was a concern: 
“participants indicated some value in the Partnership Forum serving as an echo 
chamber, a sounding board, or a way to gain buy-in to pro- posed directions and 
calls to action. But others criticized the facilitation for not pushing dialogue into new 
territory” (Fremont Center 2011, 18). Creating buy-in and mobilizing action, is not 
the same as generating accountability; it could instead be view as a process of co-
option.  
The lack of new thinking at the forum suggests a gathering of the usual 
suspects; and therefore the usual debates. At the 2011 forum, two thirds of 
participants reported (through a survey) already being engaged in Global Fund 
processes (Fremont Center 2011). The process of selecting who participates in the 
Partnership Forum raises accountability questions as it has not been particularly 
transparent. In 2011, the Civil Society Team at the Secretariat reached out to its 
networks with CSOs asking them to nominate three names for consideration, these 
were then evaluated based on regional and key population balance to develop a 
list, which was shared with relative staff for finalization. Individuals on the final list 
were sent invitations. Participants and other stakeholders express confusion over 
how this process is actually carried out, with some arguing the civil society 
delegations to the board should be consulted, and others arguing their influence 
would be in a conflict of interest as they might select CSOs that reflect their shared 
views (Fremont Center 2011). All respondents noted that the selection process 
should be more transparent. The current system of bringing together those already 
involved in the Fund raises questions about what added value the partnership 
forum has (if one of its goals is to bring together actors who do not usually engage 
in the fund) and perhaps explains the lack of ‘bold new thinking’.  
Interestingly, the one consultation at the 2011 forum where new ideas were 
put forward was the Human Rights Break Out Group. In this case, the group was 
able to demand that the Global Fund honor its commitment to human rights by 
promoting stronger language in the strategy document. Due to CSO consultations, 
language was changed in the first draft of the 2011-2016 strategy, prior to the 
Partnership Forum, from “Stimulate greater programmatic attention and investment 
  201"
to overcome stigma and discrimination” to “Increase investments in programs that 
address human rights-related barriers to access” (Global Fund 2011a; Global Fund 
2011 emphasis added).  Similarly, wording was strengthen from, “Take steps to 
ensure the Global Fund is not supporting programs that violate human rights” to 
“Ensure that the Global Fund does not support programs that infringe human 
rights” (Global Fund 2011a; Global Fund 2011 emphasis added). These much 
more direct commitments to human rights are attributed to the input of CSOs 
during the Partnership Forum (GHI Representative 2013 #16).  
However, while the forum provided an opportunity for CSOs to hold the 
Global Fund to account on rights commitments, the way decision-makers interrupt 
and implement this language remains at their own discretion. While the Partnership 
Forum provides an opportunity for civil society actors to come together to build 
connections, support the Global Fund, and provide input into policies and 
strategies, it does not fulfill its accountability mandate because the relationship 
between participants and decision-makers is one directional.  
As a result both CSOs and Global Fund representatives question the purpose 
and utility of the Partnership Forum. One observer notes:  
 
“I think you always have to question the cost 
effectiveness of a meeting of 500 people and you know I 
haven’t a clue how to evaluate value for money, cost 
effectiveness of something like that. And I think that is 
going to be a really difficult decision for the Fund in the 
future… I mean from a governance point of view, I think it 
was an interesting sort of experience and sort of 
experiment. But the extent to which it is sustainable as a 
model and the extent to which it is cost effective as a 
model I really don’t know” (CSO Representative 2013 
#30). 
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 In a letter in August 2013 board leadership stated it was discussing “an evolving 
Partnership Forum model” that took into consideration recommendations and 
critiques from past forums. Due to the weak accountability outcomes of the 
Partnership Forum it is not surprising that both external CSOs, and Global Fund 
staff and board members are questioning its utility, especially in light of the 
substantial costs (the Fund spends more than $1.5 million on each Partnership 
Forum) (Fremount Center 2011).  
 
External CSOs as Conduits of Information Sharing 
Strong downward accountability relationships require accessible information, 
something CSOs that work with the Global Fund continually advocate for. The 
2007 evaluation of the Fund found that,  
 
“Civil society stakeholders continue to report the difficulty 
they have in accessing up-to-date and easily-digestible 
information on the Global Fund and its processes, in 
particular feedback from Global Fund Board meetings on 
key decisions taken, information on the functioning of 
CCMs and the roles and responsibilities of its members 
and information on how to become involved in the different 
levels of the Global Fund architecture” (MACRO 2007, 46).  
 
Global Fund documents are famously long and complex. For example, prior to one 
board meeting over 900 pages of documentation and PowerPoint presentations 
were distributed to board members (MACRO 2007, 51). Furthermore, because the 
Fund prides itself on its dynamism, it can change policies and procedures rapidly, 
causing CSOs to feel like they are constantly playing a game of catch up. 
Research in Latin America found that, for example, many women’s groups felt 
unable to engage with Global Fund processes because of the high level of 
education required to understand rapidly changing policies (CSO Representative 
2013 #13; ICW 2012).   CSOs continue to complain of the difficulty in accessing 
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up-to-date and easily digestible information on Global Fund procedures, 
particularly on how civil society is represented in the Global Fund - knowledge 
essential to building downward accountability relationships (Global Fund 2012, 5).  
Noting these challenges, some CSOs (such as the HIV/AIDS Alliance, the 
Open Society Institute, Aids Accountability and ICASO) have taken on the role of 
synthesizing and distributing Global Fund information in more accessible formats 
by publishing bulletins and updates. In Latin America, a group of CSOs established 
El Observatorio Latino, which reports on Global Fund disbursements in the region 
aiming to increase the accountability of recipients of Global Fund grants, identify 
technical support for CSOs, and promote more involvement of CSOs in Global 
Fund processes (Global Fund 2012, 17). By producing and sharing information, 
CSO coalitions make it possible for other organizations to communicate with the 
Global Fund from an informed position. This in turn forces the Global Fund to be 
more responsive to affected communities. The evaluation notes, “This watchdog 
role has in many places forced the Global Fund to adapt its policies and countries 
to re-evaluate their targets to ensure the needs of people living with and affected 
by the three diseases are sufficiently met” (MACRO 2007).  By sharing information 
in accessible formats, CSOs create opportunities for accountability relationships 
between the fund and those it aims to serve.  
One of the most active accountability-focused CSOs is Aidspan, which was 
set up soon after the creation of the Global Fund to: 
 
“Reinforce the effectiveness of the Fund through its 
watchdog role and to act as an independent source of 
information for stakeholders both involved and not 
involved in Global Fund processes, including people and 
organizations in all sectors within developing countries 
who are applying for and implementing Global Fund 
grants, stakeholders who wish the organization to be 
more successful and members of the Global Fund Board 
delegations” (Aidspan 2013). 
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Aidspan offers two particular services. First it publishes a Guide to the Global 
Fund, which simplifies processes so that they are easily understandable. Not only 
does this increase the ability of CSOs to hold the Global Fund to account, it also 
has the spin off effect of challenging the Global Fund Secretariat to make its 
information more clear (Civil Society Representative 2013 #15).  Secondly, 
Aidspan publishes the Global Fund Observer (GF0), a monthly e-newsletter that 
reports on happenings at the Global Fund Secretariat, in CCMs and at the board. It 
is distributed to over 10,000 subscribers, in over 170 countries, and published on 
the Aidspan website. The GFO includes factual articles, as well as some 
commentary. Participants note that even the factual reports serve a watchdog 
function: “To some extent, just by reporting the facts we are facilitating the 
accountability process, even if it is not us wagging our fingers. Other people can 
wag their fingers based on what we are reporting” (CSO Representative 2013 #5). 
By making Global Fund information accessible Aidspan enables other CSOs to 
engage in accountability relationships.  
Civil society representatives on the board, and who engage with the 
Secretariat, do not have the relationships to constituents, or role in governance, to 
provide those affected by Global Fund decisions with recourse; they can question 
lack of adherence to policy and procedure, and reiterated rights claims, but have 
little influence over funding decisions or implementation strategies. Despite their 
substantial influence in decision-making, they do not fulfill ambitions to make the 
Global Fund accountable to constituents. The Partnership Forum, which explicitly 
aims to link the Global Fund with the broader response to the three diseases, also 
has not resulted in a reciprocal accountability processes that allow CSOs to hold 
the Fund to account on human rights, or other, commitments.  Many of the CSOs 
that participate in these processes, and others, are a select group of friends - the 
result is a network of horizontal accountability, as opposed to downward. Aidspan, 
and other information sharing focused CSOs, however do strengthening downward 
accountability by dissemination information in accessible formats, which provides 
opportunities for others to act as watchdogs. 
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4.2.6 Section Summary 
The creation of the Global Fund was prompted by aspirations to create an 
institution to facilitate treatment access and address global security concerns that 
was not confined by UN bureaucracy. Calls for innovation created opportunities for 
CSOs to demand space for participation to advance rights agendas, which they 
gained by demonstrating the productive role they filled as fundraising advocates. 
Despite the changes of 2011-12, the Fund remains one of the most influential 
GHIs, but questions about its partnership model, structure, legitimacy and 
accountability have become increasingly pertinent.  
Within the dynamic structure of the fund, the influence CSOs generate as 
those most affected, as advocates, and through networks, provides opportunities 
for CSOs to have influence not only in decision-making, but also over decision-
making processes. While influence is uneven, disproportionately exercised by 
northern actors, there are also examples of CSOs from all regions improving the 
Fund’s capacity to address human rights issues. 
The civil society delegations to the Global Fund board are unable to be 
representative of such large and diverse constituencies. The Developed Country 
NGO Delegation in particular exacerbates, as oppose to mitigates, input legitimacy 
challenges. Instead, the civil society delegations generate output legitimacy: for the 
Affected Communities Delegation this is tied to the normative validity of the GIPWA 
principle; for the others it reflects their (often contentious) demands that the board 
remain responsive and dynamic. Due to weak input legitimacy, the civil society 
delegations are unable to strengthen downward accountability to those most 
affected by the epidemic, or to hold the Fund to account. Similarly, the Partnership 
Forum and Secretariat processes reflect more of a horizontal accountability, than 
downward, structure. However, efforts by external CSOs to make information from 
and about the Global Fund accessible have enabled external CSOs to act as 
watch-dogs. Though civil society participants in the governance of the Global Fund 
have substantial influence, which they often use to promote human rights, claims 
that they are representative of and accountability to a broader movement are 
overstated. 
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4.3 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has presented two cases of GHIs that include CSOs. In 
particular, analysis has focused on how CSOs have tried to advance human rights 
frames through decision-making processes within these institutions, and 
considered if they have strengthened legitimacy and downward accountability. As 
each section, on UNAIDS and the Global Fund, includes its own summarizing 
conclusion, such analysis will not be repeated here. Instead themes that emerged 
will be briefly highlighted.  
The first theme relates to the tension between the stated aspirations of both 
UNAIDS and the Global Fund to be innovative, inclusive and responsive, and the 
assumption that CSO participation contributes to these goals. The inclusion of civil 
society is not enough to meet such aspirations. Institutions have to change how 
they work if CSO influence is to have effect. The Global Fund, with its dynamic 
structure, presents an example of an institution that is adaptable, and therefore 
CSOs exercise multiple types of influence (related to knowledge, emotive force, 
networks and resource advocacy). In UNAIDS, the NGO Delegation is constantly 
restricted by bureaucratic processes and state-based power structures. This limits 
the type and degree of influence it can have. In order for CSOs to have greater 
impacts on institutional governance, institutions have to be willing to adapt to of 
civil society needs - such as making information more accessible.  
The second theme relates to Cox’s claim that institutions are more likely to 
absorb alternatives, to make them less threatening, than to be sites for advancing 
transformations. In the case of UNAIDS, CSOs have to adapt to institutional 
practice in order to have influence and legitimacy (in the eyes of other governance 
actors). This causes other CSOs to feel they had been co-opted. However, CSOs 
use the space available to advance human rights arguments, making modest 
changes. In the case of the Global Fund, CSOs are able to maintain both their 
advocacy/activist identities and advance human rights claims. However, concerns 
about co-option emerge in relation to resources, with accusations that funding for 
projects and salaries, as opposed to broader rights goals, motivates the Developed 
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Country NGO Delegation. This suggests that while concerns about co-option, 
either through processes or access to resources, are well founded, they are not 
predetermined, as CSOs continue to advance rights-based alternatives despite 
these dynamics.  
The third theme relates to the relationship between input and output 
legitimacy, and consequently downward accountability. In both institutions the civil 
society delegations to the board contribute output legitimacy, but have only minimal 
impact on input legitimacy. Civil society representatives are rarely able to claim 
representation of a broad constituency base, which in turn limits the ability of CSO 
delegations to act as conduits of accountability to constituents. In both cases, 
having civil society involved in governance processes did not greatly strengthen 
downward accountability. Board delegations have impossible communication 
tasks, limited by logistical and resource constraints. However, where external civil 
society actors engage in information collection and distribution, downward 
accountability is strengthened. In the case of UNAIDS civil society participation in 
GARP reporting results in an effective accountability tool for monitoring state 
commitments. In the case of the Global Fund, the production of newsletters and 
guides by organizations such as Aidspan, empowers external actors to hold the 
Fund to account. This suggests that downward accountability can best be 
strengthened by civil society activity from outside the institution, as opposed to 
within it.  
The final theme relates to the influence of CSOs in GHIs. Despite tensions 
between input and output legitimacy, and lack of downward accountability outputs, 
in both institutions civil society actors demonstrate varying degrees and types of 
influence. Furthermore, CSO use this influence to promote human rights agendas. 
Therefore, in these cases, lack of ability to represent constituents does not mean 
that civil society participants are unable to represent a rights-based approach. This 
raises the question of, if it is assumed that a rights-based approach reflects 
constituent interests, does more direct representation matter?  
CSO participation in both UNAIDS and the Global Fund has impacted how 
these institutions have responded to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. CSOs have 
consistently promoted human rights approaches and voiced perspectives reflective 
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of, if not representative of, those most affected. In some cases these have had 
positive policy results. Have civil society participants transformed these GHIs to 
make them more equitable alternatives in the GHG order? Not over night, or even 
over the last two decades, but they are still at the table, and still asserting rights 
frames. 
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5. CSO Influence in Global Resources Governance 
 The previous chapters present how CSOs advanced human rights frames 
within the global governances of the HIV/AIDS response, particularly discussing 
how they promote these frames within GHIs. It has been demonstrated that even 
though CSOs participate within a context of dominant biomedical neoliberalism, 
and have uneven influence within institutions, they have, at the very least, 
developed and maintained an agenda for rights issues and been able to seize 
specific opportunities to influence global framing and institutional policies. In 
particular, section two of Chapter Four demonstrates that CSOs have substantial 
influence in one of the largest donor organization in the HIV/AIDS response - the 
Global Fund.  
This final research chapter advances the analysis by discussing the role of 
CSOs in the governance of resources for the HIV/AIDS response. It asks how 
CSOs have influenced the mobilization and distribution of global HIV/AIDS 
resources, particularly analyzing if CSO participation has generated resources for, 
and directed them to, rights-based alternatives. It finds that CSOs have made 
substantial contributions to mobilizing global resources, but have little influence 
over how these are distributed. 
The first section presents the context of global HIV/AIDS resource 
governance that CSOs operate within. It illustrates how the overarching 
preferences of donors shape CSO roles in resource governance and opportunities 
to promote alternatives. With these broad structures in the mind, the following two 
sections analyze efforts by CSOs to support resource mobilization and promote 
alternative priorities for distribution in the two largest funding initiatives - the Global 
Fund and PEPFAR. As the Global Fund is a multilateral and public-private 
partnership and PEPFAR represents a bilateral program, selecting the two as case 
studies facilitates analysis of how CSOs engage with different types of funding 
structures and actors. However, like the previous chapter on UNAIDS and the 
Global Fund, this is not a comparison, but rather two case studies for deepening 
overall understanding.  
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While the majority of academic research on the role of CSOs in resource 
governance in the HIV/AIDS response focuses on treatment access, this analysis 
highlights the less discussed roll of CSOs in advocating for and contributing 
resources to meet other human rights claims. Though treatment activism is a 
notable example of CSOs mobilizing to challenge and change existing resource 
practices, it is already extensively documented (see for example Ford et al. 2011; 
Hein 2007; Tativess & Walt 2008; Morin 2011). Efforts to direct resources towards 
other rights issues, such as women’s sexual and reproductive health and to fight 
stigma directed towards key populations, have been relatively neglected by the 
literature. The focus of this chapter is the role of CSOs in generating resources for 
these less discussed rights.  
 5.1 The Political Economy of HIV/AIDS Resource Governance 
This first section examines the broad resource trends in the HIV/AIDS 
response since the turn of the millennium in order to situate the participation of 
CSOs within the political economy of global health resource governance. It charts 
the rise of exceptional global resources for HIV/AIDS, and critically examines how 
dominant funding dynamics have shaped the response. It then explores the role of 
CSOs within these structures, and how CSO participation has been shaped by 
HIV/AIDS funding priorities and strategies. It argues that global resources for 
HIV/AIDS have been directed largely towards technical interventions (such as 
treatment, research and training) that reflect donor preferences for biomedical 
responses and good governance, at the expense of other types of interventions 
(such as rights-based), and that these preferences have limited opportunities for 
CSOs to promote alternatives, particularly within the current political economic 
context. 
This section presents a brief illustration of complex global processes, focusing 
on the largest donors in HIV/AIDS resource governance: DFID, the World Bank, 
public private partnerships and private foundations (the Global Fund and PEPFAR 
are discussed in detail in the following sections). It does not aim to present 
extensive new insight into global health funding processes, but instead to clarify 
the context relevant to the following sections and to introduce key themes that will 
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be analyzed in relation to CSO participation in the resource governance of the 
Global Fund and PEPFAR. Here ‘global resources for HIV/AIDS’ refers to financial 
resources generated by international donor organizations and states, and 
distributed to recipient countries, multilateral organizations and CSOs, as opposed 
to the sum of domestic resources.  
 
5.1.1 Exceptional Resources 
Following the creation of the Global Fund in 2001 (outlined in the previous 
chapter), international funding for HIV/AIDS rapidly increased for the next eight to 
10 years. This occurred within a broader trend of heightened attention to global 
health issues and resulting resources from donor states. The Institute for Health 
Metrics and Evaluation argues that development assistance for health underwent a 
rapid-growth phase between 2001 and 2010 when funding almost tripled, climbing 
to US$28.2 billion in 2010 (IHME 2012). This was due to the increased attention to 
the potential economic, political and security implications of global health (as 
discussed in Chapter Three), and a period of relative economic prosperity in donor 
countries (Fidler 2009).  
Resources for HIV/AIDS not only made up the largest share of this funding, 
but also increased at the fastest pace. While separating HIV/AIDS specific 
resources from other global health funding is challenging due to inconsistent 
access to and formats of donor records, it is agreed that HIV/AIDS took up an 
increasing portion of the global health resource pie from the turn of the millennium 
until 2010 (Oomman et al. 2007, 8). Shiffman suggests that HIV/AIDS resources 
rose from just five percent of health and population international aid commitments 
in 1998, to 47 percent of all commitments in 2007 (2009, 2). Oomman et al. find 
that annual funding for HIV/AIDS to low and middle-income countries increased 30 
times between 1996 and 2006, from US$300 million to US$8.9 billion (2007, 8).   
The majority of HIV/AIDS resources come from four donors: PEPFAR, the 
Global Fund, the UK and the World Bank (Kaiser 2010). Together these actors 
provide 80 percent of HIV/AIDS resources worldwide, demonstrating the 
importance of international aid and global level resource mobilization for the 
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HIV/AIDS response. Oomman et al. write, “Government funding now comprises a 
very small share of total resources for HIV/AIDS . . .. There is no room for doubt 
that the financing of AIDS programs is squarely on the shoulders of the donors” 
(2007, 9). While domestic resources in high prevalence states for HIV/AIDS have 
increased over the last few years (domestic resources in Sub-Saharan Africa 
increased by 11 percent between 2010 and 2012), and national public and private 
systems continue to provide the bulk of primary health care, the vast majority of 
HIV/AIDS specific resources continue to come from global donors (UNAIDS & 
Kaiser Family Foundation 2012).  
Due to the rapid rise of global resources for the HIV/AIDS response, it is often 
viewed as a case of successful financial mobilization. Sidibe et al. write that, “By 
elevating HIV to an issue of ‘high’ politics, the movement was able to generate a 
strong sense of global social solidarity between the north and south. This drove the 
mobilization and transfer of hitherto unprecedented levels of development 
assistance for a health-related issue” (2010, 3).   Forman argues that HIV/AIDS 
funding presents a departure from the norm of scarcity in GHG (Forman 2011). 
The remarkable mobilization of global resources to fight a single disease has been 
celebrated as a remarkable achievement in global health.  
5.1.2 Donor Priorities and Neglects 
Critically reflecting on the rise of global HIV/AIDS resources Harman writes: 
 
“The presence of this funding and political commitment is 
often seen as a success story in itself; however global 
interventions into HIV/AIDS should not be considered a 
successful end point in themselves. More money and 
commitment is no bad thing per se, but the key to 
understanding the strengths of these interventions is 
whether the money has reached those in need” (2009, 13).  
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While there is not space here to conduct in-depth analysis of how HIV/AIDS 
resources are directed, and to what effect, certain macro level trends can be 
identified by examining the priorities of major donors (the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR are discussed in detail in the following sections). 
The World Bank’s MAP, initiated in 2000, was the first program to offer 
African countries long-term funding for national HIV/AIDS programs, originally 
committing US$1 billion for treatment, prevention and care in Sub-Sahara Africa. 
Through MAP, the World Bank promoted a multisectoral approach to addressing 
HIV/AIDS, aimed at engaging a wide range of actors at multiple levels of 
governance.  
MAP funding is most often distributed through government ministries, but 
states are required to form National AIDS Councils (NACs), which then distribute 
funding to state, civil society and other private actors, often via District AIDS 
Councils that also consist of multiple types of actors. Officially, the NAC’s 
determine MAP funding priorities inline with national strategic plans and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers; ensuring planning is country specific (Oomman et al. 
2007). However, Harman (2007) demonstrates that in practice decisions are most 
often based on imposed directives from the Bank, with little input from states, 
implementing organizations and CSOs.  
In reviewing MAP funding practices, certain priorities can be discerned.  
Between 2000 and 2006, 40 percent of MAP funding went to systems 
strengthening, 34 percent to prevention, 16 percent to treatment and care, five 
percent to impact mitigation and four percent to monitoring and evaluation 
(Oomman et al. 2007, 50).  The large share dedicated to system strengthening 
reflects the Bank preference for developing national administrative systems and 
governance processes.  In Mozambique, for example, a quarter of all MAP funds 
were designated for capacity building, strengthening monitoring and evaluation 
systems, and other administrative costs (Oomman et al. 2007, 48). Such funding 
for systems strengthening ensures processes develop that reflect the Bank’s 
concept of ‘good governance.’ By funding national systems, the Bank has direct 
influence over their structure and components. 
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Concurrent to the development of MAP, the UK introduced its HIV/AIDS 
program. DFID included the HIV/AIDS response in its ‘war against poverty’, linking 
it with MDG programs and the Make Poverty History Campaign around the turn of 
the millennium. In 1999, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced DFID’s first package 
of £28 million to address HIV/AIDS in developing countries (Jones 2004, 395). 
Over half of this funding went to the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative; a 
Western-based public private partnership focused on research. 
The majority of DFID’s HIV/AIDS resources have continued to go to research 
and public private partnerships. What is directed overseas is channeled into direct 
budget support for governments, often for technical assistance programs, such as 
developing strategic plans, assisting with health planning, and developing 
proposals for the Global Fund. The majority of these activities are carried out by 
UK suppliers and aim to ensure recipient states practice health governance inline 
with DFID’s expectations (Jones 2004, 395).  Such priorities demonstrate a 
preference for funding technical interventions, which draw on Western expertise 
and concepts of good governance.  
Since 2009, DFID has also moved beyond strictly technical and medical 
approaches by dedicating a growing portion of its funding to social protection 
initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa. Social protection programs that focus on 
providing resources to support education, care work and food security have 
demonstrated success in addressing factors that put those living in poverty at risk 
of HIV infection, and mitigating the costs of living with or caring for someone with 
HIV/AIDS (Adato & Bassett 2012). However, this initiative has been hampered by a 
lack of resources; only £80 million of the £200 million pledged to social protection 
programs in 2009 was new money (Arnold et al. 2011). Furthermore, much of 
DFID’s social protection resources are distributed as cash transfers, a suitable 
approach for reaching the general population, but which is not effective in assisting 
key populations (such as PWID or MSM) who, in contexts where they are 
criminalized or marginalized, avoid government services (Arnold et al. 2011). As a 
result, a 2011 review of DFID’s HIV/AIDS program found it did not prioritize those 
most at risk of HIV infection and in need of social protection (Donor Tracker 2012).  
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In addition to the four main donors in the HIV/AIDS response (the Global 
Fund and PEPFAR will be discussed in detail in the following chapters) resources 
are generated through innovative financing mechanisms (Sidibe et al. 2010). 
UNITAID is the largest example of innovative financing, and receives funding from 
traditional state donors (such as France) and middle-income countries (such as 
Brazil), as well as private companies (such as pharmaceutical companies), and 
foundations (such as Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation).  In addition, it generates 
funds through an airline tax. 
The mission of UNITAID is to “increase access to treatment for HIV/AIDS, TB 
and malaria for people in developing countries by leveraging price reductions of 
quality drugs and diagnostics, which currently are unaffordable for most developing 
countries, and to accelerate the pace at which they are made available” (2014). 
UNITAID uses a market-based approach to improve access to medications and 
diagnostic equipment by “identifying and facilitating adoption and uptake of new 
and superior health commodities; providing incentives for manufacturers to 
produce otherwise unattractive products with low market demand but substantial 
public health benefits; addressing market inefficiencies . . .  contributing to low 
access of quality assured medicines, diagnostics, and preventative items” 
(UNITAID 2014). UNITAID specifically focuses on neglected niche markets of 
pediatric medicines, second-line treatment and prevention of vertical transmission.  
In 2011, UNITAID announced the first partnership with a pharmaceutical 
company in its medicine patent pool, in which the company (Gilead Sciences) 
contributed patents for combination ARVs. The patent pool, developed by 
UNITAID, encourages patent holders - companies, governments, researchers or 
universities - to voluntarily offer, under certain conditions, the intellectual property 
rights related to their inventions. Any company that wants to use the intellectual 
property to develop medicines can seek a license from the pool against the 
payment of royalties, and may then produce the medicines for use in developing 
countries (conditional upon meeting agreed quality standards) (Bermudez & Hoen 
2010, 1). The aim is to increase access to generic medications, particularly for 
second line and combination ART.  
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While UNITAID recognizes treatment as a human right, and has promoted 
alternative methods to transfer and redistribute resources, it does not address the 
underlying drivers of the epidemic, or social-economic rights issues. Initiatives like 
the Patent Pool attempt to correct the “tragedy of the anti-commons” (Bermudez & 
Hoen 2010, 5) that has come about through intense privatization and protection of 
property rights. However, they do so only within limited terms, relying on voluntary 
contributions from pharmaceutical companies (Hoen et al. 2011).  UNITAID 
represents an attempt to develop “Quasi—market norms which seek to synthesize 
the equity elements of public administration with the efficiency gains of markets” 
(Moran 2011, 141). UNITAID directs resources to biomedical and technological 
interventions that focus on market efficiencies and biomedical solutions.  
Williams and Rushton argue that the increasing role of private foundations 
and partnerships in GHG has been part of a “radical change” in global health 
(2011). Development assistance for health from private sources rose from 19 
percent in 1998 to 26.7 percent in 2007 (Williams & Rushton 2011, 3). This 
increase is largely attributed to contributions from Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, which surpass all previous and existing foundations, with total grant 
commitments since inception exceeding US$22.6 billion (McCoy & McGoey 2011, 
143). While it is difficult to determine exactly how much private foundations give to 
the HIV/AIDS responses and how their funding is distributed, because of lack of 
transparency in reporting, Funders Concerned About AIDS (2013) suggests that 
philanthropic organizations give about US$500 million to the HIV/AIDS response 
per year.  The HIV/AIDS response has been particularly attractive to private donors 
because of its vertical structure, channels to provide treatment as a comparatively 
easily measurable output, and broad political and public support. The majority of 
private HIV/AIDS resources are directed towards supporting research and 
treatment (McCoy & McGoey 2011, 150).  
Private foundations also explicitly focus on “business models” of 
development, and often prefer to work with CSOs or other private actors, being 
skeptical of government ministries (Williams & Rushton 2011, 10; McCoy & 
McGoey 2011, 147). As a result, Moran’s analysis of global health partnerships 
finds that, “rather than offering something that radically challenges the dominant 
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governance paradigm, most calls for change have been consistent with the broad 
tenets of a post-Washington consensus neoliberalism” (2011, 133). The increasing 
role of private actors in GHG has not dramatically changed it, but has strengthened 
the biomedical paradigm by prioritizing technical and private interventions.  
The major donors of the HIV/AIDS response share a number of common 
priorities – a preference for biomedical/technical interventions, and a focus on 
sponsoring good governance/business models.  Though there are also notable 
differences – such as between DFID’s preference for bilateral support and 
foundations’ preference for working with private actors – prevalent trends reflect 
the tenants of biomedical neoliberalism outlined in Chapter Three. As Lee and 
McInnes write, these dominate approaches “frame health provision as an economic 
issue and focuses on the efficient allocation of resources, rather than on the 
allocation of these resources for social justice or other ends” (2012, 79). The major 
donors of the HIV/AIDS response direct funding to technical interventions that 
reflect a preoccupation with technical efficiencies, not rights.  
Donor priorities are evident in the distribution of global HIV/AIDS resources: 
53 percent is directed to treatment and care programs, 22 percent to prevention 
interventions, 13 percent for program management, 5.5 percent to assist orphans 
and vulnerable children, 3 percent for incentives for human resources, 1.5 percent 
to enabling environments, 1.2 percent to social protection and social services, and 
0.8 percent to research (UNAIDS 2011a).  The prioritization of treatment reflects 
donor preferences for technical, easily measured, interventions; and the substantial 
amount of resources for management indicates concerns over good 
governance/business practice. 
Delineations in funding priorities demonstrate a de-prioritization of rights-
based responses. In contrast to well-funded donor priorities, the minimal amount 
(1.5 percent) dedicated to enabling environments demonstrates lack of financial 
support for interventions to support the rights of key populations. For example, 
within the prevention allocation only six percent is spent on mobilizing 
communities, a key component of a rights-based response (UNAIDS 2011a). 
Meanwhile, lack of commitment to social protection illustrates failure to address the 
underlying causes of the epidemic.  
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The context of community-based care work in Sub-Sahara Africa illustrates 
what is neglected by such priorities. In the funding break down above, only 12 
percent of the global HIV/AIDS resource directed to treatment and care 
interventions went to supporting home-based care programs (UNAIDS 2011a). In 
many high prevalence countries in Sub-Saharan Africa public health systems are 
generally unable to meet health care needs, and so the burden of care remains on 
households and communities. Rau notes, “while governments and international 
institutions have argued for more money to support HIV/AIDS programs and 
bureaucracies, civil society (individuals, families and local organizations) have 
remained the largest funders of HIV/AIDS activities” (2006, 293). Household 
expenditures include the cost of clean water, food, primary healthcare, and 
transportation to health care. These costs differ based on geography and available 
social services, and so can not be generalized, but are essential in all cases for 
HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care to be effective. Community care systems 
provide the majority of counseling, primary health care, palliative care and support 
networks.  
Community and household care systems are explicitly gendered, particularly 
in Sub-Saharan Africa where the majority of PWAs live. Harmer writes, “The rural 
demographic of sub-Saharan Africa, combined with limited government resources 
in some countries has led to a frontline of community health practitioners—
predominantly female—who provide support systems and care for the sick and 
their families” (2009, 299). A Kaiser Foundation survey found that over two-thirds 
of primary caregivers for PWAs were women (Peacock & Weston 2008, 2); a South 
African national evaluation of home-based-care found 91 percent of caregivers 
were women (Chella 2006, 8). Yet the gender nature of care work is rarely 
addressed in donor-funded programs (Esplen 2009, 7).  
Some HIV/AIDS programs actually increase care burdens on impoverished 
women by promoting ‘task-shifting’, wherein jobs that had been performed by paid 
health care workers become the responsibility of community volunteers (Chella 
2006, 8). 45 percent of posts created in South Africa’s Comprehensive Plan on 
HIV/AIDS (2007-2011) were for community health workers who carried out tasks 
that had previously been allocated to nurses (Schneider et al. 2008, 180). These 
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caregivers were recruited as volunteers receiving stipends ranged from nothing to 
US$90 per month. While task-shifting attempts to address a human resource crisis 
in many high HIV/AIDS prevalence states, it also shifts the responsibility of care 
work from the state to already impoverished caregivers, with little compensation. 
Within such policy contexts the majority HIV/AIDS care work continues to be 
carried out with only minimal support. In Zimbabwe, an evaluation of community 
responses found that unpaid volunteers provided 69 percent of human resources 
for local CSOs (Katietek 2012). Another study found that volunteers made-up more 
than half of the staff in locally based HIV/AIDS CSOs (HIV/AIDS Alliance 2010). 
While individuals and groups may receive minimal support for home-based-care 
programs from the state or other donors, this is usually only in the form in 
inconsistent volunteer stipends, training opportunities, and basic care supplies.  
As a result of the lack of meaningful support for care work, members of 
households and communities (most often women) continue to sacrifice resources, 
time and opportunities to care for the sick, exacerbating their own poverty and 
vulnerability to HIV infection. In the absence of proper equipment, such as gloves, 
caregivers are exposed to HIV infection when performing care tasks (Ankintola 
2004, 3).  Caregivers may also experience increased risk of rape due to having to 
travel alone in insecure environments (Ankintola 2006, 242). With little donor 
recognition of, or provisions for, community-based care, and continued reliance on 
volunteers who receive little more than training and basic supplies, those who 
provide the majority of HIV/AIDS care services do not benefit from global 
resources.  
While social protection programs can ease the burden on HIV/AIDS affected 
households, such programs remain limited by lack of new resources for scaling up, 
and inability to reach key populations. Similarly, while treatment provision can 
decrease care needs, ART requires particular dietary requirements to be effective, 
which requires additional costs; and side-effects and drug resistance create new 
care needs (Seckinelgin 2012b). Lack of funding for community and home-based 
care demonstrates that donor decisions about what is most important, and what 
can be neglected, results in those on the front lines of the epidemic have little 
access to global resources. 
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5.1.4 CSOs Within Resource Governance 
Donor priorities and neglects shape CSO access to resources and their role 
in resource governance. In some cases, donor priorities have increased CSO’s 
opportunities to participate. For example, the World Bank’s MAP initiative, which 
has substantial influence over domestic governance of HIV/AIDS, demands 
governments distribute 40 to 60 percent of resources to CSOs (Lancet 2008, 1724; 
Harman 2007, 486).  
However, MAP funding (which is distributed via the NACs, and then District 
AIDS Councils) is often delivered inconsistently and only for short-term projects. 
Harman writes, “Community groups sponsored under MAP often end up with 
operational projects but no funds to continue to support them beyond their first year 
of operations” (2009, 304). CSOs are given limited grants to implement projects 
conceptualized by the Bank and NACs, such as training and awareness generating 
interventions. A large portion of MAP funding for CSOs focuses on building 
administrative systems and technical capacity. Analysis from Zambia found that 38 
percent of funding for community responses was spent on management and 
administration, 26 percent on mitigation, 21 percent on prevention activities (mostly 
training programs), and 16 percent on care and support (Oomman et al. 2007, 50). 
A study of MAP interventions in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya found that the 
majority of MAP funding to community groups was used for training programs 
focused on prevention education and technical skill development (Harman 2009, 
302). These interventions are top down educational services provided to 
community members, as opposed to community-based interventions.  As a result, 
“Community driven development thus remains community-implemented 
development” (Harman 2007, 487).  
Engagement with CSOs is limited to providing training with few opportunities 
for feedback or dialogue.  While implementers technically communicate with the 
World Bank via District AIDS Councils and NACs, these consultations are often 
limited to report writing. Furthermore, government actors frequently restrict CSO 
influence on NAC’s, viewing CSOs as competition for resources  (Harman 2009, 
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305). As a result, many NAC’s suffer from lack of institutional support, limited 
capacity, and competition between ministries and CSOs (Harman 2007, 487). Due 
to these challenges, the Bank relies on INGOs, such as CARE and World Vision, to 
provide technical support to the NAC’s. Dialogue between the Bank and CSOs 
often consists of consultations with these INGOs (Harman 2007, 490).  
The role of INGOs in resource governance is strengthened by donors’ 
preferences to support CSOs that provide a range of interventions and are able to 
implement a multisectoral approach to the epidemic. This excludes smaller CSOs 
that do not already have funds to expand their programs. Harman writes that, 
“Those organizations that have expanded their practices were able to attract wider 
funds, as donors perceived them to have a more holistic approach in responding to 
the epidemic and it is more cost effective to fund one group that engages in 
multiple activities than various different organizations. Expansion of practices, 
however requires greater funding in the first place” (Harman 2009, 302). CSOs 
already with the capacity to implement extensive programs are the preferred 
recipients of MAP funding. 
As a result of the cyclical relationship between demonstrating comprehensive 
programming and the need for finances to do so, a select group of INGOs receive 
the majority of global HIV/AIDS resources. 30-50 percent of funding for HIV/AIDS 
interventions goes to large national and international CSOs, such as World Vision 
and the HIV/AIDS Alliance, with little directly going to CBOs (Bonnel et al. 2013). In 
Kenya, national and internationals CSOs receive 32 percent of the total HIV/AIDS 
finances, but only two percent is disbursed to local organizations, with the vast 
majority going to governmental and national organizations (Bonnel et al. 2013, viii).  
While INGOs generally redistribute resources to partners on the ground (and 
the practice of donors using INGOs as middlemen is common in health and 
development) the prominent role of these few large CSOs demonstrates a 
consolidation of power over resource distribution that is more likely to reflect donor 
priorities than those of affected communities and populations. HIV/AIDS resources, 
despite being exceptional in size and scope, are distributed through the typical 
mechanisms of development transfers.  
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INGOs also have an advantage over national and local CSOs due to donor 
policies related to performance-based funding. Performance-based funding refers 
to “funding decisions that are based on a transparent assessment of results 
against time-bound targets” (GFATM 2013a). GHIs, such as the Global Fund and 
private foundations, implement performance-based funding in order to demonstrate 
efficient use of resources and project effectiveness (Bartsch 2011). The demand 
for documenting results is motivated by concerns that resources are often wasted 
on unproven methods and ineffective programs. The extensive bureaucratic 
management requirements to maintain such reporting are beyond the capacity of 
many smaller CSOs.  
For example, MAP disbursements are released every six months, only after 
program reports have been completed, and made their way up the bureaucratic 
chain to the Bank. This near constant reporting strains the capacity of smaller 
CSOs, and when funds are delayed because of weak reporting or bureaucratic 
bottlenecks, further barriers to good financial management are created. INGOs, on 
the other hand, have the capacity and resources to manage funding processes and 
meet the reporting requirements of donors. As a result, those CSOs that might 
have closer relationships with communities and populations affected are excluded 
from resource governance.  
Performance-based financing also reflects both the preference for technical 
interventions (such as treatment) that can be easily counted, and demands for 
good governance/business models. It is difficult to demonstrate results of more 
complex processes, for example related to creating enabling legal environments, 
within performance-based reporting. This creates barriers for CSO’s engaged in 
advocacy efforts to access funding from donors. Consequently, the scale-up of 
HIV/AIDS resources has also corresponded to a shift in CSO activity away from 
advocacy roles towards more service delivery roles, in order to access resources 
(Rau 2006). CSO participation in HIV/AIDS resource distribution is often limited to 
INGOs redistributing donor funding to smaller CSOs for service delivery projects.  
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5.1.5 Shifts in the Global Political Economy of the HIV/AIDS Response 
Trends in funding for the HIV/AIDS response have recently shifted in 
response to broader changes in the political economy of global health. The 
economic recession in North America and Western Europe resulted in austerity 
measures, which contributed to the stagnation of overseas development 
assistance. For example, Italy, Ireland and Spain stopped contributing to the 
Global Fund when their economies were hit by the recession in 2008, and 
Denmark and the Netherlands also reduced their commitments (International 
HIV/AIDS Alliance 2012, A13). In 2010, the American government reduced 
financial targets for the scale-up of PEPFAR (Collins 2014).  Resources for 
HIV/AIDS stagnated for the first time in 2010. 
Concurrently, the backlash against AIDS exceptionalism caused HIV/AIDS 
donors to shift resources to health system strengthening. The Global Fund’s New 
Funding Model (discussed in the next section) includes a funding stream 
particularly for health system strengthening. Similarly, bilateral donors, such as the 
Netherlands, have increased the portion of resources going to health systems, and 
the European Commission shifted its focus from HIV/AIDS, Malaria and TB to 
global health more generally in 2010 (MSF 2010). While such shifts create 
opportunities for more integrated and hopefully effective global health aid delivery, 
in the absence of additional resources, such changes also limit opportunities to 
scale-up the HIV/AIDS response.  
The backlash against HIV/AIDS exceptionalism and economic crisis has 
resulted in substantial fears of a decrease in funding with dire predictions from 
UNAIDS and advocacy groups, such as the HIV/AIDS Alliance (2012), and in the 
media (IRIN 2011).  CSO recipients of international aid speak of “fighting for 
survival” and “intense competition for resources” (CSO Representative 2013 #26). 
They note the context of resource scarcity impedes their work and ability to build 
partnerships with other CSOs, with whom they have to compete for the same 
funding (CSO Representative 2013 #26). Changes in HIV/AIDS resources have 
created a tense environment for HIV/AIDS CSOs to operate in.  
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Despite persistent fears, funding for HIV/AIDS has not actually declined, but 
has plateaued since 2010 (ONE 2012). This reflects the general trend in 
development assistance for health. The Institute for Health Metrics notes that, 
“Rather than falling sharply as expected, over the past two years development 
assistance for health has been sustained at levels of spending that would have 
been inconceivable a decade ago” (2012, 7). Research from the Kaiser Family 
Foundation and UNAIDS shows that donor funding for HIV/AIDS has remained 
largely flat over the past two years, leveling off after a decade of significant growth.  
As Fidler (2009) notes, the privileged position of global health, within development 
assistance, has not so much declined but stabilized. Within this broader context, 
the position of the HIV/AIDS response within GHG has become normalized and, as 
outlined in Chapter Three, it is this process that CSOs are struggling with.  
A related trend is that in recent years a number of countries, such as those in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, with substantial or growing HIV/AIDS 
epidemics, have made the transition from low to middle-income country status. 
This has raised questions about their dependence on international aid to fund the 
response. For example, the World Bank considers Nigeria a lower middle-income 
country, but 92 percent of Nigeria’s HIV/AIDS resources come from external 
sources (Bonnel et al. 2013, 17). This raises questions about whether donor 
resources are absolving the state of its responsibility to address the epidemic, and 
if they could be better used elsewhere. 
The dynamics of states shifting to middle-income status while still receiving 
international aid for social programs is by no means unique to the HIV/AIDS 
response. What makes resource considerations particularly tense in this case is 
that many middle-income countries have concentrated epidemics amongst key 
populations, such as PWIDs and MSM, who remain marginalized and often 
criminalized by their governments (for example homosexuality is illegal in Nigeria, 
impeding programs targeted at MSM). Domestic resources are sufficient to cover 
the majority of the costs of HIV/AIDS interventions, and so donors are withdrawing, 
but states are unlikely to fill the resource gap because of lack of concern for, and 
sometimes outright opposition to, key populations. As one key informant noted, “It 
is not a financing challenge, it is a political challenge” (State Representative 2013 
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#14). The role of international donors becomes tenuous in these contexts, as the 
withdrawal of funding threatens to exacerbate the epidemic and human rights 
violations, but its continued provision enables governments to neglect the 
HIV/AIDS response and key populations.  
 
5.1.6 Section Summary 
The mobilization of global resources for HIV/AIDS has been exceptional, 
demonstrating unprecedented financing for a health issue. However, the 
transformative potential of such resources is based on how they are used. 
Overwhelmingly, global HIV/AIDS resources have been directed to technical 
interventions that reflect donor preferences for good governance and business. 
These priorities have not included rights-based interventions, as illustrated by the 
neglect of support for those, mostly women, who provide the majority of HIV/AIDS 
care work. 
 Resource distribution structures and the preferences of donors shape CSO 
participation in resource governance, often limiting local organizations to program 
implementing roles, while creating opportunities for INGOs to access resources 
and participate in governance. Within the current shifts of the HIV/AIDS response, 
CSOs fear even more restricted access to resources, particularly for key 
populations in middle-income countries. The following sections, on CSO 
participation in the Global Fund and PEPFAR, analyze if and how CSOs are able 
to promote alternatives within these overarching structures.  
 
5.2 Mobilizing and Distributing Resources via the Global Fund 
As noted in the previous chapter, CSOs have a distinct role in the Global 
Fund, and have been able to use their influence to advance human rights agendas. 
This section extends analysis to CSO participation in Global Fund governance over 
resources. After arguing that CSOs make a substantial contribution to resource 
mobilization for the Global Fund, it analyzes how CSOs attempt to influence 
resource distribution to promote a rights-based response, focusing on four key 
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processes they have engaged around: promoting CSOs as Principle Recipients 
(PRs) of grants, advocating for funding for community level organizations and key 
populations, and the development of the New Funding Model (NFM). It concludes 
that though CSOs make a substantial contribution to mobilizing resources, their 
influence over resource distribution is minimal, and they are now in the position of 
defending, as opposed to promoting, what resources they have been able to direct 
to CSOs, affected communities and key populations.  
 
5.2.1 Mobilizing Global Fund Resources 
When asked how civil society partners contribute to the Global Fund, one 
staff member states, “One, to help us with governance, two to hold us accountable, 
and three advocacy for resource mobilization” (GHI Representative 2013 #19). The 
participation of CSOs in governance and accountability processes has been 
discussed in the previous chapter. Here the focus is on resource mobilization. As 
has been documented in the history of the Global Fund, in the previous chapter, 
CSOs played a key role in advocating for the creation of the fund. CSOs have 
since continued to advocate for greater resources for the Global Fund.  
CSOs play a crucial role during replenishment campaigns. CSOs in donor 
countries lobby their governments to make sizeable commitments through direct 
advocacy and fundraising events. Prior to the most recent funding round, in 2013, 
CSOs based in Europe collaborated with the Global Fund to coordinate a 
replenishment meeting at the European Commission in Brussels. CSO 
representatives from all over the world attended the event, using it as an 
opportunity to voice their particular needs for funding from their regions. The 
replenishment meeting was then followed with a demonstration in front of the 
European institutions, calling for full funding for the Global Fund. Similar activities 
occurred in the US and UK, at international HIV/AIDS conferences, and other 
major events.  
The Global Fund Advocates Network (GFAN) was specifically formed, in 
2008, by a coalition of CSOs to support such events and lobby for continued and 
increased resources for the Global Fund. The network, based in the Netherlands, 
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supports fundraising and advocacy, aiming to build a social movement in support 
of the Fund. In 2013, it held a Global Resource Mobilization Meeting to brief civil 
society groups about the changes in the fund and develop joint fundraising 
strategies at the national and global level. About 70 CSO representatives attended, 
as well as representatives from the Global Fund board and Secretariat, including 
the Executive Director. The delegates contributed suggestions to inform the Global 
Fund’s fundraising strategies. In particular, CSO participants took issue with the 
Global Fund’s plan to propose three funding scenarios to donors, pointing out that 
in such cases donors generally chose the lowest option (GFAN 2013, 15). Instead, 
CSO representatives suggested a single ask be put forth, and suggested the figure 
of US$15 billion, which was adopted by the Global Fund. This was followed up with 
a call for action petition, which was signed by 2000 individuals asking donor and 
implementing countries to: recommit to the goals of increased strategic 
investments and scaling-up of treatment, prevention, care and support programs 
for people living with and affected by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria; fully fund 
the Global Fund by collectively committing at least US$15 billion in new 
contributions for 2014-16; recommit to increase domestic investment targets for 
health. The call to action petition was distributed prior to the major replenishment 
meeting in the US in 2013 (GFAN 2013). CSOs not only influenced resource 
mobilization by advocating for greater donor resources, but also provided input into 
Global Fund resource mobilization strategies. 
CSO representatives in recipient countries contribute to replenishment efforts 
by participating in events, and increasing awareness of the needs for greater 
resources in their regions. The Africa Regional Civil Society Platform on Health and 
Universal Access campaigned for the Global Fund replenishment by promoting 
greater domestic commitments to health, which they argue demonstrates the 
willingness of recipient countries to partner with the Global Fund towards achieving 
universal access (ARCSP 2013). The Platform also coordinated advocacy efforts 
at the BRICS summit held in South Africa in 2013.  
Other organizations, such as ARASA, set up meetings with various 
stakeholders from both implementing and donor states. They lobbied the four 
African countries that agreed to contribute to the fund to do so. ARASA also held a 
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major campaign in Kenya, aimed at exposing gaps in the current health budget and 
the need for additional resources, holding street demonstrations and making 
presentations to parliament (Civil Society Representative 2013 #20). Such 
activities expose the need for greater resources in low-income countries, promote 
domestic investments in health, and agitate for the involvement of middle-income 
countries in resource mobilization.  
Members from implementing country CSOs also participated in the Here I Am 
Campaign, writing and producing video blogs about living with HIV/AIDS, TB and 
Malaria. These were distributed widely via social media and the online news site 
the Huffington Post. The title of the campaign ‘Here I Am’ confronted perceptions in 
donor countries that the HIV/AIDS epidemic was some how less server than 
previously feared by purposeful demonstrating what it is like to live with the virus 
and be reliant on international support for life prolonging treatment and care (GFAN 
2013). This campaign was officially developed by ICSS, but received much 
mentoring, marketing and technical support from the Global Fund Secretariat. As 
with many CSO resource mobilization activities, there was a high level of crossover 
and sharing of resources, expertise and connections between CSOs and the 
Global Fund Secretariat.  
In December of 2013, donors committed to US$12 billion over three years for 
the Global Fund -  two billion short of the civil society ask (Faison 2013). It is not 
possible to conclude how much of this funding is because of CSO advocacy, 
compared to other factors, but anecdotal evidence suggests that CSOs played a 
key role in the fundraising. Staff members within the Global Fund noted that they 
would not have been able to carry out fundraising efforts on the current scale 
without CSO support (GHI Representative 2013 #3). These views were reiterated 
in public statements by Global Fund leadership. The Executive Director noted that, 
“Civil society and communities are key for advocacy around the Fund, including as 
we seek new resources” (GFAN 2013).  
Observers suggest that the reason other organizations, such as UNITAID and 
GAVI, followed the Global Fund’s example of including civil society in their 
governance structures is that they realize the key role these groups played in 
mobilizing resources (CSO Representative 2013 #1). As noted in the previous 
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chapter, CSO representatives to the Global Fund board derive influence from their 
involvement in fundraising, suggesting that this contribution is substantial. The 
numerous fundraising activities CSOs in both the global north and south initiate, 
and widespread recognition of the utility of these endeavors, indicate that CSOs 
play a crucial role in resource mobilization for the Global Fund. 
 
5.2.2 CSOs as Principle Recipients of Global Fund Grants 
Activist and other groups that advocated for the creation of the Global Fund 
had hoped that it would provide funding to CSOs in order to support CBOs, and 
interventions aimed at addressing the rights of key populations. However, the 
majority of financing continues to be distributed to government ministries for both 
pragmatic and ideological reasons. On the practical side, the size of the grants 
distributed requires bureaucracies that can absorb and manage the funds, which 
most CSOs cannot. The decision to provide such large grants is based on the 
desire to keep the Global Fund Secretariat small, and not require numerous 
country offices; providing many smaller grants to CSOs would require greater 
supervision and therefore overhead costs at the Secretariat (CSO Representative 
2013 #1). Ideologically, this preference for states as PRs reflects a desire for 
Global Fund resources to be distributed inline with government policies, which 
ideally means they will reflect national needs. In practice this only works where and 
if the government is responsive to the communities and populations most affected.  
While, the Fund aims to support “country ownership”, promoting a national 
multisectoral response, Walker (2012) notes that the dominant approach reflects 
more of a policy of “state ownership”, in which CSOs have little power compared to 
governmental actors. Though the CCMs, which nominate the PRs of Global Fund 
grants, consist of both state and non-state actors, these are often dominated by 
state interests, and CSOs that are friendly to them, with a notably lack of 
participation of key populations (Oberth 2012).  
 Though the majority of funding continues to be directed to government 
ministries, in the minority of situations CSOs act as PRs. CSOs take on PR 
responsibilities where governments are unable or unwilling to acts as PR, or where 
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CSOs have specific expertise that provides a particular advantage. For example, 
the HIV/AIDS Alliance (the CSO that receives the largest amount of Global Fund 
grants) is a PR in the Ukraine, due to its expertise in, and government opposition 
to, harm reduction (CSO Representative 2013 #1). The Alliance is recognized as 
able to provide a rights-based approach beyond the scope of the government. 
Other common CSO PRs are Population Services International, Care and World 
Vision – all INGOs.   The role of INGOs as PRs is justified by assumptions that 
they are better equipped, than governments, to implement projects that address 
the rights and needs of key populations.  
CSOs appear to be particularly effective in implementing grants. The Global 
Fund’s evaluation system rates grants along one of five categories: A1 (exceeding 
expectations), A2 (meeting expectations), B1 (adequate), B2 (inadequate but 
potential demonstrated), and C (unacceptable). These ratings guide decisions on 
disbursement amounts, and whether or not to renew a grant. Grants with a C rating 
will usually not receive subsequent disbursements. CSO PRs receive the majority 
of top ratings for performance, with over 50 percent of CSO PR grants ranking in 
‘A’ categories between 2008 and 2010 (comparable to government PR grants, of 
which just over 30 percent ranked in A categories) (Global Fund 2011, 3).  
Informants argue that CSOs’ higher performance in grant implementation relates to 
their ability to develop strong networks with affected communities, and their 
historical commitment to advancing rights-based approaches (CSO Representative 
2013 #2). However, no sustained analysis has been done on why CSOs perform 
better than other PRs (and the analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis). The 
high ranking of CSO PRs demonstrates that where CSOs have the opportunity 
they contribute to more effective resource distribution (according to the Global 
Fund’s standards).  
Pointing out the demonstrated success of CSOs PRs in reaching key 
populations and implementing grants effectively, CSO representatives on the 
Global Fund board and committees advocated for Dual Track Financing (DTF). 
DTF encourages proposals to the Global Fund to include both government and 
non-government PRs. A number of interviewees note the adoption of DTF was the 
direct result of the efforts by the communities and NGO delegations on the Global 
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Fund board, and their continued campaigns for a greater role of CSOs in grant 
implementation (GHI Representative 2013 #3; GHI Representative 2013 #21). At 
the 15th Board Meeting, in 2007, under the heading of “Strengthening the Role of 
Civil Society and the Private Sector in the Global Fund’s Work” the board approved 
the recommendation for routine use of DTF. The Secretariat then, in consultations 
with CSOs, produced guidelines that encouraged CCMs to nominate at least one 
government and one non-government PR to lead program implementation. The 
guidelines did not require proposals to include DTF, but included the following 
caveat: “If a proposal does not include both government and non-government PRs, 
it should contain an explanation of the reason for this” (GFATM & International 
HIV/AIDS Alliance 2008, 7).   
However, DTF has not become a dominant approach within Global Fund 
grant disbursements. In 2009, 70 DTF proposals were received (out of 159 
proposals in total) and 35 were approved (out of a total of 85 approved proposals) 
(TRP 2009). In 2010, 52 DTF proposals were received (out of 150 proposals in 
total), and 27 approved (out of an approved in total 79) (TRP 2010). Despite strong 
language within the board resolution and guidance documents, the majority of 
proposals, successful and unsuccessful, did not include DTF. Furthermore, the 
number of DTF proposals decreased between funding rounds, demonstrating 
declining commitment to DTF. One reason provided by the TRP for CCM’s not 
submitting DTF proposals was that current PRs felt they were performing well, and 
so the need to add an additional PR was not recognized (TRP 2008). Such 
rationales indicate that, despite advocacy by CSOs and directives from the Global 
Fund, the majority of CCMs do not recognize the benefits of increasing the role of 
CSOs as PRs.  
Where governments do include CSOs, they often do so because they believe 
it will increase the chances of submitting a successful proposals, as opposed to out 
of recognition of the benefits of partnering with CSOs: “Government-dominated 
CCMs may have less understanding of the role of CSOs and often make the 
decision to nominate a CSO as a PR because the Global Funds recommends 
doing so, rather than because they recognize civil society as a key partner” 
(ICASO 2012a, 11). This superficial sense of partnership results in poor co-
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operation between government and CSO PRs. For example, though the India 
HIV/AIDS Alliance, a local CSO, has a record of successfully implementing grants 
as a PR under DTF, it does not have a strong relationship with the government PR. 
Furthermore, because it was a PR, the Alliance could not participate in the CCM, 
and was frustrated to see CSO seats on the CCM remain empty because of 
government apathy to CSO involvement. A report found,  
 
“The result is a situation where civil society is poorly 
represented and implementing organizations such as the 
Alliance cannot contribute. This situation, coupled with many 
government agencies’ critical view of the capacities and 
governance of civil society organizations in general, has had a 
negative impact on the ability of civil society to be considered 
equal and/or significant players to date for the Global Fund” 
(ICASO 2012a, 17).  
 
DTF, while having marginally increased access to resources and influence over 
distribution for CSOs, has not transformed the approach of those governments who 
remain resistant to sharing power and funding.  
 
5.2.3 Directing Resources to Communities and Key Populations 
CSOs have continually advocated for funding streams that aim to provide 
resources more directly to communities through local CSOs, faith-based groups 
and other actors. One avenue they have pursued is the promotion of funding 
specifically for Community Systems Strengthening (CSS). The Global Fund defines 
CSS as “the provision of financial, technical and other kinds of support to 
organizations and agencies that work directly with and in communities” (2014). The 
key principles of CSS are:  
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“Significant and equitable role in all aspects of program 
planning, design, implementation and monitoring for 
community-based organizations and key affected populations 
and communities, in collaboration with other 
actors; programming based on human rights; programming 
informed by evidence and responsive to community experience 
and knowledge; commitment to increasing accessibility, uptake 
and effective use of services to improve the health and well-
being of communities, and accountability to communities 
(GFATM 2014a, 9).  
 
This formalized approach to increasing the involvement of affected communities 
and key populations in Global Fund resource governance represents an effort to 
systematical strengthen community responses, and support human rights 
interventions, providing a corrective to the usual distribution channels, which 
neglect these aspects of the response (as outlined in section one of this chapter).  
Much like DTF, key informants note the prominent influence of CSOs in 
advocating for the creation of CSS. Civil society board members continually 
pushed for funding structures that direct resources to local CSOs, arguing that 
funding that flows through governments and international organizations rarely 
reaches community-based organizations (CBOs) and key populations (CSO 
Representative 2013 #1).  Pressure also came from CSO representatives on 
CCMs, who argued that in order for local CSOs to participate in Global Fund 
processes they required greater support and capacity building (ICASO 2012b). In 
response to this pressure, the Global Fund began referring to the need for CSS in 
communications with CCMs and partners in 2006. That year it produced, in 
partnership with the HIV/AIDS Alliance, case studies of successful CSO 
participation in implementing Global Fund grants as CCM members, PRs and sub-
recipients, labeling these activities CSS. The report read, “These interventions, 
known as community systems strengthening (CSS), are increasingly becoming a 
core part of the Global Fund’s preferred strategy across its programs. More and 
more civil society groups are receiving not only financial support but also crucial 
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technical support in areas including accounting and monitoring and evaluation” 
(GFATM & International HIV/AIDS Alliance 2008, 5). The following year the Global 
Fund issued information notes advising applicants on how to include CSS in 
proposals (GFMSM 2013, 7).  
Under pressure from CSO delegates, in 2008, the board recommended, “the 
routine inclusion, in proposals for Global Fund financing, of requests for funding of 
relevant measures to strengthen community systems necessary for the effective 
implementation of Global Fund grants” (GFATM and International HIV/AIDS 
Alliance 2008, 6). Applicants were specifically encouraged to include CSS activities 
in proposals, and indicate how resources would reach local level groups and key 
populations.  
However, the opportunity to include greater focus on CSS was infrequently 
and inconsistently adopted by applicants. During the following funding round the 
TRP reported, “As in round seven, the TRP was disappointed to see that the 
majority of proposals submitted to the Global Fund for support (and HIV proposals 
especially) failed to include any real discussion on whether particular groups are 
under-represented in accessing and/or receiving prevention, treatment, and/or care 
and support services relevant to the particular country context” (2008, 23). Round 
nine saw only a slight increase in proposals including CSS. Furthermore, many of 
the activities labeled funded as CSS more closely resembled health systems 
strengthening: “activities included microscopes and training for microscope 
operators in community health centres; renovation of local, regional, and national 
health facilities; capacity building for local government units in HIV planning; and 
training of health care professionals” (MSMGF 2011, 5). These inputs were not the 
sort of community support, such as funding for peer support groups and advocacy 
activities, that CSO proponents had envisioned. Despite CSO advocacy and Global 
Fund Secretariat promotion of CSS, the majority of applicants did not seize the 
opportunity to include requests for rights-based interventions. 
CSOs attribute the weak adoption of CSS to the challenges of communicating 
CSS results within the Global Funds performance-based management framework 
(ICASO 2012a). Local CSOs often have limited time and capacity to engage in 
extensive monitoring and reporting procedures, making them risky sub-recipients 
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of grants. Furthermore, support activities, such as peer counseling, and advocacy 
efforts, such as promoting legal rights of key populations, did not deliver easily 
measurable results. The Global Fund found that “it has been difficult for community 
actors to clearly explain the connections between health outcomes and community 
activities that have potential impacts on health but are not directly related to health 
service delivery, for example advocacy, social protection and welfare services, 
home-based care or legal services” (Global Fund 2014, 8). Because CSS 
outcomes were not easily measured, they were viewed as detracting from the 
strength of proposals, despite Global Fund calls for a greater focus on CSS. While 
CSS was adopted and promoted in principle by the Global Fund, it did not fit into 
pre-established systems and governance processes, which restricted 
implementation.  
In response to these challenges, and under continued pressure from CSO 
representatives on the board to improve its capacity to support CSS, in 2010, the 
Global Fund released an extensive framework to encourage greater focus on CSS 
in Round 10. This framework was developed in collaboration with a range of CSOs, 
such as the Coalition of Asia Pacific Regional Networks on HIV/AIDS, and other 
organizations, such as UNAIDS and the World Bank. A draft was consulted on 
through interviews, meetings, workshops and an online questionnaire with CSOs 
around the world, giving CSOs multiple opportunities to influence the final draft 
(Global Fund 2014, iv-v). The resulting framework was well received by CSOs who 
saw it “as an opportunity to frame and strengthen their efforts in the response to 
AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria and to redress the balance of programming toward 
the most neglected groups” (GFMSM 2013, 3). 
Following the development of the framework, in Round 10, CSS interventions 
were included in 65 of the 150 eligible disease proposals (43 percent), and in six of 
the 28 crosscutting health system strengthening requests (21 percent) (Rivers 
2010). However, the majority of requests continued to be for community service 
delivery interventions, which the GFMSM notes “is significant because service 
delivery does not reflect the more traditional notions of community system 
strengthening like advocacy, capacity building and leadership development” (2013, 
9).  In some cases, the Global Fund encouraged CSOs to include greater service 
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delivery components at the expense of advocacy activities. During Round 10, a 
regional network of sex worker organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean 
applied for CSS funding with a proposal aimed at reducing stigma towards sex 
workers in health care settings. Initially, the network did not include direct service 
delivery in the proposal because it did not want to overlap with national efforts. 
However, Global Fund Secretariat staff pressured the proposal developers to 
include high-level impact indicators related to service delivery, because these were 
better reflected in the monitoring framework (GFMSM 2013, 13). Even with the new 
CSS framework, the disconnect between the ideal of CSS, as promoting enabling 
environments at the local level, and the confines of Global Fund reporting priorities, 
shifted resources away from advocacy and support, to technical interventions.  
During the same round, over half of CSS funding went to government 
recipients, not CSOs, raising concerns that resources would continue to be spent 
at the national, not local level, and on government sanctioned interventions, as 
opposed to advocacy and rights projects for marginalized groups. The GFMSM 
noted, “The fact that such a high proportion of CSS funding is used by the 
governmental sector indicates that a smaller proportion of CSS funding is being 
used for activities that the government neglects or that are most effectively carried 
out by civil society organizations. This is particularly true for interventions targeting 
key populations” (2013, 9).  While CSS had been conceived of as a corrective to 
provide resources to communities, populations and organizations neglected by 
dominant resource distribution patterns, the majority of funding was still provided to 
governments for generalized programs. In contexts where governments denied 
existence of key populations, for example MSM populations, directing CSS funds 
through a Ministry of Health was unlikely to reach those most in need. The GFMSM 
found, “efforts to use CSS for key populations have faced the same challenges that 
key population programming has faced since the creation of the Global Fund” 
(2013, 14).  In other words, the status quo was maintained.  
Similarly, national and local level CSOs expressed concerns that CSS was 
more often being carried out by INGOs than by community groups, demonstrating 
a further continuation of usual practices (GFAN 2013, 11). The prominent role of 
government and INGOs suggests that CSS did not develop into an alternative from 
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the typical mode of resource delivery and use, but another channel for the usual 
actors to access resources, for typical activities, just under a different name.    
 Any further potential of the new framework was stemmed by the cancelation 
of Round 11, in November 2011, and resulting period of upheaval within the Global 
Fund. One key informant sums up the process of promoting CSS:  
 
“The role of the community representatives involved in the 
board, as well as those who are working within the 
Secretariat, pushed hard for the creation for the CSS 
framework. That got developed, but it really hasn’t been 
implemented. Many of the recommendations that have 
been made repeatedly to the Global Fund about how it 
could improve its CSS approaches, how it can better utilize 
funding structures for key affected populations, those ideas 
have not really been adapted and adopted to the extent 
that they could or should be” (CSO Representative 2013 
#2).  
 
Despite successfully advocating for a CSS Framework, which espoused ideals of 
community participation and human rights, the over arching structures of the 
Global Fund, the dominant role of states as PRs, and reliance on large 
organizations as middlemen for resource distribution, limited its potential to provide 
a corrective to current distribution priorities.  
 
The Most at Risk Population Reserve 
In addition to promoting CSS, CSOs on the Global Fund board, and through 
groups such as the GFAN, continued to advocate for greater resources for 
interventions focused on key populations. Between 2002-2010, only about 10 
percent of the Global Fund’s cumulative approved funding for HIV prevention was 
allocated to interventions targeting the key populations of sex workers, people who 
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inject drugs and men who have sex with men (Aveeda et al 2011, 8). Recognizing 
this gap, in 2010, the board approved the creation of a dedicated reserve of 
funding for most at risk populations (MARPs). The MARP Reserve, created only for 
round 10, set aside a maximum of US$75 million over two years to fund proposals 
from applicants who focused interventions towards key populations affected by 
HIV/AIDS.  Applicants who wished to address the needs of MARPs could either 
submit a regular HIV/AIDS proposal focusing partly, predominantly or only on 
MARPs through the general process, or submit an HIV proposal focusing on 
MARPs through the reserve (GFATM 2010). 
This reserve aimed to particularly provide funding to support interventions 
targeting key populations in upper middle and lower middle-income countries. In 
this way it was different than CSS, which was largely directed towards supporting 
community interventions in low-income countries. Instead the MARP Reserve 
recognized that in contexts of low prevalence, but concentrated epidemics, there 
was a need for specific funding for key populations, especially considering that 
concentrated epidemics were characteristic of middle-income countries, which 
were not prioritized in grant distribution. Through this new route, proposals from 
middle-income countries focusing on key populations did not have to compete with 
proposals responding to generalized epidemics. The creation of the MARP reserve 
reflected recognition that demand was out pacing supply for the Global Fund - by 
advocating for the reserve, CSOs tried to protect funding for key populations in 
middle-income countries. 
In 2010, 25 MARP proposals were received, and 12 were approved (with total 
funding of US$46.9 million) (TRP 2010). This was a somewhat higher success rate 
than for general proposals (48 compared to 41 percent), leading the TRP to 
conclude, “Overall, the quality of focus on these populations was greatly enhanced 
in the proposals submitted under this funding reserve in Round 10, suggesting that 
this mechanism provided an appropriate incentive for applicants to focus on these 
groups” (TRP 2010, 4). Approved MARP proposals contained 11 percent more 
activities related to prevention, care and support, and to addressing stigma 
targeting key populations than general HIV proposals; the MARP reserve resulted 
in a modest increase of interventions targeting key populations.  Furthermore, the 
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TRP found that proposals to the general category of funding also included greater 
focus on MARPs in Round 10, noting “This could suggest that all Round 10 
applicants, regardless of their choice of HIV proposal type, were appropriately 
made more aware by the board’s message and Secretariat information notes on 
this topic. This initiative most likely resulted in a better prioritization of interventions 
focused on those that are most at -risk of being infected” (TRP 2010, 12-13).  The 
TRP recommended that the MARP reserve be continued. However, like the CSS 
process, the development of MARP reserve was stalled by the cancelation of 
Round 11 and subsequent upheaval in the Fund.  
Despite efforts to promote CSO participation in resource distribution through 
CSS and the MARP Reserve only the minority of Global Fund resources were 
dedicated to addressing the human rights issues of key populations and affected 
communities. The TRP consistently reported, in its reviews following funding 
rounds, disappointment in the relatively low prioritization of programs for key 
populations, and to address human rights and gender inequality in funding 
proposals (TRP 2010). Despite CSO efforts to develop distribution channels so that 
resources would better reach affected communities and key populations, funding 
has not reflected these rights goals.  
 
5.2.4 The New Funding Model 
Following the cancelation of Round 11, the Global Fund went through a 
period of substantial restructuring. Throughout the process, CSOs continually 
advocated for greater resources being directed towards community responses and 
key populations, often struggling with the competing interests and priorities of other 
governance actors. As consultations about the NFM unfolded, CSOs fought to hold 
on to the modest gains they had made in terms of funding for CSOs, CSS and the 
MARP Reserve.  
This process occurred following accusations of corruption in the fund, 
cancelation of Round 11, and subsequent restructuring, which in turn occurred 
within the broader context of economic recession in donor countries and the 
backlash against AIDS exceptionalism. These external dynamics, though not 
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focused on in this analysis, were influential factors, particularly making the 
Secretariat and Board sensitive to donors’ interests, due to fear of lack of 
resources.  
 
Developing the NFM 
The ability of CSOs to influence the NFM is difficult to demonstrate, especially 
as the NFM is being rolled out at the time of writing and so how it will be 
operationalized remains to be seen. However, it is possible to consider how CSOs 
tried to promote the rights of key populations and affected communities, and how 
these efforts have been reflected, or not, (so far) in the structure of the NFM. 
The development of the NFM aimed to be participatory and inclusive. CSOs 
engaged in conference calls, and meetings with board and committee members of 
the Global Fund, as well as the Secretariat. However, a number of respondents 
noted the frustration of working with a leadership team that was not necessarily 
familiar with human rights approaches, or used to working with CSOs. The interim 
Executive Director during much of this process, Gabriel Jaramillo, had a 
background in banking, as opposed to global health, and was viewed by a number 
of informants as not particularly open to CSO input (CSO Representative 2013 #1; 
CSO Representative 2013 #30). Furthermore, CSOs expressed frustration that the 
numerous consultants involved in the process often usurped their expertise. One 
key informant reflected on the processes, “So you could say, yeah we’ve been 
involved but the question is whether we have been effective” (Civil Society 
Representative 2013 #26). Others complain of having participated in “hundreds of 
useless consultations” (CSO Representative 2013 #30). 
Of the various networks involved, GFAN worked particularly closely with civil 
society members to gather input to inform the content of the NFM. Early in the 
process it began advocating for a pledging opportunity in 2012. However, this did 
not materialize as the Secretariat and Board felt it was imperative to focus on 
reforms before asking donors to give. GFAN then consulted with its members to 
develop a common CSO position on the NFM. Key components of the resulting 
position paper were:  the rejection of pre-set country funding allocations/ envelopes 
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as these would prevent full expressions of country demand; a suggestion that, if 
funding is insufficient, high quality asks be prioritized if further funding became 
available; and an ask for a more flexible resource mobilization strategy that would 
provide predictable and sufficient funding opportunities (GFAN 2013).  
The GFAN had limited success in ensuring that the NFM reflected these 
priorities. In terms of country allocations, the NFM is structured so that countries 
can access three types of funds: indicative funds, based on the allocation they 
have been awarded; incentive funds, which represent an opportunity for further 
financing based on achieving performance targets; and unfunded quality demand, 
for innovative and ambitious projects that, if there are cost-savings or additional 
resources available, will be funded on a case-by-case basis (Garmaise 2014). 
Though CSOs managed to influence the model to avoid completely restrictive caps 
on funding by successfully advocating for the creation of the unfunded quality 
demand, indicative funding (the majority of resources to be distributed) is capped 
by country allocations, something CSOs opposed. Furthermore, while the incentive 
funding reflects CSO calls for the prioritization of high quality asks, the fact that this 
is presented as an extra resource pool, to be distributed only if additional funding is 
available, means it does not provide predictable financing. Instead it is to be 
distributed on a case-by-case basis, and therefore more evidence of its use is 
needed in order to analyze if it will be implemented in a way that provides funding 
to rights-based interventions, and mitigates the negative effects of restrictive 
country allegations.  
 
Middle Income Countries 
Early in the process of developing the NFM, donors voiced opposition to 
funding responses in middle-income countries, such as those in Eastern Europe, 
arguing governments in middle-income countries had the ability to cover the costs 
themselves. A number of states that received Global Fund resources had shifted to 
middle-income country status in previous years, and donors argued that Global 
Fund resource distribution needed to be reconsidered. They further stressed that in 
a context of resource scarcity, due to the global recession, funding should be 
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dedicated to where it could have the largest impact, or the ‘”greatest return on 
investment”, which was in low-income, high HIV/AIDS prevalence states (State 
Representative #14; Garmaise 2012).  
For many CSOs the shift away from funding responses in middle-income 
countries represented a retreat from the idea of a global response, indicating 
instead the more common development assistance approach of transfers from the 
north to the south. At the 2012 International AIDS Conference, CSOs protested 
with signs that read “keep the Global Fund global.” CSOs also viewed the decline 
of support for funding to middle-income countries as a reversal on commitments to 
universal access, noting that treatment coverage in Eastern European countries 
was lower than in Sub-Saharan Africa (Civil Society Representative 2013 #2).12 For 
CSOs operating in middle-income countries, the potential decline of Global Fund 
resources threatened their survival, as they relied on international funding and did 
not benefit from domestic support. They also expressed fear that the shift from 
international to national funding would result in a retreat on key population and 
rights-based programs, as many middle-income governments have restrictive 
approaches to drug use and sexual rights.  
CSO representatives on the Global Fund board and committees continually 
voiced opposition to reducing funding in middle-income countries with concentrated 
epidemics. In May 2012, the Developed Country NGO Delegation to the board 
submitted a paper arguing,   
 
“Many countries are transitioning from low to middle income, 
but poverty in middle-income countries remains high.... Middle-
income countries have higher burdens of HIV and TB than low-
income countries....The capacity of middle-income countries to 
pay for health and their disease responses varies…. The 
Global Fund will only achieve its targets if investment is 
proportionate to disease burden” (Garmaise 2012).  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
12"Treatment"coverage"in"Eastern"Europe"and"Central"Asia"is"just"over"30"percent,"compared"to"70"
percent"in"Sub^Saharan"Africa"(UNAIDS"2013b)."
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External CSOs used forums, such as the GFAN meetings, to express concerns 
over plans to decrease funding to middle-income countries (GFAN 2012). They 
produced research demonstrating the potential negative impact of cuts to 
HIV/AIDS resources and lobbied both donor governments and the Global Fund 
Secretariat (HIV/AIDS Alliance 2011; Raminta et al. 2013). In a commentary in the 
Global Fund Observer, CSO representatives wrote that though one of the five 
strategic objectives outlined in the strategy for transitioning to the NFM was to 
protect and promote human rights, such “noble aspirations are to some extent 
undermined by the absence of any concrete effort to ensure that populations 
specifically affected are not left behind. Focus is again constrained to those 
countries where the greatest gains can be made” (Kapilashrami & Hanefeld 2014).  
The debate over funding for middle-income countries (between CSOs and 
donor states) revolves around differing understandings of greatest need. For 
donors, who are concerned about dependence on their resources, the withdrawal 
from middle-income countries is based on economic rationales that consider 
supply and demand, and returns on investments (there is more demand in Sub-
Saharan Africa and implementing interventions is cheaper). From the rights-based 
perspective of most CSOs, greatest need is not only indicated by poverty, but also 
unequal access to resources. For example, CSOs from Latin America argue that 
many middle-income countries also have high degrees of inequality, which 
prevents the majority of the population from enjoying the benefits of economic 
development (CSO Representative 2013 #13). They further note that such gross 
inequality generates marginalization and discrimination, which increases 
vulnerability to HIV. As one CSO representative summarizes, “much of the 
discussion around driving funding for middle-income countries has been very much 
focused on the economics of it, that middle-income countries have money, they 
should take responsibility for paying for their own, and that makes all the sense in 
the world until you start talking about gay men in Nigeria, drug users in Russia, sex 
workers anywhere” (CSO Representative 2013 #2).  CSOs repeatedly point out - in 
board meetings, consultations and publications - the numerous flaws in the World 
Bank classification of country incomes, noting such classifications do not take into 
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account inequalities within countries, human rights concerns or the willingness of 
states to respond to the HIV/AIDS epidemic and needs of key populations.  
The development of the NFM was dominated by the economic rational of 
donor states concerned with investment impacts. Whereas pervious frames around 
HIV/AIDS exceptionalism had created space for CSO arguments for the need of 
truly global response, in the context of economic recession and restructuring of the 
Global Fund, donors were able to assert their preferences, which tended towards 
more traditional resource transfers from the global north to south. One advocate 
notes, “CSO concern to be honest were kind of ignored because the Global Fund 
was going through its own internal crisis” (CSO Representative 2013 #20). The 
funding crisis in the Fund made it more sensitive to donor interests, which justified 
funding priorities on the basis of perceived resource scarcity. 
As a result, those countries that were identified as having had receiving more 
than their fair share of Global Fund resources were told to expect funding 
decreases. In a letter received by the Ukraine CCM, the Global Fund Secretariat 
said: "The allocation formula used in the new funding model indicates that 
Ukraine’s HIV and TB components are receiving more funding than the country’s 
fair share of Global Fund resources. ….Given the need to balance limited 
resources across the entire Global Fund portfolio, with focus on the highest 
disease burden and lowest income level countries, this allocation will need to be 
gradually reduced” (Quoted in Gelfand 2014).  In response, the PR for the Ukraine, 
the HIV/AIDS Alliance, reported,  
 
“Ukrainian situation is a quite evident example how the 
country AIDS response can suffer from the NFM math. 
Common sense says to me that the existing grant pipeline 
should be as much as realistic / up-to-date. As we see it is 
not the case, assuming this funding level for 2014, the 
funding for the next year will dramatically decrease. Legally 
the Global Fund might have stronger arguments, but 
programmatically - not! And with the Global Fund we are not 
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battling a legal case in a court, we are jointly fighting the 
epidemic, and disarming us makes fighting the epidemic in 
Ukraine weaker” (Quoted in Gelfand 2014).  
 
While, the impacts of decreasing allocations to middle-income countries have yet 
to play out, CSOs continue to argue against the logic promoted by donors and 
adopted by the Secretariat, suggesting (as the quote above demonstrates) that 
reducing funding for middle-income countries threatens a global compact to fight 
the epidemic. However, CSOs have not been able to shift resource governance 
principles back to reflecting earlier aspirations for exceptional global solidarity.  
 
Funding for Key Populations in NFM 
The lack of funding for key populations in middle-income countries is 
exacerbated by the lack of continuation of the MARP Reserve.  The MARP 
Reserve is not incorporated into the NFM, as funding for key populations is 
expected to be included in both indicative and incentive funds.  However, based on 
the first round of concept notes received by the TRP, the increased focus on the 
rights of key populations noted in Round 10 has not been maintained (TRP 2014). 
Instead, the TRP found that concept notes lacked reliable and appropriate size 
estimates for key populations, and that there were only two proposals (out of five) 
in which human rights policy changes were cited as critical enabling factors, and 
these were only related to minimal requests for investments.  
Furthermore, the separation of indicative and incentive funding, and unfunded 
quality demand, may have further marginalized programs focused on human rights. 
The TRP found that proposals regulated such interventions to the above indicative 
funding requests; meaning rights-based interventions would only be funded in the 
case of surplus resources or exceptional performance.  The TRP concluded that, 
“these cases suggest that the Global Fund has missed opportunities to leverage its 
considerable influence to advance policy issues that are critical for program 
success and sustainability” (quoted in Garmaise 2013). It went on to recommend 
that the Secretariat develop a strategy to work with partners to promote greater 
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focus on the rights for key populations. The short-term success of the MARP 
reserve in round 10 has not been carried over to the NFM. CSO gains in promoting 
this special fund for key populations are stalled and possibly reversed. 
 
CSS in NFM 
CSOs particularly fought to ensure the continuation of the CSS in the NFM, 
bringing up the importance of CSS in consolations with Global Fund staff, in board 
meetings, and through consortium meetings. Organizations such as the GFMSM 
(2011) published analysis of the limitations with the previous CSS framework and 
recommendations for how to better incorporate CSS in the NFM to support the 
rights of key populations and affected communities. In early 2013, the Secretariat 
released information that CSS would be combined with health systems 
strengthening. This was opposed by CSOs, who noted that health systems 
strengthening efforts tend to focus on infrastructure, personnel, and technical 
inputs and so rarely address less formal care work and efforts to address the social 
and economic determinants of health (GFMSM 2013, 8). Based on these 
arguments, the decision to combine the two was reversed (GFAN 2013, 12; GHI 
Representative 2013 #21).  
Instead the Secretariat worked with institutional partners, such as UNAIDS 
and UNDP, as well as regional CSOs, such as the Coalition of the Asia Pacific 
Regional Networks on HIV/AIDS, to develop a guidance document on how CSS fits 
within the NFM. The draft was circulated through an international consultation with 
civil society, using an online questionnaire, interviews and a two-day meeting with 
key informants (GFATM 2014a, v).  
Within this framework, the scope of CSS and the range of community sector 
activities remain relatively unchanged (GFATM 2014a, iii). However, the CSS can 
no longer include community-led program implementation or service delivery. This 
change responds to concerns expressed by CSOs that CSS service delivery 
interventions had caused confusion and duplication of efforts with health system 
strengthening in the past (GFMSM 2013). Instead service delivery components 
must be included in core programming within other modules. Where applicants 
  247"
decide that these services should be carried out by community organizations, they 
are to include strengthening interventions from the CSS framework to ensure the 
organizations can fulfill these roles (GFATM 2014a, 27). The continuation of CSS, 
consultations with CSOs on its revisions, and clear delineation from service 
delivery funding, demonstrates that CSOs have been able to ensure this funding 
stream continues to adapt towards a rights-based response. 
 
CSO participation in Country Dialogue Processes 
Under the NFM system, instead of CCMs producing a proposal to then be 
reviewed by the TRP during established funding rounds, CCMs are to produce a 
concept note, which can be developed in conjunction with their other health and 
related planning schedules, such as national strategic plans, and which then 
initiates a dialogue with the Global Fund in order to develop a full proposal.  Within 
this processes there is the potential for both greater and more restricted CSO 
participation and influence. Kapilashrami and Hanefeld write,  
 
“Provided that such dialogue is a process and not a one-off 
meeting, drawing both national and sub-national 
engagement in an open and transparent and inclusive 
series of consultations that are not restricted to pre-
existing Global Fund networks of civil society, there is an 
opportunity for civil society to better prepare for grant 
management and implementation….How this model will 
allow for community-level engagement in decision-making, 
particularly among vulnerable populations and groups who 
have hitherto remained invisible or marginalized in the 
decision-making and grant application processes, remains 
to be seen. Here again is the challenge of tremendous 
opportunity pitted against a historical legacy of coming up 
short” (2014).  
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CSOs are hopeful the new system will result in inclusivity and responsiveness, but 
fear prevalent practices of government control and bureaucratic requirements will 
limits opportunities for change. 
CSOs in Zimbabwe found that the impetus to develop a concept note that 
reflects a country’s national strategic plan (a key pillar of the new process) meant 
that, because their government denies some key populations (such as MSM) exist, 
opportunities to include CSOs and interventions that target key populations are 
restricted. Indeed, the TRP feedback on the Zimbabwean concept note found it 
suffered from programming gaps for key populations, such as MSM and PWID 
(Zimbabwe CCM 2013, 17). Furthermore, CSOs felt that during the concept note 
development process, Global Fund staff and other CCM participants pressured 
them to direct their efforts primarily to the health system strengthening component, 
which focuses on service delivery and the health workforce, not towards the needs 
of key populations, community infrastructure and enabling environments 
(Zimbabwe CCM 2013, 28). Such early outcomes of the concept note process 
suggest that the new system continues to struggle to balance the need to 
coordinate funding with national responses, with ambitions for rights-based 
responses. 
The ability of CSOs to participate in the Country Dialogue process is 
restricted by continued confusion over the NFM and demands for highly technical 
proposals.  CSOs that gathered for a GFAN meeting expressed concerns and 
confusion over how civil society participation in country dialogues will be structured 
(11, 2013). Following a workshop on the NFM, attended by 60 representatives from 
government and CSOs in Cote d’Ivor, participants expressed dismay at the 
complexities of the process, and the need for a high level of technical expertise to 
develop a concept note through the country dialogue process. One CCM member 
was quoted as reflecting “The methodology is extremely demanding. . . . We don't 
have all the necessary skills; we need a team that is better-equipped" (quoted in 
Fontaine 2014). Experience in Zimbabwe similarly found the concept note process 
no less time demanding or complicated than the previous proposal development 
process, and recommended that it be simplified and the length of the concept note 
be shortened (Zimbabwe CCM 2013).  
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While funding for technical support is available in order to develop concept 
notes, participants worry that such assistance might not be provided in time to 
develop concept notes, which could have negative effects on the quality of the 
proposal produced. Furthermore, the continued reliance on outside consultants to 
develop concept notes not only creates further resource demands, but also 
alienates local actors from the process, inhibiting country ownership.  Much like the 
previous funding system, CCMs have to seek funding to hire a consultant to 
access further funding. The dependence on external aid and resources is self-
perpetuating, detracting resources and attention from addressing the epidemic.  It 
appears that CSOs face similar barriers to engagement with the concept note 
process as under the previous proposal development process, and that the 
process continues to favour external expertise as opposed to community input. 
This restricts opportunities for local CSOs to propose alternatives through the 
dialogue process.   
 
5.2.5 Section Summary  
Since advocating for the creation of the Global Fund, CSOs have consistently 
tried to direct greater resources to non-state actors, affected communities and key 
populations. In these efforts they have achieved a degree of change - in terms of 
promoting policies such as DTF, CSS and the MARP Reserve. However, 
implementation of these policies has continually faced barriers related to the 
demand for performance-based results, government resistance, and the 
restrictions created by the changing political economy of global health. What 
modest gains were initially achieved were then stalled by the cancelation of Round 
11 and subsequent upheaval in the Fund. CSOs have tried to protect funding for 
key populations and CSS, through participation in the development and 
implementation of the NFM, but have switched from an offensive position of 
advocating for greater resources for rights-based responses, to defending what 
gains they have previously achieved.  
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5.3 Mobilizing and Distributing Resources via PEPFAR 
PEPFAR is the single largest donor in the HIV/AIDS response. As a state-
based bilateral program it does not include CSOs in its governance. However, 
CSOs have had particular, if limited, influence over both the mobilization and 
distribution of PEPFAR resources. An unlikely coalition of CSOs called for an 
increased American response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, contributing to the Bush 
administration’s decision to launch PEPFAR. However, this coalition soon split 
between those evangelical CSOs who pushed for specific funding restrictions and 
preferences, which reflected their ideological approach and interests, and 
HIV/AIDS and family planning/women’s health CSOs promoting a rights-based 
approach. During PEPFAR I (2003-2008), while evangelical CSOs maintained 
influence, other CSOs were excluded from participating in funding decisions and 
distribution. The change of administration, in 2008, has decreased evangelical 
CSO influence in PEPFAR II, and created opportunities for a more rights-based 
approach. However, perceived resource scarcity and a continued need for bi-
partisan support restricted CSO influence. The case of PEPFAR demonstrates 
complex struggles between CSOs to influence state-based funding, and that CSO 
influence is not always benign, or even positive.  
CSOs are not the only, or even primary, actors that engaged in PEPFAR 
resources governance: political parties, other state entities, private businesses and 
foundations also play key roles. However, the focus here is on the role of CSOs, 
and the dynamics of their interactions around PEPFAR resource governance. Due 
to lack of transparency surrounding PEPFAR funding, information on partners and 
sub-partners, the resources they receive and how they spend them is not readily 
available (Fan 2013). This restricts analysis, though general trends can still be 
mapped.  
 
5.3.1 PEPFAR I: CSOs and the Bush Administration 
In 2003, President Bush signed the United States Leadership Against 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act, also known as the Global AIDS Act, 
creating “the largest international health initiative in history initiated by one nation 
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to address a single disease” (OGAC 2005, 11). PEPFAR committed US$15 billion 
to the HIV/AIDS response over the following five years. Between 2003 and 2008, 
PEPFAR provided funding to 108 countries, focusing specifically on 15 countries—
Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia. The 
Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator directed the expenditures, distributing 
funding among a number of US government agencies, including the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the Department of Health and Human 
Services, the Department of Defense, the Department of Labor, the Peace Corps 
and the Census Bureau. These agencies then provide grants to partners, often 
American NGOs, who sub-grant funding to smaller organizations.  
 
Advocating for PEPFAR 
The reasons behind President Bush’s decision to create PEPFAR are 
debated. As Ingram notes, “The creation of PEPFAR was proposed, to the surprise 
of many” (2010, 607). Some argue that it was in response to fear of the security 
implications of the epidemic - particularly the framing of AIDS orphans as potential 
terrorist recruits (Lyman & Morrison 2006). Others suggests that Bush needed a 
humanitarian cause to balance his intention, announced in the same State of the 
Union Address, to invade Iraq. Pereira (2011) suggests PEPFAR was created as 
an additional avenue to promote US interests abroad. The argument that security 
fears motivated the creation of PEPFAR is unsupported, as the Bush 
administration never made such claims or used such language (Pereira 2011). The 
desire for a humanitarian flagship that could advance US interests is more 
probable, but the question still remains why HIV/AIDS - an issue previous 
Republican presidents had neglected and even dismissed.  
The Bush administration chose to develop an HIV/AIDS program “as the 
prime international exhibit for its vaunted philosophy of compassionate 
conservatism” (Over 2008, 7). This compassionate conservative philosophy 
reflects the social priorities of the evangelical Christian base that largely supported 
the Bush administration. In the US context, evangelical Christians represent a 
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coalition, which is difficult to define, but is often referred to as ‘the religious right’ 
due to perceptions that these groups support the Republican Party and 
conservative social policy. Evangelical leaders, such as Pat Roberson of the 
Christian Coalition and Jerry Falwall of the Moral Majority, openly engage in politics 
and have substantial influence with Republican Members of Congress and 
Senators (Leyman & Hussey 2005). Evangelical Christianity is believed to be the 
largest religious group in the US, with both Catholic and Protestant groups 
identifying as such (McMahon 2006). A unifying factor between these churches, 
and related organizations, is a desire to share their religious views and practices 
through domestic and international policy (McMahon 2006). Evangelical Christian 
organizations and leaders engage in a number of global human rights issues, 
including human trafficking, religious freedom and poverty reduction. Hertke writes 
that Evangelical CSOs fill “a void in human rights advocacy, raising issues 
previously slighted—or insufficiently pressed—by secular groups, the prestige 
press, and the foreign-policy establishment” (2004, 5).   Evangelical groups are 
able to exert a particular type of influence, directing political and popular attention 
to such issues, because of their networks with political, particularly Republican, 
leaders and their extensive grassroots support.  
The involvement of evangelical groups in human rights issues demonstrates 
the plurality of understandings around human rights, and differing approaches over 
how to secure them. Evangelical groups tend to prioritize criminalization of unsafe 
or ‘immoral’ activities, advocating, for example, a prohibitory approach to sex work 
and drug use. Such strategies often contradict other rights-based perspectives, 
especially those related to the HIV/AIDS response, which tend to promote 
decriminalization and harm reduction. Therefore, while there is some overlap 
between these two conceptions of rights (which are by no means the only 
understandings), there are also notable tensions.  
In order to avoid confusion the term ‘rights-based response’ is used in this 
thesis to refer to the human rights frame promoted by HIV/AIDS specific CSOs, as 
discussed in Chapter Three. This approach is more representative of the global 
HIV/AIDS movement, as demonstrated in policies of HIV/AIDS CSO networks and 
institutions (for example global networks, such as GNP+, and institutions, such as 
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UNAIDS, promote harm reduction and the decriminalization of sex work as 
essential to securing the rights of those most affected by the epidemic). Those 
CSOs that engage in the HIV/AIDS response but take an evangelical approach will 
be referred to as ‘evangelical CSOs’, as the vast majority are not HIV/AIDS 
specific.  
Around the turn of the millennium evangelical CSOs began to draw attention 
to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, much to the surprise of outsiders. The religious right 
had been indifferent, and at times hostile, to the HIV/AIDS cause, due to a belief, 
openly stated by some evangelical leaders, that the pandemic was God’s 
punishment for immoral sexual behaviours, such as homosexuality and 
promiscuity. This rhetoric began to shift as awareness of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, which primarily affects women and children, increased. 
Evangelical groups linked the Sub-Saharan African epidemic with campaigns to 
eradicate poverty and ensure the rights of vulnerable women and children.  
In 2002, over 100 leaders signed a statement of conscience on the global 
HIV/AIDS crisis at a conference convened by evangelical CSOs including World 
Vision, World Relief and MAP International. The statement read: “Regrettably, the 
response to the cries of those infected with and affected by HIV/AIDS has been 
largely silence. The Church was not the first to the front lines of this conflagration. 
However, we believe the Church is uniquely positioned to serve as the pivotal 
agent in turning the tide against AIDS through its message of reconciliation, 
faithfulness, hope and compassionate care” (quoted in Woong Shin 2006). 
Evangelical groups in the US reframed the HIV/AIDS crisis as requiring Christian 
compassion, referring to it as modern day leprosy (Gardner 2011).  As a solution, 
evangelical CSOs promoted behaviour change approaches to prevention, such as 
the ABC’s (Abstain, Be Faithful and Use Condoms), with a particular focus on the 
‘A’, conflating evangelical values about sexual behaviour with HIV/AIDS 
prevention. Ken Isaacs, a spokesperson for the Christian charity Samaritan’s Purse 
insisted, “AIDS has created an evangelism opportunity for the body of Christ unlike 
any in history” (quoted in Epstein 2005). The HIV/AIDS epidemic was presented as 
a chance for evangelicals to demonstrate the compassion of their religion through 
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care and support for PWAs, at the same time as sharing the teachings of their faith 
as a prevention strategy that would save both bodies and souls.  
The influence of evangelical CSOs in promoting the creation of PEPFAR is 
not clearly delineated, but there is a demonstrable relationship. The broad support 
evangelical groups provided to Bush during his campaign, and numerous links they 
enjoyed with the Republican Party, provided an opportunity for CSOs to champion 
the need for stronger American leadership on HIV/AIDS. As a result, during the 
2000 campaign, Bush, promised to provide more federal funding to faith-based 
groups working on various social problems, including HIV/AIDS (Epstein 2005). In 
his state of the union address announcing PEPFAR he claimed, “This nation can 
lead the world in sparing innocent people from a plague of nature” (Bush 2003), 
reinforcing Christian imagines of innocent victims in need of a savior.  Dietrich 
writes, “In Bush’s eyes, AIDS relief is tied to a religious obligation to help the 
suffering because all humans are God’s creations” (2007, 282). Evangelical groups 
had “significant impact” in determining how Bush understood the epidemic and 
appropriate responses to it (Diven 2009, 253; Dietrich 2007).  
In addition to evangelical CSOs, liberal humanitarian and medically focused 
CSOs also promoted a greater American response to the epidemic. ONE, an 
international NGO established by rock star Bono and based in the US, lobbied both 
political parties, and evangelical leaders, to support the creation of an American 
HIV/AIDS program (CSO Representative 2013 #7). Combined with the power of 
the evangelical Christians, a unique coalition of CSOs was created to advocate for 
greater American leadership in the HIV/AIDS response. As Bono noted, "The 
administration isn’t afraid of rock stars and student activists—they are used to us. 
But they are nervous of soccer moms and church folk. Now when soccer moms 
and church folk start hanging around with rock stars and activists, then they really 
start paying attention" (quoted in Stolberg & Stevenson 2003). And the Bush 
administration did pay attention, creating the largest bilateral funding program in 
history, to the acclaim of both evangelical and HIV/AIDS CSOs.  
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Funding Directives 
Differences between various civil society supporters of PEPFAR emerged 
when it came to how funding was to be distributed. The legislation that created 
PEPFAR included specific provisions on what resources could be used for: 55 
percent for treatment; 20 percent for prevention (one third of which was earmarked 
for abstinence only programs); 15 percent for palliative care; 10 percent to support 
orphans and vulnerable children.  This funding structure demonstrates political 
compromises between various interests, including evangelical groups, medical 
CSOs, pharmaceutical companies, and others (Evertz 2010).  
The allocation of 55 percent of resources for treatment was, at the time, 
agreeable to most constituencies. Previously, the majority of American funding for 
HIV/AIDS had gone to prevention (Burkhalter 2004, 8). Treatment was considered 
too expensive for low and middle-income countries, especially considering US 
opposition to generic medication production and distribution (Ingram 2012, 2). 
However, access to ART had become a domestic and international flashpoint as 
HIV/AIDS activists from the US connected with treatment access campaigns 
around the world.  A high profile court case in South Africa successfully tarnished 
the reputations of both the pharmaceutical companies and US government, which 
supported them, for putting profits before the lives of impoverished women and 
children (Moran 2011). Such media attention and activism shifted public 
perceptions to favour universal access to treatment, putting the US government in 
the uncomfortable position of being caught between popular sentiment and 
pharmaceutical industries’ interests.  
Burkhalter writes that it was the support of evangelical CSOs that tipped the 
scales in favour of treatment; “the conservatives' endorsement of the president's 
intention to put millions of people on anti-retroviral therapy has settled the 
controversy over treatment once and for all” (2004, 8). At the first International 
Christian Conference on HIV/AIDS, conveyed by Samaritan’s Purse in 2003, over 
800 evangelical leaders and overseas missionaries called for universal access to 
treatment. Senator and evangelical Christian Jesse Helms spoke at the conference 
and published an op-ed in the Washington Post promising to secure US$500 
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million to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS. Support for greater 
investment in treatment united evangelical CSOs with other HIV/AIDS CSOs. 
Cross-constituency agreement on the need for treatment partially explains 
why it garnered the overwhelming majority of resources. In addition, PEPFAR 
established a policy of purchasing US manufactured brand name ART, as opposed 
to much more affordable generic medications, which meant that instead of 
threatening American pharmaceutical companies’ profits, promoting universal 
access to treatment expanded their markets for ART (Pereira 2011). Though 
HIV/AIDS CSOs and medical professionals repeatedly pointed out the gross 
expense of the policy of buying brand name medications, it also allowed a 
convergence of interests for greater access to treatment - albeit at great cost.  
Consensus between various CSOs disintegrated when it came to determining 
how prevention resources were to be used. Evertz writes, “When it came to 
drafting the legislation that would create PEPFAR, some of President Bush’s 
conservative backers were uncomfortable with the idea of promoting and supplying 
condoms to worldwide populations believing that it would implicitly endorse 
premarital sex” (2010, 9). The Family Research Council, an evangelical lobbying 
organization, expressed concern that PEPFAR would become “an airlift for 
condoms” (Brukhalter 2004). Republic Senator Sam Brownback, organized 
evangelical CSOs to promote abstinence-based prevention programs. The 
organization Empower American sent research to congress, which argued that 
since African countries that have a high reported usage of condoms also have high 
HIV infection rates, such as South Africa, condoms were an ineffective prevention 
method. HIV/AIDS CSOs pointed out the lack of logic behind such advocacy, 
noting condoms had effectively halted the spread of HIV amongst MSM in the US.  
However, the evangelical arguments resonated with Republic Party 
approaches to sexual and reproductive health, and so were replicated in PEPFAR 
policy. The PEPFAR act demanded one third of resources allocated to prevention 
be used for abstinence-until-marriage programs.  In 2006, this was increased so 
that 66 percent of prevention resources had to be used for prevention programs 
“that encourage abstinence and fidelity” (Evertz 2010, 11). Key informants attribute 
such provisions to the influence of evangelical CSOs: “I would say that Catholic 
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Relief Services, and World Vision and some of the others were a lot of the reason 
that there was this sort of … cloak of morality on the original legislation, you know 
the ABCs . . .. You know that, a lot of that, was not supported by individual teams 
in country, but by headquarters and what felt like a way to move their worldview 
and have it reflected in this legislation” (Civil Society Representative 2013 #31). 
PEPFAR legislation also stated that recipients of funding were not required “to 
endorse, utilize, or participate in a prevention method or treatment program to 
which the organization has a religious or moral objection" (US Congress 2003, 
733). This conscience clause allowed recipients of PEPFAR funding to refuse to 
promote proven preventions strategies, such as condom use, focusing only on 
abstinence and fidelity messaging. 
HIV/AIDS CSOs, public health professionals and researchers advocated for a 
more holistic rights-based response to prevention within PEPFAR. They argued 
that the prioritization of funding for abstinence programs neglected the needs of 
women and key populations; the focus on abstinence failed to consider the power 
relationships women negotiate sexual encounters within, as well as cultural norms 
around fertility; the focus on abstinence before marriage assumed heterosexual 
relationships (as same sex marriage is illegal in most PEPFAR recipient countries), 
excluding MSM communities; the de-prioritization of condoms restricted access to 
prevention technologies for MSM (Evertz 2010).  
Groups such as Advocates for Youth, the Planned Parenthood Federation, 
and others repeatedly lobbied for prevention programs based on access to 
contraception, testing and treatment. They held call-in and post card campaigns, 
and organized public demonstrations. They recruited grassroots activists and 
celebrities, gaining the support of less conservative Christian CSOs, such as the 
United Methodist Church. Human Rights Watch produced research that 
demonstrated that every abstinence-only program that has ever been evaluated 
has failed to reduce rates of teen pregnancy or sexually transmitted diseases. It 
accused the US government of violating the rights of young people to information 
about sexuality, condoms, and other methods of contraception that could save their 
lives. Physicians for Human Rights tried to initiate informed dialogue with 
evangelical CSOs arguing that, “If a common front can be matched with some 
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common sense, the results could be truly impressive” (Burkhalter 2004, 14). 
However, the coalition that had supported the formation of PEPFAR and rollout of 
treatment programs could not agree on prevention strategies.  
In these advocacy efforts HIV/AIDS and allied CSOs had, in addition to the 
prominent rights framing of the epidemic, a wealth of scientific literature backing up 
their arguments. Even the administration’s own evidence supported arguments to 
change prevention spending directives. A 2006 US Government Accountability 
Office study of 20 country teams required to meet the A(bstience) and B(e faithful) 
spending requirements reported that prevention directives “challenges their ability 
to develop interventions that are responsive to local epidemiology and social 
norms.” Similarly, the 2007 Institute of Medicine evaluation (mandated by 
congress) of PEPFAR stated, "The Committee has been unable to find evidence 
for the position that abstinence can stand alone or that 33 percent is the 
appropriate allocation for such activities even within integrated programs” (IoM 
2007, 80).  
The unwillingness of the Bush administration to act on such findings, 
demonstrates a deviation from dominant biomedical approaches to the epidemic, 
but through a religious-conservative alternative, as opposed to a transformative, 
rights-based, one. With little evidence to support the ABC approach as a primary 
strategy for HIV prevention, the influence of the evangelical CSOs and the ideology 
of the Bush administration itself is the most plausible explanation for the majority of 
PEPFAR prevention funding continuing to be directed to such a compromised 
prevention strategy. Other CSOs did not have the political connections or 
ideological resonance with the administration, even if they did have evidence on 
their side. 
 Evangelical CSOs also used prevention directives to restrict integration of 
PEPFAR with family planning interventions. The US Conference of Catholic 
Bishops lobbied the Bush Administration to ensure family planning was not 
included in PEPFAR’s mandate (Biron 2012). Such CSOs conflated family planning 
with abortion provision, and spread fear that American tax dollars would be used to 
fund abortions abroad. Bush had restored the Mexico City Policy, initiated by 
President Reagan in 1984, requiring NGOs receiving federal funding to agree that 
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they would neither perform nor actively promote abortion as a method of family 
planning in other nations. However, during the creation of PEPFAR, Bush stated 
that this rule would be relaxed for groups fighting HIV/AIDS, as long as they kept 
HIV/AIDS funds separate from other resource. However, there were also instances 
of PEPFAR recipients being denied funding based on the Mexico City Policy. In 
August 2003, funding was terminated for a well-regarded HIV/AIDS program run by 
a consortium of seven groups because one group had worked with the UN 
Population Fund, which in turn had worked with the Chinese government, which 
was accused of promoting abortion (Diestich 2007).  
CSOs, such as the Planned Parenthood Federation, pointed out that 
confusion over the implementation of the Mexico City Policy prevented PEPFAR 
recipients from integrating HIV/AIDS and other sexual and reproductive health 
programs, a best practice essential to ensuring HIV/AIDS interventions addressed 
women’s rights and particular vulnerability to HIV. For example, due to lack of 
integration, PEPFAR funded programs could provide rape victims with post-
exposure prophylaxis to prevent HIV infection, but not a pill to prevent unwanted 
pregnancy (CSO Representative 2014 #35). Lack of integration meant PEPFAR 
resources could not be used to ensure the holistic sexual and reproductive health 
rights of women, as well as prevented efficient integration of health resources.  
In order to highlight these limitations, the Guttmacher Institute and other 
CSOs produced research demonstrating the importance of linking HIV/AIDS 
programs with reproductive health in order to ensure women’s rights to complete 
health care were met (Cohen 2008). The organization CHANGE had African 
women present to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, speaking directly of 
the need for integrated HIV/AIDS and family planning programs (Sippel 2014). 
However, much like the case of prevention, such evidence from CSOs had little 
effect. The abortion issue was so politically polarized in the US that the Bush 
administration simply refused to listen to organizations that were pro-choice, even 
when they were discussing family planning more generally.13 HIV/AIDS CSOs were 
not able to influence PEPFAR policy to integrate HIV/AIDS and reproductive health 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
13"Abortion"is"often"an"election"issue"in"the"US,"and"the"Republican"base"in"predominantly"against"
abortion."For"more"on"reproductive"and"sexual"rights"and"American"politics"see"Layman"et"al."2011"
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because of the influence of evangelical CSOs within the Bush administration, and 
the political polarization of women’s reproductive rights in the US. 
Evangelical and HIV/AIDS CSOs also conflicted over HIV/AIDS interventions 
for sex workers. Evangelical CSOs had a history of engaging in anti-trafficking 
initiatives, and argued that all sex workers were essentially trafficked victims. 
Together with abolitionist feminists (women’s rights groups who believe sex work is 
inherently exploitive and therefor prohibition is necessary) evangelical CSOs 
promoted the Trafficking Victims Protection Act in 2000, which conflated sex work 
and trafficking and prohibited funding to groups that “promote, support or advocate 
the legalization or practice of prostitution.”   Evangelical CSOs and abolitionist 
feminists combined forces to ensure this policy was incorporated into PEPFAR’s 
programming.  
During the development of the Leadership Act to form PEPFAR, with 
evangelical CSOs support, Republican Congressman Christopher Smith proposed 
an amendment, which became known as the Anti-Prostitution Pledge. The pledge 
mandated that organizations receiving PEPFAR funding explicitly oppose 
prostitution and sex trafficking, and banned PEPFAR recipients from promoting or 
advocating for decriminalization of sex work. This language was nearly identical to 
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act drafted in 2000 by evangelical CSOs. The 
amendment was included, and evangelical CSOs ensured it was implemented. In 
2005, the Christian Medical Association, Alabama Physicians for Life, World 
Religion and the Traditional Values Coalition sent a letter to President Bush, urging 
him to resist any efforts to remove the Anti-Prostitution Pledge (Ahmed 2011, 245).  
For HIV/AIDS CSOs the pledge restricted a rights-based approach to 
HIV/AIDS programing, denying services to a key population affected by the 
epidemic. HIV/AIDS and women’s rights organizations (such a the International 
Women’s Health Coalition) submitted letters to Health and Human Services 
expressing concern about the Anti-Prostitution Pledge, and seeking clarification on 
what the pledge meant by opposing prostitution. Organizations asked if this 
extended to conducting research on sex workers’ vulnerability to HIV, and on 
providing support to sex work collectives to better protect themselves and access 
health services, but did not receive clear answers. In 2007, 170 individuals and 
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organizations, including the Global Network of Sex Work Projects, submitted 
another letter seeking further clarification. The response was again vague and 
maintained language that conflated sex work with trafficking, and opposed any 
form of support for decriminalization (Ahmed 2011).   
A coalition of rights-based CSOs  (including the Alliance for Open Society 
International, the Open Society Institute, Pathfinder International, the Global Health 
Council, and Interaction) filed a lawsuit against USAID, arguing that the prostitution 
pledge violated the First Amendment because it compelled PEPFAR recipients to 
adopt the government’s viewpoint and restricted freedom of speech (Ahmed 2011). 
While the case entered the courts, the Anti-Prostitution Pledge continued to restrict 
activities PEPFAR recipients might direct towards supporting the rights of sex 
workers - a key population at risk of HIV infection. 
Spending directives on prevention, restrictions on funding for family planning 
and prohibition on interventions to support sex workers demonstrate the triumph of 
ideology over not only human rights arguments, but also evidence. While other 
HIV/AIDS funding programs prioritized easily measurable, evidence-based 
approaches, such as condom distribution and targeting key populations, PEPFAR 
prioritized a conservative response. The influence of evangelical CSOs and their 
Republican allies subverted biomedical neoliberal norms to produce a particular 
type of HIV/AIDS resource governance.  
 
Lack of Transparency 
HIV/AIDS CSOs’ inability to influence funding directives is partly explained by 
their exclusion from the funding decisions, monitoring and evaluation of PEPFAR. 
PEPFAR is consistently rated poorly on the global transparency index, and CSOs 
of all types struggle to access information on specifically where PEPFAR resources 
go and how they are used (Fan et al. 2013). The generally accepted, though 
unofficial, reasoning behind this lack of transparency is that it allows implementers 
a degree of freedom from the restrictive provisions on prevention funding and 
family planning. By not making transparent the details of how PEPFAR funding is 
used, the administration is able to turn a blind eye to transgressions that support a 
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greater rights-based response. One CSO informant notes, “From our friends within 
PEPFAR, a lot of what we hear is basically, ‘look we are pushing sound public 
health interventions as far as we can, without having congress freak out and repeal 
this bill. We are going as far as we can within the language of the law, and if we 
have to report to congress every month, it’s a huge distraction and they are going 
to be really unhappy” (CSO Representative 2013 #31). Somewhat ironically, it is 
argued that lack of transparency allows a more rights-based response by 
obscuring how PEPFAR funds are actually used. 
Indeed anecdotal evidence suggests that local CSOs and FBOs do not 
always follow PEPFAR’s prevention guidelines (CSO Representative 2014 #35). 
For example, evidence from a Catholic run PEPFAR funded programs in Tanzania 
found that workers made a distinction between condom education and promotion in 
order to continue to make condoms available through ‘education’ activities, without 
going against Catholic policy forbidding condom ‘promotion’ (Morgan 2014, 47). In 
such cases, PEPFAR resources may frequently support a more holistic approach 
to addressing the epidemic than is intended or reported.  
However, lack of transparency also inhibits HIV/AIDS CSO advocacy efforts.  
The same key informant as quoted above goes on to note, “There is always this 
tension. They say ‘because of opaqueness we are able to do great things, just trust 
us’. . . .But we are also working without a lot of data. It is hard to effectively craft 
policy asks, and know where we can best be using our energy,  to have the most 
robust the most reflective of public health need program. If we don’t know anything, 
if they force us to just trust” (CSO Representative 2013 #31). Without access to 
information, CSOs are denied a key tool in advocacy efforts, and are impeded from 
engaging in informed debates. While some Washington D.C. based organization 
enjoy informal communications with PEPFAR staff, there are few formal 
consultations, and CSOs outside of the capital have almost no interaction with 
PEPFAR headquarters (CSO Representative 2013 #7).  Lack of transparency is 
justified as allowing greater flexibilities within programs, but at the same time 
prevents CSO from determining if these flexibilities are being exercised, and 
inhibits opportunities to influence interventions and advocate for a rights-based 
response.  
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Funding Distribution 
The influence of evangelical CSOs over distribution of funding can be further 
discerned through analysis of recipients of PEPFAR grants. In 2004-05, 71.6 
percent of grants for abstain/be faithful prevention programs went to faith-based 
organizations (FBOs). In 2006, 23 percent of all PEPFAR partners were faith-
based.  This positive discrimination to FBOs was a “reward” for Bush’s Christian 
supporters in America, who saw the HIV/AIDS response as an evangelical and 
organizational opportunity (Pereira 2011, 17). The Bush administration argued that 
it positively discriminated towards FBOs as recipients because in many rural areas 
in Sub-Saharan Africa FBOs provided the majority of health and social aid. It also 
pointed out that as the majority Sub-Saharan African’s identified as Christians and 
attended church, FBOs were an entry point into communities. It stated “more than 
80 percent of citizens participate in religious institutions” and “in certain nations, 
upwards of 50 percent of health services are provided through faith-based 
institutions, making them crucial delivery points for HIV/AIDS information and 
services”(quoted in Pereira 2011, 17).   
While, it is true that FBOs were some of the first responders to HIV/AIDS in 
many high prevalence contexts, and have strong connections with affected 
communities, the majority of PEPFAR funding rarely went to these indigenous 
organizations. Instead religious groups with little HIV/AIDS expertise or community 
connections received PEFPAR funding based to their networks with American-
based evangelical organizations (Diven 2009, 237).  Furthermore, the majority of 
funding went to large American, not local, FBOs. Organizations such as World 
Vision, Samaritan’s Purse, and Catholic Relief Services became key recipients for 
PEPFAR funding. The evangelical CSOs that advocated for PEPFAR domestically 
also became the primary CSO recipients of PEPFAR funding overseas.  
Concurrently, funding for experienced, secular organizations decreased. The 
international organization CARE saw its funding for HIV/AIDS programs from the 
US government decline from US$138 million, prior to the formation of PEPFAR in 
2001, to US$96 million after the creation of PEPFAR in 2005. CARE attributed this 
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drop to attacks by evangelical CSOs over its policy of promoting condom use and 
broader reproductive health goals (Diven 2009). Meanwhile, organizations with a 
proven track record in providing sexual and reproductive health services, such as 
the Planned Parenthood Federation, were unable to apply for funds because they 
refused to compromise their family planning programs through PEPFAR directives 
related to abortion and prevention.  
The preference for funding American-based Christian organizations further 
hampered PEPFAR’s ability to reach key populations affected by HIV/AIDS and 
promote a rights-based response. While pioneers of sexual rights initiatives, such 
as Planned Parenthood, were excluded, other organizations, such as Catholic 
Relief Services, who had a more restricted approach to sexual health were 
promoted as recipients. Local CSOs and FBOs that might better be positioned to 
respond to community needs and promote the rights of vulnerable groups only 
benefited from trickle down funding. The Bush’s administration’s positive 
discrimination of American evangelical CSOs restricted the ability of PEPFAR 
funding to reach key populations and affected communities.  
 
Funding Outcomes 
The influence of evangelical CSOs over PEPFAR resource distribution is 
much debated. Diven writes that the demands of evangelical groups restricted the 
ability of PEPFAR to meet its aims, because of the focus on abstinence as 
prevention (2009, 242). Pereira notes that, “Most critiques of PEPFAR, insistently 
casted by large family planning organizations ….can be framed as feminist 
accusations of neglect of women rights, in general, and specific risk groups in 
particular” (Pereira 2011, 12). Women’s rights groups and reproductive health 
rights organization condemned the evangelical influence over PEPFAR’s 
prevention policies and restrictions on funding as denying, not supporting, a rights-
based and most effective response to the epidemic. The CSO Advocates for Youth 
argued, “Considering the scale of its impact in many low-resource countries, 
PEPFAR in its first five years imposed a policy regime that was at times unhelpful 
and even dangerous to helping vulnerable young people prevent transmission of 
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HIV through sexual activity” (2009). From such perspectives the resources 
PEPFAR distributed via evangelical CSOs achieved little beyond advancing a 
particular ideology.  
Others argue that evangelical CSO support was essential to gaining cross-
party support for PEPFAR, allowing congress to dedicate an unprecedented 
amount of resources to a humanitarian cause (Beyer et al. 2011, 2). PEPFAR did 
provide crucial resources for many groups engaged in the international response to 
HIV/AIDS, and who generally supported a rights-based response, such as MSF. By 
the end of 2008, PEPFAR had provided ART to 2.1 million PWAs, reached 58.3 
million through ABC prevention awareness programs, distributed over 2.2 billion 
condoms, and supported the prevention of HIV infection from mother to child for 16 
million pregnancies. Reflecting on these gains, Bush stated that PEPFAR had 
“yielded the best possible return: saved lives” (quoted in Ingram 2010, 612).  
It is impossible to refute this claim by producing counterfactual evidence of 
what PEPFAR might have achieved if it applied a more evidence-based approach 
to prevention, adopted a rights-based frame as advocated by the majority of 
HIV/AIDS CSOs, and distributed funding to more diverse recipients. However, from 
the critical perspective of this thesis, while PEPFAR notably scaled-up the 
response to HIV/AIDS, greatly contributing to universal access, it did so within a 
conservative paradigm, promoted by evangelical CSOs, that met their interests (for 
funding and to promote their ideology), but contradicted a rights-based response. 
The influence of CSOs during the first phase of PEPFAR was limited at best, and 
detrimental (as opposed to transformative) at worst.  
 
5.3.2 PEPFAR II: CSOs and the Obama Administration 
The first phase of PEPFAR ended in 2008, an election year and President 
Bush’s last year in office, creating political pressure to secure the future of 
PEPFAR as a “Bush legacy”(Hayden 2009). During the reauthorization process, it 
was agreed to continue the greater allocations of funding for treatment, compared 
to the more contentious prevention methodologies. A group of Republican senators 
argued that “eliminating the treatment floor would mean more money spent on 
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bureaucracy and ‘unproven’ prevention programs rather than ‘saving lives’, which 
the further rolling out of ART would guarantee” (quoted in Loewenberg 2008).  As a 
technical intervention, relatively free of political controversy, treatment provision 
remained a key priority. The new act did not stipulate specific treatment targets, but 
that PEPFAR must spend “at least half” of funding on increasing ART access and 
support.  
CSOs continued to struggle to change PEPFAR’s prevention policies. A 
number of groups, such as CARE, the International Women's Health Coalition and 
the Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation, saw reauthorization as an 
opportunity to advocate for changes in funding directives by, for example, including 
funding for family planning services and dropping the requirements on funding for 
ABC style prevention. However, there was fear that the next president might 
decrease HIV/AIDS funding, leading some CSOs, such as ONE, to argue that 
contentious issues should be left unchallenged in order to secure bi-partisan 
support (GHI Representative 2014 #20). HIV/AIDS and women’s rights CSOs 
criticized what they saw as the willingness of some HIV/AIDS CSOs to concede 
sexual and reproductive health to conservative and evangelical positions in order 
to pass the bill, and the tendency of some INGOs to remain silent about rights 
issues so as not to jeopardize future contracts. Many women’s rights focused 
CSOs felt that PEPFAR advocacy was not worth their time and resources, as there 
were so few opportunities to promote women’s health rights within the program, 
and so disengaged from the process (CSO Representative 2013 #31). Such 
contentions created a further split among HIV/AIDS and previously allied CSOs.  
 Evangelical CSOs lobbied to preserve the original structure of PEPFAR 
funding, including the original spending directives on prevention and positive 
discrimination towards FBOs (Ingram 2012). They referred to a draft bill that 
challenged such directives as “the abortion bill”, and argued that providing services 
to sex workers was the same as pimping (Sippel 2014).  This rallied their 
Republican allies to oppose any major changes to funding directives. 
Such influence ensured the continued limitations on any changes the Obama 
administration might want to make. Democratic Party policies were more in line 
with HIV/AIDS CSO advocacy goals (for example, the party is pro-choice implying 
  267"
they would see fewer problems with integrating HIV/AIDS and family planning 
programs), but the ‘Bush Legacy’ and its evangelical CSO proponents, as well as 
domestic partisan politics, continued to restrict change. The US Conference of 
Catholic Bushes and evangelical protestant groups continued to pressure the 
government, in co-operation with their Republican allies, ensuring any changes 
had to generate support from both parties (Boonstra 2012). The threat of 
Republicans blocking reauthorization, if it did not reflect their evangelical 
constituency’s demands, was real enough to force compromises on rights 
approaches even in the context of a more sympathetic – to rights-based 
approaches – administration. State-based politics continued to restrict 
opportunities for change, despite CSO efforts and a more sympathetic 
administration. 
Boonstra reported, “During the long reauthorization process, a diverse set of 
organizations….pushed for but ultimately failed to secure measures that would 
have strengthened the role of family planning service providers in providing HIV 
prevention services and would have encouraged the provision of contraceptive 
counseling, referral and even direct services in dedicated HIV programs” (2008). 
With neither the White House nor HIV/AIDS CSOs wishing to see reauthorization 
fail, negotiations produced a messy compromise. The resulting bill called for 
greater focus on women’s rights, but remained silent on integrating reproductive 
health and family planning into HIV/AIDS programming. In addition, the conscience 
clause was extended to cover care, as well as treatment and prevention. It 
stipulated that 50 percent of funding must go to activities that promote abstinence, 
delay of sexual debut, fidelity and partner reduction in countries with generalized 
epidemics. However, it did allow countries to submit a justification to congress for 
different funding allocations if this was deemed necessary to address the particular 
characteristics of the epidemic in that location.  
HIV/AIDS CSOs saw this change as a modest victory after years of advocacy. 
One informant stated, “It was a pretty coordinated effort to include family planning 
and get rid of the abstinence earmark and the prostitution pledge. And so from 
those things, the only thing we were really able to change in the law was the 
abstinence piece. And we weren’t able to get rid of it entirely, which would have 
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been ideal” (CSO Representative 2013 #31). HIV/AIDS CSO efforts combined with 
evidence from the field to ease funding restrictions, allowing more holistic 
prevention programs that better represented a rights-based approach.  
 
Resource Mobilization 
Because PEPFAR remained structured by the previous Bush administration’s 
directives, HIV/AIDS CSOs feared that the Obama administration might try to 
subvert the spending restrictions by redirect funding to other health issues. 
Obama’s advisors suggested, at the beginning of his first term, that funding for 
maternal and child health would be a better use of resources than PEPFAR 
because of the funding restrictions on family planning (Denny & Emanuel 2008). 
The Obama administration began talking of a global health strategy, causing 
concern among CSOs that funding for PEPFAR would be cut. However, in 
practice, the Global Health Initiative became an overarching umbrella for foreign 
health programs, as opposed to a competing framework to PEPFAR, though its 
introduction did single a shift to more integrated approaches in development 
assistance for health.  
In the context of a national and global recession, as well as the end of AIDS 
exceptionalism, CSO campaigns for additional resources for PEPFAR II achieved 
only minimal success. Health Gap, along with partner CSOs, produced a report 
advocating for a funding allocation of US$50 billion for 2009 to 2013. This figure 
became a reference point for advocacy efforts, with CSOs from varying 
backgrounds able to collaborate as long as they focused on resource mobilization 
“only in the abstract” (CSO Representative 2013 #31), and not discuss differing 
preferences for how resources, once mobilized, would be used. The final amount 
authorized was just below the CSO ask, at US$48 billion, but included tuberculosis 
and malaria programs, as well as HIV/AIDS.  
PEPFAR funding would continue to fall short of CSO ambitions for increased 
resources.  Congressional appropriations for PEPFAR reached a high of US$6.9 
billion in fiscal year 2010. Funding then plateaued, and in 2013 (when PEPFAR 
was again reauthorized) decreased by more than US$100 million (two percent) 
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below 2012 levels. In response, HIV/AIDS CSO leaders produced an impassioned 
editorial, arguing that in real terms  “The program is now at its lowest funding level 
since 2007” (Collins 2013). This was somewhat recovered in 2014, with an 
increase of more than US$200 million (three percent) over 2013 levels (Kaiser 
Foundation 2014). In the president’s 2015 budget request, which was released in 
March 2014, PEPFAR’s bilateral HIV/AIDS funding totaled US$4,350 million, 
matching the 2014 funding level. CSOs, such as the Kaiser Family Foundation, 
expressed concerns over this stagnation of resources, noting that funding in other 
realms, such as for international affairs, was increasing while commitments to 
global health were stagnating.  
Evangelical CSOs did not enjoy the same influence with the Obama 
administration as they had with the Bush administration (CSO Representative 2013 
#31). Their Republican allies maintained influence over spending directives, but 
were less enthused about the project under Democratic leadership and so did not 
championed greater resource commitments. While the American government 
maintained its commitment to PEPFAR, the lack of consensus on how PEPFAR 
funds should be used, as well as other political and economic shifts, prevented the 
aspirations of CSOs for greater funding being fulfilled.  
A continued limitation on the ability CSOs to advocate for greater resources 
for PEPFAR II is the continued lack of transparency and access to information. 
According to analysis by CDG, PEPFAR became less transparent with 
reauthorization. In 2013, the think-tank released a report in which it tried to track 
where PEPFAR money went, but could only access the most basic data. The 
report concludes, “this study serves as another call for greater transparency and 
evaluation” (Fan et al. 2013, 16). PEPFAR is ranked as having very poor 
transparency by the Aid Transparency Index — falling 50th out of 67 aid agencies 
worldwide. While PEFPAR collects perhaps the most information of any aid 
program in the world, it does not make this information available in a timely way 
(Kavanagh & Baker 2014). Country reports are only published after programs have 
been completed for months, and even reports to congress do not include 
information on how program funds are allocated. Kavanagh and Baker argued that: 
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“If published as soon as they are approved for the coming 
year, with details about the interventions funded, 
geographic areas of activity, and specific goals and targets, 
then Country Operational Plans could be important 
instruments for partner governments and civil society . . .. 
Civil society in countries that receive PEPFAR funding 
could be mobilized to help to monitor the effectiveness of 
PEPFAR programs, as well as their own government's 
efforts alongside donor-funded efforts” (2014, e14).  
 
The 2013 Institute of Medicine Report also notes the need for improved 
transparency in PEPFAR reporting. This continued lack of transparent restricts 
CSO opportunities for engagement. Without access to information, CSOs have 
little recourse to challenge current PEPFAR policies and demonstrate what greater 
resources could achieve.  
 
The Blueprint 
In 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the goal of 
creating an “AIDS-free generation” and in 2012 released a Blueprint for achieving 
this goal. It included four road maps—saving lives, smart investments, shared 
responsibility, and driving results with science— based on five principles: 
• Make strategic, scientifically sound investments to rapidly scale-up 
core HIV prevention, treatment and care interventions and maximize 
impact; 
• Work with partner countries, donor nations, civil society, people living 
with HIV (PLHIV), FBOs, the private sector, foundations and 
multilateral institutions to effectively mobilize, coordinate and efficiently 
utilize resources to expand high-impact strategies, saving more lives 
sooner; 
• Focus on women and girls to increase gender equality in HIV services; 
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• End stigma and discrimination against PWAs and key populations, 
improving their access to, and uptake of, comprehensive HIV services; 
and 
• Set benchmarks for outcomes and programmatic efficiencies through 
regularly assessed planning and reporting processes to ensure goals 
are being met. 
These goals represent the convergence of rights and biomedical framings of the 
epidemic, with reference to both improving efficiencies and targeting key 
populations. For example, the Blueprint demands that country portfolios reflect the 
country’s epidemic profile, including what key populations are most affected. It 
includes investment in epidemiological studies to determine burden of disease 
among key populations, and requires countries to use this data to monitor 
progress, arguing this will improve effective use of resources. It also suggests a 
broader rights-based agenda, specifically calling for improving girls’ access to 
education, increasing economic opportunities for women, preventing and 
addressing gender-based violence and exploitation, engaging men and boys in 
addressing norms and behaviours, and repealing laws that criminalize LGBT 
populations.   
PEPFAR has begun to act on these goals. In 2013, it released an updated 
gender strategy that requires country teams to undertaken in-depth analysis of 
gender related issues that affect access to HIV related resources and services and 
control over those resources. The analysis, which is required to be conducted in 
consultation with government and CSOs focuses on “Who benefits from gender 
integration in HIV programs”, and on roles and norms affecting girls, women, boys, 
men, gay, disabled and transgender people, MSM, and people who sell sex. 
Barton (2014) notes the language in the communication to country teams is 
particularly stringent, indicating a commitment to implementing programs that take 
into greater consideration the rights of women and key populations.  
The Blueprint, and follow-up activities, came as a welcome surprise to many 
HIV/AIDS CSOs, who particularly celebrated the intentional focus on women and 
girls, and key populations. A CSO representative (2013 #31) noted, “We see a lot 
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of things we worked very hard for included [in the blue print].”  The GFMSM 
similarly celebrated the Blueprint’s focus on key populations as a positive outcome 
of its years of conducting high-level advocacy with the US government (GFMSM 
2012). While the development of the Blueprint was very much a state department 
initiative under the authority of Hilary Clinton, who is known for her commitment to 
sexual and reproductive rights campaigns, it responded directly to many of the 
concerns HIV/AIDS and allied CSOs had been highlighting since the first 
authorization of PEPFAR, suggesting CSO influence in its creation.   
However, the Blueprint also reflects continued compromises to ensure 
bipartisan support and appease evangelical CSOs. For example, it maintains 
restrictions on integrating HIV/AIDS and family planning. The guidance stated, 
“PEPFAR funds may not be used to purchase family planning commodities” 
(2011). Family planning methods, with the exception of condoms, are excluded 
from PEPFAR funding. CSOs argued that this continues to prevent integration with 
sexual and reproductive rights programs, inhibiting their ability to reach and benefit 
vulnerable women. One CSO advocate writes, “The U.S. government just 
voluntarily stopped short of potentially saving a great number of lives … women’s 
lives are yet again being treated like expendable assets” (Sippel 2014). This 
“stopping short” is again attributed to the fear that allowing funding for family 
planning will lose bipartisan support for PEPFAR. Though PEPFAR funding is 
shifting towards a more rights-based response in terms of key populations and 
women’s broader empowerment goals, evangelical influence still prevents funding 
to support women’s full reproductive and sexual rights.  
The Blueprint also commits to greater synergies with the Global Fund. 
PEPFAR funding that is channeled through the Global Fund is not subject to 
restrictions around prevention and family planning programs, and the Obama 
administration is dedicating a growing portion of HIV/AIDS funding in this way. 
While under Bush between 15 to 20 percent of HIV/AIDS resources went to the 
Global Fund annually, in recent years the Obama administration has directed 25 
percent (2012) and 33 percent (2013) to the Global Fund - a trend that is projected 
to continue (PEPFAR 2014a). This may be one way the Obama administration 
seeks to mitigate the impacts the Bush administration’s funding directives without 
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having to confront the Republican and evangelical CSO constituencies. For CSOs 
it indicates an opportunity to use the more open and accessible forum of the Global 
Fund to influence how PEPFAR resources are used. 
 
The Anti-Prostitution Pledge 
The ongoing struggle over conceptions of rights within PEPFAR is depicted in 
the culmination of the court case over the Anti-Prostitution Pledge. HIV/AIDS CSO 
appeared to achieve a victory for a greater rights-based response in May of 2013 
when, after 10 years, the US Supreme Court ruled that the prostitution oath 
violated the first amendment. While HIV/AIDS, sex worker and women’s rights 
CSOs celebrated this apparent victory, their success was immediately squashed 
by a narrow interpretation of the ruling, which determined that the pledge could not 
be required of US based organizations, but could still apply to foreign and affiliate 
organizations. Therefore, for example, CARE US does not have to sign the pledge, 
but Care Botswana does. As a result, the pledge is essentially still in effect; still 
included in PEPFAR contracts, and still being signed by recipients of PEPFAR 
funding.  
CSO representatives involved are “mystified” by the interpretation of the 
ruling, and unable to comprehend the political reasoning behind it. One informant 
reflects, “It is a great example of how agonizingly slow advocacy is. And how even 
when you get big high profile win, like the supreme court of finding the clause 
unconstitutional as applied, you still have to keep fighting for forever. You never 
really get to pop Champaign” (CSO Representative 2013 #31). The extensive 
efforts of HIV/AIDS CSOs to fight the prostitution pledge, to increase access of a 
key population to HIV/AIDS resources, and the continued restrictions on their 
efforts to do so, demonstrates the extremely limited ability of CSOs to influence 
state controlled HIV/AIDS resources, especially where there are competing 
interpretations of rights, and lack of consensus among CSOs. 
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5.3.3 Section Summary  
As of September 2013, PEPFAR reports that it has supported ART for more 
than 6.7 million PWAs, and provided care for 17 million individuals. By providing 
antiretroviral prophylaxis to 780,000 HIV positive pregnant women, it enabled 
240,000 babies to be born HIV-free. In March 2014, Dr. Deborah Birx was 
announced as the new US Global AIDS Coordinator in charge of PEPFAR. 
HIV/AIDS CSOs immediately posed questions for Dr. Birx about targets, 
cooperation with other GHIs, such as the Global Fund, funding and transparency.  
The struggle to shape the largest global HIV/AIDS funding program continues with 
CSOs mobilizing to generate resources and influence how they are used.  
The case of CSO involvement in PEPFAR is crucial for a number of reasons. 
Not only is PEPFAR the largest bilateral funder of the HIV/AIDS response, but also 
the role of CSOs has been highly complex. A coalition of various CSOs advocated 
for a greater American response to the epidemic, particularly in terms of funding 
universal access to treatment. Within this coalition evangelical CSOs had particular 
influence based on connections and shared ideologies with the Republican Party. 
They used this influence to promote an alternative to technical approaches to 
prevention. Instead of promoting a rights-based response, largely ineffective 
methods were deployed by American INGOs and evangelical CSOs with few 
connections to communities. In some cases key populations, such as sex workers, 
were excluded, others, such as MSM, where simply ignored.  Provisions on family 
planning particularly made it difficult for recipients to ensure the rights of women. 
HIV/AIDS CSOs pointed out these limitations and advocated for change, but had 
little success due to the polarized nature of these debates in US politics and lack of 
access to information.  
Since the change in administration, some of the restrictions on PEPFAR 
funding have relaxed, and evangelical CSOs do not have the same influence. 
However, the current financial context, and continued need for bipartisan support, 
has restricted opportunities for PEPFAR to embrace more rights-based 
interventions. Meanwhile domestic politics (such as abolitionist approaches to 
prostitution) maintain the legacy of evangelical CSO, even if the organizations 
themselves are less involved. While CSOs played a notable role in mobilizing 
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PEPFAR funding, their influence over distribution has either been severely 
restricted (in the case of HIV/AIDS CSOs) or negative (in the case of Evangelical 
CSOs).  
5.4 Chapter Conclusion 
CSO participation in global HIV/AIDS resource governance is shaped by the 
broader political economy of GHG, the limitations it imposes and opportunities 
within its contradictions. The over arching preference for technical interventions is 
reflected in the priorities of both the Global Fund and PEPFAR, both of which 
dedicate the vast majority of resources to treatment and related technical 
interventions. CSOs have attempted to promote alternative resource distribution 
patterns in addition to these priorities: in the case of the Global Fund through the 
CSS framework and MARP Reserve; and in PEPFAR through faith-based 
approaches to prevention, and competing campaigns for the rights of key 
populations and women. Within PEPFAR the evangelical CSOs that collaborated 
with the Bush administration succeeded in advancing an alternative ideological 
approach to HIV prevention, but one that is conservative as opposed to 
transformative. As a result, HIV/AIDS CSOs have had to continually fight for 
modest resources to advance rights-based approaches. 
INGOs enjoy the greatest degree of access to global HIV/AIDS resources. 
For example, PEPFAR has prioritized American based evangelic organizations. 
When innovative programs are introduced in an effort to direct resources to 
community level interventions, such as the Global Fund’s CSS framework, these 
often struggle to fit into the existing funding architecture, dominated by prevalent 
norms of what good health governance looks like (extensive reporting of 
quantifiable targets). Meanwhile CSOs continue to be pressured to act as service 
delivery organizations, as opposed to advocates - a role that removes them from 
confrontations with existing power structures.  
Opportunities to promote alternative distribution patterns are restricted within 
the current political economy of global health. This is evident in the limits on 
funding for innovative programs within the NFM, and declining support for 
interventions to address the rights of key populations in middle-income countries. 
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Since 2008, PEPFAR funding has not increased in real terms, threatening 
ambitious plans for more rights-based programming in the Blueprint. 
Though CSOs have played a key role in advocating for global resources, they 
have had only limited influence over distribution, due to dominance of donor 
preferences and shifts in the current political economy. This raises questions about 
who they are advocating for funding for and if their role as fundraisers is serving 
the interests of those most affected by the epidemic or of donors.  
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6. Thesis Conclusion  
This thesis began by asking, does civil society involvement in the global 
governance of the HIV/AIDS response present an example of transformation from 
below; and what are the outcomes of CSO participation in global HIV/AIDS 
governance?  There are a number of assumptions within these questions that can 
now be evaluated in light of the evidence presented in the preceding chapters. 
First, is the assumption that CSOs come from or represent those ‘below’; in other 
words, and in the context of this discussion, those most affected by the epidemic. 
The research presented here demonstrates that the HIV/AIDS response was 
initiated by PWAs and their allies who formed support groups, service delivery 
organizations and global networks. In this sense, the origins of CSO involvement in 
the HIV/AIDS response are bottom up. However, it is also demonstrated that, 
within the context of AIDS exceptionalism, these grassroots forces became 
increasingly entwined with the interests of states, institutions and other actors. 
Analysis of those CSOs that engage in global institutions and resources 
governance demonstrates a certain elitism: governance actors in the Global Fund 
are a group of ‘good old friends’; CSOs representatives without the right (i.e. 
Western) skill set struggle to participate effectively in UNAIDS’ PCB; those CSOs 
with influence in resource governance are more often INGOs than those operating 
at the community level. 
 At the same time marginalized populations, such as PWIDs, have been able 
to use the human rights and key populations framing of the response to access 
global governance processes and spaces. Furthermore, these ‘elite’ CSOs have 
consistently advocated for increased space for other CSOs – such as by promoting 
greater inclusion of key populations in the Country Dialogue process of the Global 
Fund’s NFM. Therefore, the ethos of promoting the participation of those most 
affected remains, despite structures (such as institutional bureaucracies) that 
restrict local and national access to global governance forums and processes. 
The thesis has also demonstrated the persistence of CSOs in advocating for 
a rights-based response to the epidemic, suggesting that even if the majority of 
organizations that engage in global governance processes do not directly 
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represent marginalized and affected constituencies, they do aim to represent their 
interests. CSOs have pushed for global policies that decriminalize sex work; have 
worked with the Global Fund to direct resources towards key populations; and 
fought PEPFAR policies that deny integrated sexual and reproductive health care 
to women. While CSO participation in the global governance of the HIV/AIDS 
response does not inherently, or consistently, represent those most affected, CSO 
participants continue to create and seize opportunities to advance the rights-based 
response that community groups initiated. 
The second part of the question is then, does this participation (which aims to 
represent, if not be representative of those ‘from below’) result in transformative 
governance outcomes, with transformation conceptualized as change towards a 
more equitable order. The argument here is that CSO participation has promoted 
potential alternatives within the dominant order, and maintained space for further 
transformations.  
The most apparent example of change is the CSO promoted human rights 
framing of the epidemic and response, and the adoption of this frame (in 
conjunction and competition with other frames) by global institutions and donors. 
This frame expanded conceptions of ill health and appropriate response to include 
social, economic and political causes and correctives. Peer support and equal 
access to health care became key principles of the response. While Western 
understandings of this rights-frame remain dominate, HIV/AIDS CSOs in other 
parts of the world have integrated it with, and adapted it to, indigenous approaches 
- for example, by linking global frames around sexual rights with local conceptions 
of rights. 
 While the rights-based frame emerged in conflict with biomedical neoliberal 
understandings, it has become increasingly entwined with these, particularly during 
the period of HIV/AIDS exceptionalism, raising questions such as: does this 
indicate a co-option of rights alternatives or a sophisticated subversion of 
hegemonic ideas? The evidence of how CSOs have continued to advance rights 
goals within the current key populations frame suggests that the linking of 
biomedical and rights approaches has continued to create space for CSO 
participants to advance claims, by linking a rights-based approach with efficiency 
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language, but also restricted possibilities for transformation – for example, by 
continuing the neglect of women’s rights. In the current political economy of 
restricted opportunities these continued struggles, such as around Option B+, 
demonstrate that CSO actors are well aware of the compromises and 
contradictions within the conflation of rights and biomedical frames, and are 
attempting to use the space available to continue to advance alternatives that will 
better meet the needs of those most affected by the epidemic.  
Widespread acceptance of rights framing, and the linked argument for CSO 
participation, generated global institutional forms that were more inclusive than 
previous arrangements (Ritterberger et al. 2009). This has lead to uncritical 
celebrations of GHIs, such as UNAIDS and the Global Fund, as transformative. A 
more nuanced analysis has been presented here, demonstrating the barriers CSO 
participants face influencing decision-making, representing constituents and 
working within rigid institutional structures. A degree of agency has also been 
demonstrated, with CSOs exercising a particular type of influence - tied to their role 
as members (as opposed to representatives) of affected populations - and expert 
status based on lived experience, both of which generate discursive and emotive 
influence. CSOs have used this influence, as well as that derived from their global 
networks, to continue to advocate for rights agendas, having some more clearly 
identifiable successes - such as ensuring indicators in global HIV/AIDS reporting 
that measure rights-based outcomes - than others. So while CSOs might not have 
transformed institutional governance, they have promoted shifts towards a more 
equitable order in and through institutions.  
 Analysis of CSO participation in resources governance demonstrates that 
CSOs have contributed to outcomes related to the remarkable level of global 
resources dedicated to HIV/AIDS, but that the way these resources have been 
distributed represents more of a continuation of hegemonic power and interests, 
than a deviation from it. Though CSOs have promoted some minor correctives in 
resource use, directing funding to CSS via the Global Fund and advocating for 
greater investment in women’s health through PEPFAR, the dominance of donor 
power and preferences is apparent. Furthermore, possibilities for change have 
become increasingly restricted by trends within the political economy of global 
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health, as evidenced by the limited opportunities to continue to advance funding for 
key populations in middle-income countries through the Global Fund’s NFM.  
Does this suggest that despite persistent campaigns to change how the 
epidemic and response is understood, and to ensure CSO participation in 
institutions, the production of resources for the HIV/AIDS response - arguably the 
outcome with the greatest potential to directly impact those most affected by the 
epidemic - has been unaffected? Evidence of the continued domination of donor 
states in both PEPFAR and the Global Fund indicates that CSOs bring little 
influence to resource governance. However, this does not mean efforts to promote 
rights and CSO involvement in global governance are meaningless, just that the 
struggle is ongoing.  
This struggle is complicated by the multiple agendas of CSOs. Not only are 
health related CSOs competing for resources, as demonstrated by conflicts over 
the framing of the post-MDG agenda, the role of evangelical CSOs in PEPFAR 
demonstrates competing notions of rights-based responses. The outcomes of 
evangelical CSO influence in resource governance are not transformative, but 
conservative. This is a crucial reminder to advocates of greater CSO participation 
in GHG that CSO influence can take many different forms and have restrictive, as 
well as transformative, outcomes.   
Even when considering conservative spending directives, the narrow priorities 
of donors and conflicts among health and rights-based CSOs, the amount of 
resources dedicated to the HIV/AIDS response has not, despite some analysis, 
done harm. It has in fact achieved clearly identifiable ‘good’ - over half of those in 
need are on treatment and new infections have decline by 33 percent globally 
since 2001 (UNAIDS 2013a).  What has been achieved, through CSO advocacy, 
state initiatives and donor support, should not be negated.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that CSOs have contributed transformational 
elements to global HIV/AIDS governance by promoting an alternative human rights 
frame and demanding space to represent the interests of those most affected in 
governance forums. This transformation began among those most affected by the 
epidemic who demanded a global response that was inclusive and rights-based. 
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While, governance outcomes have been limited by shifts in the broader political 
economy, rigid institutional forms, and a continued lack of CSO power to determine 
resource distribution, CSOs remain active participants. The have advanced a 
rights-based response in global HIV/AIDS governance, despite these limits and 
many changes in the response over the past 30 years, fostering continued 
transformative potential. A number of historical and theoretical insights can be 
drawn from these findings, which contribute to the literature on CSO participation in 
global governance and on the HIV/AIDS response.  
 
6.1 Historical Insights 
This thesis has sketched, in broad strokes, the complicated history of the 
global response to HIV/AIDS, and the role of CSOs within it. Broad strokes were 
necessary because global processes respond to and interact with uncountable 
local and national processes, which there was not room here to expand on. So this 
is largely a macro level narrative, digging deep where possible to illustrate 
connections with other levels of activity. This is a history of conflicting processes, 
co-operation and compromises that occurred over three decades, in varying 
spaces, among an ever-shifting combination of actors.  
This is a narrative about change. It illustrates the challenge an unknown and 
lethal epidemic posed to traditional biomedical health responses, and the 
opportunity this created for a new type of response. It describes how a unique 
sense of global solidarity formed, for a moment at least, around the concept of 
AIDS exceptionalism, setting a precedent for addressing a global health issue. It 
outlines how human rights frames became increasingly interlinked with biomedical 
neoliberalism, and shifted into discussions around key populations with both new 
opportunities and limitations for transformation. It presents the uneven progress of 
these frames – such as around harm reduction - from local to global forums, and 
back to national and local contexts. It explains how the failure of biomedical state-
based systems, and the use of AIDS exceptionalism, allowed new, more inclusive 
if not transformative, institutional forms to be created, and unprecedented levels of 
resources to be applied.  
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This narrative also illustrates what has not changed - the dominance of 
biomedical neoliberal approaches to GHG. This has limited rights-based outcomes: 
sex workers still receive inadequate support and are stigmatized; the rhetoric of 
commitment to gender equality by HIV/AIDS institutions and leaders is not 
translated into policy action or resources; impoverished women continue to provide 
the majority of HIV/AIDS care work with little external support. As the HIV/AIDS 
response moves from being an exception within GHG to being normalized, 
opportunities for change constrict, as demonstrated by the lack of human rights 
language within the draft post-MDG health goals.  
The overarching narrative is one of resistance within a dominant nebulous, 
and the struggles that ensued.  Within these processes, CSOs have been 
positioned as central agents - reflecting the focus of the research questions. This is 
just one take on a much broader story about GHG, the role of CSOs in global 
processes, and struggles for human rights. It is an important one because it 
demonstrates that community groups, activists, FBOs and NGOs are actors to be 
reckoned with in global forums; and that they have promoted change, even within 
the confines of a political economy of biomedical neoliberalism and dominant donor 
state power.  
Throughout this history of CSO participation, contradictions (such as between 
the rhetoric of supporting CCS in the Global Fund’s NFM and continued restrictions 
created by results-based management) and opportunities (such as to use the key 
populations frame to advance the participation of PWID in global governance 
forums) have been made explicit, contributing to efforts to conceive of more 
equitable alternatives.  
 
6.2 Theoretical Insights 
The findings of this thesis have a number of theoretical implications. Murphy 
(2000), among others, has noted that critical IR theorists have not done a good job 
of documenting transformations from below. This thesis aims to contribute to filling 
this gap by presenting a historical case of how grassroots mobilization aimed to 
influence a global response towards a more equitable order. This demonstrates 
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that analysis of such processes is not only possible, but can also contribute critical 
perspectives on how and why change occurs. In this case, the role of CSOs is 
positioned as instrumental in advancing alternatives within the HIV/AIDS response, 
contributing to discussions on why the response has been exceptional, and on 
current changes within it. Such analysis adds deeper understandings of global 
governance processes and non-state actors within them. 
This thesis conceptualizes global governance as a site of struggle, breaking 
the often vague and hard to decipher processes of global governances into 
analytically manageable pieces. While the delineation of struggles around frames, 
institutions and resources is admittedly a false distinction, in the sense that these 
processes are continually interlinked and overlapping, the separation has been 
useful in directing focus to specific outcomes.  It also roots analysis in historical 
experience, as opposed to theoretical confines. Instead of forcing governance 
processes into predetermined categories, such as agenda setting, this more 
flexible framework starts with history, looking at how the global HIV/AIDS response 
has changed, why and to what effect. This ensures that global governance is not 
conceptualized as only structural, but as also the sum of various actors’ actions to 
promote their “projects” (Friedrichs 2009).  Such an approach highlights who does 
governance (including untraditional actors, such as activist groups), as well as how 
their efforts are structured by the broader political economy (such as the global 
economic recession).  
The historical perspective further ensures that the analysis is not just on 
stated intentions, but also on the outcomes of these intentions. CSO participation is 
not accepted as promoting a rights-based response because CSOs say they are 
rights-based, but because they created and defined a rights-based frame, and their 
participation has resulted in identifiable rights-based changes - such as removal of 
HIV/AIDS travel bans in China and the US. 
Implicit in the analysis presented here is the question - what types of power 
do CSOs have in global governance processes, where and why? While findings 
here are specific to the HIV/AIDS response, they may provide indications for 
further analysis of CSO influence in global governance. The first type of power 
CSOs exerted, was the power of an alternative. When biomedical responses failed 
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to develop an initial response to the epidemic, CSOs were well positioned to assert 
a different type of response. The central role CSOs played in the early response 
provided them with space and credibility, on their own terms, to mitigate the risk of 
co-option by powerful interests.  
CSOs external to GHIs have influence as watchdogs, sharing information to 
motivate change and motivating institutions to increasingly consult civil society and 
improve the accessibility of their information. This is demonstrated by the role of 
CSOs in the reporting on global commitments to the HIV/AIDS response, and by 
the role of organizations such as Aidspan in sharing Global Fund information. 
Where CSOs still do not have access to information, such as in the case of 
PEPFAR, they are less influential - indicating the crucial connection between 
access to information and influence.   
CSO representatives have power as members of key populations. Their lived 
experiences of stigma and discrimination, of living with the virus, and being on the 
receiving end of the response generates justification for their participation in global 
institutions, and also demands that other actors listen to them. The power and 
knowledge of lived experience that CSO representatives bring to governance 
forums presents a corrective to processes that are often accused of being 
dominated by technical experts and distanced from realities on the ground. Within 
the institutional governance arrangements discussed here, CSOs have translated 
key population status into discursive and emotive influence. 
CSOs generate influence through their extensive networks. Despite 
differences, conflicts and competition between CSOs, their ability to converge 
around specific issues, such as the need for greater resources, provides a 
culminated influence. When there was a threat that PEPFAR funding might be cut, 
evangelical and women’s rights CSOs both advocated for further funding. It is 
these moments of co-operation that have generated the greatest CSO initiated 
change in the global governance of the HIV/AIDS response.  
Cox skeptically asks if international institutions can represent constituencies 
of the marginalized. Chapter Four of this thesis explores this possibility in-depth 
through the cases of UNAIDS and the Global Fund. Both institutions have involved 
  285"
people from marginalized constituencies - including gay men from countries were 
same-sex relations are illegal, PWIDs, sex workers and women from impoverished 
communities. Do these individuals represents broader constituencies? They aim to 
represent their interests by promoting rights-based responses within the 
institutions. Therefore, while the institutions themselves may not be representative, 
they have incorporated members of marginalized constituencies to promote these 
interests. 
Within debates over the role of global governance, there are those who 
suggest CSOs have little influence in global governance processes, acting only as 
conduits of more powerful interests (Bebbington et al. 2008). This thesis refutes 
such analysis, providing ample examples of CSO struggling against powerful 
actors. Though CSOs have frequently co-operated with other governance actors, 
this has most often been in order to advance their own goals within the confines of 
dominant biomedical neoliberalism. For example, HIV/AIDS CSOs have continued 
to advocate for greater resources for PEPFAR, while fighting the restrictive aspects 
of the program. As a result, PEPFAR’s recent Blueprint includes a greater focus on 
human rights – by for example recognizing the particular needs of key populations. 
While the outcomes of CSO struggles rarely fully achieve their goals (as the 
continued limited response to a more holistic approach to sexual and reproductive 
rights within the Blueprint demonstrates), the struggles themselves depict 
resistance to co-option. Within the global HIV/AIDS response, CSOs are 
considered actors that should not be antagonized, but must be brought into co-
operative arrangements (often through certain rights concessions in declarations, 
decisions and funding structures). Just as the hegemonic approach of biomedical 
neoliberalism within GHG cannot be ignored, neither can the rights-based agenda 
of CSO coalitions.  
This thesis has woven feminist analysis into a broader discussion of the 
HIV/AIDS response, arguing that the gendered nature of the epidemic necessitates 
consideration of the gendered structure of the response. Feminist analysis 
demands the constant linking of global processes to outcomes, and subsequent re-
evaluation of claims to support rights. The question behind such analysis is - but 
what does this mean for women and other marginalized populations? For example, 
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the success of Option B+ is evaluated not against global targets, but the impact of 
the program on the wellbeing and relationships of women affected.  
In this way the thesis has highlighted certain aspects of CSO participation in 
the response that might have been ignored by more androcentric analysis.  In 
particular, feminist analysis has exposed the failure of all aspects of the response 
(framing, institutional governance and resource distribution) to prioritize the needs 
of the group most affected by the epidemic (impoverished women living in Sub-
Saharan Africa). Women’s rights have been neglected by institutions, such as the 
Global Fund, under the justification of country ownership, and the key populations 
frame continues this neglect. PEPFAR policies against integration of HIV/AIDS 
care and family planning inhibit the full achievement of sexual and reproductive 
rights for women in recipient communities. Perhaps more than any other aspect of 
this thesis, the feminist analysis has demonstrated the limits of transformation, 
making explicit the continued dominance of biomedical neoliberalism and its 
patriarchal nature.  
Concurrently, feminist approaches stress the importance of documenting 
resistance, and so campaigns that may otherwise have been ignored because they 
were unsuccessful, such as to change PEPFAR’s anti-prostitution pledge, are 
included. This also facilitates analyzes of why change does not happen (in the 
case of the prostitution pledge, it appears to be due to the dominance of 
conservative ideologies of more powerful actors and the particular polarization of 
the issue within American politics), as well as why it does; questions crucial to 
understanding future opportunities for resistance.  
 
6.3 Reflections on the Contribution to the Knowledge and Areas 
for Further Study 
This thesis aims to make a number of contributions to the literature on CSO 
participation in global governance in general, and to the GHG of the response to 
HIV/AIDS in particular. Findings support Benner et al.’s (2004) assertion that 
neither full-blown optimism nor pessimism is helpful in conceptualizing the role of 
CSOs in global governance. The role of CSOs in the HIV/AIDS response has 
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promoted alternatives to hegemonic approaches, strengthening rights 
considerations, but has had limited governance outputs related to improving 
legitimacy and accountability, or directing resources to those most in need. CSO 
participation is neither a panacea to the challenges of global governance, nor a 
threat to improvements. 
This historical account is situated within the context of the political economy 
of global health, demonstrating that where and why CSOs have influenced change, 
and where they have not, relates as much to external forces, and interests of other 
actors within them, as to the characteristics, motivations and agency of the CSOs. 
For example, CSOs were incorporated into UNAIDS’s governance structure 
because of their successful promotion of the GWIPA principles, as well as the 
desire by many states to experiment with creating more responsive UN systems. 
Therefore, Lencucha’ et al.’s (2010) argument for context specific analysis of the 
role of and opportunities for CSOs in global governance is strengthened. 
While future studies on the role of CSOs in global governance will therefore 
present their own unique findings, it is hoped that this thesis may provide an 
impetus for further historically ground research. For example, the discussion on the 
role of CSOs in the post-MDG process is used to illustrate a finding here - that 
HIV/AIDS CSOs do not have the same influence as they did during exceptionalism 
- but is an interesting process around CSO involvement in GHG in its own right. 
Further research could build from the analysis here to consider the influence CSOs 
exert in the post-MDG agenda setting processes and to what effect.  
The assumption that CSO participation in the HIV/AIDS response has been 
transformative, as is espoused by many leaders (Sidibe 2010) and scholars 
(Parker 2011), is critically explored throughout this thesis. Examples of CSO led 
shifts to a more equitable order are presented (such as demanding UNODC adopt 
harm reduction policies), as are examples of cases were CSOs efforts have faced 
resistance (such as influencing cultural conceptions around sexual rights). More 
importantly, why CSOs have been able to promote change in some cases and not 
in others is discussed (for example, why the Global Fund’s Partnership Forum 
does not generate strong downward accountability, but external CSOs are able to 
do so through information sharing). These discussions demonstrate that despite 
  288"
limitations, especially within the current political economy, CSOs have continued to 
struggle for transformation (for example by continuing to advocate for improved 
CSS within the Global Fund’s NFM), and therefore the outcomes of their 
involvement are not fixed or predetermined.  
One of the arguments within this thesis, specifically in Chapter Three, is that 
CSOs are responsible for creating and advancing the rights-based frame of the 
epidemic and response. This is not a new argument. Others (Parker 2011; Hein et 
al. 2007; Ford et al. 2011) have written to the same effect. What is added here is 
that as opposed to focusing on rights outcomes related to treatment (which the 
above authors do), the focus is on other rights related to sexuality, access to harm 
reduction, the rights of sex workers, and women’s sexual and reproductive health. 
Implicit to all of these rights campaigns is the need for social and economic rights, 
as well as legal and political rights. This expands the literature on HIV/AIDS and 
human rights from the narrow focus on treatment access.  
This contribution is important because while the right to treatment is correctly 
viewed as a major achievement for those most affected by the epidemic, the 
outcomes of these other rights campaigns are arguably just as important, but much 
more difficult to decipher (which may explain the gap in academic and policy 
literature). For example, it is more difficult to measure women’s ability to make 
choices about family planning, than how many women have access to pre and post 
natal ART to prevent vertical transmission. Despite this challenge, and while not 
attempting to quantify outcomes, this thesis has presented a unique analytical 
discussion on efforts to advance rights related to the global HIV/AIDS movement.  
This also presents a more complete analysis of CSO efforts to effect change. 
For while they have indeed been champions of universal access to treatment, they 
have also been engaged in numerous struggles for other rights, which are rarely 
recognized but demonstrated here. Lack of recognition of rights struggles can 
result in neglect, with donors and policy-makers ignoring such rights claims. By 
drawing attention to the struggles of CSOs to promote rights other than access to 
treatment, this thesis provides examples of resistance that are often ignored in 
academic literature and policy discussions about the HIV/AIDS response.  
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A primary limitation to this study is that the focus on global governance 
processes directs analysis to one level of engagement. This focus was selected in 
response to the notable gap in the literature on CSO participation in global 
processes related to HIV/AIDS, and by the theoretical framework, which oriented 
analysis to be situated within the political economy of global health. Furthermore, it 
was hoped that the focus on the three areas of struggles (around framing the 
response, producing institutions and governing resources) provided a somewhat 
comprehensive, if broad picture of CSO participation, while recognizing that this 
prevented more in-depth study into any of the specific issues areas. 
Because the focus is on global level processes, the discussion of specific 
rights campaigns such as for PWID, MSM and sex workers are discussed in less 
detail than a more focused analysis might allow. There is an opportunity to expand 
on many of the themes in this thesis -  such as the use of global forums to create 
acceptance of harm reduction and how this impacts national and local struggles - 
through further research.  
Studies could discuss more specific issue areas CSOs have engaged around, 
either related to rights claims (such as sexual rights) or processes (such as 
strengthening downward accountability) to explore the links and relationship 
between global, regional, national and local processes. In particular, research 
could look more closely at CSO PRs of Global Fund grants; to what degree they 
integrate a rights-based response, and if this contributes to high performance 
rating. Such research would provide a more detailed picture of the outcomes of 
CSO involvement at the global level on those most affected by the epidemic in 
specific contexts. 
As noted in Chapter Two, there is a major gap in the literature on the role of 
CSOs in GHIs. Instead assumptions that CSO participation strengthens legitimacy 
and downward accountability, as well as effectively represents constituents in 
global decision-making, are repeatedly asserted with little evidential support. This 
thesis has contributed to filling this gap by presenting two case studies of CSO 
involvement in GHIs: UNAIDS and the Global Fund. This has demonstrated that 
the outcomes of CSO participation are much more complex than previously 
presented. Furthermore, outcomes are not all positive. CSO insistence on certain 
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issues (such as funding for their own organizations) and methods (such as activist 
tactics) can detract from the legitimacy of GHIs. Due to weak downward 
accountability relationships, CSOs can contribute to, as opposed to mitigate, 
dominate power relations and bureaucratic processes that alienate constituents. 
This supports Bartsch’s  (2007) assertion that CSO participation can create new, 
as well as address old, legitimacy and accountability challenges. However, there 
are also previously under-discussed positive outcomes of CSO participation; for 
example, the ability, and utility of external CSOs to strengthen accountability. Such 
findings add a nuanced understanding of CSO participation in GHIs. This could be 
advanced by further discussion of CSO participation in other GHIs, such UNITAIDS 
and the WHO.  
This thesis presents one of the few known analysis of CSOs as active 
participants in resource governance. While findings support assumptions that 
CSOs’ role in this governance realm has been neglected because they do not have 
significant influence, it also demonstrates that they continued to engage in 
struggles over resources use, influencing - even if not to a great degree - resource 
generation and distribution. CSOs have played a demonstrable role in mobilizing 
resources for both the Global Fund and PEPFAR, and have tried to influence the 
resource distribution of both institutions. Within the Global Fund they have had 
modest success in directing resources to affected communities and key 
populations, which they are now trying to maintain. CSOs engaged with PEPFAR 
have both directed funding to FBOs and influenced specific funding directives. 
Other CSOs have resisted this influence. Such accounts demonstrate that CSOs 
are active participants in the global governance of HIV/AIDS resources, whose 
influence must be considered, along with more dominant actors such as states and 
private foundations. This analysis could be extended to the engagement of CSOs 
with other funders, such as DFID and the World Bank.  
This research was limited by practical constraints. Greater insight into the 
interactions between states and CSOs was restricted by lack of access to state 
decision-makers and civil servants. This was somewhat mitigated by relying on 
primary documentation, but personal insights from key informants would have 
added to the analysis. The relationships between states and CSOs, their dynamics 
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of co-operation and conflict over specific issue areas and at times competition over 
resources, is an area requiring further data and analysis.  
 
6.4 Governance and Policy Implications 
While this thesis is written in the academic tradition and does not assume to 
make recommendations, the findings do raise some relevant questions for policy-
makers and governance actors that are worth introducing, even if in-depth answers 
to them are not possible at this point.  
Considering ongoing calls to reform and rebuild GHG, one question is - if it is 
accepted that CSO participation is beneficial within GHG, or even just an 
established reality, how can governance arrangements be crafted to make it more 
effective and responsive? The findings presented indicate some suppositions. 
The first is that, as the quote at the beginning of this thesis demonstrates, this 
is not a case of dominant global governance actors deciding to include CSOs; this 
is a case of CSOS creating a movement, demanding a global response and then 
ensuring their own place within this response. Acceptance by states and 
institutions was required, but it can be argued that these other actors had little 
choice, considering the prominent role CSOs played in initiating the global 
HIV/AIDS response. Therefore, this implies that CSO participation must be self-
generated, not brought in after the fact. Policies that aim to promote greater and 
more effective CSO participation might do well to look at existing CSO mobilization, 
and support CSOs in these endeavors, as opposed to trying to create social 
movements or networks from the top down.  
The discussion on institutions also presents insights into debates around 
CSO participants’ ability to strengthen accountability and legitimacy in global 
governance. It finds that concepts such as legitimacy and accountability need to be 
conceived of as flexible to the unique global governance arrangements that are 
emerging. Both institutional cases suggest that CSO participation has few positive 
legitimacy outcomes. In particular, CSOs only contribute to both input and output 
legitimacy where they have influence not only over decision-making, but also 
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processes. Where CSOs’ preferred engagement strategies, such as of activism, 
are not tolerated (such as within UNAIDS) they face challenges to their input 
legitimacy because of the need to adapt to hegemonic interests’ preferred 
processes, which in turn alienates their constituents.  Institutions that aim to 
effectively include civil society must consider how to be flexible to CSOs’ preferred 
processes.  
Weak legitimacy, combined with rigid bureaucracies, necessarily affects the 
ability of CSO participants within institutions to generate downward accountability. 
In both institutional cases analyzed here CSO delegations do not generate strong 
downward accountability relations - at the best representing networks of horizontal 
accountability with allied CSOs. The Global Fund’s Partnership Forum presents an 
example of a complex, but one-way accountability mechanism, the value of which 
is questionable.  
Instead external CSOs that aim to share and comment on institutional 
processes make greater contributions to downward accountability. For example, 
CSOs that produce and disseminate information about the Global Fund have 
forced it to be more transparent and accessible; CSOs that work with the UNAIDS 
Secretariat to produce the GARP reports strengthen global accountability 
processes. These cases suggest downward accountability is best generated from 
outside of the institution, as opposed to within it.  
CSOs also need to ask themselves challenging questions about their 
participation in resource mobilization. Is it possible that they could use their role as 
advocates for greater funding to have more significant power over resource 
distribution? Currently, CSOs mobilize funds they have little control over, raising 
questions about whose interests their advocacy efforts serve. The continued 
dominance of donor states and institutions in deciding how resources are used, 
presents perhaps the most crucial struggle for CSOs in the HIV/AIDS response.  
Having demonstrated that CSOs have contributed to potential transformation 
in the global HIV/AIDS governance, a further follow-up question is - have these 
changes had ripple effects beyond the HIV/AIDS field to other aspects of GHG, 
and global governance in general? The answers to such a question would require 
  293"
an additional thesis, but some suppositions can be explored briefly. Key informants 
note that they had hoped the example of CSO involvement in the HIV/AIDS 
response would set a precedent for governance processes around other issue 
areas (CSO Representative 2013 #26). Some express frustration that this has not 
been achieved, noting many institutions, such as the WHO, still do not incorporate 
CSOs in a meaningful way (CSO Representative 2013 #30). Others argue that now 
the precedent of CSO involvement in global HIV/AIDS governance had been set it 
would be hard for GHIs go back to primarily state-based systems (CSO 
Representative 2013 #2). These commentators cite the example of CSO 
participation in the post-MDG agenda as evidence of acceptance of the CSO 
involvement. The history presented here suggests that CSO participation in the 
HIV/AIDS response has set a new precedent, or a higher bar of inclusivity, whether 
current and future governance arrangements will rise to meet the challenge, and 
perhaps advance it, remains to be seen.  
 
6.6 CSOs and the Future of the HIV/AIDS Response 
What does this history indicate for the future of the HIV/AIDS response and 
the role of CSOs within it? Parker, reflecting on this question, concludes,  
 
“In the now 30 year history of the civil society response to 
the epidemic, grassroots activists have managed to 
transform their movement into a transnational coalition 
capable of overcoming the resistance of some of the most 
powerful private interests in the world and creating an 
unprecedented level of mobilization of public institutions at 
both the national and intergovernmental level in ways that 
are unheard of in relation to any other global health issue. 
While the economic and policy challenges are significant, 
the persistence of the AIDS activist movement in seeking to 
transform the world's response to the epidemic should give 
us at least some reason for hope about the future” (2011, 
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35). 
 
While it is not the purpose of this thesis to make predictions, I agree with Parker’s 
suggestion that there is reason to hope for the future. CSOs engaged in GHIs are 
proving increasingly apt at working within existing systems to advance human 
rights discussions despite a restrictive political economy. The NFM of the Global 
Fund, while representing continued restrictions on CSO influence over resource 
use, also creates opportunities for CSOs to demand funding for rights-based 
interventions, and history suggests they will continue to do so with fervor. Despite 
repressive policies around the rights of sexual minorities in many countries, 
increasing global mobilization deems these unacceptable, and local actors are 
adapting struggles for sexual rights to the local HIV/AIDS response and society in 
general. CSOs continue to demand critical conversations be held around new 
developments in the response, such as Option B+; not opposing them, but 
asserting the need for a rights-based ethos to their roll-out, ensuring such 
endeavors do more good than harm. Without CSOs, it is unlikely such 
conversations would occur. It is these ongoing struggles that justify Parker’s “hope 
about the future”.  
This hope is not based on false promises about the End of AIDS, generated 
in Geneva, or an AIDS Free Generation, generated in Washington DC. It is based 
on the committed individuals and organizations around the world who have 
struggled to promote more inclusive and responsive global governance 
arrangements in response to one of the most defining health threats of the past 
half century. 
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8. Appendix  
8.1 Appendices A: Key Informants 
 
Classification Number of Informants 
Civil Society Representatives 20 
GHI Representatives 17 
State Representatives 2 
 
Location of informants by WHO regions  
Africa 7 
Americas 8 
South East Asia 1 
Europe 21 
Easter Mediterranean 1 
Western Pacific 1 
 
Sex  
Male 20 
Female 19 
 
Total Informants 39 
 
 
Organizations Represented 
A number of informants were affiliated with more than one organization. All 
affiliations are listed here: 
1. Aids Accountability International 
2. Aids Coalition to Unleash Power (ActUP) 
3. AIDS Rights Alliance of Southern Africa 
4. Aidspan 
5. Asia Pacific Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS 
6. ATHENA Network 
7. Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network 
8. Center for Health and Gender Equality  
9. European Treatment Action Group 
10. Fermont Center 
11. Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
12. Global Network for and by People Living with HIV/AIDS 
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13. Harm Reduction International 
14. Health Economics and HIV/AIDS Research Division 
15. International Coalition of AIDS Support Organizations 
16. International Community of Women with HIV/AIDS 
17. International HIV/AIDS Alliance 
18. International Network of People Who Use Drugs 
19. Medicines Sans Frontiers 
20. ONE 
21. Pivot Legal Society 
22. Positive Women’s Network 
23. Stop HIV/AIDS Alliance 
24. Treatment Action Coalition 
25. UNAIDS 
26. UNDP 
27. UNICEF 
28. WomenArise 
29. World AIDS Campaign 
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8.2 Appendix B: Sample Interview Guide 
Interviewer: Julia Smith 
Interviewee:  
Interviewee contact information: 
Date and Time: 
Location:  
 
Theme 1: AIDS Activism 2 I understand you were involved in the early days of ORG, do you think AIDS 
activism has changed over the years? How has it changed? Why has it 
changed? 2 What have been the big developments, gains or challenges in AIDS activism 
over the past 5-7 years? 2 Is it fair to speak of a global AIDS movement?  Or is it lots of diverse 
movements? Explain? 2  
Theme 2: Interactions with the Global Fund 2 Tell me a bit about your work with the Global Fund. 2 How would you describe the role of Communities Delegation on the board of 
the fund? Can you think of any examples of where it has had particular 
influence? 2 Do you think the recent changes in the Fund affected its work and 
relationship with ORG? How so? 2  
Theme 3: Interaction with UNAIDS 2 Tell me a bit about your work with UNAIDS. 2 How would you describe the role of NGO Delegation on the PCB? Can you 
provide any examples of where it has had particular influence? 
 
Theme 4: Future of the Global HIV/AIDS Response 2 What is your organization currently focusing on, in terms of global 
campaigns? 2 What are the big challenges for the AIDS response now? 
 
Note: These general questions and themes were expanded on through follow-up 
questions in the semi-structured interview format.  
 
